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Abstract 
While the health related implications of pandemics are well established, and some 
attention has been paid to the security implications of pandemics in the past, a 
comprehension of the political impact of pandemics has been lacking within 
international relations literature. This thesis takes on the responsibility of assessing 
the political implications of pandemics. The thesis reasserts the dominance of 
Morgenthau‘s classical realism within the field of international relations. The utility 
of Morgenthau‘s work exists within his particular framework of national power. 
This thesis seeks to assess the veracity of Hans Morgenthau‘s 20th century classical 
realism, in the 21st century international environment, and investigates the threat 
posed to nation states by infectious disease; and in particular the widespread and 
lethal pandemic.  
 
The thesis ultimately adapts Morgenthau‘s original elements of national power to 
the modern international environment to gain an understanding of how the modern 
state perceives its national power. The result is a clear indication of states behaving 
in an orthodox realist manner that seeks to protect their national power above all 
else. This thesis provides an understanding of the political implications of 
pandemics.  
 
The task of the thesis is to utilise Morgenthau‘s realism to assess a non-state actor 
and thereby establish the adaptable nature of his original work to a non-traditional 
security threat such as a pandemic. Then the thesis establishes the political nature of 
the pandemic threat by assessing three significant pandemics, namely: Plague, 
Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
(HIV/AIDS), and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). The aetiology and 
pathogenesis of each pandemic is then presented as case studies.  
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The aim of each case study is straightforward. They seek to establish the pandemic 
agency an actor, in a relationship of power, and then assess the political 
implications of the pandemic actor. The case studies do so by applying 
Morgenthau‘s framework of national power to assess the political threat of that 
pandemic. 
 
The results of the thesis indicate first, that Morgenthau‘s framework is both 
adaptable and relevant in the study of modern international relations. Historically, 
the utility of Morgenthau‘s work is rarely questioned; however it remained to be 
seen as to the usefulness of Morgenthau in the modern international environment, 
where the power of state actors is being increasingly subverted by the rise of non-
state actors. 
 
The second result of the thesis surrounds the nature of Morgenthau‘s framework 
and its adaptability for the 21st century. Not only has Morgenthau‘s framework of 
national power established the multi-faceted political implications of pandemics, 
but also in doing so, the framework has established its validity in modern 
international relations studies. While the threat of pandemics is ongoing, the ability 
to garner a stronger appreciation of the implications of pandemics for the modern 
state cannot be overlooked. The responsibility of this thesis, in part, has been to 
develop such an appreciation. 
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Preface 
Contemporary man, living in a scientific age in which epidemic disease is 
understood and to a large extent controlled, is apt to lose appreciation of the 
enormous, uncomprehended losses of life in past generations, to say nothing of 
the prolonged and widespread emotional strain occasioned by such disasters. 
   -Sigmund Freud1 
 
Within the remote mountain village of La Gloria, in the state of Veracruz, Mexico, a 
statue of a five-year-old boy, Edgar Hernandez, sits gloriously in the town‘s central 
park. While the beaming statue of Edgar, complete with frog in hand, could be 
mistaken for any typical five-year-old child, it is Edgar‘s infamous role as the ‗first 
person known to have contracted swine flu‘ in 2009 that has lead to his 
enshrinement as the boy who sparked a global health crisis.2 Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, or the more generically known Swine Flu pandemic, dominated the minds 
and actions of the world‘s medical and political elite for a period of seventeen 
months. Despite the best efforts of scientists and governments, between March 2009 
and August 2010, Swine Flu would be reported in ‗more than 214 countries and 
overseas territories or communities,‘ and lead to the deaths of over 18, 449 people.3 
Efforts by various state governments to prevent the spread and impact of a 
pandemic were tested during the 2009 pandemic; a test that impacted governments 
admit they ultimately failed.4 Providentially, the low mortality of the H1N1 
                                                 
1 Freud, S. (1915) ‗Thoughts For The Times On War And Death‘, The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume XIV (1914-1916): On the History of the 
Psycho-Analytic Movement, Papers on Metapsychology and Other Works, pp.273-300. 
2 Lacey, M. (2009) ‗Politician‘s Novel Idea for Mexican Tourism-Statue of Swine Flu Survivor‘, New 
York Times [online], 25 May, available: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/26/world/americas/26mexico.html [accessed 21 Aug 2011]. 
Keating, J. (2010) ‗Foreign Policy: When Bad Art Meets Bad Politics‘, NPW [online], 6 April, available: 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=125617551 [accessed 21 Aug 2011]. 
3 Global Alert and Response, World Health Organization (2010) Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 – UPDATE 
112, [online] available: http://www.who.int/csr/don/2010_08_06/en/index.html [accessed 21 
Aug 2011]. 
4 House of Lords Science and Technology Committee (2009) Pandemic Influenza: Follow-Up, 
London: The Stationary Office Limited. Secretary of State for Health (2009) Government Response to 
the House of Lords Science and Technology Committee Report on Pandemic Influenza – 3rd Report of 
Session 2008-09, London: The Stationary Office Limited. Kite, M., Donnelly, L., Ralph, A. (2009) 
‗Swine Flu: Ministers Blamed for Chaos‘, The Telegraph [online], 25 Jul, available: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/swine-flu/5908539/Swine-flu-ministers-blamed-for-
chaos.html [accessed 1 Sep 2011]. Yee, J. (2009) ‗Canada‘s Swine Flu Shame, The Guardian [online], 
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pandemic meant that while the flaws in government preparedness were exposed 
and weaknesses assessed, this occurred with a relatively low-impact pandemic and 
without a significant mortality on the global population. 
 
The success of the Swine Flu in propagating globally was likely a result of 
international authorities pre-ordaining the Asian region as the epicentre for the 
next great influenza pandemic; not the mountain village of La Gloria, in Veracruz, 
Mexico. In other words, the unpredictable nature of disease outbreaks was 
reinforced when speculation that Asia would be the epicentre of the next disease 
was mistaken.  Relman, Choffnes, and Mack highlight the surprise this blunder 
brought with it. 
In a world poised to prevent a devastating H5N1 avian influenza pandemic 
originating out of Asia, the appearance of an influenza pandemic in the form of 
a relatively mild (to date) swine-origin virus originating (apparently) in the 
Americas was a surprise.5 
The wrong-footed preparedness also meant that the scientists and governments 
were underprepared to counter the attack by this contagion on their states‘ medical 
and political vulnerabilities. Initially, and spurred on by increases in modern day 
transportation, the Swine Flu pandemic exposed the vulnerability of the modern 
state to the multitude of swift and medical threats posed by pandemics.6 Over time, 
the impacts broadened to include the political and the protective functions of the 
state.7 The belief that pandemics merely threaten the health and wellbeing of 
humankind is outdated and fails to account for the wider implications of a 
pandemic for the state. The feverish media and academic attention to the swine flu 
                                                                                                                                           
30 Jun, available: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/30/swine-flu-canada-
first-nations [accessed 1 Sep 2011].  
5 Relman, D.A., Choffnes, E.R. and Mack, A. (Rapporteurs) (2010) ‗The Domestic and International 
Impacts of the 2009-H1N1 Influenza A Pandemic: Global Challenges, Global Solutions: Workshop 
Summary‘, Washington D.C.: The National Academies Press, p.15. 
6 Waterer, G.W., Hui, D.S., and Jenkins, C.R. (2010) ‗Public Health Management of Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 Infection in Australia: A Failure!‘, Respirology, 15, pp.51-56. 
7 Ibid. Relman, D.A., Choffnes, E.R. and Mack, A. (Rapporteurs) (2010), op. cit. 
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outbreak and its implications for the continued success and longevity of the state, as 
an entity of power, attest to this.8  
 
But the swine flu outbreak is not the first event to spur such contemplation. Other 
recent epidemic/pandemic outbreaks have increased attention to the wider threat 
posed by pandemics. One example is the Influenza H5N1, or avian flu, within South 
East Asia, which started in 1996 and continues to be a concern for health 
authorities. 
 
Avian flu has mainly been isolated within South-East Asia, and, more recently, 
within Egypt.9 . As of August 2011, the World Health Organization (WHO) had 
received reports of a total of 565 human cases globally, with 331 of those cases 
being fatal - equating to a mortality rate of nearly 60%.10  The progression of avian 
influenza has been slow in human populations in comparison to other pandemics.11 
The virus was first isolated from a farmed goose in Guangdong, China in 1996, with 
                                                 
8 Joffe, H. (2011) ‗Public Apprehension of Emerging Infectious Diseases: Are Changes Afoot?‘, Public 
Understanding of Science, 20(4), pp.446-460. Seale, H., McLaws, M., Heywood, A.E., Ward, K.F., 
Lowbridge, C.P., Van, D., Gralton, J., MacIntyre, C.R. (2009) ‗The Community‘s Attitude Towards 
Swine Flu and Pandemic Influenza‘, Medical Journal of Australia, 191(5), pp.267-269. Kates, B. 
(2009) ‗WHO Declares Level 6 Swine Flue Pandemic—First Time Since 1968‘, New York Daily News 
[online], 11 Jun, available: http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-06-
11/news/17926564_1_swine-flu-flu-pandemic-vaccine [accessed 1 Sep 2011].  BBC (2009) ‗WHO 
Declares Swine Flu Pandemic‘, BBC News [online], 11 Jun, available: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8094655.stm [accessed 1 Sep 2011]. Cheng, M. (2009) ‗WHO: Swine 
Flue Pandemic Has Begun, 1st in 41 Years‘, Guardian.co.uk [online], 13 Jun, available: 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/8556387 [accessed 1 Sep 2011]. Gardner, A. (2009) 
‗Study Supports Swine Flu‘s Pandemic Potential‘, US News & World Report [online], 11 May, 
available: http://health.usnews.com/health-news/managing-your-healthcare/infectious-
diseases/articles/2009/05/11/study-supports-swine-flus-pandemic-potential [accessed 1 Sep 
2011]. Wagnell-Egger, P., Bangerter, A., Gilles, I., Green, E., Rigaud, D., Krings, F., Staerklé, C., and 
Clémence, A. (2011) ‗Lay Perceptions of Collectives at the Outbreak of the H1N1 Epidemic: Heroes, 
Villains and Victims‘, Public Understanding of Science, 20(4), pp.461-476. Cohen, J. (2009) ‗Flu 
Researchers Train Sights on Novel Tricks of Novel H1N1‘, Science, 324(5929), pp.870-871. 
Enserink, M. (2009) ‗Swine Flu Name Evolving Faster Than Swine Flu Itself‘, Science, 324(5929), 
p871. 
9 Egypt has had significant outbreaks of H5N1 over the period of 2009-2011 accounting for just 
over 55% of H5N1 infections within that period. (see Global Alert and Response, 2011) 
10 Global Alert and Response, World Health Organization (2011) Cumulative Number of Confirmed 
Human Cases of Avian Influenza A/(H5N1) Reported to WHO, [online] available: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2011_08_19/en/index.ht
ml [accessed 28 Aug 2011]. Mortality rate is the percentage of fatal cases, in this instance the exact 
mortality rate is 58.584%.  
11 The slow pace of avian influenza is a result of those working directly with infected animals mainly 
contracting H5N1, with very few instances of infection being transmitted from human to human. See 
Aberth, J. (2011) Plagues in World History, Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 128-130. 
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the first human cases being reported in Hong Kong in 1997 where 18 people were 
infected, six of them fatally.12 The watershed for avian influenza was its re-
emergence in November 2003, where a man, initially diagnosed with Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), was retrospectively identified as H5N1 positive.13 
Avian influenza has - since the retrospective diagnosis in 2003 until 201114 - been 
detected in sixty-three countries, and ‗caused an estimated $20 billion of economic 
damage across the globe‘.15 Such a significant economic impact indicates the ability 
of pandemics to be a political threat to a state. Indeed, the high mortality of avian 
influenza has served as the impetus for governments, and international 
organisations, to ultimately create preparedness plans designed to minimise the 
impact on the state (and its power) from the medical and political effects of 
influenza pandemics.  
 
The eruption of SARS took place almost thirty years after the ‗US Surgeon General 
declared that modern public health and medicine had finally conquered infectious 
diseases, freeing the energies and technologies of epidemiology, medicine, and 
science to wage war on the rising scourge of non-communicable diseases.‘16 While 
the Surgeon General‘s proclamation turned out to be premature, if not ill-judged 
and medically scandalous, he was not the first to wrongly herald the death of 
infectious diseases. Nobel prize winner for Physiology or Medicine (1960) F.M. 
Burnett argued in 1951 that,  
                                                 
12 World Health Organization (2011) H5N1 Avian Influenza: Timeline of Major Events, [online] 
available: http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/ai_timeline/en/index.html [accessed 
28 Aug 2011], p.1. 
13 World Health Organization (2011), op. cit.  
14 The most recent situation update regarding avian influenza from WHO contends that the most 
recent fatal case of avian influenza took place in a four-year-old Cambodian girl. Global Alert and 
Response, World Health Organization (2011) Avian Influenza – Situation in Cambodia – Update 5 
[online], 2 Aug, available: 
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/avian_influenza/country/cases_table_2011_08_19/en/index.ht
ml [accessed 28 Aug 2011].  
15 Food and Agriculture Organization: Media Centre (2011) ‗Bird Flu Rears Its Head Again‘ [press 
release], 30 Aug, available: http://fao.org/news/story/en/item/87196/icode/ [accessed 30 Aug 
2011].  
16 Fidler, D.P. (2004b) SARS, Governance and the Globalization of Disease, Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp.1-2. 
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If one looks around the medical scene in North America or Australia, the most 
important current change he sees is the rapidly diminishing importance of 
infectious disease. The fever hospitals are vanishing or being turned to other 
uses. With full use of the knowledge we already possess, the effective control of 
every important infectious disease, with the one outstanding exception of 
poliomyelitis, is possible.17 
Burnett‘s statement reinforces that infectious diseases have been a constant burden 
to governing authorities, regardless of medical advances. While advances in 
scientific technology have arguably decreased the magnitude of the infectious 
disease burden, the scourge of infectious disease pandemics remains unabated, as 
has been witnessed in the outbreaks of SARS, avian and swine influenza. 
 
The responsibility to confront minor and major outbreaks of infectious diseases, in a 
way that mitigates any potential impact on society, remains the responsibility for all 
governing authorities. This means that all governing authorities have to be attuned 
to changes that may herald a new or previously unidentified contagion and be on 
the lookout for a ‗host of interacting factors…including ecological changes, changes 
in human demographics and behaviour (particularly the explosion of air travel in 
the past twenty years), technology and industry, and microbial adaptation and 
change‘ that will conflate into a pandemic and a threat to the authorities‘ status. 18 
The contamination of a significant proportion of citizens is the likely consequence of 
inaction or failing to identify a newly exposed disease. The most recent pandemic 
with a decidedly, at least initially, lacklustre response by political authorities, 
remains the Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Acquired Immunodeficiency 
Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) pandemic.   
 
The eruption of HIV/AIDS in the 1980s highlights the importance of governing 
authorities addressing infectious disease pandemics with immediacy and urgency. 
Not to do so encourages a magnification of the diseases impact. Initially the HIV 
                                                 
17 Burnet, F.M. (1951) ‗Viruses‘, Scientific America, 184(5), p.51. Pier, G.B. (2008) ‗On the Greatly 
Exaggerated Reports of the Death of Infectious Diseases‘, Clinical Infectious Diseases, 47(8), p.1133. 
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pathogen was prescribed an appearance of a disease isolated to a politically 
maligned demographic of society, and victims branded as deviate and deserving 
casualties.19 The reluctance of authorities to take aggressive action to mitigate the 
pandemic for all sectors of the public tainted the initial response to the outbreak. 
Such a hindered response has seen HIV/AIDS, in some states, become endemic 
thereby impeding the ability of the state to prosper. HIV is a pathogen with the 
potential to dominate politically weak states as they struggle to combat the impacts 
of the virus on their public, as well as their economies. Furthermore, the HIV/AIDS 
pandemics are now considered a long-wave event, meaning the impact reoccurs 
over multiple generations. So great has the personal and political influence of the 
HIV pandemic been on the human population that the only comparable global event 
is the Black Death pandemic(s).20 
 
The scourge of the Black Death on medieval society remains notorious. The 14th 
century outbreak of this plague decimated the European populations, radically 
altering the demographic distribution of Europe.21 So grand was the potency of the 
Black Death on society that governing authorities were forced to make fundamental 
changes and interfere in the structure of society. The realisation of the importance 
of a healthy population became a priority for city-states and the national interest. 
Garrett goes so far as to contend that ‗in the immediate wake of the Black 
Death…Florence, and…England, recognized that social services are components of 
state survival‘.22 The action taken by governing authorities to ensure their survival is 
at the bedrock of the study of international relations. 
                                                 
19 Behrman (2004) confirms the misnomers surrounding the spread of AIDS in the nascent years of 
the pandemic. In describing the first International AIDS Conference, organised by the CDC in 1985, 
Behrman contends that journalists, on hearing ‗that the origins of the disease could be traced back to 
monkeys in central Africa‘ asked African delegations ‗Is it true? Do Africans have sex with 
monkeys?‘. (p.15) Altman (1981) furthers the myths surrounding AIDS in reporting AIDS‘ spread for 
The New York Times, argued that there was ‗no apparent danger to non homosexuals of contagion.‘  
20 Garrett, L. (2005a) HIV and National Security: Where Are the Links?, New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, p.17. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. p.18. 
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Understanding the role of governing authorities in the both the mitigation of, 
combat during, and recovery from pandemics, has garnered little attention. Yet, the 
response of the state, or governing authorities since the instance of the Black Death 
has remained constant: to use resources that are available to them to undertake such 
actions as to ensure the survival of the state. Survival of the state is a key component 
of the international relations theory of realism. Therefore, this thesis aims to assess 
the actions taken by governing authorities to mitigate the impact of pandemics on 
their respective national power through the application of the international 
relations theory of realism.  The thesis argues that throughout history the response 
of the state to the various pandemic threats has remained constant, that is, to 
primarily protect the power of the state so that the agents of the state can, secondly, 
ensure the survival of the public of the state. 
 
To undertake this investigative task, this thesis utilises two prominent aspects of 
international relations theory to establish the national power implications of 
pandemics. The first aspect reveals pertinent characteristics of power and validates 
the situation of pandemics within an international relations framework. Daniel A. 
Baldwin establishes the relational power through the dimensions of scope, domain, 
weight, and cost: all are designed to explore the relationship between two actors. 
Within this thesis those actors are the state and the pandemic. The dimensions 
provide a framework to comprehend both the power possessed by the pandemic 
actor, and the relationship of power between the state and pandemic actor. In 
establishing such a relationship the ability to understand the effect of pandemics on 
the behaviour of a state is crystallised, validating the assertion that pandemics 
constitute an actor in international affairs. Only by understanding the power 
wielded by the pandemic actor can a further exploration of the impact of the 
pandemic actor on the state actor take place. The impact of a pandemic on a state‘s 
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national power requires a theoretical vehicle of sufficient robustness to be able to 
authoritatively interpret the primary, secondary, and anecdotal evidence that 
traverses multiple centuries and pandemic events. Such a theoretical vehicle can be 
seen in the international relations theory of realism as articulated by Hans J. 
Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace.23 
 
Hans J. Morgenthau conceived of a state‘s national power as being aspirational: the 
aspiration to maintain power already acquired, and/or aspire to increase acquired 
power, and/or aspire to demonstrate that power. Morgenthau understood that the 
underlying motivation for self-preservation is the most obvious element of human 
motivation and that of homo politicus.24  But to achieve power and sustain the state 
there needed to be identifiable elements that accounted for the acquisition of power. 
This thesis contends that the nine Morgenthau elements25 do provide a measure of a 
state‘s national power, and constitute a malleable framework to assess threats to a 
state‘s national power. The use of pandemics as a basis to test Morgenthau‘s 
framework within this thesis is a result of the frequent emergence of, and 
devastating impact from, pandemics throughout human history that have largely 
been ignored by political analysis.  While Morgenthau‘s seminal work establishes 
the respective power elements, this thesis broadens the possibility of the original 
elements to confirm the utility of Morgenthau‘s original work for threats to the state 
that are not traditional and which have occurred in history and which continue to 
occur unabated. Pandemics are not the traditional threat envisioned by Morgenthau 
against which the self and political entity strives to combat, survive, and exert 
power over. However pandemics do attack the conditions necessary for the survival 
                                                 
23 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006) Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed., New 
York: McGraw Hill/Irwin. 
24 Frei, C. (2001) Hans J. Morgenthau: An Intellectual Biography, Louisiana: Louisiana University 
Press, pp.126-127. 
25 Morgenthau‘s nine elements consist of geography; natural resources; industrial capacity; military 
preparedness; population; national character; national morale; the quality of diplomacy; and the 
quality of government.  Each of these elements, and their role in the provision of national power, is 
explored in Chapter Two: Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism.  
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of the self and trigger the impulse for self-defence by the individual and the political 
state. Morgenthau‘s realism and the nine elements allow us to understand how the 
state reacts to the pandemic actor threat. Once understood the impact of the 
pandemic can reveal the responses of political agents of the state.   
 
Morgenthau‘s framework of national power is unique in that it provides the 
foundation of both a quantitative and qualitative analysis of threats to the state that 
neatly embrace the totality of the pandemic threat. While initial impacts of non-
traditional security threats, such as pandemics, take a quantitative toll on society, it 
is the qualitative impacts of the threat that magnify the initial impact. Therefore, it 
becomes the responsibility of this thesis to illustrate the viability of Morgenthau‘s 
framework in assessing the totality of the pandemic threat towards the national 
power of the state. 
 
In order to assess the utility of Morgenthau‘s classical theory, this thesis is presented 
over six chapters. Chapter One: Power and Pandemics lays bare the bedrock of this 
thesis: that pandemics constitute an actor in a relationship of power with the state. 
The chapter establishes that pandemics are an actor in international relations. In 
order to develop an appreciation of the central element of realist theory the chapter 
first addresses the notion of power and international relations, before exploring the 
notion of relational power. Relational power provides a foundation for the thesis; it 
establishes the dimensions necessary for a pandemic to be considered an actor in 
international relations. The chapter reinforces the notion of pandemic actors by 
highlighting the role of pandemics in the evolution of both international society and 
the notion of international health security.  
 
Chapter Two: Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism expands on the notion of power and 
pandemics. The chapter argues that the international theory of realism, specifically 
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Hans Morgenthau‘s classical realism, provides the strongest framework of 
assessment to determine the threat posed to the international community by 
pandemics. The chapter has two main components. First, the chapter offers a brief 
review of realist literature in order to establish the centrality of realism in modern 
international relations. Realism‘s focus on the survival of states provides an ideal 
underpinning for an exploration of the political implications of pandemics. Second, 
the chapter then introduces Hans Morgenthau‘s realism and provides a detailed 
account of Morgenthau‘s elements of national power in order to establish the 
primary methodological approach of this thesis. Realism will then be applied over 
three individual case studies to establish its voracity over time and circumstance.   
 
Chapter Three introduces the first, and perhaps most infamous, pandemic: The 
Plague Pandemic.  Plague provides the foundational case study of the thesis in 
recognition of its considerable physical and psychological power. In order to 
explore the power of the plague pandemics, the chapter, after offering a brief 
background of the pandemic actor, utilises Baldwin‘s dimensions of relational 
power to establish the power wielded by the plague pandemic actor. Having 
established the plague pandemic as an actor the chapter then uses Morgenthau‘s 
elements of national power framework to indicate the impact of the pandemic on 
the national power of the state. The bulk of the pandemic assessment within Chapter 
Three is concentrated on the effect of the Black Death. By adopting such a 
concentration the chapter showcases the effect of a highly virulent, high mortality 
pandemic on a ―state‖ prior to the recognition of states through the Treaty of 
Westphalia. Chapter Three: The Plague Pandemic thereby establishes the utility of 
Morgenthau‘s classical realism in assessing historical events where the response of 
governing authorities remained designed to protect their national interests from the 
impact of the pandemic. 
 
Preface 
xxiv 
Chapter Four: The AIDS Pandemic aims to provide an insight into the implications of 
pandemics for the state in the Westphalian era of modern government systems. In a 
similar vein to its predecessor the chapter first provides a background of the AIDS 
pandemic placing an emphasis on the socio-political background of the pandemic. 
The use of Baldwin‘s dimensions, once again, establishes the relationship of power 
between the AIDS pandemic actor and the state. The dimensions reveal the AIDS 
pandemic to be a long-wave pandemic whose impacts are felt over a number of 
generations. The chapter will then assess the impact of the AIDS pandemic on 
Morgenthau‘s elements of national power. The AIDS pandemic highlights the 
implications for a state‘s national power when the governing authorities are unable, 
and unwilling, to deal with a growing epidemic. The unwillingness of authorities to 
address the growing AIDS pandemic in its nascent years was largely associated with 
the social stigma attached to the disease. The chapter establishes that when 
governing authorities focus on the psychosocial aspects of a disease, as opposed to 
the threat posed by a pandemic towards the state‘s national power, the longevity of 
the pandemic is extended. Having established the utility of Morgenthau‘s realism, in 
both the pre-Westphalian and Westphalian eras, the final case study looks to assess 
the response of both state and non-state actors to a 21st century pandemic from its 
eruption to its conclusion. 
 
The final case study of the thesis investigates the response of states to the 2002 
outbreak of SARS. Chapter Five: The SARS Pandemic adopts a narrative approach to 
assessing the SARS pandemic in order to illustrate the realist reaction of both state, 
and non-state entities, to a pandemic. The SARS pandemic actor‘s short lifespan 
allows for a strategic assessment of the response of governing authorities to the 
pandemic. To provide such an assessment, the chapter first provides a background 
of the SARS virus, including both the medical and socio-political effects of the 
pandemic. The chapter then concentrates on SARS‘ initial outbreak in China to 
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confirm the realist response of the communist state to this pandemic actor. Just as 
the SARS pandemic flowed onward to Canada, so too does the chapter. The 
Canadian response, while somewhat different to the Chinese, was fundamentally in 
line with classical realism, that is, Canadian authorities took actions designed to 
protect their power. The SARS pandemic also exposed the realist nature of other 
actors, both state and non-state, when confronting a pandemic, which is detailed 
within the third section of the chapter.  
 
Chapter Six: The Pandemic Threat provides a synthesised account of the threat 
posed by pandemics towards the national power of the state. In order to do so the 
chapter first asserts that Baldwin‘s dimensions provide a flexible framework that 
allows for a more detailed analysis of the power possessed by non-state actors. The 
broadness of Baldwin‘s dimensions allow for an element of discipline to be applied 
to the assessment of international actors. The chapter then argues the utility of 
Morgenthau‘s classical realism in the modern era. Central to the assessment of the 
pandemic threat has been the impact of the various pandemics on the traditional 
elements of national power. Chapter six illustrates the versatility of Morgenthau‘s 
traditional elements of national power to confirm the utility of his classical realism 
in 21st century international relations. 
  
 
Chapter One: Power & Pandemics 
1.0 Introduction 
This chapter will review existing interpretations of the notion of power within the 
international relations (IR) theory of realism. As a theoretical approach, realism has 
habitually focused on conflict between states, and ‗expects to find conflict as the 
usual pattern of interaction in international politics.‘1 The determinant of conflict 
within international politics is relative to the ‗power‘ of the actors within that 
conflict. Within realism, what constitutes an actor in international affairs is 
orthodoxly restricted towards that of a political community or state. This thesis 
contends that such a restriction has constrained the potential of realism as an 
analytical tool. In utilising realism as a theoretical grounding, the thesis adopts a 
broader analysis of conflict within international affairs, specifically, the conflict 
between state actors and non-state actors. In order for such an analysis to transpire, 
there is an inherent need to reinterpret the label of actor within international affairs 
to establish what constitutes an actor in IR, and to better appreciate the threats to 
the modern-day state.  
 
The chapter introduces the dominant ideas and debates within the realist 
framework, and shows that the existing literature has yet to account for non-
traditional security threats (NTST): specifically, pandemics. Theorists and analysts 
have steered away from assessing the impact of infectious disease on international 
relations. In the same narrow focus, international organisations involved in 
infectious disease research and control, routinely focus only on the domestic impact 
of the disease. Such narrow interpretation by theorists, analysts, and preventive 
                                                 
1 Thompson, K.W. and Clinton D.W. (2006) ‗Foreword‘, in Morgenthau, H.J., Politics Among 
Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 7th ed., New York: McGraw Hill, p.xviii. 
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practitioners, thwarts a sharper theoretical and international understanding of the 
pandemic threat.  
 
Realist literature has focused almost entirely on the traditional threat of inter-state 
conflict.2 There is a tendency for realist theoretical works to be constructed in the 
immediate aftermath of inter-state war seeking to facilitate a greater appreciation of 
the causes of that particular conflict.3 The influence of traditional inter-state 
conflict on the construction of these theoretical works is a significant contribution 
to the elevation of the state as the quintessential actor.  Realism contends that states, 
due to their predominance, ‗are always searching for opportunities to gain power 
over their rivals,‘4 as they seek to secure their position as the consummate actor. 
Indeed, Schmidt argues that ‗the close relationship that exists between the realist 
school and the concept of power stems from its basic, [but most useful], insight: 
conflict and competition are intrinsic to the practice of international politics‘.5  
 
By focusing on the state, or states, as the primary actor, the use of the realist 
paradigm to analyse threats toward a state has been vigorous, but limited. By 
realigning realist thought to assess the potential damage caused by a NTST a greater 
                                                 
2 Major contributors to the Realist school of thought include: Thucydides (2004) The Peloponnesian 
War, Trans. Richard Crawley, Colorado: Project Gutenberg E-Book. Hobbes, T. (1973) Leviathan, 
London: Dent. Carr, E.H. (2001) The Twenty Years‘ Crisis, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. Waltz K.N. (2001) Man the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, 
New York: Columbia University Press. Waltz, K.N. (1979) Theory of International Politics, San 
Francisco: McGraw Hill. Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: 
Norton and Company. Zakaria F. (1998) From Wealth to Power, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. All of whom framed their theoretical perspectives based on historical accounts of inter-state 
conflict.  
3 The influence of inter-state war on the main authors of realist works (see above n.2) is significant 
in that it allows insight into the psyche of the author. Long considered to be the father of the realist 
theory, Thucydides‘ account of the Peloponnesian War establishes the foundation of realism: state 
competition. Thomas Hobbes‘ immense fear caused by the civil disorder following the civil war in 
Britain contributed to the concept of the Leviathan. Hans Morgenthau‘s seminal textbook Politics 
Among Nations was heavily influenced by the author‘s own experiences as a refugee from the Nazi 
Germany. Indeed Politics Among Nations has been explained by Robert Jervis (1994), as 
Morgenthau‘s desire to give American students greater insight into European politics. More recently 
authors such as Waltz, Mearsheimer, and Zakaria, have used various aspects of prior interstate 
conflicts to demonstrate their own theoretical perspective. 
4 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001), op. cit. p.29. 
5 Schmidt, B.C. (2007) ‗Realist Conceptions of Power‘, in Berenskoetter F. and Williams M.J. eds. 
(2007) Power in World Politics, Oxon: Routledge, p.45. [Brackets Added] 
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understanding of the ‗conflict and competition‘ that impedes states from reaching 
their utmost power potential, when confronted with an NTST, is generated. While 
realism is still considered by analysts to be the dominant theory of IR,6 there has 
been an influx of theoretical division over the accuracy, and thereby supremacy, of 
realism in determining the proliferated threats of the 21st century.7  
 
The central objection to the theoretical supremacy of realism involves the 
prominence of power as the foundation of the IR system. Berenskoetter argues that 
‗critics of realism [have] gained their academic currency by either refining or 
rejecting realism‘s focus on [national] power, instead of forcefully articulating an 
alternative reading of [realism‘s focus].‘8 Therefore, the central premise of this 
chapter becomes that assessments of the impact of pandemics on a state‘s ―power‖ 
have lacked complexity and, consequently, meaningful political assessment, to 
develop an understanding of the threat posed by the impact of pandemics on the 
state has also been retarded. In providing such an analysis, this thesis widens the 
focus of realism where the state is embraced as the predominant actor, to contend 
that pandemics meet the determinants of an actor in the field of IR.  The thesis 
                                                 
6 The dominance of realism in IR theory is a point continually acknowledged within modern IR texts 
and textbooks. See Dunne, T. and Schmidt, B.C. (2005) ‗Realism‘ in Baylis, J. and Smith, S., eds., The 
Globalization of World Politics, 3rd ed., New York: Oxford University Press. Shimko, K.L. (2005) 
International Relations: Perspectives and Controversies, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Smith, 
M.J. (1986) Realist Though From Weber to Kissinger, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 
Hutchings, K. (1999) International Political Theory, London: Sage Publications. Jørgensen, K.E. 
(2010) International Relations Theory: A New Introduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Goldstein, J.S. and Pevehouse J.C. (2008) International Relations, 8th ed., New York: Pearson 
Longman. Baylis, J., Smith, S., and Owens, P. (2011) The Globalization of World Politics: An 
Introduction to International Relations, 5th ed., New York: Oxford University Press. Griffiths, M. 
(2011) Rethinking International Relations Theory, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Donnelly, J. 
(2000) Realism and International Relations, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Frankel, B., ed. 
(1996) Roots of Realism, London: Frank Cass and Co.  Goldstein J.S. (2004) International Relations, 
5th ed., New York: A.B. Longman. Weber, C. (2009) International Relations Theory: a Critical 
Introduction, 3rd ed., Oxon: Routledge. Griffiths, M. (1992) Realism, Idealism, and International 
Politics, London: Routledge. Griffiths, M., O‘Callaghan, T., and Roach, S.C. (2008) International 
Relations: The Key Concepts, 2nd ed., New York: Routledge. 
7 Walt (1998) provides a condensed summary of realism and the main challenges posed towards it. 
In particular he highlights the importance of theories in that ‗it is hard to make good policy if one‘s 
basic organizing principles are flawed, just as it is hard to construct good theories without knowing a 
lot about the real word.‘ (p.29) Furthermore, while acknowledging that ‗realism remains the most 
compelling general framework for understanding international relations‘ (p.43) he concedes that ‗no 
single approach can capture all the complexity of contemporary world politics‘ and that ‗we are 
better off with a diverse array of competing ideas rather that a single theoretical orthodoxy‘. (p.30) 
8 Berenskoetter, F. (2007) ‗Thinking About Power‘, in Berenskoetter, F. and Williams, M.J., eds., 
(2007) Power in World Politics, Oxon: Routledge, p.1. [Brackets Added] 
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argues, in short, that the use of realism as a framework for analysis of pandemics is 
viable and timely. 
 
Because analysts of IR theory have focused primarily on the role, or power, of the 
state they have failed to incorporate the vulnerabilities of the nation state when 
faced with any threat other than another state. Such a univocal concentration 
within IR has prevented recognition of the impact of medical threats, such as 
pandemics, on international affairs.9 That the state is the primary actor in 
international affairs remains constant throughout the following assessment.  
 
The challenge, then, for this chapter becomes to substantiate that pandemics 
constitute an actor within IR. To do so, the chapter first looks towards the role of 
power in IR, paying particular attention to traditional power politics and the 
international state system to show that the possession of power is not indigenous to 
the state actor. Second, by adapting a relational power approach, the chapter shows 
that pandemics have constituted, and continue to constitute an actor within the 
international state system. Third, by assessing the unmitigated impact of pandemics 
on the international community the argument of pandemics being an actor is 
supported. This chapter lays the foundation for the greater task of the thesis: to 
provide an account of the power of pandemics and the threat towards state security 
whenever they emerge as a viable (realist) political actor in the 21st century. 
 
                                                 
9 Historians such as William McNeill (1998) and Professor A.J. McMichael (2001) provide a 
substantial account of the evolution of human culture and the disturbance such evolution has bought 
to the natural equilibrium between ‗man and microbe.‘ In particular, McMichael has managed to 
confine these disturbances into three historical transitions, which were ‗processes of equilibration: 
the first between humans, animals and pest species; the latter two between regional and then 
transoceanic populations.‘ (p.115) McMichael‘s thesis is further explored in section 1.4 Power and 
Pandemics: Pandemics and the Evolution of International Society. 
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1.1 Power and International Relations 
Considered to be one of the more complex dimensions of international relations to 
define,10 power plays a vital role in ‗international political theorizing‘.11 Indeed, the 
common perception that international politics is the arena for states to seek and 
obtain power in an increasingly anarchic world has become the foundation of 
modern international relations theory.12  In particular, ‗realists throughout the ages 
have argued that power is the decisive determinant in the relations among separate 
political communities.‘13 According to Guzzini, ‗power has been of central 
importance in IR, because it seemed essential for the understanding of two central 
issues: who [one or more] can be expected to win a conflict? And, related to this, 
who [one or more], governs international politics?‘14 Such a determination can only 
be made on evaluating the attributes of a state‘s power. 
 
Evaluation of state power in international relations can be reduced to two main 
schools of thought: ‗the elements of national power approach, which depicts power 
as resources, and the relational conception of power, which depicts power as an 
actual or potential relationship.‘15 The actual, or potential, relationship is usually 
one of conflict or aggression, traditionally such aggression has been perpetuated by 
another state; however, pandemics provide an opportunity for greater insight into 
states‘ preservation of national power in the face of a non-state aggressor. In 
providing a method to assess a state‘s power, both approaches enable the observer 
                                                 
10 Nye, J. (2004a) Power in the Global Information Age: From Realism to Globalization, New York: 
Routledge, p.54. Baldwin D. A. (1979) ‗Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old 
Tendencies‘, World Politics, 31(2), (Jan 1979), p.161. 
11 Baldwin (1979), op. cit. p.161. 
12 See Nye, J. (2005) Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, 
5th Ed., New York: Pearson Longman. Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. Waltz, K. (2001), op. cit. 
Guzzini, S. (2000) ‗The Use and Misuse of Power Analysis in International Relations Theory‘, in 
Palan, R., ed., Global Political Economy: Contemporary Theories, London: Routledge, pp.53-66. 
13 Schmidt, B.C. (2007), op. cit., p.43. 
14 Guzzini, S. (2000), op. cit. p. 53. [Brackets added] 
15 Baldwin D. A. (2002) ‗Power and International Relations‘, in Carlsnaes, W., Risse, T., Simmons B.A. 
eds. (2002) Handbook of International Relations, London: Sage Publications, p.185; Schmidt, B.C. 
(2007), op. cit. p.47. 
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not only to understand particular state actions16 but also to scrutinise the impact of 
external aggression.   
 
In the first ‗power as resources', school of thought, elements of national power, 
according to Schmidt, ‗define[s] power strictly in terms of measurable material 
attributes, such as the size of a country‘s population and military forces‘17 to 
determine the power of the state. The idea is to combine ‗all of the important 
resources that a state possesses…in some fashion to determine its overall aggregate 
power‘.18 In strong support of such an argument, Mearsheimer goes so far as to 
proclaim that the material basis of ‗power…represents nothing more than specific 
assets or material resources that are available to a state,‘19 and derives further 
power from the ‗socio-economic ingredients that go into building military power‘.20 
In other words the responsibility of the state is to convert resources at its disposal 
into power - the very notion of power conversion. 
 
According to Joseph Nye, ‗power conversion is the capacity to convert potential 
power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed 
behaviour of others.‘21 Power conversion is a significant barrier to the elements of 
national power approach, in large part because ‗what functions as a power asset in 
one situation may be a power liability in a different situation‘.22 The case studies of 
this thesis would certainly support this point. Furthermore, when ‗determining 
which resources provide the best basis for a particular context‘,23 the elements of 
national power approach encounters further difficulty, because ‗power resources 
                                                 
16 Typical state actions may include the expansion of territory through war and the implementation 
of beneficial trade agreements.  
17 Schmidt, B.C. (2007), op. cit. p.45. [Brackets Added] 
18 Ibid. p.47. 
19 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2001), op cit. p.57. 
20 Ibid. p.55. 
21 Nye, J. (2004a), op. cit. p.54. 
22 Baldwin, D.A. (2002), op. cit. p.179. 
23 Nye, J. (2005), op. cit. p.60. 
Chapter One: Power & Pandemics 
7 
always depend on the context‘.24 Pandemics provide an insight to the meaning of 
context here, as they emerged and receded over protracted times in history, thereby 
allowing a comparison of context and impact as a political actor.  Insight into 
context also emerges, as there are few, if any, resources of which pandemics will 
not take advantage.25 Therefore, while the elements of national power approach 
allows for insight into the prospective power of the state, it is the relational power 
approach that serves to determine whether or not the state, or actor, has actual 
power. 
 
The second school of thought, being the relational conception of power, argues that 
‗power is a process of interaction whereby a state is able to exercise influence over 
the actions of another state.‘26  Sometimes referred to as the Dahlian formulation of 
power,27 the approach essentially follows Robert Dahl‘s basic ‗intuitive idea of 
power‘ being that ‗A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do.‘28 The foundation of a relational 
conception of power is ‗the ability to demonstrate change in outcomes‘.29 Relational 
power challenges the notion of ‗power as a set of material resources‘ on the grounds 
that the ‗actual ability of Actor A to change the behaviour of Actor B‘ is more 
important than the mere possession of resources.30 Dahl concedes that such a simple 
statement ‗is not very interesting, informative, or even accurate‘,31 however, by 
embracing multiple dimensions of power it is possible to provide a greater 
                                                 
24 Nye, J. (2005), op. cit. p.60. 
25 For example, according to Nolen (2007), ‗the relationship between AIDS and mining is not just a 
social or medical issue but an economic one. In a 2006 assessment of the South African 
economy…the Economist Intelligence Unit listed HIV/AIDS before any other factor (a volatile 
currency, powerful unions) as the one to watch in terms of impact on growth. The big mining 
companies have been forced to acknowledge that the disease is pushing up the cost of operations – 
through absenteeism, funeral costs, lowered productivity due to illness, [and] poor staff morale.‘ (See 
Chapter 4, Section 4.3.3 The AIDS Pandemic: Industrial Capacity) 
26 Nye, J. (2005), op. cit. p.60. 
27 See Barnett, M. and Duvall, R. (2005) ‗Power in International Relations‘, International 
Organization, 59, pp. 135-140. 
28 Dahl, R.A. (1957) ‗The Concept of Power‘, Behavioural Science, 2(3), p.202-203. 
29 Schmidt, B.C. (2007), op. cit. pp.47-48. 
30 Ibid. p.48. 
31 Ibid. 
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understanding of the actors involved. Central to Dahl‘s formulation was the 
emphasis that ‗power is a relation…‘ and that ‗the objects within that relationship‘ 
of power are actors.32 Importantly for this thesis, Dahl‘s composition allows for the 
possibility of a non-sentient organism being considered an actor in international 
relations, providing a relationship can be established. 
 
In seeking to establish the existence of a power relationship between actors 
Baldwin33 provides a synthesised account of four dimensions of power, which he 
deems to be the ‗most important‘ in establishing the relationship of power.34 First, 
the dimension of scope; which ‗refers to the aspect of B‘s behaviour affected by A‘ 
inferring that an actor may possess a variety of influences and/or behaviours. 
Second, the domain of an actor‘s power; which ‗refers to the number of actors 
subject to its influence,‘35 meaning the influential alliances an actor possesses. 
Third, weight of influence; the probability that ‗B‘s behaviour is or could be affected 
by A,‘ or, more simply, the reliability of A‘s influence. Fourth, the cost of exercising 
such influence; whether it is ‗costly or cheap for A to influence B‘ or ‗costly or cheap 
for B to comply with A‘s demands.‘36 The power dimensions provided by Baldwin, 
traditionally utilised to assess the power of a state, are advantageous in 
understanding that pandemics not only have the ability to assert power in line with 
the various dimensions, but in doing so, pandemics obtain the status of actor.37 The 
lesson this thesis draws from Baldwin is that a state, or an individual, can hardly 
ignore the behavioural pattern of a pandemic, any more than they ignore the other 
                                                 
32Dahl, R.A. (1957), op. cit. p.203. Dahl defines actors as ‗individuals, groups, roles, offices, 
governments, nation-states or other human aggregates‘ (p.203). 
33 While the dimensions of relational power have been interpreted by a number of analysts 
specifically Dahl (1957) and Guzzini (1993), Baldwin‘s assessment provides an amalgamation of the 
main aspects of these dimensions. 
34 Baldwin, D.A. (2002), op. cit. p.178. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Baldwin, D.A. (2002), op. cit.  pp.178 – 179. 
37 See section 1.3 Power & Pandemics: Pandemics as an International Actor, for a detailed account of 
pandemics as an actor within IR. 
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actors in the international system. As a result, pandemics challenge interpretations 
of the traditional power politics and the orthodox international system. 
 
1.2 Traditional Power Politics and the International State System 
The expansion driven and self-interested nature of the state is central to Martin 
Wight‘s analysis of power politics, where ‗it is the nature of powers to expand‘.38 
The desire for expansion by powers is indicative of a system where ‗great powers… 
are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their rivals, with 
hegemony as their final goal.‘39 Wight interprets the modern states-system to be the 
‗continuous and organised‘ relations between ‗independent units, which we call 
states, nations, countries or powers‘.40 The structure of these relations has taken 
many forms, such as diplomacy, trade or even war. The overarching goal of such 
relations is to ‗gain mastery of the states-system,‘41 meaning that ‗the [international] 
system encourages states to look for opportunities to maximise their power vis-à-vis 
other states.‘42   In other words, Wight perceives the ‗international scene‘ to be 
‗properly described as an anarchy – a multiplicity of powers without a 
government.‘43 Indeed, Wight insists that the ‗absence of international government, 
or, the anarchy of sovereign states,‘ is the ‗fundamental cause‘ of all wars.44 The 
existence of anarchy is what ‗distinguishes international politics from ordinary 
politics‘;45 thus, ‗while in domestic politics the struggle for power is governed and 
circumscribed by the framework of law and institutions, in international politics 
law and institutions are governed and circumscribed by the struggle for power.‘46 
Within the struggle for power among states, international law, and institutions, 
                                                 
38 Wight, M. (1978) Power Politics, London: Leicester University Press, p.144. 
39 Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001), op. cit. p.29. 
40 Wight, M. (1978), op. cit. p. 23. 
41 Ibid. p.30. 
42 Mearsheimer, J.J. (2001), op. cit. p.29. [Brackets Added] 
43 Wight, M. (1978), op. cit. p.101. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Wight, M. (1978), op. cit. p.102. 
46 Ibid. 
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non-traditional security threats, especially pandemics, are able to capitalise on the 
disorder that is prevalent in the anarchy and maximise their own power potential.47  
 
For Wight, the primary duty of the state is to ‗preserve the interests of the people it 
rules and represents against the competing interests of other peoples.‘48 Such 
interests are ‗certain things that a power deems essential to its continued 
independence‘ and are of such importance that the state ‗will go to war to defend‘.49 
Importantly, Wight argues that the state determines what these ‗vital interests are‘50 
and, in doing so, the state will not be cajoled by another power in this 
determination. Such an argument is highly conducive to the global health 
environment, where often one state is afflicted by diseases that other states have 
managed to eradicate successfully from their population.  
 
Historically, communicable disease has yet to evoke bloody conflict between two 
powers, yet the impact of disease on a state‘s population can be just as vicious. As 
Pirages illuminates, 
Over the centuries the number of deaths and injuries from military combat 
have paled in comparison to those from disease. It is estimated that all the wars 
of the twentieth century killed 111 million combatants and civilians, an 
average of about 1.1 million a year. Communicable diseases are now killing 14 
times as many people annually.51 
Wight concedes that vital interests are likely to change as the international society 
continues to evolve.52 Evolution is also fundamental to the development, prediction, 
and containment of pandemics.  In large part the analysis of historical accounts 
allows for such preparation to take place. Classical realists utilise historic state 
versus state conflict to support their theoretical discourses on the international state 
                                                 
47 As will be addressed later in the chapter, nowhere within the international state system is this 
‗struggle‘ more evident than within the global health arena. The disparity between the ‗Have and 
Have Not States‘ (Bull, 1968) has never been more evident then when looking at the health of 
respective citizens.  
48 Wight, M. (1978), op. cit. p.95. 
49 Ibid. p.95. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Pirages D. (2005) ‗Containing Infectious Disease‘, in Starke L., (ed), (2005) State of the World 
2005: A Worldwatch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society, London: Earthscan, 
pp.42-43. 
52 Ibid. 
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system. By adopting a similar approach, it becomes possible to establish a 
framework to assess how states respond to non-traditional threats, including 
pandemics. The utilisation of such a framework provides an indication of any 
‗evolution‘ of state interest that transpires when that state is confronted with a 
pandemic. Regardless of the evolution of ‗interest‘ the primary role of the state, 
being to preserve and protect that interest, is still predominant. 
 
Additionally, Wight contends that the true motivations of the state are to preserve 
‗the influence derived from power‘ which the state possesses; Wight refers to this 
influence as ‗prestige‘.53 Importantly, Wight contends that ‗unless the power is 
present power there can be little prestige‘.54 In looking towards a state‘s prestige, 
Wight offers a greater insight into one aspect of power in international relations: the 
ability for one state to influence, not only other states, but also the path of 
international organisations. E. H. Carr supports this explanation of prestige, being 
‗the recognition by other people of your strength…[is] extremely important; for if 
your strength is recognised, you can generally achieve your aims without having to 
use it.‘55 In essence, prestige is ‗not only something that other people recognise, it is 
also something that you assert; and it can be asserted wisely or unwisely, necessarily 
or unnecessarily.‘56 However, the possession of prestige by a state varies 
considerably between the have and the have-nots states. Arguably, the possession 
and assertion of prestige when confronting a pandemic provides for states to seek 
assistance in developing the tools necessary to defend their national interest 
successfully from the non-state actor.  
 
Indeed, the central premise of Wight‘s argument is that while the international 
society may be anarchical, in that there is no ‗common government‘ there is, clearly, 
                                                 
53 Wight, M. (1978), op. cit. p.97. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Carr, E.H. (1937). Great Britain as a Mediterranean Power, Cust Foundation Lecture, University 
College, Nottingham, p.10, in Wight, M. (1978) op. cit. p.98. [Brackets Added] 
56 Wight, M. (1978), op. cit. p.98. 
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‗co-operation in international affairs.‘57 However, within this cooperation the 
practice of prestige, that basic element of power politics, prohibits a level of 
cooperation which benefits both the ‗Have and the Have Nots.‘58 The possession of 
prestige contributes toward the level of influence a state possess over another state 
or international organisation, as they seek assistance to confront various threats. 
 
This ability to influence or ‗control others‘ is, according to Nye, closely associated 
with the amount of resources in the control of the state.59 When defining a state‘s 
power in line with the resources that it possesses, the notion of power becomes 
much  ‗more concrete, measurable, and predictable‘60 than the relational power 
approach. What is required, according to Nye, is the ability to convert the ‗potential 
power, as measured by resources, to realized power, as measured by the changed 
behaviour of others‘.61 In endorsing both notions of power, Nye echoes the complex 
approach of Morgenthau by seeming to endorse ‗both the relational and the 
elements-of-national-power approach‘.62Nye also agrees with Wight in that special 
attention must be paid by states towards what Nye has termed the ‗changing sources 
of power‘.63 Nye asserts that ‗in assessing international power…factors such as 
technology, education, and economic growth are becoming more important, 
whereas geography, population, and raw materials are becoming less important.‘64 
With such lists, both authors allude to the necessity not to neglect the complex 
                                                 
57 Wight, M. (1978), op. cit. p.105. 
58 Prestige highlights the power distance between developed and developing countries. The degree to 
which a state is willing to cooperate with another state is reliant on the benefit derived from that 
cooperation for the state. 
59 Nye, J. (2004a), op. cit. p.53. Nye further contends that these resources incorporate the population 
of the state, the territory possessed by the state, its natural resources, economic size, military forces 
and political stability. Nye‘s assertions further reinforce Hans Morgenthau‘s elements of power, 
which are addressed in Chapter Two: Morgenthau‘s Classical Realims, indicating the vitality and 
increased relevance of Morgenthau‘s assertions. 
60 Nye, J. (2004a), op. cit. p.53. 
61 Ibid. p.54. 
62 Schmidt, B.C. (2007), op. cit. pp.48-49. 
63 Nye, J. (2004a), op. cit. p.55. 
64 Ibid. Nye‘s contention is made with a view to assessing international power, whereas this thesis 
contends that these same measures provide a framework of analysis to assess the impact of 
pandemics on a state‘s international power. In doing so, the thesis contends that the ‗importance‘ of 
all measures remains equal. Chapter Two: Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism, provides greater insight 
into the elements of national power. 
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frameworks established by Morgenthau.  This thesis concurs with that finding: 
Morgenthau‘s theoretical frameworks remain integral to any assessment of power in 
respect to pandemics. In conforming with Wight‘s original assertion of evolving 
interests, Nye opines the importance of being able to influence other states, without 
resorting to military force.65 For example, alternatives to military force may include 
the use of financial aid or economic power as a source of influence. When 
confronting a pandemic the ability to influence states is necessary to comply with 
international health regulations for the protection of power within the IR system. 
 
Indeed, the mutual correlation of military force, economic power, combined with 
the influence over opinion, was the focal point in E. H. Carr‘s discourse on power in 
international politics. According to Carr, The Twenty Years‘ Crisis was authored 
‗with the deliberate aim of counteracting the glaring and dangerous defect of nearly 
all thinking, both academic and popular, about international politics…the almost 
total neglect of the factor of power.‘66 Furthermore, and importantly for this thesis, 
Carr professes that his study ‗too readily and too complacently accepts the existing 
nation-state, large or small, as the unit of international society.‘67  Such a confession 
adds weight to the potential for pandemics being considered an actor within 
international society, by suggesting that a wider focus on international society, 
incorporating non-state actors and their influence on power, is plausible. 
Furthermore, by delving into The Twenty Years‘ Crisis it becomes possible to garner 
a greater appreciation of the impact of pandemics on that power in international 
relations. 
 
With Carr‘s admission that his primary goal was to address the neglect of power 
within academic work, there is an element of concern in his reluctance to provide 
                                                 
65 Nye, J. (2004a), op. cit. pp. 54-57.  
66 Carr, E. H. (2001), op. cit. p.cv. 
67 Ibid. p.cvi. 
Chapter One: Power & Pandemics 
14 
‗an explicit definition of power‘.68 As Schmidt points out, ‗Carr argued that power 
was indivisible, yet he claimed for the purposes of discussion it could be divided into 
three categories: military power, economic power, and power over opinion.‘69 In 
limiting the aspects of analysis for a state‘s power to three categories Carr has 
stopped short of elucidating a concise argument. Indeed, Carr offers more of a 
statement of fact rather than a theoretical justification of state power, a point 
substantiated by Mearsheimer who goes so far as to argue that in avoiding ‗why 
states care about power or how much power they want,‘ Carr stops short of 
producing any theoretical argument for international politics.70 However, as 
contended by Smith, the central premise of Carr is to ‗emphasize the ubiquity of 
power, not to explain how and under what circumstances it is used‘.71 Carr‘s work 
provides an interpretation, albeit somewhat limited, into some of the foundational 
aspects of the elements of national power approach towards state power.  
 
Carr pays specific attention to establishing how the term international politics is to 
apply to his framework of analysis. He contends that the term ‗political‘ should only 
apply ‗to issues involving a conflict of power‘.72 Furthermore, once ‗this conflict is 
resolved, the issue ceases to be ‗political‘ and becomes a matter of administrative 
routine‘.73 For example, the alliance between Japan and America following Japan‘s 
surrender after World War II arguably moved the conflict away from the political 
towards administrative. However, Carr fails to provide adequate explanation as to 
what he deems to be the actual meaning of administrative. A similar example can be 
illustrated with pandemics: the global struggle to eradicate smallpox was a complex 
conflict between humans and a combative microbe, in which the human race 
eventually declared victory, and states now administratively protect their citizens 
                                                 
68 Schmidt, B.C. (2007), op. cit. p.49. 
69 Ibid. Carr, E.H. (2001), op. cit. p.102.  
70 Mearsheimer, J.J (2001), op. cit. p.18. 
71 Smith, M. J. (1986), op. cit. p.75. 
72 Carr, E.H. (2001), op. cit. p.97. 
73 Ibid. 
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against the microbe.74 However, recently established fears of a bioterrorism attack, 
with smallpox as the infectious agent, have prompted speculation that the initial 
victory, and relegation of dealing with the virus to the administrative, may have 
been somewhat premature.75 While there is an element of validity within Carr‘s 
argument, the idea of any political conflict becoming resolved and then relegated to 
administrative status seems optimistic.   
 
Indeed, Carr goes as far as relegating the prevention of ‗the spread of epidemics‘76 to 
a non-political status, describing the notion of prevention as ‗non-political or 
technical‘.77 While Carr‘s reference to epidemics is anecdotal, evidence of states‘ 
behaviours in relation to pandemics in the 21st century, indicates a somewhat 
different perspective. In regard to the level of state co-operation on the non-political 
issues, two examples dominate: first, the Chinese government‘s initial unwillingness 
to cooperate with international health authorities during the outbreak of SARS in 
200278 and, second, Indonesia‘s ―power play‖ in withholding avian influenza 
samples from the World Health Organization in January 2007.79 In both 
circumstances the ramifications of non-cooperation further ameliorated the 
epidemics, with the SARS outbreak proliferating to the status of pandemic.80 Carr‘s 
                                                 
74 World Health Organization (2007) The World Health Report 2007: A Safer Future Global Health 
Security in the 21st Century, Geneva: World Health Organization, p.6. 
75 McKay, B. (2011) ‗Bioterror Fears Prompt U.S. to Keep Its Smallpox Cache‘, The Wall Street Journal 
[online], 18 Jan, available: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704029704576088032149613692.html 
[accessed 12 Feb 2011]. 
76 Carr, E.H. (2001), op. cit. p.97. 
77 Ibid. Carr contends that when states seemingly forego conflict and embrace cooperation, such as 
‗maintaining postal or transport services…or suppress the traffic in drugs all issues become non-
political or technical‘. (p.97) 
78 McNally (2003) contends that ‗miscalculation and a long held penchant to bury unfavourable 
information and statistics in China led to a news blackout about the nature and extent of the SARS 
epidemic. The viral disease was therefore able to penetrate deep into Beijing, China‘s cultural and 
political center‘. (p.70) (See Chapter Five: The SARS Pandemic) 
79 The suspension of supplying WHO with samples of the virus threatened the ability of WHO to 
monitor the evolution of the virus. At the time Indonesia argued that it would ‗not provide virus 
samples to the WHO as long as pharmaceutical companies can use them to make vaccines…[the]… 
country cannot afford.‘ (CTV Edmonton, 2008)  The utilisation by Indonesia of the avian influenza 
samples as leverage to protect its national interest, specifically, the health and well-being of its 
citizens. 
80 The SARS outbreak provided justification for a number of changes to the International Health 
Regulations, in particular, the ability for WHO to take into account sources of information other than 
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concession that ‗as soon as an issue arises which involves, or is thought to involve, 
the power of one state in relation to another, the matter at once becomes 
‗political,‘81 and opens the door to further assessment of the role of pandemics in the 
international state system. In both ‗non-cooperation‘ examples noted here, other 
states were immediately affected by the power reaction of one state. 
 
Carr further divides power in the ‗international sphere‘ into three categories. In the 
first category, military power is seen as one of ‗supreme importance,‘ which, ‗lies in 
the fact that the ultima ratio of power in international relations is war‘.82 In echoing 
the teachings of Carl Von Clausewitz,83 Carr contends that ‗every act of the state, in 
its power aspect, is directed to war, not as a desirable weapon, but as a weapon 
which it may require in the last resort to use‘.84 Furthermore, with ‗potential war 
being…a dominant factor in international politics, military strength becomes a 
recognised standard of political values.‘85 The importance of a state‘s military 
strength is incorporated as a common theme within the realist framework. The 
reasoning behind such a focus draws on the expansionist and self-interested nature 
of states. Carr illustrates the longevity of this realist tradition arguing that;  
International politics amply confirm the aphorisms of Machiavelli that ‗men 
never appear to themselves to possess securely what they have unless they 
acquire something from another‘ and of Hobbes that man ‗cannot assure the 
power that means to live well which he hath present, without the acquisition of 
more‘.86 
Mankind‘s desire for further acquisition of power closely mimics the behaviour of 
infectious disease, in that neither man nor microbe has shown evidence of 
constraint.87 
 
                                                                                                                                           
the state. Such a move raises questions in regard to the respect of sovereignty when countering global 
health concerns, and further highlights the increased importance of global health in the 21st century. 
81 Carr, E.H. (2001), op. cit. p.97. 
82 Ibid. p.102. 
83 Clausewitz, C.V. (1968) On War, London: Penguin Books. 
84 Carr, E.H. (2001), op. cit. p.102. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Ibid. p.105. 
87 As is explored in Section 1.4 Power and Pandemics: Pandemics and the Evolution of International 
Society 
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Carr‘s second category, economic power, is largely based on a state‘s economic 
strength being an ‗instrument of political power, if only through its association with 
the military instrument.‘88 At the centre of a state‘s economic power exists the 
concept of autarky, or self-sufficiency. Autarky is considered to be ‗not only a social 
necessity, but an instrument of political power‘.89 In other words, a state that is able 
to provide for itself holds power over another state that is unable to provide for 
itself. During World War I, the appeal of autarky led to ‗the development of 
synthetic materials by Germany‘ as well as ‗the accumulation by Great Britain of 
stocks of foodstuffs‘;90 both actions sought to increase the overall power of the 
respective state and insulate each state from any impediment to survival. During a 
pandemic, states have created preparedness plans that strongly endorse the notion 
of autarky. The reactive ‗stockpiling‘ of medication is but one example of states 
edging closer towards that autarkical goal.91   
 
In Carr‘s third category, ‗power over opinion,‘ he devotes ‗specific attention to 
analysing propaganda as a form of power‘.92 The idea of power over opinion 
indicates a movement away from the harder, more established forms of power, 
towards what Joseph Nye has termed ‗soft power.‘93 Carr illustrates the increasingly 
vital role of propaganda in establishing a state‘s power. Through the use of 
propaganda the skilled statesman is able to ‗mold and form the will of the people.‘94 
The increased prominence of propaganda, according to Carr, stems from the 
                                                 
88 Carr, E.H. (2001), op. cit. p.105. 
89 Ibid. p.111. 
90 Ibid. p.114. 
91 There are a number of risks inherent in adopting an autarkical policy, the least of which is the 
‗expenditure that may turn out to be wasteful‘. (Carr, p.114) The stockpiling of antiviral medications, 
embraced by a number of developed countries during the 2009 Influenza A(H1N1) outbreak, is one 
example of expenditure that may turn out to be wasteful, as states prepare for a pandemic. Recently 
the United States Food and Drug Administration was forced to issue a reminder of the pending 
expiration of stockpiles of Tamiflu and Relenza  (Food and Drug Administration, 2010). 
92 Schmidt, B.C. (2007), op. cit. p.50. 
93 Nye (2004b) refers to soft power as ‗the indirect way to get what you want‘ essentially ‗getting 
others to want the outcomes that you want‘.(p.5) The implementation of a soft power ideal can 
provide further legitimacy to a state in the eyes of others. (Nye, J. (2004a), p.57) The idea of soft 
power is ‗becoming more important in world politics today.‘ (Ibid.) 
94 Bernays, E. (1928) Propaganda, Brooklyn, NY: Ig Publishing, p.109. [Brackets Added] 
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‗broadening of the basis of politics, which has vastly increased the number of those 
whose opinion is politically important‘.95 Carr maintains that ‗universal popular 
education‘ is the ‗oldest, and still perhaps most powerful tool‘96 that a state possesses 
to maintain power over opinion. However, the ability and instruments by which a 
state disseminates information, have greatly expanded since Carr first published his 
works in 1939.97  A state‘s ability to control the flow of information allows that state 
to exercise its power over the population, thereby shaping both action and 
reaction.98 In the face of a pandemic, there are serious implications for both how 
much, and what type of, information is divulged to the public. The inherent fear of 
pandemics stems from dark memories of plagues past, yet as history has shown, any 
over or under reaction to the presence of a pandemic has the ability to extend the 
length, and power, of that pandemic.99 Carr argued that ‗it was a condition of 
success on the military and economic fronts that the ‗morale‘ of one‘s own side 
should be maintained, and that of the other side sapped and destroyed.‘100 A similar 
mindset is applied when confronting a pandemic, in order to prevent an assault 
against the power of the state. In order to validate the theoretical finding presented 
thus far, the thesis now requires the establishment of pandemics as a political actor. 
 
                                                 
95 Carr, E.H. (2001), op. cit. p.120. 
96 Ibid. p.121. 
97 For example, Lloyd N. Cutler (1984) contends that ‗TV news now has a much greater effect on 
national policy decisions – especially foreign-policy decisions – than print journalism has even been 
able to achieve.‘ This is in large part because ‗TV news has a wider reach and faster impact that must 
now be taken into account‘. (p.113) Given the increased popularity of the internet and the 
proliferation of mobile communication devices, any government trying to exert influence, through 
propaganda, over its population, will have a difficulty. See Hanson, R.E. (2010) Mass 
Communication Living in a Media World, 3rd ed., Washington: CQ Press.   
98 Government control of education systems, particularly within African states, has led to an increase 
in enrolments within primary schools throughout the region. However, as argued by Boler and 
Archer (2008) such an increase has placed unprecedented strain on already fragile systems. 
Furthermore, the quality of education, particularly in relation to sexually transmitted diseases 
remains questionable. (pp.7-18)  
99 In analysing the outbreak of Plague in Australia during the early years of the 1900‘s Townsend 
(2007) contends that ‗Australia had six years to prepare for plague, but when it arrived in January 
1900 it infected thousands, killed hundreds, and stayed for more than twenty years‘. (pp. 63-64)  
100 Carr, E.H. (2001), op. cit. p.123. 
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1.3 Pandemics as an International Actor 
The aim of this section is to show that pandemics constitute an actor in a 
relationship of power with states. Baldwin‘s four dimensions of power: scope, 
domain, weight, and cost, when applied to pandemics clearly illustrate the power of 
this non-state actor. In recognising the relationship of power between states and 
pandemics, the possibility of applying a wider framework of analysis to assess the 
impact of infectious disease pandemics is validated.  
 
The shift towards the relational conception of power is considered to have 
‗constituted a revolution in power analysis‘.101 The move allowed for the idea that 
power was more multi-dimensional than previously thought, and that  ‗power could 
increase in one dimension while simultaneously decreasing in another‘.102 The 
malleable nature of conceiving power across a number of dimensions creates the 
ability to assess various actors within IR. The use of Baldwin‘s dimensions to 
establish the relationship between the non-state pandemic actor, and the state actor 
is vital, as the dimensions provide the tools necessary to confirm the power of the 
pandemic in question.  
1.3.1 Scope 
Baldwin‘s first dimension of scope encapsulates the aspect of behavioural change 
that transpires in the state affected by the pandemic. The impact of any pandemic 
on any state is multifaceted. Hughes provides a strong example of this impact in 
relaying the significance of The Bubonic Plague on Sydney in the early 1900s. 
One day no one gave it a thought; on the morrow it was in all men‘s mouths. 
Before noon, alarm bordering on panic had spread throughout the community, 
and by nightfall the trains to the mountains were crowded with citizens fleeing 
from the infected city. The columns of the Press were full of stories well 
calculated to arouse the fears of the people: articles by distinguished specialists; 
ghastly stories of the Great Plague of 1665, when the doors of the stricken 
houses were daubed with a red cross, and the drivers of the carts into which 
those who had succumbed were dumped, cried, ―Bring out your Dead!‖ All this 
                                                 
101 Baldwin, D.A. (2002), op. cit. p.178. 
102 Ibid. 
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and much more of the same kind put the fear of God into the people. Normal 
Business in Parliament and outside it was almost at a standstill.103 
Initially, the immediate impact of a pandemic places extra strain on established 
health infrastructure. Yet, in order to counter successfully the spread/scope of the 
pandemic, a state must also look towards the coordination of effective border 
response programs and other non-health areas, for greater insulation from the 
pandemic actor. Indeed, the scope of The Bubonic Plague pandemic on Australia 
‗had a profound effect on Australia‘s healthcare systems‘.104 In more recent years, 
states have established preparedness plans to counter the scope of any potential 
outbreak,105 yet the success of these plans has been moderate at best; the type of 
contagion, as well as the severity of its mortality rate, requires changes in the 
established behavioural pattern of states. Those changes will be determined by the 
scope of the pandemic.  Essentially two main components of assessment determine 
the scope of a pandemic: first, the changes within the domestic behaviour of the 
state that is a result of the pandemic, and, second, the changes in the international 
behaviour of the state and the ramifications for the state‘s power, when responding 
to a pandemic. As the contagion spreads, the scope of the pandemic will become 
more impactful and significantly more difficult for the state to counter.  
1.3.2 Domain 
As the pandemic impact deepens both nationally and internationally, the domain of 
its influence continues to grow. The technical definition of a pandemic, as offered 
by the WHO is an infectious agent that causes ‗sustained community level outbreaks 
in two or more countries in one WHO region‘106 and that the same infectious agent 
                                                 
103 Hughes, W.M. (1950) Policies and Potentates, Sydney: Angus and Robertson, p.37. 
104 Townsend, I. (2007) ‗Learning from Forgotten Epidemics‘ in Schultz, J. ed., Griffith Review 17: 
Staying Alive, Griffith University: South Brisbane, p.64. Townsend maintains that the pandemic 
‗revealed widespread conditions of filth; it [the pandemic] resulted in the creation of a national 
quarantine service; and more money was spent on public health systems…In fact, the plague helped 
create the public health systems we know today.‘ (p.64)  
105 These preparedness plans were specific to an outbreak of pandemic influenza and are typically 
housed within a state‘s ministry or department of health.  
106 The WHO has established six regions around the world they are – Africa Region, Region for the 
Americas, the Eastern Mediterranean region, European Region, South-East Regions, Western Pasific 
[sic] Region. (WHO, 2009a) See Appendix One: WHO Member States By Region. 
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causes ‗sustained community level outbreaks in at least one other country in another 
WHO region.‘107 Therefore, by virtue of definition, pandemics have a domain of 
considerable size.  
 
The simplicity of such a definition posed some difficulty for the international 
community during the 2009 outbreak of pandemic influenza. Specifically, the 
contemporary media coverage allowed for a proliferation of misinformation. Jenkins 
maintains that: 
The role of the media in a pandemic situation is immensely influential. Initial 
media focus on the WHO Pandemic Phase step up to Level 6108 led the public to 
believe we were on the brink of a catastrophic and devastating pandemic, 
rather than by way of explanation informing them that this is a predictable, 
natural evolution of spread of disease.109  
When looking solely at the ‗domain‘ of the pandemic, there is a need to limit the 
influential factor of the virulence of the contagion. In other words, regardless of the 
virulence of the pandemic in question, for the purposes of this thesis, the geographic 
spread of the pandemic is the contributory factor towards the domain aspect of 
power.   
1.3.3 Weight 
The third dimension refers to the weight or probability that the pandemic was 
responsible for the change in behaviour. In order to comprehend the probability of 
responsibility, an assessment of the severity of a pandemic is necessary. In gauging 
the severity of a pandemic, the United States of America (USA) based Centers for 
                                                 
107 World Health Organization (2009a) Pandemic Influenza Preparedness and Response: a WHO 
Guidance Document, Geneva: World Health Organization, p.25. 
108 The WHO initially developed the pandemic phase framework in 1999 and revised the initial 
system in 2005. The aim of the phase framework, according to WHO (2009a), is to ‗make the 
phases…applicable to the entire world and provide a global framework to aid countries in pandemic 
preparedness and response planning.‘ (p.24) The WHO stipulates that the pandemic phases are not 
‗designed to predict what will happen during a pandemic‘ nor are they  ‗always going to proceed in 
numerical order.‘ (p.24) A significant point of contention with the WHO document relating to the 
definition of pandemic adopted by the Organization. Specifically, the removal of the need for ‗a new 
influenza virus…[appearing]...against which the human population has no immunity, resulting in 
several, simultaneous epidemics worldwide with enormous numbers of deaths and illness.‘ (WHO, 
2005; Doshi, 2009) 
109 Waterer G.W., Hui, D.S., and Jenkins, C.R. (2010, op. cit. p.54. 
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Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) highlight the need to compliment WHO‘s 
Pandemic Phase‘s system with,  
a Pandemic Severity Index [PSI] based primarily on case fatality ratio, a 
measurement that is useful in estimating the severity of a pandemic on a 
population level and which may be available early in a pandemic for small 
clusters and outbreaks.110 
The central purpose of the PSI is to assist in the planning stages for a state‘s response 
to a specific outbreak. By establishing a correlation between pandemic severity and 
the scope of behavioural change, the understanding of the relationship of power 
between the state and the pandemic actor becomes unambiguous. While other 
‗epidemiologic features that are relevant in overall analysis of mitigation plans 
include total illness rate, age-specific illness and mortality rates, the reproductive 
number, intergeneration time, and incubation,‘111 the likelihood of this information 
being available ‗during the early stages of a pandemic,‘ is low.112 More importantly, 
by adopting a historical analysis of past pandemics, it is possible to incorporate these 
particulars into the analysis of a pandemic‘s weight. In doing so, the contention 
becomes unmistakable of the pandemic in question being responsible for the scope 
of behavioural change exhibited by the state.  
1.3.4 Cost 
The cost of both preparing and countering a pandemic constitutes the fourth 
dimension of relational power. Baldwin maintains that this relational aspect of 
power needs to accommodate the cost to both actor A and actor B. Pandemics are 
unique in that 100% of the cost is borne by the state, the financial cost to the 
pandemic actor is nil.113 Moreover, the cost to the state is likely to be varied relative 
                                                 
110 Centers for Disease Control (2007) Interim Pre-pandemic Planning Guidance: Community 
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza Mitigation in the United States- Early, Targeted, Layered Use of 
Nonpharmaceutical Interventions, Centers for Disease Control [online], available at 
http://www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/community/community_mitigation.pdf [accessed 7 Jan 2011] 
p.31. 
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 When assessing one actor‘s power over another the calculation of financial cost to both actors can 
be extrapolated relatively simply. Similarly, the determination of the cost of a pandemic on the state 
actor can also be assessed. However, the cost to the non-state pandemic actor is significantly more 
difficult to assess. If a pandemic is to an infectious disease, as a state‘s foreign policy is to the state, 
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to the preparedness of the state to mitigate the specific organism constituting the 
pandemic. Such a diversity of scale propels the power status of pandemics 
significantly. As the past has shown, states incur considerable expense in order to 
counter pandemics; this, when combined with the impact on a states elements of 
national power, presents a serious imbalance in the power dichotomy between the 
state and pandemic. 
 
When assessing the above dimension for ‗meaningful scholarly communication,‘ 
Baldwin maintains the minimum set of conditions, as put forward by Jack Nagel, 
which should be used to establish a causal concept of power, to be the domain and 
scope of the actor. 
To say ‗X has power‘ may seem sensible, but to say ‗X causes‘ or ‗X can cause‘ is 
nonsense. Causation implies an X and a Y – a cause and an effect. If power is 
causation, one must state the outcome causes. Stipulating domain and scope 
answers the question ‗Power over what?‘114 
Pandemics do have significant scope and domain. By incorporating the dimension of 
weight within the analysis of pandemics, the significance of the actor‘s scope and 
domain is reinforced. The impact of pandemics has been well known: weighty losses 
of life, yet the threat of pandemics is still not taken as seriously as other threats. 
WHO has expressed concern that ‗pandemic preparedness in most, if not all 
countries, remains incomplete‘.115 The lack of preparedness may be indicative of a 
lack of appreciation of the impact that pandemics can have, and have had on 
international affairs. Through the recognition of the power possessed by a 
pandemic, the possibility of enhancing that appreciation becomes reality. 
Furthermore, by investigating the relationship between pandemics and the evolution 
of international society, a wider understanding of the pandemic threat is developed.  
                                                                                                                                           
the potential cost of the pandemic behaviour is the eventual eradication of the disease. While such a 
ramification would pose a significant deterrent towards a sentient being, the non-cognisant status of 
infectious disease makes the notion of cost towards itself mute. 
114 Nagel J. (1975) ‗The Descriptive Analysis of Power‘, New Haven: Yale University Press, in 
Baldwin, D.A. (2002), op. cit. p.114. 
115 World Health Organization (2009a), op. cit. p.13. 
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1.4 Pandemics and the Evolution of International Society 
Infectious disease has been a constant companion of humankind throughout the 
evolution of international society. Pirages contends that ‗large scale disease 
outbreaks, epidemics, and even pandemics occur when something happens to 
disturb an evolutionary equilibrium that normally exists between people and 
pathogens.‘116 Indeed, this persistent disturbance in the ‗biological equilibrium 
between man and microbe‘117 illustrated via three ‗historic transitions,‘ provides a 
significant insight into the role assumed by pandemics in international relations.  
 
The first such transition is believed to have occurred ‗from around 15,000 years 
ago‘ as human population size expanded rapidly.118 According to McMichael, the 
formation of stable agrarian communities allowed parasitic agents greater exposure 
to potential victims for two main reasons:  
First, human settlements were pervaded by their own accumulated waste and 
excreta, and this enabled the recycling of infectious agents, assisted by 
proliferating rodents and insects. Second, many new infectious agents were 
acquired from closely encountered animal populations.119  
As communities expanded into towns and city-states the propensity increased for 
disease to become endemic. However, historic evidence for pandemics is difficult to 
ascertain,  ‗from around 3,500 years ago there are clear references to epidemic 
diseases in the Bible.‘120 Indeed, ‗written evidence does…clearly attest the 
appearance of epidemic diseases in the ancient Middle East.‘121 As time progressed 
both human and microbe developed an ability to cohabitate.  However, human 
propensity for exploration would lead, once again, to a disturbance of this re-
established equilibrium. 
                                                 
116 Pirages, D. (2005), op. cit. p.44. 
117 McMichael, A.J. (2001) Human Frontiers, Environments and Disease, Port Chester NY: Cambridge 
University Press, p.98. 
118 McMichael, A.J. (2001), op. cit. p.100. 
119 Ibid. p.101. 
120 Ibid. p.104. 
121 McNeill, W.H. (1998). Plagues and Peoples, Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, p.96. Specifically 
McNeill singles out the ‗disasters mentioned in the Babylonian Epic of Gilgamesh as preferable to the 
flood was visitation from the god of pestilence, and an Egyptian text of about the same age (ca. 2000 
B.C.) compares fear of Pharaoh with fear of the god of disease in a year of pestilence,‘ as evidence of 
the presence of disease prior to biblical texts. (p.96)  
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Established civilisations started to branch out to make contact through ‗trade, travel 
and regional warfare‘122 beginning around 2,500 years ago. Once again the world 
started to witness a disturbance of that fragile equilibrium. As the ‗Roman Empire 
and China‘s Imperial Han Dynasty, at opposite East-West poles of Eurasia, began to 
make contact…epidemic convulsions began to occur as virulent, newly exchanged 
epidemics ravaged both populations.‘123 According to McMichael ‗in the second 
century AD, the records indicate that both Rome and China were overwhelmed, and 
probably politically enfeebled, by pestilence.‘124 Throughout this transitional period, 
plagues of infectious disease ravaged throughout the civilised world.  
 
The impact of the subsequent Black Death in particular highlights the severity of 
pandemics, and the widespread implications for society. The Black Death 
‗devastated the Western world from 1347 to 1351 killing 25% to 50% of Europe‘s 
population.‘125 James Thompson, expressing surprise at the similarities with more 
modern times,126 argues that society experienced: ‗economic chaos, social unrest, 
high prices, profiteering, depravation of morals, lack of production, industrial 
indolence, frenetic gaiety, wild expenditure, luxury, debauchery, social and 
religious hysteria, greed, avarice, maladministration, decay of manners.‘127 
Regardless of timeframe, such societal impacts of pandemics contribute to the 
overall threat posed to a state‘s power. 
 
                                                 
122 McMichael, A.J. (2001), op. cit.  p.107. 
123 Ibid. p.107. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Gottfried, R.S. (1983), The Black Death: Natural and Human Disaster in Medieval Europe, New 
York, NY: The Free Press, p.xiii. 
126 Thompson authored his piece in 1921 following the conclusion of World War I and three years 
following the Spanish Influenza pandemic. 
127 Thompson, J.W. (1921). The Aftermath of the Black Death and the Aftermath of the Great War, 
The American Journal Of Sociology, 26(5), p565. 
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The third transition began ‗as Eurasian and non-Eurasian civilisations made trans-
oceanic contact.‘128 Throughout this transition, infectious disease became an 
impressive weapon, albeit accidentally, for the microbe-carrying conquering forces 
of Hernando Cortez over the Aztec Empire where pandemics thinned the indigenous 
populations.129 The exposure of the indigenous peoples of New World America to 
‗Old World infections‘ ranged from European settlements in California, Louisiana 
and as far north as Canada.130 The transition continued and during the period from 
1490 to 1648 the world ‗was scarred by warfare, religious schisms and fast moving 
epidemics‘.131 Even fiscal policy contributed, when ‗in the seventeenth century the 
trans-Atlantic slave trade introduced the deadly falciparum malaria and yellow 
fever to the Americas‘.132 In Hawaii, the impact of disease outbreaks on the 
indigenous population was devastating; ‗the native Hawaiian population declined 
from 300,000 to 37,000 within 80 years of Captain James Cook‘s first arrival‘.133 In 
exposing these indigenous populations to infectious disease, the ability multiplied 
for the Europeans to hasten the colonisation process and increase their state power. 
 
Arguably, the global political system is currently experiencing the fourth transition, 
in large part due to ‗the dynamics of industrialization, globalization, population 
growth, and urbanization‘.134 McMichael contends that:  
As populations become interconnected economically, culturally and physically, 
the mixing of people, animals and microbes from all geographical areas 
intensifies, long-distance travel and trade facilitates the geographical 
redistribution of pests and pathogens.135  
As the international system has evolved to encourage cooperation on political, 
military, economic and even health security, the world has encountered a number 
                                                 
128 McMichael, A.J. (2001), op. cit. p.111. 
129 McNeill (1998) contends that the exposure of the Aztec and Incan civilisations to smallpox a 
‗population [that] lacked inherited or acquired resistances‘ (p.20) enabled the group of 600 
Spaniards to conquer the population of millions. McNeill estimates that the disease likely caused the 
deaths of ‗something like a quarter to a third of them.‘ (p.20) 
130 McMichael, A.J. (2001), op. cit. p.112. 
131 Ibid. p.113. 
132 Ibid. (2001), op. cit. p.114. 
133 Ibid. 
134 Pirages, D. (2005), op. cit. p.45. 
135 McMichael, A.J. (2001), op. cit. p.115. 
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of newly identified pathogens.136 However, substantial efforts have been made by 
the international community to enhance the level of cooperation among states in 
order to provide a coordinated approach to limiting the impact of the pandemic 
actor. 
1.5 The Evolution of International Health Security 
At the inaugural International Sanitary Conference in Paris (1851), the vital 
principle that ‗health protection was a proper subject for international 
consultations‘ was established.137 In describing the first International Sanitary 
Conference, Hiroshi Nakajima, former Director General of WHO, contends that the 
conference was ‗convened by the ministries of foreign affairs of eleven European 
states and Turkey to standardize the international quarantine regulations aimed at 
preventing the importation of cholera, plague and yellow fever‘.138 Furthermore, 
within the conference:  
Each country was represented by a diplomat and a public health physician. 
Each representative voted separately. This example of international cooperation 
in communicable disease control demonstrated how states‘ foreign health 
policies could be coordinated. Governments realized that international 
cooperation provided the best means of combating the threat of infectious 
disease transmission.139 
Ever since the convening of the Conference, the cooperation between states, 
international health organisations, and non-government organisations has led to the 
conclusion of a number of treaties on a myriad of health issues.140 Such efforts 
commonly fall under the banner of public health security. WHO stipulates that 
public health security ‗is defined as the activities required, both proactive and 
reactive, to minimize vulnerability to acute public health events that endanger the 
                                                 
136 For example, Swine (A/H1N1) Influenza (2009), Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (2003), the 
Nipah Virus (1999), Avian (H5N1) Influenza (1997), Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (1997), 
Australian Bat Lyssavirus (1997).  
137 World Health Organization (2007), op. cit. p.7. 
138 Nakajima, H. (1997) ‗Global Disease Threats and Foreign Policy‘, The Brown Journal of World 
Affairs, 4(1), p.320.  
139 Ibid.  
140 Fidler, D.P. (2005) ‗Health as Foreign Policy‘, The Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and 
International Relations, Summer/Fall, p.180. 
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collective health of national populations.‘141 When elevated to an international 
status, such a definition is widened to incorporate the impact of disease on 
‗economic or political stability, trade, tourism, access to goods and services, 
and…demographic stability.‘142 While quarantine is considered to be a significant 
advancement in the realm of international cooperation, it is widely accepted that 
two other advances, sanitation and immunisation, were also an impetus for such 
international coordination.143 
 
1.5.1 Quarantine 
The notion of quarantine is relatively simple: separate the elements of the 
population who are sick, from those who are not.144 According to WHO, ‗the 
practice of separating people with disease from the healthy population is an ancient 
one, with both biblical and Koranic references to the isolation of lepers.‘145 However 
it was not until the plague pandemic of the 14th century, when the governments of 
Europe were faced with an immense political challenge, that ‗the great plague [not 
only] disrupted government, the economic, and social and cultural life…[but 
also]…made way for a restructuring of local governments‘.146 Bourdelais, in 
describing the impact of plague on Italian city-states, contends that when ‗faced 
with the threat of plague, it was governments, rather than the physicians at the 
famous Italian universities, that equipped themselves with the tools to fight 
epidemics.‘147 The role of the government in countering the great plague provides 
                                                 
141 World Health Organization (2007), op. cit. p.1. 
142 Ibid.  
143 Ibid. p.6. 
144 The International Health Regulations, as agreed to by the World Health Assembly (2005) define 
quarantine to mean ‗the restriction of activities and/or separation from others of suspect persons 
who are not ill or of suspect baggage, containers, conveyances or goods in such a manner as to 
prevent the possible spread of infection or contamination.‘ (p.8) 
145 World Health Organization (2007), op. cit. p.2. 
146 Bourdelais P. (2006) Epidemics Laid Low: A History of What Happened in Rich Countries, 
translated by Bart K. Holland, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, p.14. [Brackets Added] 
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the first example of a government taking actions to protect the state‘s power from a 
pandemic.  
 
Bourdelais contends that the black plague enabled Italian states to institute a 
number of measures designed to protect the population. These measures also had 
significant international ramifications:  
In 1374, Genoa and Venice refused to let into port ships that had come from 
infected areas. In 1377, the town of Ragusa required a month‘s isolation before 
ships could enter the port. Soon thereafter, in Venice, this was extended to forty 
days, on the basis of the Hippocratic doctrine that considered the fortieth day 
as the last possible day of illness for acute diseases such as the plague. Thus, 
quarantine – the protective strategy that was to be used until the middle of the 
nineteenth century – was born.148 
Indeed the measure of quarantine became a staple of pandemic response globally. 
Over time, cities would establish committees tasked with the coordination of public 
health measures, inclusive of quarantine.149 According to WHO, ‗during the 18th 
century, all major towns and cities along the eastern seaboard of the United States 
passed quarantine laws, which typically were enforced only when epidemics 
seemed imminent.‘150 The success of quarantine measures in combating infectious 
disease pandemics contributed to quarantine becoming a staple of both state 
governments, and the arsenal of the wider international community for confronting 
outbreaks of infectious disease. The implementation of quarantine measures by any 
state should be perceived as the state taking action to protect itself against the 
potential impacts from the introduction of pathogens to the state‘s environment. 
 
1.5.3 Sanitation 
The second major advance, sanitation, transpired in the mid-19th century when 
London was experiencing a particularly devastating cholera outbreak. The outbreak 
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of cholera prompted a stronger, albeit somewhat mild, domestic focus on combating 
the disease. 
The first outbreak of cholera in Britain (1832) promoted establishment of local 
boards of health. Being unpaid and locally elected, the personnel of these 
boards often lacked experience as well as legal power to alter living conditions; 
indeed, not everyone agreed that filth and ill health went together.151 
However, a physician by the name of John Snow152 was able to demonstrate that 
outbreaks of cholera, particularly the 1854 outbreak, ‗could be traced to the 
original source,‘153 being the Broad Street water pump. Snow explained ‗the dismal 
ratios of survival among the people living near the pump, and the unusual 
exemptions granted to people who had not drunk the water.‘154 While somewhat 
sceptical of Snow‘s argument, the St James Parish Board decided to close down the 
pump.  
 
Johnson maintains that the decision to remove the pump would ‗be more significant 
than the short-term effects‘155 of preventing the pandemic. The pump‘s removal 
provided the impetus for greater public health interventions based on evidence‘ as 
opposed to mere conjecture:   
For the first time a public institution had made an informed intervention into a 
cholera outbreak based on a scientifically sound theory of the disease. The 
decision to remove the handle was not based on meteorological charts or social 
prejudice or watered-down medieval humorology; it was based on a 
methodological survey of the actual social patterns of the epidemic, confirming 
predictions put forward by an underlying theory of the disease‘s effect on the 
human body.156 
The effect of Snow‘s discovery, as well as the decisive actions of the board, 
contributed ‗to improvements in sanitation in the United Kingdom that reduced the 
threat of cholera‘.157 The role sanitation played in combating cholera is widely 
recognised. Furthermore, the role of the state in ensuring sanitation illustrates the 
value the state places on a healthy population to maintain its national power.  
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1.5.3 Immunisation 
The infectious disease smallpox was another particularly devastating disease, in 
large part for its propensity to attack, and kill, children. The unrelenting severity of 
the disease bought about the third advance in global health security, inoculation or 
immunisation. According to WHO, ‗during the 18th century, smallpox killed every 
seventh child born in Russia and every tenth child born in France and Sweden‘.158 
This significant impact on the general population prompted Edward Jenner, in 
1796, to conduct experiments to inoculate persons against the disease.159 Medical 
considerations aside, and within the realm of this thesis, the importance of this 
event rests in the dissemination of information throughout the world, as McNeill 
contends 
Personal and political accidents, scientific and professional organization, and a 
systematically expanded network of communication among men of learning all 
came together therefore in the course of the eighteenth century to bring a 
sharp reduction of smallpox deaths within the power of European doctors. 
Organized medicine thereby began for the first time to contribute to population 
growth in a statistically significant fashion.160 
While quarantine, sanitation, and immunisation, developed separately, the trilogy of 
advances ‗came to be seen as requiring international coordination in order to 
strengthen global public health security‘.161 At the centre of encouraging both the 
coordination and cooperation required to control communicable disease exists the 
World Health Organization. 
 
The potential consequences of pandemics led WHO, during the Twenty-Second 
World Health Assembly (1969), to adopt a series of regulations designed to 
minimise the impact of communicable disease,  
The International Sanitary Regulations were founded on principles which 
―ensure the maximum security against the international spread of disease with 
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the minimum interference with world traffic. These regulations…included 
conditions and measures to be taken for control of infectious disease at 
seaports, airports, and border areas open to international traffic.‖162  
The Regulations were designed to allow not just for the evolution of 
microorganisms, but the way to address them as well. In 1969 the International 
Sanitary Regulations ‗were renamed the International Health Regulations‘ (IHR).163 
Nakajima argues that the regulations ‗constitute an area where the foreign policy 
concerns of WHO‘s member states to protect the health of their citizens have been 
translated into an internationally binding legal instrument‘.164  
 
Significant changes within IHR have transpired within the most recent incarnation 
of the regulations. For example, WHO ‗is now authorised through IHR to take into 
account information sources other than official notifications‘165 highlighting the 
seriousness of pandemics in the 21st century. In other words, WHO is now legally 
authorised to ignore the representations of the state, thereby confronting the sacred 
concept of sovereignty, and accept reports of disease from other sources.166 The 
evolution of international health security has shown that the impact of pandemics in 
the past has prompted major reforms for combating the scourge of infectious 
disease. The realisation for international cooperation is vital for any effort in 
defeating future pandemics. However, there can be no escaping the difficulties in 
bringing about such cooperation. In large part these difficulties have been limited 
by an omission to acknowledge that pandemics are an actor in international affairs. 
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1.6 Conclusion 
By utilising the IR theory of realism, and the notion of relational power the chapter 
has laid the foundation for a more in-depth analysis of the impact of pandemics in 
the 21st century. The chapter contends that power is a determining factor of 
international relations, and that by looking towards the effects of a pandemic in 
terms of power, it becomes possible to establish a greater understanding of the 
politics and power of pandemics. 
 
Infectious disease has played an important role in the evolution of human society. 
The requisite cooperation for actively fighting a pandemic has been widely 
recognised through the institution of IHR. As McNeill reminds:  
any effort to understand what lies ahead, as much as what lies behind, the role 
of infectious disease cannot properly be left out of consideration. Ingenuity, 
knowledge, and organization cannot cancel humanity‘s vulnerability to 
invasion by parasitic forms of life. Infectious disease which antedated the 
emergence of humankind will last as long as humanity itself, and will surely 
remain, as it has been hitherto, one of the fundamental parameters and 
determinants of human history.167 
In arguing that pandemics are an actor in IR, the use of four dimensions of 
relational power, being the scope, the domain, the weight, and the cost of 
pandemics were assessed; in all dimensions pandemics easily constitute a challenge 
to a state‘s power. As an actor in IR, pandemics wield considerable power. While 
states do have an ability to combat the pandemic actor medically, such ability is 
usually delayed, while a viable treatment/prevention technique is 
discovered/adopted. By understanding the non-medical effects of a pandemic for a 
state‘s power, the state is able to minimise the wider implications derived from the 
pandemic actor and shield its national power. 
 
The larger task of this thesis now becomes to establish realism as a valid theoretical 
framework of analysis for evaluating the threat to state power of the pandemic 
actor. By treating pandemics as an actor, and not merely an issue of health concern, 
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this thesis bridges a divide between IR and global health.  The immediate task of the 
thesis now is to elaborate further the theoretical divisions within international 
relations to establish why realism, along with the use of an elements of national 
power approach, provides a strong and innovative framework for assessing the 
threat of pandemics to the state. 
 
  
Chapter Two: Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism 
2.0 Introduction 
Theories of international relations provide a conceptual framework to analyse the 
complexities of the international political arena. According to Walt ‗a theory is a 
causal explanation – it identifies recurring relations between two or more 
phenomena and explains why that relationship obtains.‘1 International relations 
theory allows this ‗by providing…a picture of the central forces that determine real-
world behaviour‘.2  As a subject international relations ‗attempts to create criteria by 
which imperfections and injustices can be recognised, and dangerous risks 
avoided.‘3 In utilising a theoretical approach the possibility to create a framework 
for threat perceptions presents itself. As Hans Morgenthau notes,  
A theory of international relations performs the functions any theory performs, 
that is, to bring order and meaning into a mass of unconnected material and to 
increase knowledge through the logical development of certain propositions 
empirically established.4  
By using a theoretical approach to assess the impact of pandemics on international 
relations it becomes possible to ‗account for phenomena that would otherwise seem 
mystifying‘.5  The impact of pandemic actors on the power of a state is such a 
phenomenon that, with the use of international relations theory, the development 
becomes possible of a stronger understanding of the non-medical impacts of the 
disease.6  
                                                 
1 Walt, S.M. (2005) ‗The Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations‘, Annual 
Review of Political Science, (8), p.26. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Windsor, P. (2002) ‗International Relations – The State of the Art‘ in Berdal M., ed. Studies in 
International Relations: Essays by Philip Windsor, Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, p.18. 
4 Morgenthau, H.J. (1970) ‗The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory‘, in Der Derian, J., ed. 
(1995) International Theory: Critical Investigation, London: Macmillan, p.46. 
5 Walt, S.M. (2005), op. cit. p.27. 
6 In the wake of the Spanish Influenza pandemic of 1918 George Soper, writing for Science, 
contended that ‗the most astonishing thing about the pandemic was the complete mystery which 
surrounded it. Nobody seemed to know what the disease was, where it came from or how to stop it.‘ 
Furthermore, while ‗floods, famines, earthquakes and volcanic eruptions have all written their stories 
in terms of human destruction…never before has there been a catastrophe at once so sudden, so 
devastating and so universal.‘ (Soper, p.501) The profound case of Spanish Influenza is that some 90 
years later, the world is still troubled by its derivatives. (See Morens, D.M., Taubenberger, J.K., and 
Fauci, A.S. (2010) ‗The 2009 H1N1 Pandemic Influenza Virus: What Next?‘, mBio, 1(4), e00211-
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Having established pandemics as an actor in international affairs it now becomes 
the responsibility of this thesis to validate the use of IR theory to assess the political 
impact of pandemics. This chapter does so by providing a theoretical approach that 
will ‗simplify reality in order to render it [the political response to pandemics] 
comprehensible‘.7  Traditionally, international relations theory has been utilised to 
‗explain or predict‘ the ‗patterns of behaviour among various international actors‘.8 
This chapter argues that the international theory of realism, specifically Hans 
Morgenthau‘s classical realism, provides the strongest framework of analysis to 
determine the threat posed to the international community by pandemics.  
 
In order to validate such a position, the chapter will first provide an overview of the 
theory of realism, in particular the resurgence of realism in the 21st century, to 
establish the validity of the theoretical foundation of the thesis. Second, the chapter 
will draw on the work of Hans Morgenthau, particularly his interpretation of 
realism and the politics among nations9 to confirm realism‘s utility as a diagnostic 
framework to assess the political impact of pandemics. Morgenthau‘s realist 
elements of national power approach, when assessing the pandemic threat develops 
a wider appreciation of the threats posed by pandemics to the nation state. This 
chapter illustrates the ability to bridge the theoretical divide between traditional and 
non-traditional security threats. By showing the adaptability of Morgenthau‘s 
framework the methodological approach of the thesis is exposed. 
                                                                                                                                           
10.) Similar reports exist in regard to the devastation of Europe following the Black Plague, the 
impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic throughout Africa, as well as the impact of Severe Acute 
Respiratory Syndrome outbreak. (See Chapter Four: The Plague Pandemic, Chapter Five: The AIDS 
Pandemic and Chapter Six: The SARS Pandemic for a more detailed account of the impact of these 
specific pandemics.) 
7 Walt, S.M. (2005), op. cit. p.26. [Brackets Added] 
8 Viotti P.R., and Kauppi, M.V. (1999) International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism 
and Beyond, Needham Heights, MA: Pearson Education, p.3. 
9 Edward A. Kolodziej (2005) maintains that the title of Morgenthau‘s text indicates ‗a sensitivity to 
nationalism as a force impelling state behaviour and shaping its value system and interests, a point 
lost to many theorists, such as Kenneth Waltz (1979), who implicitly transforms Morgenthau‘s pre-
rational, pre-national, emotion-driven nation-states into cold-blooded rational entities inured to 
popular impulse of compulsions.‘ (p.119) 
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In his seminal work Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Hans 
Morgenthau develops a theory based on political reality. He aims to create a theory 
that would not be judged by ‗some preconceived abstract principle or concept 
unrelated to reality‘, but one that could ‗bring order and meaning to a mass of 
phenomena that without it [the theory] would remain disconnected and 
unintelligible.‘10 In order to develop such a theory, Morgenthau adopted ‗the central 
terms ―power‖ and ―interest‖,‘ and in doing so created ‗a realist model that 
described objective patterns in the structure and dynamism of world politics‘.11 In 
using Morgenthau‘s model to interpret the threat posed to nations by pandemics, 
the utility of his theory is magnified to accommodate the more recently termed non-
traditional security threats. 
 
The use of a traditional theory, to assess the non-traditional security threat of 
pandemics, seeks to realign the notion of threat perception within the realist 
framework. At the heart of realism is the premise that ‗the overriding goal of states 
in this environment of international anarchy is to survive,‘12 and that, ‗the only way 
that states can reasonably ensure their survival is to increase their power‘.13 Any 
actor that negatively impacts on a state‘s power threatens that state‘s ability to 
survive. Yet, when it comes to the study of health activity and international 
relations, David P. Fidler, contends that ‗international health activity has been 
obscure and neglected,‘ a possible consequence of ‗those who dissect international 
politics…[considering] health issues unimportant and uninteresting‘.14 Fidler 
reasons that such a scenario transpires because, 
The neglect of health has been considered a function of health‘s place in the so-
called ―low politics‖ of international relations. ―High politics‖ involves issues of 
                                                 
10 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.3. [Brackets Added] 
11 Hacke C. (2005) ‗Power and Morality: On the Legacy of Hans J. Morgenthau‘, American Foreign 
Policy Interests, 27, p.171. 
12 Weber C. (2001) International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, London: Routledge, p.15. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Fidler, D.P. (2005), op. cit. p.180. [Brackets Added] 
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war and peace, competition for power, the dilemma of national security, and 
the fight for survival in anarchy. ―Low politics‖ concerns international 
cooperation on economic, environmental, and social issues. The distinction 
between ―high politics‖ and ―low politics‖ has been prominent in debates in 
international relations theory.15  
The relegation of health to a low politics category insinuates that states will seek 
cooperation when attempting to counter the effects of a pandemic. In response to a 
pandemic, states have often acted collectively both to develop and embrace 
measures of prevention. Bourdelais argues that such cooperation indicated ‗the 
determination of governments‘ and their desire ‗to protect cities, provinces, and 
countries from danger,‘16 being largely derived from historic experience. Indeed, 
‗historians know quite well that [with] each step toward the globalization of trade 
and the economy…a new generation of epidemics‘17 was encountered. When a 
pandemic threatens, the desire and need for international cooperation is strong. 
However, rarely do the cooperative measures that transpire prove to be adequately 
effective. Such reluctance is indicative of the state confronting pandemics with an 
isolationist grasp, placing the survival of the state before any collective measures, 
and further reinforcing the realist notions of self-interest and survival. 
 
Central to the debate surrounding the prominence of realism is the apparent 
disregard of the theory for international cooperation. Indeed, critics of realism refer 
to the end of the Cold War and the adoption of international cooperative regimes, 
and the increased prominence of the United Nations, as evidence of realism‘s 
demise.18 However, realism does not rule out the notion of international cooperation 
as Thompson and Clinton confirm: 
By and large, realists have not maintained that international cooperation is 
impossible but only that, in order to be successful, efforts at international 
cooperation must accommodate themselves to the realities of power, rather 
                                                 
15 Fidler, D.P. (2005), op. cit. p.180. 
16 Bourdelais, P. (2006), op. cit. p.xii. 
17 Ibid. pp.x – xi. [Brackets Added] 
18 Michael Cox (2007) argues that critics of realism often attach the theory to ‗the Cold War as a 
particular kind of bipolar system that had bought about some form of stability to the world. Hence, 
its incapacity to predict the system‘s demise occurred not just for intellectual reason alone…but 
because of something far more disturbing: its identity with, and effective defence of an order whose 
structures it should have been analysing instead of rationalizing.‘ (p.168)  
Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism 
39 
than vainly attempting to suppress the desire for power or ignoring the pattern 
of relative influence that the current distribution of power creates.19 
When a state is forced to confront the pandemic actor, more often than not, the state 
has little choice but to seek international cooperation, in order to minimise any 
disruption of its national power. Mearsheimer provides insight into the notion of 
cooperation within the realist world, conceding that such cooperation ‗is difficult to 
achieve…and always difficult to sustain‘.20 The main difficulty in facilitating 
genuine international cooperation stems from two factors, ‗relative-gains 
considerations, and concerns about cheating‘.21 These difficulties conform to the 
realist concept of survival being the primary motivation of state behaviour. In 
regard to a pandemic, the survival of the state is the impetus for all state 
cooperation. As the case studies contained in Chapters Three, Four and Five convey, 
the actions taken by a state to survive a pandemic are of an extreme parallel to state 
actions often reserved for times of war. At times of war, the bridge/barriers between 
theory and practice blur. 
2.1 Realist Theory and Practice 
Realism remains prominent in the field of international relations theory.22 Legro and 
Moravesik summarise the situation with realism remaining, ‗the primary or 
alternative theory in virtually every major book or article addressing general 
theories of world politics.‘23 Furthermore, political science academics such as 
William C. Wohlforth endorse realism as ‗the foil against which many other schools 
of thought define themselves and their contributions,‘ and suggest that if one were 
to ‗take realism out of the picture…the identities of these schools as well as the 
                                                 
19 Thompson, K.W. and Clinton, W.D. (2006), op. cit. p.xviii. 
20 Mearsheimer, J. (1994-95) ‗The False Promise of International Institutions‘, International Security, 
19(3), p.12. 
21 Ibid. Mearsheimer echoes Grieco‘s 1988 International Organization article ‗Anarchy and the 
Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism‘. Grieco‘s central 
thesis in regard to cooperation is predicated on ‗realism find[ing] states are positional‘ and that ‗state 
positionality is more defensive than offensive in nature.‘(p.500) In essence, because ‗states are 
uncertain about one another‘s future intentions…they pay close attention to how cooperation might 
affect relative capabilities in the future.‘ (p.500) [Brackets Added] 
22 See Legro J.W. and Moravesik A.M. (1999) ‗Is Anybody Still a Realist‘, International Security, 
24(2), p.5; Zakaria, F. (1992) ‗Is Realism Finished‘, The National Interest, 20(Winter), p.21. 
23 Legro, J.W. and Moravesik, A.M. (1999), op. cit., p.5. 
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significance of their argument‘ would become ‗much less clear‘.24 In looking to 
define the theory Nikolas Gvosdev, executive editor of The Nations Interest, 
succinctly argues that ‗realism is conflated with ―being realistic,‖ that is, adopting a 
particular course of action that is pragmatic or expedient‘.25 Gvosdev‘s definition 
lays bare a theoretical concept that maintains a rich history.  
 
The central characteristics of realism have a tendency to ‗converge around four 
central propositions‘ to establish the theoretical construct.26 The first proposition 
pertains to the notion of groupism, the premise of which is that ‗politics takes place 
within and between groups‘.27 The solidarity within these groups provides the 
foundation for ‗domestic politics and conflict and cooperation between polities 
[being] the essence of international politics‘.28 In regard to the nature or essence of 
the polity ‗realism makes no assumption‘ allowing realism to be applied ‗to any 
social setting where groups interact‘.29 Wohlforth maintains that in order ‗to 
survive at anything beyond a subsistence level, people need the cohesion provided 
by group solidarity, yet that very same in-group cohesion generates the potential for 
conflict with other groups.‘30 In respect to the likelihood of cooperation under a 
realist paradigm, Ilona Kickbuch contends that realism foresees ‗the co-operation of 
sovereign states in global health as interdependent utility functions based on self-
interest, security considerations and competition for power‘.31 While the desire for 
cooperation may exist, without the considerations of security and self-interest, the 
impetus for cooperation is lacking. Therefore, the essence of international politics is 
                                                 
24 Wohlforth, W.C. (2008) ‗Realism‘, in Reus-Smit, C., and Snidal, D., eds., (2008) The Oxford 
Handbook of International Relations, New York: Oxford University Press, p.131. 
25 Gvosdev, N.K. (2005) ‗The Values of Realism‘, The SAIS Review, XXV(1), p.17. 
26 Wohlforth, W.C. (2008), op. cit., p.132. 
27 Ibid. p.133 
28 Wohlforth, W.C. (2008), op. cit. p.133. [Brackets Added] 
29 Ibid. Mearsheimer (2001) elucidates on the realist worldview in that ‗Realists tend not to draw 
sharp distinctions between ‗good‘ and ‗bad‘ states, because all great powers act according to the same 
logic, regardless of their culture, political system, or who runs the government.‘ (pp. 17-18) 
30 Ibid. 
31 Kickbuch, I. (2003) ‗Global Health Governance: Some Theoretical Considerations on the New 
Political Space‘, in Lee, K. ed., (2003) Health Impacts of Globalization: Towards Global Governance, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, p.194. 
Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism 
41 
epitomised through either ‗conflict‘ or ‗cooperation‘ among political groupings or 
polities.32 The behaviour of these political groupings is reflected by the second 
proposition of realism, egoism. 
 
Egoism is defined by Wohlforth as political action by individuals or groups ‗driven 
principally by narrow self-interest‘.33 Egoism is central to the realist argument that 
‗all politics is an expression of the same human drives‘.34 Hans Morgenthau informs 
Wohlforth‘s assertion in arguing that interest, or egoism, ‗is indeed the essence of 
politics, and is unaffected by the circumstances of time and space‘.35  While egoism 
is capable of being ‗overcome by national and international political structures, 
institutions and values,‘36 Zakaria contends that the longevity of these regimes can 
be limited as,  
International regimes serve to regularize cooperation, reduce transaction costs, 
and provide institutional support for multilateral policies. These regimes often 
play a positive role in international life, but they cannot make member-states 
choose international over national interests.37  
The inability for international regimes to enforce compliance from members in line 
with the regimes‘, or international, interest makes a contribution to the third 
proposition articulated by Wohlforth; anarchy. 
 
Simply put, ‗the absence of a government dramatically shapes the nature of 
international politics‘ and relates to the anarchic international system.38  The 
constant flux of anarchy imposes ‗distinctive constraints on the ability of 
                                                 
32 Wohlforth, W.C. (2008), op. cit. p.133. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Lebow, R. N. (2010) ‗Classical Realism‘, in Dunne, T., Kurki, M., and Smith S., eds., (2010)  
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, New York: Oxford University Press, p.61. 
Central to Morgenthau‘s (2006) concept of realism is that ‗political realism, like society in general, is 
governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.‘ (P.4) Thompson and Clinton 
(2006) go as far as to argue that ‗stemming from their understanding of human nature, and their 
reading of history, realists hold such a respect for the destructiveness of power and such a fear that it 
will be misused that they are convinced that it must be controlled.‘ (p.xxi) 
35 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit., p.10. 
36 Wohlforth, W.C. (2008), op. cit. p.133. 
37 Zakaria, F. (1992), op. cit. p.29. 
38 Wohlforth, W.C. (2008), op. cit. p.133. 
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international actors to achieve their purposes and exacerbate[s] group egoism.‘39 
According to Joseph M. Grieco realists believe that international anarchy ‗fosters 
competition and conflict among states and inhibits their willingness to cooperate 
even when they share common interests.‘40 Grieco‘s argument is further reinforced 
by Kenneth Waltz, who in his 1959 work Man, the State, and War, retells 
Rousseau‘s stag parable to illustrate cooperative action, ‗when all agree on the goal 
and have an equal interest in the project, one cannot rely on others‘.41 Likewise, the 
anarchic structure of international politics provides an environment for states to 
execute their power to ensure their survival.  
 
When analysing international relations, realists ‗look for where the power is, for 
what the group interests are, and to the role power relationships play in reconciling 
clashing interests.‘42 For this reason the fourth, and possibly most cited, proposition 
regarding realism is the notion of power politics.43 Morgenthau‘s justification for 
the utilisation of power as a central signpost for political realism was to define ‗the 
concept of interest in terms or power‘.44 The notion of interest defined as power 
provides an ‗objective category that is universally valid, but…does not endow that 
concept with a meaning that is fixed and for all‘.45  The intent is that a state‘s 
interest is not set in stone: as time progresses there is a need for those responsible for 
maintaining the state‘s national power, not only to recognise the movements within 
the gamut of national interest, but to appreciate the threats towards that interest, 
and to ensure the preservation of the state‘s national power.  
                                                 
39 Ibid. [Brackets Added] 
40 Grieco, J. M. (1988) ‗Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the New Liberal 
Institutionalism‘, International Organization, (42)3, p.485. 
41 Waltz, K.N. (2001), op. cit. p.168. Rousseau‘s stag parable, as told by Waltz (2001): ‗Assume five 
men who have acquired a rudimentary ability to speak and to understand each other happen to come 
together at a time when all of them suffer from hunger. The hunger of each will be satisfied by the 
fifth part of a stag, so they ―agree‖ to cooperate in a project to trap one. But also the hunger of any 
one of them will be satisfied by a hare, so, as a hare comes within reach, one of them grabs it. The 
defector obtains the means of satisfying his hunger but in doing so permits the stag to escape. His 
immediate interest prevails over consideration for his fellows.‘ (pp.167-168)  
42 Wolhforth, W.C. (2008), op. cit. p.134. 
43 See Chapter One section 1.1 Power and Pandemics: Power and International Relations. 
44 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.5. 
45 Ibid. p.10.  
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In confirming the prominence of power and politics Morgenthau maintains that ‗all 
political phenomena can be reduced to one of three basic types. A political desire 
either to keep power, to increase power, or to demonstrate power.‘46 The ability to 
conceptualise ‗interests defined as power‘ provides a significant advantage to the 
scholar of international relations. Morgenthau advocates that conceiving of 
‗interests defined as power imposes intellectual discipline on the observer, infuses 
rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical 
understanding of politics possible.‘47 By concentrating on power, and the elements 
constituting that power, realism presents itself as a theory that will enable an 
assessment of the threat posed to the state by the pandemic actor. As will be shown, 
during the period of a pandemic, and the aftermath, states act purposely to keep 
their power and seek increased power against the threat, and throughout, 
demonstrate their power in all their actions in confronting the contagion threat.   
 
In order to demonstrate these overarching concepts of Realism, it is important to 
now identify and drill down into the particular elements of national power as 
identified by Morgenthau.  Such attention will facilitate a nuanced understanding of 
the relationship between the pandemic actor and the components of state power. 
 
2.2 Morgenthau‘s Elements of National Power 
In order to ascertain ‗the power of a nation vis-à-vis‘ other nations, Hans 
Morgenthau established ‗the components of what…[he] called national power‘.48 
This thesis focuses on the threat posed by a pandemic towards a state‘s power. In 
                                                 
46 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.50. Zakaria (1998) goes one step further in arguing that it is 
the ‗statesman‘s responsibility…to maximise his country‘s security and influence in the world; to 
allow for the inevitable shifts in international power and prestige; and finally, to preclude or preempt 
a general war.‘ (p.29) 
47 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.5. 
48 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.122. 
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order to establish a framework to assess the impact of pandemics on national power 
the thesis uses Morgenthau‘s various elements of national power. Such an 
assessment reveals the vulnerabilities of the nation state. Morgenthau contends the 
main vulnerability is the breaking point of both individuals, and societies as: 
…[T]here is a point beyond which human endurance does not carry human 
initiative in the face of such unprecedented massive devastation…under the 
impact of such devastation, civilization itself will collapse.49 
In employing Morgenthau‘s elements of national power this thesis seeks to provide 
an interpretation of the threat posed by pandemics of infectious disease to a state‘s 
national power.  
2.2.1 Geography 
Morgenthau contends that the element of geography is ‗the most stable factor on 
which the power of a nation depends‘.50 His assertions are founded on the strategic 
strength of a state that finds itself geographically isolated from the rest of the 
world.51  Isolation provides a buffer, protecting the state from an aggressor state 
considering conflict, allowing the state to foresee the pending conflict and then 
make adequate preparations for protection from the aggressor.  Geographic 
isolationism provides little solace for the unseen threat such as pandemics, hence 
Morgenthau‘s concession that the element of geography is, ‗certainly much less 
important today than it was fifty or a hundred years ago‘ now appears predictive.52  
 
The ‗geographic conditions‘ of a state ‗have great influence on international 
problems‘;53 a state‘s geographic situation should be utilised as a gauge of the 
                                                 
49 Morgenthau, H. J. (1966) ‗The Purpose of Political Science‘, in Charlesworth, J.C., A Design for 
Political Science, Philadelphia, PA: American Academy of Political Science, pp.66-67. [Brackets 
Added] 
50 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.122. 
51 Morgenthau (2006) illustrates his argument by looking towards the ‗insular location‘ (p.123) of 
Great Britain contending that the physical separation of Great Britain from the rest of Europe ‗by a 
small body of water, the English Channel‘ (p.122) impeded the conquering forces of Julius Caesar, 
William the Conqueror, Philip II, Napoleon, and Hitler. 
52 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.122. 
53 Wilson, C. M. (1950) ‗The Geographical Basis of National Power‘, Ohio Journal of Science, 50(1), 
p.35.; Wilson argues that geographic conditions incorporate aspects such as ‗space relations 
(location, size and shape), land forms, climate, land content (soils and minerals), and native 
vegetation‘ all of which ‗strengthen[s] some states and weakens others‘. (p.35) 
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impact of any security threat. Morgenthau further maintains that there are two 
prominent measures within the element of geography: the state‘s location and the 
state‘s size, both of which contribute to the susceptibility of the state, and the ability 
of the state to respond. Both are critical at a time of a pandemic.  
 
The strength of a state‘s geographic location is of ‗paramount consideration in 
analyzing a nation‘s actual and potential power‘.54 Location plays a crucial role in 
sustaining a population.55 Geography is constant and it is difficult to modify. 
Spykman goes so far as to argue that ‗geography is the most fundamental factor in 
the foreign policy of states because it is the most permanent‘.56 Morgenthau 
illustrates that history has shown that, where states are either isolated by the ocean 
or provided solace by a rugged mountain range, they have a relative power 
advantage in the face of a traditional threat, such as an advancing military.57 Yet 
technological advances have a negative impact on the value of such security. While 
Morgenthau argues it to be ‗fallacious to assume…that the technical development of 
transportation, communications and warfare has eliminated altogether the isolating 
factor of the oceans,‘58 it stands within reason that Morgenthau was unable to fully 
predict the extraordinary advances in technology of the modern era. However, 
technological advances, have not challenged the fundamentals of Morgenthau‘s 
realism. Technological globalisation, and the speed with which it has become ‗part 
of every society‘s strategy for survival and progress,‘59 can be perceived as 
demanding a contemporary interpretation of the traditional protective power of the 
(physical) geographic element.  
 
                                                 
54 Ibid. p.37. 
55 The geography of a nation not only has the ability to provide solace to a community from an 
aggressor, but also incorporates the viability of sustaining the population based on the agricultural 
possibilities derived from the quality of the soil. 
56 Spykman, N. J. (2007) America‘s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of 
Power, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, p.41. 
57 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. pp.122-124. 
58 Ibid. p.122. 
59 Khanna, P. (2008) The Second World: How Emerging Powers are Redefining Global Competition 
in the Twenty-First Century, London: Penguin Books, p.xxi. 
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In regard to trade, a state‘s geographic location has become strategically less 
important, for example, in the 21st century, than it was previously.60 Curtis Wilson 
echoes Morgenthau‘s thesis when he states, ‗location…determines their [the states] 
degree of accessibility, a factor which no state can afford to ignore if expecting to 
survive in a world harassed by international conflict.‘61 As a result, the notion of 
protection offered by borders becomes altered, but nonetheless important. Borders 
foremost act as a barrier to those beyond them and as a boundary marker for the 
terrain and space for the population within. However their repelling and 
containment abilities have altered.  
 
The more accessible a state‘s border the more likely an actor‘s ability to capitalise on 
such a weakness. Threats towards a state‘s territorial border vary significantly, 
based on the geographic factors of that border. States that share mutual borders, 
without geographical intimidation, are more prone to mutual intimidation of one 
another, than states whose geography manages to seclude them from their nearest 
neighbour. Such seclusion can come in the form of mountain ranges or expansive 
bodies of water.62 These geographic attributes were deemed by Morgenthau to be a 
‗natural frontier‘ meaning a ‗frontier predetermined…by geographical factors.‘63 
Therefore, border ‗geographical situations [are]…an important element in the 
political and military considerations‘ of a state, and must be taken into account 
when assessing potential threats to the state.64  Threats such as pandemics do not 
respect frontier border restrictions. 
 
                                                 
60 Particularly in regard to isolated island nations, the decrease in importance of geographic location 
correlates directly with advances in transportation and communication such advances were derived 
from the need for states to evolve from the imperial trade routes of the 18th and 19th century, to 
adapt to more direct trade and shipping (e.g. air freight). 
61 Wilson, C. M. (1950), op. cit. p.37. [Brackets Added] 
62 Morgenthau (2006) argues that the separation of the Italian peninsula from the rest of Europe ‗by 
the high mountain massif of the Alps‘ poses significant challenges to ‗invade Central Europe from 
Italy, while it has made it much less difficult to invade Italy from the north. In consequence, 
invasions of Italy have been much more frequent than invasions by Italy‘. (p.123) 
63 Morgenthau H. J. (2006), op. cit. p.124. 
64 Ibid. p.123. [Brackets Added] 
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In regard to the element of geography and the internal accessibility of the state, both 
the size of the state and any geological impediment must be taken into consideration 
to adequately determine the impact of a threat. Wilson contends that ‗size 
measurably determines the vulnerability of industrial establishments and 
transportation-communication nets.‘65 Awareness of internal vulnerabilities is 
arguably one of the foremost requirements for a state to possess in the face of border 
security threats.  
 
Morgenthau illustrates the importance of a state‘s size and geography by 
highlighting the threat of nuclear war, arguing that 
In order to make a nuclear threat credible, a nation requires a territory large 
enough to disperse its industrial and population centers as well as its nuclear 
installations. The conjunction between the large radius of nuclear destruction 
and the relatively small size of their territories imposes a severe handicap on 
the ability of the traditional nation-states, such as Great Britain and France, to 
make a nuclear threat credible.66 
In this instance, the credibility of the threat corresponds to the likely impact of a 
first strike, or even a retaliatory attack, on the power of the state and the 
geographical realities. The greater the impact the more the power of possessing a 
nuclear weapon diminishes. In the same way pandemics can efficiently decimate a 
population of a state with a non-resistive geography. The awareness of a state‘s 
geographical advantages and disadvantages is vital in any emergency situations, 
including pandemics. 
 
In utilising Morgenthau‘s element of geography to gauge the impact of a pandemic 
a number of insights are developed. First, the state‘s proximity to a pandemic 
outbreak, and the likelihood of cross-border contagion propagation are significantly 
increased through modern day transportation, with the notion of a geographic 
barrier becoming diminished. Second, a nation‘s internal geographic make-up has 
the ability either to impede the diagnosis and suppression of pandemics, or to 
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facilitate the further dissemination of the pandemic. In order to comprehend the 
behaviour of the pandemic actor, an understanding of the impediments of a state‘s 
geography is vital. 
2.2.2 Natural Resources 
Natural resources, closely linked to the preceding element of geography, are the 
materials and substances that occur in nature and can be utilised not only for 
economic gain but also as a foundation of power for the state. The possession, or 
acquisition, of natural resources allows a state to ensure its survival. Indeed, Wilson 
goes so far as to argue that ‗in order to become a world power, a state must either 
have essential natural resources within its borders or…the power to guarantee 
access to foreign supplies at all times‘.67 Without a reliable natural resource supply, 
the state exposes its vulnerability. 
 
The power generated by a state‘s natural resources is, derived from the notion of 
self-sufficiency. According to Morgenthau ‗a country that is self-sufficient, or nearly 
self-sufficient has a great advantage over a nation that is not‘.68 For example, a state 
that is not rich in natural resources will find itself ‗dependent on foreign sources to 
supply its deficiencies‘.69 Morgenthau divides the element of natural resources into 
the sub-elements of food and raw materials, with each category providing a unique 
insight into a state‘s accumulation of power, while further calling attention to the 
potential threats to that power. 
2.2.2.1 Food 
The importance of food to national power seems straightforward as ‗the abundance 
or scarcity of food production, a serious factor in security as well as the foremost 
requirement for national power, largely determines the economic, political, and 
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cultural development of a people‘.70 A nation that is not self-sufficient in food ‗must 
be able to import the foodstuffs it does not grow, or else starve‘.71 Morgenthau 
demonstrates such a requirement by utilising the example of Great Britain during 
the Second World War; a nation whose ‗power and…very existence…[had] always 
been dependent on its ability to keep the sea-lanes open over which the vital food 
supplies had to be shipped in‘.72 Whenever the state‘s ability to provide for its 
citizenry is challenged, the power of that state is also challenged, thereby directly 
threatening the state‘s ‗survival as a nation‘.73 Conversely, states that find themselves 
self-sufficient gain an advantage by not having to ‗divert [their] national energies‘, 
allowing the states ‗to pursue much more forceful and single-minded policies,‘74 
designed either to advance or preserve the national power. 
 
However, self-sufficiency in food can be difficult to maintain over time, as the 
demands of a population escalate as a result of ‗changes in the consumption of food 
brought about by changing conceptions of nutrition‘.75 The ‗nutrition transition‘76 
concedes that ‗centuries old diets are being altered comparatively speedily‘.77 
Drewnoski and Popkin in their 1997 study argued that the nutrition transition has 
created ‗a major dilemma…[for] the health and nutrition profession in any 
country‘.78 The transition, when combined with a growing global population gives 
rise to ‗not only greater overall demand for food, but also greater demand for water 
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and energy needed to produce and transport that food‘.79 The impact on the power 
from this particular element stems from both increases in demand as well as 
changes in agricultural technique, although the benefit of the latter in particular, 
has been somewhat one sided. Developed countries have been the main 
beneficiaries of changes in agricultural advances. In developing states, particularly 
those exposed to the HIV/AIDS pandemic have seen a loss in the accumulated 
knowledge gained through intergenerational experience. A July 2005 study by 
Hlanze, Gama, and Mondlane, outlines the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on 
crop production in Swaziland. The report contends that ‗because HIV/AIDS kills 
certain members of the family who have certain types of knowledge, those who are 
left behind will not have the knowledge if they have not yet given themselves time to 
learn‘. 80 In this way the impact of a pandemic mimics the effects of Morgenthau‘s 
self-sufficiency requirement for this element of national power. 
2.2.2.2 Raw Materials 
Raw materials are vital to the industrial production of the state and refer to more 
than just food production. Morgenthau contends that when combined with the 
‗increasing modernization of warfare…national power has become more and more 
dependent on the control of raw materials in peace and war‘.81 As with the element 
of food, a state has two options available in regard to the acquisition of raw 
materials.  
 
First, the state can acquire these by developing the technical infrastructure in order 
to extract the materials from within the territory of the state. The industrialisation 
and protection of the state is paramount to its ability to capitalise on raw materials. 
Mearsheimer contends that the benefits of industrialisation are two-fold:  
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First, highly industrialized states have considerably more surplus wealth to 
spend on defense than do semi-industrialized states, mainly because much of 
the physical product of the peasantry is consumed on the spot by the peasants 
themselves. Second, only states with the most advanced industries are capable 
of producing the large quantities of sophisticated weaponry that militaries need 
to survive in combat.82  
In order for a state to preserve its power it needs to move beyond self-sufficiency to 
ensure a surplus of material to call on in emergencies, such as pandemics. However, 
the notion of a state being self-sufficient dissipates as a country‘s population grows 
out of proportion to its possession of natural resources. The decline in self-
sufficiency forces states to source raw materials externally. 
 
Second, the state has the option of importing raw materials from foreign sources. 
The reliance on other nations to maintain a state‘s national supply is decidedly 
unstable for a nation‘s power, as there is no guarantee of the longevity of supply. As 
Spykman illustrates in regard to the USA which as,  
A country richly endowed with natural resources…[is]… perhaps more self-
sufficient than any other state in the world. But the requirements of an 
advanced industrial civilization are so varied and so complex that even the 
wealth of the North American Continent is inadequate to supply the 
multitudinous demands of her economy. A vast fleet of steamers from every 
port in the world must bring its cargo to her warehouses and factories in order 
that peace time production may continue uninterrupted.83 
In a world where individual states are reliant on others to satisfy their demands for 
raw materials, a threat to the national supply of raw materials for one state can 
transcend national boundaries to threaten the national supply of another. 
 
The power derived from a nation‘s natural resources for the state is potential at best. 
The possession of natural resources certainly ‗exerts important influence on the 
power of a nation with respect to other nations,‘84 yet at the same time, without the 
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ability for the state to capitalise on these resources, there is little advantage garnered 
from their possession. 
 
Morgenthau‘s element of natural resources provides a number of valuable insights 
into the vulnerabilities of this element when confronted by the pandemic actor.  
First, the domestic ramifications of a pandemic on a state‘s food supply must be 
considered. If the state is unable to satisfy demand for food, as a result of a loss of 
agricultural or industrial workers due to a pandemic, the state must look towards 
foreign entities for provision. Second, if the state is dependent on another state for 
access to raw materials, the industrial capacity of the afflicted state becomes a 
concern for the dependent state. Furthermore, if a state is reliant on foreign 
materials for the state to sustain an industrial complex, then this same industrial 
complex must be capable of preserving the supply of a broad range of resources 
during a pandemic. Maintaining the industrial complex is closely interwoven with 
Morgenthau‘s third element of industrial capacity. 
 
2.2.3 Industrial Capacity 
The link between a state‘s industrial capacity and its natural resources is relatively 
straightforward, as the ‗state‘s capacity for industrialization…is almost wholly 
dependent on the availability of natural resources‘.85 The state is reliant on its 
industrial infrastructure to maximise the utility of the natural resources, whether 
the natural resources are foreign or domestic. An inability to protect the industrial 
capacity poses a significant dilemma for states wanting to maintain, their power 
status, or maximise their power potential. Morgenthau, utilising the threat of 
traditional warfare reinforces the importance of this element,   
The technology of modern warfare transportation and communications has 
made the overall development of heavy industries an indispensible element of 
national power. Since victory in modern war depends on the number and 
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quality of highways, railroads, trucks, ships, airplanes, tanks, and equipment 
and weapons of all kinds, from mosquito nets and automatic rifles to oxygen 
masks and guided missiles, the competition among nations for power 
transforms itself largely into competition for the production of bigger, better, 
and more implements of war. The quality and productive capacity of the 
industrial plant, the know-how of the working man, the skill of the engineer, 
the inventive genius of the scientist, the managerial organization- all these are 
factors on which the industrial capacity of a nation, and hence, its power 
depend.86 
The element of industrial capacity is paramount to the domestic productivity of the 
state. Without a strong, resolute industrial capacity, the ability of a state to maintain 
its power status, or overcome any threat toward that status, is impeded. 
Morgenthau‘s inclusion of ‗the know-how of the working man, the skill of the 
engineer, the inventive genius of the scientist…‘87 is indicative of the importance of 
the human resources of a state‘s industrial capacity. Such a realisation not only 
widens the scope of the element, it strengthens the argument for protecting a state‘s 
industrial capacity, and its people, against both traditional and non-traditional 
security threats. 
 
Morgenthau contends that a state‘s infrastructure should be utilised to assure 
‗modern victory in war‘, as a state‘s industrial capacity provides a nation with the 
domestic infrastructure that enables the state to function on a daily basis. Regardless 
of whether the state is at war or peace, the power of a state‘s industrial capacity 
provides insight into the vulnerability of the state.  This need is largely derived from 
the state‘s reliance on foreign sources to fulfil their need for natural resources when 
they are unable to do so themselves. Meaning that if one state is dependent on 
another to subsidise any disparity in the state‘s domestic resource supply, the 
domestic issues of the supplying state, and the vulnerability of their industrial 
capacity, become a concern for the dependent state. Therefore, the need to protect 
this element extends to close trading partners. 
 
                                                 
86 Morgenthau, H. J. (2006), op. cit. p.132. 
87 Ibid. 
Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism 
54 
History has shown that infectious disease is often spread along trade routes.88 The 
swiftness of this spread has intensified as a result of modern day air travel, further 
increasing the likelihood of exposure to a pandemic. In order to prevent such 
exposure, appropriate measures of surveillance are required to monitor, and if need 
be, contain outbreaks of infectious disease using the trade route itself. Indeed, 
Michael Osterholm, writing for Foreign Affairs, highlights the dangers of a 
pandemic in modern society, arguing that,  
Given the extent to which modern commerce relies on the precise and readily 
available international trade of goods and services, a shutdown of the global 
economic system would dramatically harm the world‘s ability to meet the 
surging demand for essential commodities such as food and medicine during a 
crisis.89  
By understanding the threat a pandemic poses towards a state‘s industrial capacity, 
it becomes possible to provide a greater insight into the economic and political 
implications of a pandemic. Such insight propels a modern state to formulate 
comprehensive preparedness plans designed to incorporate political elements 
beyond the immediate health services to include transportation. The aim is to 
minimise the economic impact of a pandemic actor.  
 
Furthermore, a state‘s industrial capacity has the potential to play a key role during 
various stages of a pandemic. For example, given the very nature of industrial 
capacity as the delivery of goods, the industrial capacity of a state can be a 
significant partner in both the prevention (delivering remedies), and proliferation 
(delivering contagion) of the pandemic. Furthermore, by capitalising on the state‘s 
industrial capacity and its system of transportation networks, the state has the 
ability to utilise this capacity as a remedy to the pandemic. In this way, the 
industrial complex of the state has the capability to further minimise the economic 
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burden of a pandemic, by serving as a conduit for pandemic protection and or 
treatment. 
 
By strengthening a state‘s industrial capacity the possibility for appropriate 
pandemic preparedness is considerably reinforced. The 2008 study entitled 
Pandemic Influenza, Worker Absenteeism and Impacts on Freight Transportation,90 
highlights the potential impact of an outbreak of pandemic influenza on the 
domestic infrastructure of the USA. The study concludes that ‗there is significant 
likelihood of major breakdowns in the freight transportation sector under the more 
severe influenza scenarios as a direct result of large-scale worker absenteeism.‘91 
Such a breakdown is likely to ‗affect distribution and availability of a wide variety of 
consumer goods as well as availability of raw materials for many other industries.‘92 
The Jones et. al. study has a narrow focus on the impact of worker absenteeism on 
the United States, and never purports to provide insight into the wider global 
ramifications of a pandemic. However, the study does highlight how elements such 
as industrial capacity are important when considering the potential ramifications of 
a pandemic actor. 
 
Morgenthau justified the inclusion of the element of a state‘s industrial capacity, on 
the grounds that an ‗industrial establishment commensurate with the abundance of 
raw materials‘ can overcome the ‗lag between the potentialities and actualities of 
power.‘93 In the modern globalised world the role of industrial capacity has grown 
from being an element aimed at making an effective contribution towards a state‘s 
armed forces, towards an element fundamental to a state‘s economic prosperity. 
Military preparedness, however, remains pivotal to all states‘ power attributes. 
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2.2.4 Military Preparedness 
The importance of a state‘s military preparedness when dealing with a pandemic 
revolves around the military‘s ability to care for its troops, so that they are able to 
support both the national protection of the state, as well as the state‘s foreign policy. 
At the same time the military must adapt and fill the void created within the 
domestic infrastructure of the state as a result of any disaster, including pandemics. 
In short, the element of military preparedness undertakes its role to guarantee the 
survival of the state. 
 
The element of military preparedness and its relationship to a state‘s power is, as 
Morgenthau originally articulated, ‗too obvious to need much elaboration‘.94 The 
main determinant of a state‘s military preparedness, according to Morgenthau, is a 
‗military establishment capable of supporting the foreign policies pursued‘.95  The 
ability to achieve such support is derived from the principle factors of ‗technology, 
leadership, and the quantity and quality of the armed forces,‘96 each of which 
demands greater discussion below.  
 
The central purpose of a state‘s military is to ensure the survival of the state. A well-
prepared military must not only be adequately prepared for a pandemic, but also 
possess the ability to reinforce the sectors of society that are most severely impacted 
by a pandemic. Such a task requires an adaptive military. This requirement 
transforms the role of the military from ‗its primary responsibility to prepare for 
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conventional conflicts,‘97 towards a domestic guarantor of justice and order, a role 
that is magnified during a pandemic attack. 
2.2.4.1 Technology 
Morgenthau argued that ‗the fate of nations and of civilizations has often been 
determined by a differential in the technology of warfare for which the inferior side 
was unable to compensate in other ways,‘98 meaning, that if a state were able to 
develop advanced weaponry, which an enemy state was unable to counter, the 
stronger state would be at an advantage. Morgenthau‘s focus on the use of 
technology for weapon development and the implications for power contributes to 
any discussion on the combat against non-state actors. By following the notion that 
technological advancement should be based on the application of scientific 
knowledge for practical purpose,99 the actions taken by a state‘s military when 
confronting infectious disease are one such practical purpose. More often than not, 
a state‘s military has been at the forefront of the state‘s effort to (medically) protect 
its constituents.100  
 
Historically, the state has utilised the military as the primary guardian of the state. 
William McNeill asserts the strong interaction between ‗Europe‘s political history 
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and the health of professionalized standing armies and navies,‘101 contributed 
towards the state adopting sanitary regulations: 
The rise of absolutism on the European continent hinged on the availability of 
well-trained armies to do the sovereign‘s will; and the preservation of such 
armies, in turn, rested on the development of rules of sanitation and personal 
hygiene that reduced losses by epidemic disease to relatively minor 
proportions, winter and summer, in the field and in cantonments.102 
The technical contribution of the military establishment towards the prevention of 
outbreaks of infectious disease among troops has been made with a view to 
protecting personnel in times of conflict. Eliot Cohen refers to these technological 
innovations as ‗invisible [military] technology,‘103 arguing that,  
Often the most important elements of a military system are not the ones most 
evident to the casual observer, yet mastery of such technologies may weigh 
most in battle. American forces in the south-west Pacific in the Second World 
War struggled not only with the Japanese, but also with disease. The insecticide 
DDT, as much as any bomber or battleship, won the fight for New Guinea.104  
The evolution of military technology, in relation to confronting pandemics, is 
founded on the need to protect military personnel, as it is ‗through the debilitation 
of military personnel, [that a] pandemic can degrade human resources and reduce 
force strength.‘105 Such a scenario enforces effective management of a state‘s 
military preparedness so that it might protect the national power level of the state. 
 
Arguably the technological capabilities of a state‘s military represent a microcosm of 
the technological capabilities of the state. Morgenthau‘s element of military 
technology provides an avenue to assess a state‘s military‘s technological capacity 
not only to overcome the effects of a pandemic on the military complex, but also to 
actively contribute to limiting the impacts of a pandemic on a state‘s national power.  
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2.2.4.2 Leadership 
The effectiveness of a state‘s military is primarily a reflection of the abilities of the 
state‘s military leadership. When assessing a state‘s military preparedness ‗the 
quality of [a state‘s] military leadership has always exerted a decisive influence‘.106 
Decisive military leadership has the ability to assess and then counter a threat 
successfully; the contribution of military leadership to the state‘s national power is 
significant. For example, Morgenthau describes the inability of the French general 
staff to foresee the deficiencies of the Maginot Line to counter the ‗tendencies of 
modern technology, especially its trend toward mechanization of transportation and 
of communications,‘107 as a strong indicator of a deficient military leadership. In a 
similar fashion, a military that fails to appreciate the power potential of the non-
state actor, such as pandemics, risks strategic defeat. 
 
When utilising Morgenthau‘s sub-element of military leadership to assess a state‘s 
military preparedness to counter a pandemic, two prominent capabilities emerge: 
first, the strategic capabilities of the military to counter a pandemic, pertaining to 
the training and deployment of personnel to effectively combat the pandemic actor; 
second, the transparency of the military leadership in regard to the surveillance of 
the health and well being of its personnel.  
2.2.4.3 Quantity and Quality of Armed Forces 
While military preparedness is the bedrock of Morgenthau‘s elements, without the 
quantity and quality of military personnel to secure the power of this element, the 
preparedness assessment becomes redundant. As Morgenthau explains,   
A nation may have a good grasp of technological innovations in warfare. Its 
military leaders may excel in the strategy and tactics appropriate to the new 
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techniques of war. Yet such a nation may be militarily and, in consequence, 
also politically weak if it does not possess a military establishment that in its 
overall strength and in the strength of its component parts is neither too large 
nor too small in view of the tasks it may be called on to perform.108 
A large and qualified military ensures a diversification of skill and ability. 
Morgenthau regards reflexive diversification to be a vital element in the power of a 
nation. More specifically he states, ‗the power of a nation in military terms 
is…dependent on the quantity of men and arms and their distribution among the 
different branches of the military establishment.‘109 The endurance of the medical 
corps within the military recognises the importance of maintaining good health to 
ensure military preparedness.110  
 
A 2007 study by Jean-Paul Chretien111 draws attention to the ability of a state‘s 
military, particularly within developing countries, to make a substantial 
contribution to confronting emerging epidemics. The study highlights the surge in 
military personnel in developing countries112 during the 1990s, and contends that 
military personnel are a vital consideration in both exposure to, and surveillance of, 
infectious disease pandemics, as they ‗extend their public health capabilities to 
civilian populations not adequately served by civilian public health programmes‘.113 
Chretien echoes Morgenthau‘s awareness of a reflexive military and draws a direct 
line to the role of the military in confronting the pandemic actor. 
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the fact that the recruits brought widely different disease experience and resistances into the army, 
the medical corps was able to prevent massive epidemic outbreaks, and [take] swift advantage of new 
discoveries.‘ (p.275) [Brackets Added] 
111 Chretien, J.P., Blazes, D.L., Coldren, R.L., Lewis, M.D., Gaywee, J., Kana, K., Sirisopana, N., 
Vallejos, V., Mundaca, C.C., Montano, S., Martin, G.J., and Gaydos, J.C. (2007), ‗The Importance of 
Militaries from Developing Countries in Global Infectious Disease Surveillance‘, Bulletin of the 
World Health Organization, 85(3), pp.174 – 180.  
112 Chretien, J.P. et al. highlight that ‗militaries in developing countries currently comprise 17 of the 
25 largest active duty forces worldwide, with a combined total of 10.5 million of the 14.3 million 
personnel in these 25 forces‘. (p.174) 
113 Chretien, J.P. et. al. (2007), op. cit. p.174. For example ‗groups experiencing humanitarian 
emergencies or people in remote areas beyond the reach of ministries of health.‘ Importantly, ‗the 
mobility that facilitates such operations can also allow military forces to carry infectious agents to 
susceptible civilian populations.‘ (p.174.) 
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An effectively prepared military must possess the ability to reduce the risk posed to 
personnel who are deployed internationally, presumably furthering the national 
interest of their homeland.114 Any deployment of a state‘s military115 increases the 
likelihood of exposure to infectious disease.  Exposure may come from the country 
they are deployed to or, in the circumstance of multinational humanitarian 
missions, the military personnel from other states with which they are deployed. If a 
military is capable of protecting its personnel from a pandemic on deployment, it 
also has the ability to translate this protection to a domestic medical threat by 
deploying its learned capabilities effectively. 
 
2.2.5 Population 
Morgenthau‘s element of population is the first element to account for ‗the purely 
human factors that determine the power of a nation‘.116 The element of a state‘s 
population looks towards a quantitative evaluation of national power ‗to be 
discussed in terms of size of population‘.117 This is because normally a large 
population projects a state‘s power, 
Without a large population it is impossible to establish and keep going the 
industrial plant necessary for the successful conduct of modern war; to put into 
the field the large number of combat groups to fight on land, on the sea, and in 
the air; and finally, to fill the cadres of the troops, considerably more numerous 
than the combat troops, that must supply the latter with food, means of 
transportation and communication, ammunition, and weapons.118  
Central to the determination of a state‘s population‘s contribution to national power 
are its demographics. Demographics are incorporated within Morgenthau‘s sub-
                                                 
114 Ibid. p.175. 
115 Whether for security or humanitarian reasons.  
116 Morgenthau, H. J. (2006), op. cit.  p.137. 
117 Ibid.  
118 Ibid. As much as a large population contributes to the establishment of a states national power, 
unless the state has the capacities to provide for that population its size may be detrimental to its 
national power. Indeed, this particular aspect of national power is missing from Morgenthau‘s 
analysis, as ‗he does not seem to have explicitly considered how the interactions between… 
population size and natural resources might affect a nation‘s ability to exercise power.‘ (Nichiporuk, 
p.5) For the purpose of analysing the impact of pandemics the interactions between population size 
and natural resources, becomes important particularly given the high reliance on human resources 
to maintaining a states industrial capacity. 
Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism 
62 
elements of population ‗distribution and trends‘ and remain relevant here due to the 
rapid changes in demographics when a pandemic attacks a population.119  
2.2.5.1 Distribution 
Morgenthau provides a limited assessment of the distribution of a state‘s population, 
arguing that it pertains to ‗the relative size of the population of countries competing 
for power and, especially, the relative rate of their growth.‘120 He maintains that the 
relative power of a nation, in regard to the population‘s distribution, is derived from 
‗a population sufficiently large to create and apply the material implements of 
national power‘.121 However, when assessing the implications of a threat, the 
distribution of a nation‘s population takes on a significantly wider demographic 
composition. 
 
The demographic composition of a state‘s population pertains to the ‗characteristics 
of a given population‘122 and includes ‗parameters such as size, age distribution, 
geographic distribution…and level and distribution of human capital‘.123 The use of 
a state‘s population distribution reveals the wider vulnerabilities of that population 
to the pandemic actor.  
Size 
States may be impeded by the size of their population as the ‗largeness of their 
population‘ can become an ‗obstacle to…[the] development‘ of national power.124 
Essentially, states with large populations struggle to capitalise on power 
potentialities as they ‗divert scarce resources from the development of their national 
power to the feeding and care of their populations‘.125 The link between pandemics 
and large populations is straightforward - large populations tend to develop higher 
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122 Nichiporuk, B. (2000) The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors, Santa Monica: RAND, p.3. 
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124 Nichiporuk, B. (2000), op. cit. p.3. [Brackets Added] 
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density living conditions that are conducive to the spread of infectious disease. The 
difficulty for a state‘s health authority to adequately monitor the population for 
outbreaks of infectious disease is dependent on both size, and population density.   
Age 
Age demographics determine the power of the state when the population is 
dominant in members that are considered of ‗maximum potential usefulness‘.126 The 
age distribution of a population is vital to any study of an infectious disease 
pandemic, as the results may allow policy makers the opportunity for more refined 
planning. For example, if a particular disease is only infecting a single age group 
within a society, it becomes possible to allocate the appropriate resources primarily 
to protecting that demographic. Other age segments of society are relegated to a 
secondary consideration.127 With pandemics, all ages are typically affected which 
complicates and stretches state planning to address the pandemic threat further.  
Geographic Distribution 
The geographic distribution of a population pertains to the spread of the population 
throughout the geographic territory of the state. The population density of 
particular areas creates a dichotomy between power and threat. Arguably, the 
stronger a population is within an urban centre, the stronger its economic 
functions. Yet, the more condensed a population is, the greater the likelihood of 
spreading infectious disease. Historically, small communities have countered the 
geographical distribution conundrum by instigating programs designed to facilitate 
the protection of their community.128 However, the greater the geographic spread of 
                                                 
126 Ibid. The issue of age distribution is further elaborated on under Section 2.2.5.2 Morgenthau‘s 
Classical Realism: Population: Trends). 
127 The older a population tends to be, the higher the demand on the health care infrastructure of the 
state. If a particular pandemic infects a demographic whose reliance on health care is not the 
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the population, the more difficult it becomes for a state authority to provide 
comprehensive surveillance and treatment of communicable disease outbreaks. 
Level and Distribution of Human Capital 
The level and distribution of human capital, being the abilities and skills of a 
population and their geographic spread, are of great significance in any assessment 
of a pandemic. If not just because ‗any discussion of disease control priorities and of 
the health system for delivering interventions requires an understanding of the 
demographic context and how it is changing.‘129 The human resources available to 
a state, particularly scientists and medical officers, will play a vital role in both 
controlling and minimising the immediate impact on a state‘s power, and make a 
greater contribution to the state‘s power.130 The long-term impact of a pandemic is 
likely to be reflected within any change of the population trend. 
2.2.5.2 Trends 
When assessing a population‘s national power, trends, relate to ‗trying to assess the 
future distribution of power‘131 by investigating the population trends of any 
particular nation. In making his argument Morgenthau asserts,  
All other things being equal, a nation with a relatively large population of 
maximum potential usefulness for military and productive purposes (roughly 
between twenty and forty years of age) will have an edge in power over a 
nation in whose population the older age groups predominate.132 
These findings hold true for traditional analysis of society trends. However, what 
was once a society trend strength, becomes a power vulnerability when considering 
the impact of contagion.  The trend of a population‘s age distribution is extremely 
                                                                                                                                           
allowed a similar logic to hold true within the nation. The weak governmental machinery, with its 
federal fragmentation and relatively impotent central administration, meant that if anything were 
done to arrest the progress of disease it would have to be at the borders, points of ingress, and those 
other few spots where authority‘s powers of inspection, isolation, and quarantine could be brought to 
bear. (pp. 230-231) 
129 Lopez, A.D., Begg, S., and Bos, E., (2006) ‗Demographic and Epidemiological Characteristics of 
Major Regions, 1990-2001‘, in Lopez, A.D., Mathers, C.D., Ezzati, M., Jamison, D.T., and Murray, 
C.J.L., eds., Global Burden of Disease and Risk Factors, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.17. 
130 The immediate impact of a pandemic places a strain on the health care systems of the state. A state 
that maintains an adequate and appropriate health care system is better placed to be able to confront 
a pandemic, than a state that does not. In this sense the health care systems within a country also 
become a strategic asset. By ensuring the strategic placement of health care providers throughout the 
state it becomes possible to allow for greater treatment, surveillance and prevention of the population 
as a whole.  
131 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.139. 
132 Ibid. p.140. 
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important when matters of public health are concerned, as ‗many aspects of risk 
behaviour, as well as disease and injury outcomes, are strongly associated with 
age‘.133 When a pandemic strikes down the productive segment of society which, in 
line with Morgenthau‘s findings are those between twenty and forty years of age, 
the ability for the state‘s population to recover is impeded. Current population 
trends provide a powerful insight into the relationship between this element and 
national power. 
 
The 2009 World Population Ageing Report by the United Nations examines current 
and future population trends. The report concludes that ‗population ageing is 
unprecedented, a process without parallel in the history of humanity.‘134 Current 
predictions allow for ‗the number of older persons…to exceed the number of 
children for the first time in 2045.‘135   Our aging population trend is indicative of a 
decrease in the segment of a population that provides a state with the ‗maximum 
potential usefulness‘ as alluded to by Morgenthau. When utilising the population 
trend to assess the impact of a pandemic, the possibility to foresee issues regarding 
population recovery, as well as the impact on the state‘s productive power, is 
presented.  However, such an assessment must account for the migratory patterns 
that occur both within the state - as a result of changes in the geographic 
distribution of the population - and external to the state, being the introduction and 
inclusion of migrants from other states. 
 
The internal migration trend is usually a result of high population growth, 
particularly in developing countries. Dennis Pirages, writing for the 2005 State of 
the World report contends that the 
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Population growth in…[developing] countries is pressing people to settle on 
previously unoccupied land, often cleared forests. This newly settled land is 
frequently shared with numerous potentially dangerous pathogens.  These 
microbes have remained in animal hosts in forested areas until people have 
intruded, thus offering them new pathways out of the forest into larger human 
populations.136  
In the same way, people share space with unknown pathogens during times of 
pandemic. McMichael and McNeill137 agree on the importance of focusing on a 
disturbance in the equilibrium between man and microbe for the nation state. By 
surveilling the population appropriately for infection, the state is able to monitor 
and address any disturbances of the equilibrium that may transpire. The provision 
of adequate medical surveillance is a costly exercise that challenges both developed 
and developing states. 
 
International migration, historically, has facilitated expanding the territory and 
influence of the state. Migrants were encouraged to seek prosperity outside of the 
homeland. However, as Macpherson, Gushulak and Macdonald contend ‗modern 
migration is fuelled by pre-existing social, political, and economic considerations, as 
well as by discrete environmental and political events, including disasters and 
humanitarian crises‘.138 Migration patterns have altered dramatically during the 
second half of the 20th century, as states have become more independent after the 
Second World War and transportation technology has improved to simplify the 
migration process. Similar to periods in migratory history, new population flows 
create new pathways for pathogens. 
 
The change in migratory pattern has increased the potential for the exposure of 
populations to infectious diseases, ‗of international importance that are associated 
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138 MacPherson, D.W., Gushulak, B.D. and Macdonald, L., (2007) ‗Health and Foreign Policy: 
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with mobile populations, such as SARS and pandemic influenza‘.139 The assessment 
of the migration patterns of a population, and the contribution of these patterns to 
the proliferation of a pandemic, allows for the development of effective planning to 
counter the health consequences associated with international migration. Such 
planning would involve both domestic measures, such as appropriate health 
screening at a country‘s point of entry, and foreign policy measures such as health 
interventions in states deemed susceptible to viral outbreaks. 
 
Morgenthau‘s element of population makes an important contribution to an 
assessment of the pandemic actor. The element expands the traditional focus of 
population analysis, from size and trends, to incorporate a significantly wider scope 
of demographics and migratory trends. The study of pandemics on a population is 
usually relegated towards the medical and the mortality. However, by utilising a 
more in-depth evaluation of the specific demographics and the probable impact of 
the pandemic on the trend of the population, it becomes possible to develop an 
understanding of the wider implications of the pandemic actor for national power. 
Populations are diverse and will respond to the pandemic threat differently. Often 
this response is interlinked with Morgenthau‘s next element, national character.  
2.2.6 National Character 
Morgenthau‘s element of national character along with national morale, ‗stand out 
both for their elusiveness from the point of view of rational prognosis and for their 
permanent and often decisive influence on the weight a nation is able to put into the 
scales of international politics‘.140 Central to Morgenthau‘s assessment of a state‘s 
national character are the ‗certain qualities of intellect and character‘ that ‗occur 
more frequently and are more highly valued in one nation than in another‘.141 The 
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national character in the face of a pandemic directly influences the state‘s ability to 
maintain its power successfully. 
 
The national character of a state is derived from the population that constitutes the 
state. The contribution it makes to the national power of the state is unmistakable, 
National character cannot fail to influence national power. For those who act 
for the nation in peace and war; formulate, execute, and support its policies; 
elect and are elected; mold public opinion; produce and consume – all bear to a 
greater or lesser degree the imprint of those intellectual and moral qualities 
that make up the national character.142 
The fortitude of a state‘s national character refers to the cultural traits that have 
become ingrained in society. When employing a state‘s national character to assess 
the threat posed by a pandemic, an immediate consideration becomes the fortitude 
of a state‘s authorities to implement adequate preventative measures. The strength to 
uphold these preventative measures is a determinant of the overall impact of a 
pandemic on a state‘s national character.  
 
Professor of History at Loyola University of Chicago, Jo Hays, maintains that during 
pandemics ‗different types of authority have been at stake: political, religious, 
intellectual, and professional‘.143 When the constituency challenges the authority of 
the state, the state becomes responsible for ensuring this form of fortitude does not 
resort to anarchy. If it does so, then efforts to minimise the impact of a pandemic 
become difficult. Pandemics historically have goaded populations into an anti-
authoritarian stance.144 Such a dilemma poses a significant challenge for more 
liberal states where the will of the people is revered, in opposition to regimes where 
national character can be moulded for an appropriate response to the pandemic 
threat. How the population counteracts the power of this actor, in both prevention 
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and accepting treatment, will determine both the lethality and the longevity of the 
pandemic.  
 
The element of national character is perhaps one of the more difficult of 
Morgenthau‘s elements to evaluate. Regardless, Morgenthau warns against 
overlooking national character as a trait of national power, arguing that ‗however 
difficult it may be to assess correctly so elusive and intangible a factor…failure to do 
so will lead to errors in judgement and policies‘.145 The impact of a population‘s 
national character in prevention, treatment, and proliferation therefore remains 
quintessential to the understanding of the pandemic actor. 
2.2.7 National Morale 
As a state‘s national character pertains to the ‗intellectual and moral qualities‘ of a 
population, the element of national morale pertains to the ‗degree of determination 
with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its government in peace or 
war‘.146  In defining a state‘s national morale, Morgenthau concedes that the 
element is ‗more elusive and less stable, but no less important than all other factors 
in its bearing on national power‘.147 Morgenthau contends that the national morale 
‗permeates all activities of a nation, its agriculture and industrial production as well 
as its military establishment and diplomatic service‘.148 Assessing national morale is 
difficult in times of peace, Morgenthau contends, because, 
Its presence or absence and its qualities reveal themselves particularly in times 
of national crisis, when either the existence of the nation is at stake or else a 
decision of fundamental importance must be made on which the survival of the 
nation might well depend.149  
During times of a pandemic, the national morale must be maintained within two 
specific parties and in two different ways: first those that have been infected with 
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the disease that require medical responses, and second, the state must accommodate 
the morale of those who have not acquired the pandemic disease.  
 
The importance of this element to assessing the impact of the pandemic actor on 
state power is derived from the unpredictability of the element. A state‘s national 
morale is only ever tested ‗at the decisive moment,‘150 meaning that the reaction of 
the state‘s population cannot be predetermined.  
For the quality of national morale, the quality of government takes on a special 
importance. Whereas it [the quality of government] operates on the other 
elements of national power as one among several influences, all more or less 
manageable by human action, it [the quality of government] is the only 
tangible factor among intangibles that accounts for the quality of national 
morale. Without national morale national power is either nothing but material 
force or else a potentiality that awaits its realization in vain. Yet the only means 
of deliberately improving national morale lies in the improvement of the 
quality of government. All else is a matter of chance.151 
While Morgenthau claims that all else is a matter of chance, other authors152 have 
reviewed pandemics and their influence on national morale, to conclude that a 
state‘s response to a pandemic can only be effective if the population supports that 
response.  
 
According to Hays, during the 17th century plague in Italy, ‗urban populations 
[reacted] to decrees of city boards of health by pelting health officials with stones‘ as 
well as creating ‗dense networks of popular resistance to rules of quarantine, 
isolation in pest houses, sanitary cordons, health passes and inspections‘.153  The 
morale within the state circumvented the actions of the state in attempting to 
confront the pandemic, ultimately prolonging the impact of the pandemic. 
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The careful management of the national morale during a pandemic is a prerequisite 
to the recovery of the state. When pandemics strike, society‘s perception of the 
disease is largely shaped by history and dark memories of the past. 
Individuals have a deep-seated, visceral fear of infection associated with the 
invisibility of a disease threat and the notion of horrific symptoms leading to an 
unpleasant death. In addition societies have a collective fear of contagion 
informed by dark memories of past pestilences such as smallpox and bubonic 
plague.154 
The role of national morale in the manifestation of these fears needs to be carefully 
managed, to ensure the buoyancy of national soul and to protect this valuable 
element of national power.  
 
2.2.8 The Quality of Diplomacy 
Morgenthau maintains a state‘s diplomacy to be ‗the brain of national power, as 
national morale is its soul‘.155 A state‘s diplomatic ability cultivates an effective 
foreign policy to maximise the leverage of the state‘s national power. Morgenthau 
argues that ‗by using the power potentialities of a nation to best advantage, a 
competent diplomacy can increase the power of a nation beyond what one would 
expect it to be in the view of all other factors combined.‘156 Essentially, the quality of 
diplomacy refers to the ability of the state‘s officials to manipulate the other 
elements of national power in order to maintain the state‘s relative power. 
Diplomacy of a high quality will bring the ends and means of foreign policy 
into harmony with the available resources of national power. It will tap the 
hidden sources of national strength and transform them fully and securely into 
political realities.157 
A high quality of diplomacy will place the national interest at the forefront of all of 
known responsibilities. Matters of health have, in the past, been relegated towards 
the lower end of foreign policy priorities, considered secondary to the more 
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aggressive traditional threats to national security.158 This applies except when the 
matter of health evolves to a pandemic. 
 
The increased prominence given to international health diplomacy in the 21st 
century has seen the audience and role of the diplomat undergo a considerable 
transformation.  
[Diplomacy] is a world to which outsiders find it difficult to relate, where the 
art of diplomacy juggles with the science of public health and concrete 
national interest balances with the abstract collective concern of the larger 
international community in the face of intensive lobbying and advocacy.159    
Pandemics are international and to retain power a state will be engaged with a 
variety of international actors and the diplomat will be at the forefront of these 
efforts. Continuous representation of the state during a time of crises exemplifies 
state power.  
2.2.9 The Quality of Government 
The necessity of good government and its contribution to a state‘s national power 
seem relatively straightforward. Without good government ‗the best conceived and 
most expertly executed foreign policy, drawing on an abundance of material and 
human resources, must come to naught‘.160 Morgenthau contends that when 
‗viewed as an independent requirement of national power‘ good government can be 
perceived as possessing three attributes. 
Balance between…the material and human resources that go into the making 
of national power and…the foreign policy to be pursued; [the] balance among 
those resources; and [the] popular support for the foreign policies to be 
pursued.161 
In other words, when it comes to confronting pandemics the quality of a state‘s 
government is, in large part, based on the capacity of the government to respond to 
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the pandemic in a way that maintains such a balance. Any government response to 
a pandemic that is able to maintain the delicate balance of the aforementioned pre-
requisites would enjoy the popular support.  
Balance between Resources and Policy 
When ‗the very existence of the nation is at stake,‘162 the government ‗must choose 
the objectives and methods of its foreign policy in view of the power available to 
support them with a maximum chance of success.‘163 During times of emergency 
Morgenthau maintains that it becomes acceptable to ‗override…the rational 
considerations or national power.‘164 Pandemics are such an emergency.  
 
The focus on a government‘s ability to balance the resources it maintains and the 
policy it enacts, particularly in the face of a pandemic, provides a strong indication 
of the strength or quality of the government. In order to defeat a pandemic there is 
an inherent need for international cooperation.  
Balance among Resources 
The second dilemma for governments is the maintenance of a balance amongst its 
resources. Morgenthau argues that in order for a nation to maintain its national 
power at the maximum attainable level, the nation must have ‗at its disposal a 
sufficient quantity and quality…of those resources that will allow it to pursue a 
given foreign policy with a maximum chance of success‘;165 for example, the 
industrial and military establishments and the impact that giving these elements a 
priority may have on other elements of national power ‗such as national morale and 
the physical resilience of the population‘.166 A similar concern exists for the 
government when confronting a pandemic. Governments must manage the balance 
between normal health care procedures and the extraordinary strain placed on 
health care infrastructure for the duration of a pandemic. 
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Popular Support 
Popular support is a serious issue for ‗contemporary governments…subject to 
democratic control,‘167 as Morgenthau‘s concluding remarks note in regard to the 
quality of government.  The task for a government, ‗perhaps the most difficult of all‘ 
is to ‗secure the approval its own people for its foreign policies and domestic ones 
designed to mobilize the elements of national power‘.168 The maintenance of 
popular support during a pandemic places governments in a predicament. On one 
hand, the population will demand the government take aggressive action to prevent 
the spread of a pandemic. On the other hand, the population will likely demand that 
the action taken by the government maintains their established way of life. 
 
Such a quandary places governments in a precarious position. Simply put, the 
higher the quality of government, the higher the quality and management of a 
pandemic response will be. Such an analysis provides insight into the ability of 
various forms of government and their ability to respond to traditional threats.169  
Pandemics to date, and as the case studies show, are either thwarted or assisted 
depending on the popular support for government(s) and their policies designed to 
mitigate the threat. 
2.3 Conclusion  
Traditionally, the realist looks towards the power of the state and the maintenance 
of that power with the aid of hard power, being a state‘s military ability. The 
provision of guaranteeing security for that power is the responsibility of the state, 
and while the state may utilise particular alliances to help assure this security, the 
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opposed to a liberal democracy‘s population who would be likely to express dissatisfaction with any 
enforcement of quarantine for a lengthy period of time. 
Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism 
75 
anarchic form of the international system provides little assurance to the strength of 
alliances when a state is under threat – including the threat of a pandemic.  
 
Indeed, ‗given the global spread of infection, and the global nature of response,‘170 
IR theory has the ability to provide a much needed investigation of the political 
nature of the pandemic actor. Fidler singles out the lack of crossover between 
international health activity and international relations to be a primary contributor 
to ‗health as foreign policy…not [being] an important diplomatic activity.‘171 The 
21st century has seen health issues take on a greater role within international affairs 
with,  
The protection of health…no longer seen as primarily a humanitarian and 
technical issue relegated to a specialized UN agency, but more fully considered 
in relation to the economic, political and security consequences of the post-
Cold War system of interdependence. This has led to new policy and funding 
initiatives at many levels of governance and a new political space within which 
global health action is conducted.172 
The need to place a greater focus on the impact of pandemics on the security 
infrastructure of the state has come about in part due to the increased attention 
being paid to health related foreign policy concerns. These concerns now necessitate 
a greater focus on the impact of pandemics on the national power of the state.  
 
While Morgenthau provides the framework to assess a state‘s national power via his 
elements of national power, the adaptability of this framework to assessing threats 
to national power remains untested. The task of this thesis now turns to adopting 
Morgenthau‘s elements as a tool to assess the implications for a state‘s national 
power when confronted by a pandemic. In order to ascertain the versatility of the 
                                                 
170 Lee, K., and Zwi, A. (2003) ‗A Global Political Economy Approach to AIDS: Ideology, Interests and 
Implications‘, in Lee, K., ed., Health Impacts of Globalization: Towards Global Governance, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp.13. 
171 Fidler, D.P. (2005), op. cit. p.180. Fidler, D.P. (2004a) ‗Germs, Norms and Power: Global Health‘s 
Political Revolution‘, Law, Social Justice & Global Development, (1), available: 
http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2004_1/fidler/Fidler.rtf [accessed 28 May 
2010]. [Brackets Added] 
172 Kickbusch, I. (2003), op. cit. pp. 192-193. 
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framework an analysis of three distinct pandemics is presented over the following 
chapters.  
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Chapter Three: The Plague Pandemic 
3.0 Introduction 
Plague, caused by infection with the microorganism Yersinia pestis (Y. Pestis), is ‗the 
deadliest of all diseases, one that was responsible for perhaps the most lethal 
pandemic in all of history‘.1 Plague presents a strong case study to provide an 
introduction to the threat posed by pandemics to a state‘s national power. Plague, as 
a pandemic, has recurred multiple times in history. The persistent return of plague 
pandemics alludes to the resilience of this non-state actor. As Sherman contends 
‗during the last 2,000 years, three great bubonic plague pandemics have resulted in 
social and economic upheavals that are unmatched by those caused by any armed 
conflict or any other infectious disease.‘2 Indeed the ramifications of plague 
pandemics are synonymous with traditional security threats such as war. In 
highlighting such similarities James W. Thompson noted the comparable impact of 
the Black Death and the Great War (World War I) on Europe: 
The turmoil of the world today serves to visualize for us what the state of 
Europe was in the middle of the fourteenth century far more distinctly than 
ever was perceived before. It is surprising to see how similar are the complaints 
then and now: economic chaos, social unrest, high prices, profiteering, 
depravation of morals, lack of production, industrial indolence, frenetic gaiety, 
wild expenditure, luxury, debauchery, social and religious hysteria, greed, 
avarice, maladministration, decay of manners.3 
Analysing the effects of plague on national power through Morgenthau‘s 
framework, reveals similarities between the impact of pandemics and the impact of 
warfare. 
 
                                                 
1 Aberth, J. (2011), op. cit. p.19. Furthermore, there are three variants of plague, bubonic, 
pneumonic, and septicaemic. Bubonic plague is considered the most common and least lethal of the 
strains, the various epidemiological features of the three strains is further explored in section 3.1 The 
Plague Pandemic: Background. 
2 Sherman, I. W. (2006), op. cit. p.67. The three plagues pandemics are commonly referred to as: 
The Justinian Plague (541-750); the Black Death (1347-1351); and the Third Pandemic (1894-
1901). 
3 Thompson, J.W. (1921) ‗The Aftermath of the Black Death and the Aftermath of the Great War‘, 
The American Journal of Sociology, 26(5), p.565. 
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The use of plague as the opening case provides a foundation to show the utility of 
international relations theory in assessing a pandemic threat. Plague altered 
fundamentally the behaviour of states on all three pandemic occasions, and, tested 
the state‘s ability to adapt and react to a non-state actor. This chapter provides an 
overview of a long-running conflict between two actors: the state, and plague. To 
analyse the conflict, the case is presented in three parts.  
 
First, a background of the disease plague, along with the three resultant pandemics. 
This broad overview offers an insight into how plague was able to continually 
reappear to threaten the society forced to confront pandemic plague. By developing 
an appreciation of the epidemiological features of the disease, a foundation for a 
stronger analysis of the plague pandemic actor through the use of Baldwin‘s 
dimensions of power is established.  
 
Baldwin‘s dimensions of power facilitate the bedrock analysis of the plague 
pandemic actor. By assessing plague over four dimensions: scope, domain, weight 
and cost, the relationship between the two actors in conflict becomes simplified. The 
use of Baldwin‘s dimensions establishes the power of the plague pandemic actor. In 
essence, the dimensions provide the clarity and validation required prior to 
assessing the impact of the plague pandemic on the state‘s national power.   
 
In order to assess the impact of the plague pandemic on the national power of the 
state, the chapter utilises Morgenthau‘s elements of national power framework. The 
use of Morgenthau‘s framework to assess the impact of the plague actor highlights 
both the versatility and the utility of Morgenthau‘s framework. The bulk of the 
plague pandemic assessment is restricted to assessing the impact of the Black Death 
pandemic. Such a restriction provides the opportunity to assess not only a 
widespread, high-mortality outbreak, but also an actor that assaulted the world 
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prior to the establishment of the Westphalian state system. By doing so an 
understanding is obtained of how a far more simple, and limited, form of 
government confronted this ferocious pandemic actor.  
 
3.1 Background 
Plague is a zoonosis whose path of transmission from vector to host has been well 
established; the growing consensus contends that plague is ‗transmitted between 
rodents and to other animals via wild rodent fleas, cannibalism or (possibly) 
contaminated soil‘.4 Furthermore, plague exists in three forms, bubonic, pneumonic, 
and septicaemic.5 According to Gottfried, Bubonic plague, considered to be the most 
common strain of plague, has an incubation period from ‗the time of infection to the 
appearance of the first symptoms…[of] generally about six days‘.6 While Bubonic 
Plague ‗is the least toxic of all plague types…it is still highly lethal, killing 50% to 
60%‘ of its victims that remain untreated.7 Bubonic plague is considered to be ‗the 
classic disease in humans‘ and is usually the result of ‗a flea bite or direct 
contamination of an open skin lesion by plague-infected material‘.8 Bubonic plague 
cannot be transmitted from human-to-human, which is markedly different to the 
second variation of plague. 
 
The second variation, Pneumonic plague, is highly contagious, and is the one form 
of plague that ‗can be transmitted directly from person to person‘.9 Aberth 
highlights the ease with which Pneumonic Plague can spread with, 
                                                 
4 Tikhomirov, E. (1999) ‗Epidemiology and Distribution of Plague‘, in World Health Organization 
(1999) Plague Manual: Epidemiology, Distribution, Surveillance and Control, Geneva: World Health 
Organization, p.11. (Brackets in original) 
5 Aberth, J. (2011), op. cit. p.19. 
6 Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. p.8. [Brackets added] 
7 Ibid. 
8 Poland, J.D., and Dennis, D.T. (1999) ‗Diagnosis and Clinical Manifestations‘, in World Health 
Organization (1999) Plague Manual: Epidemiology, Distribution, Surveillance and Control, Geneva: 
World Health Organization, p.43. 
9 Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. p.8. Aberth, J. (2011), op. cit. p.20. 
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Direct human-to-human contagion [being] the norm in pneumonic plague, 
where no other animal intermediary is necessary, even though a pneumonic 
plague outbreak seems to start out as a secondary symptom of the bubonic 
form and tends to be localized, owing to the narrow window of time in which 
this form of disease can be spread by the symptom of an infective cough. 
However, since the patient is usually well enough to travel during the 
incubation period, which in pneumonic plague can last up to three or four 
days (but in bubonic plague can last up to a week), it is possible that an 
outbreak of the disease in one locality then gives rise to another at a 
considerable distance away.10 
The final variation of plague is Septicaemic plague, which, according to Aberth, ‗has 
almost no distinguishing symptoms beyond those characterizing the general onset of 
the disease, since it usually kills the patient too quickly-sometimes in twenty-four 
hours or less-to allow‘ for more symptoms to present.11  
 
While the plague disease has managed to proliferate many times throughout history, 
three significant plague pandemics are commonly recognised as the most severe 
outbreaks. Furthermore, as Aberth contends, the persistent theme ‗running through 
all three pandemics is that plague inspired some dramatic responses among the 
populations affected that had enduring consequences for cultural identity and 
survival.‘12 Cultural identity and survival are central themes in national security, 
thereby allowing the use of Morgenthau‘s framework to assess the impact of the 
plague pandemics on national power.  
 
The first recognised13 pandemic of plague that appeared ‗in full view of literate 
observers‘ began in 541 and is widely referred to as Justinian‘s Plague.14 While the 
initial outbreak of plague was limited to three years, plague would sporadically 
                                                 
10 Aberth, J. (2011), op. cit. p.20. [Brackets Added] 
11 Ibid. p.22. 
12 Ibid. p.23. 
13 Herlihy (1997) maintains that historical accounts offered of plague may have been ‗filtered 
through the reports of witnesses, who might have been unperceptive, uninformed, gullible, 
panicked, or eager to prove that they had read earlier accounts of dramatic mortalities. For example, 
medical writers of late antiquity and the early Middle Ages recognized only one type of epidemic 
disease marked by only one kind of symptom, inflammations, boils, or buboes in the area of the 
groin.‘ (p.19) 
14 Little, L. K. (2007) ‗Life and Afterlife of the First Plague Pandemic‘, in Little, L.K., ed. (2007) Plague 
and the End of Antiquity: The Pandemic of 541-750, New York, N.Y.: Cambridge University Press, 
p.4. Little contends that ‗as this debut took place during the reign of the Emperor Justinian, 
Byzantinists especially refer to this outbreak as the ―Plague of Justinian‖ or the ―Justinianic Plague‖.‘ 
(p.4)  
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‗recur in 10-to-24-year cycles for the next 200 years‘.15 However, the death toll of 
these outbreaks would pale in comparison with the initial outbreak. Justinian‘s 
plague is reported to have spread throughout Asia, Africa and Europe and claimed 
nearly one hundred million victims.16  
 
The second pandemic of plague commenced in the fourteenth century and ‗is well 
known to all readers of history as the Black Death‘.17 The Black Death was to last for 
20 years taking with it ‗between 35% and 40% of the overall population‘ of 
Europe.18 As this chapter will explore, the ramifications of the Black Death for 
European society were diverse. While the assault on human capital was significant, 
this assault transpired at a time when the human population was seemingly out of 
balance with its natural resources. For this reason the Black Death plays a 
prominent role in assessing the security implications of the plague pandemic. 
Furthermore, as Hirshleifer affirms, the subsequent pandemics of plague that 
followed the Black Death in 1361, 1369 and 1374, increased the longevity of the 
impact of the Black Death,19 proving an even stronger validation of the impact of 
plague pandemics on national power. 
 
The third pandemic of plague transpired during the ‗second half of the nineteenth 
century‘.20 Eventually this third pandemic would claim at least fifteen million 
lives.21 The third pandemic seemingly ignored the majority of Europe, but built on 
the geographic spread of its pandemic predecessors by capitalising on the 
technological advances of the time, namely: the invention of the steamship, to ‗cross 
                                                 
15 Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. p.11. 
16 Tikhomirov, E. (1999), op. cit. p.12. 
17 Little, L.K. (2007), op. cit. p.5. 
18 Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. p.53. 
19 Hirshleifer, J. (1966) Disaster and Recovery: The Black Death in Western Europe, Santa Monica: 
RAND, pp.19-20. Hirshleifer (1966) offers an indication of the mortality rate of these various plague 
outbreaks in England. The Black Death of 1348-50 had the highest mortality rate (16.6%). The 
outbreaks of plague that immediately followed were less deadly than the initial outbreak. The Pesitis 
Secunda of 1360-61 had a mortality rate of 12.7%. Pestis Tertia struck in 1369 with a mortality rate 
of 10%, and a fourth outbreak in 1374 had a mortality of 8.6%. (p.7)  
20 Little, L.K. (2007), op. cit. p.5. 
21 Echenberg, M. (2007), op. cit. p.xi. 
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the Pacific to Honolulu and from there to San Francisco in 1899‘.22 Indeed, the 
ability for this third, nameless pandemic, to cover the world offers the first insight 
into the implications of modernising transportation and the relationship to the 
transmission of infectious disease.   
 
The third pandemic also allowed for the identification of the pathogen that caused 
plague, a feat widely recognised as being carried out by Alexandre Yersin.23 
Although Yersin‘s discovery of the pathogen was instrumental in developing a 
greater understanding of the disease, his discovery did little to assist in 
understanding the mode of transmission of plague. During the same third 
pandemic, Paul-Louis Simond, ‗was sent by Pasteur to Vietnam and India to follow 
up on Yersin‘s observations‘.24 By 1898 he ‗found that the chief vector of Yersinia to 
be a flea…whose preferred hosts in turn were rats, either…the common stay-at-
home black rat, or… the sea-going brown wharf rat‘.25 These developments have 
made a considerable contribution in the way state authorities confront plague. It is 
important to note for the historical record here that, plague remains problematic in 
particular geographic regions,26 though not on the scale of the three main 
pandemics. 
 
The ability of plague to spread around the world has seen the resilient disease firmly 
implant itself as an actor in the human health arena. Indeed, plague is one of three 
                                                 
22 Little, L.K. (2007), op. cit.  p.5. Echenberg, M. (2007), op. cit. p.17. 
23 Little contends that ‗when word of the outbreak of plague in 1894 at Hong Kong spread, 
Sibabasaburo Kitasato of Tokyo, a student of [Robert] Koch, rushed to the scene as did Alexandre 
Yersin, a [Louis] Pasteur student who was then working in French Indochina. An intensely 
competitive race ensued. Although Kitasato was the first to claim victory, the scientific community 
eventually awarded that claim to Yersin. The bacillus he isolated and described was duly named 
Yersinia pestis.‘ (p.5) 
24 Sherman, I.W. (2006), op. cit. p.83. 
25 Little, L.K. (2007), op. cit. p.6. Little further contends that ‗contrary to the long-held assumption 
that plague is a contagious disease, it is most commonly by the bite of a rat flea that the highly toxic 
substance gets injected into a human being and drains into a lymph node. Multiplying rapidly, it 
there forms the painful swelling known as a bubo. Once fatal to slightly more than half the people 
who contracted it, plague in recent decades has become routinely curable, if timely diagnosis and 
medical supplies permit…‘ (p.6) 
26 Plague still maintains a presence within most WHO Regions, however, the ability for the state to 
control the disease, on diagnosis, has significantly reduced the burden of the disease. 
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diseases permanently ingrained within the International Health Regulations (1969) 
further reinforcing the notoriety of this formidable non-state actor.27 The 
prominence of the plague disease demands a closer examination of the dimensions 
that contributed to the power wielded by this actor and the relationship between the 
plague pandemic actor, and the state.  
 
3.2 Plague: The Pandemic Actor 
The plague brings with it a reputation that overwhelms that of any other 
microorganism. In large part, this reputation is derived from the immense impact 
the disease bore on medieval society during the Black Death. The disease 
overwhelmed medieval society to the point where the only path for states to recover 
their national power was to look toward significant socio-economic reforms. In 
order to develop a stronger appreciation of the plague pandemic actor, an account 
of the power possessed by this actor is required. Baldwin‘s dimension of scope, 
domain, weight and cost provide an overview of the power relationship between the 
disease and the countries it infects. 
3.2.1 Scope 
Baldwin‘s dimension of scope looks to comprehend the behavioural effect of the 
pandemic actor on the state actor. Overwhelmingly, the scope of plague has been 
both immediate and tempestuous.  The rapid speed with which plague is able to 
overwhelm its victims plays a significant role in affecting the behaviour of the state. 
The effect of plague on the state provides an understanding of what states will 
experience during high-mortality events. Indeed, American economist Jack 
Hirshleifer, models the ‗potential catastrophe of a large-scale nuclear war‘, on the 
                                                 
27 Tikhomorov, E. (1999), op. cit. p.11. World Health Organization (1983) International Health 
Regulations (1969), Geneva: World Health Organization. The most recent incarnation of the IHR has 
seen the removal of the three named diseases which have been replaced with a clause mandating 
states to inform WHO of ‗receipt of evidence of a public health risk identified outside their territory 
that may cause international disease spread.‘ (Emphasis Added) See World Health Assembly (2005), 
op. cit. p.12. 
The Plague Pandemic 
84 
ramifications of the second plague pandemic, The Black Death.28 Hirshleifer 
contends that such a comparison is derived from plague‘s ‗geographical extent, 
abruptness of onset, and scale of causalities‘ and unlike traditional warfare the 
Black Death involved, ‗no direct destruction of material property‘.29 Regardless of 
the size of the pandemic, or when the plague pandemic erupted, the consequences 
of a plague outbreak for a state follow similar patterns to other outbreaks of 
infectious disease with both a primary and secondary effect.  
 
Primarily the effect of plague, particularly during the earlier plague pandemics, is 
magnified by its indiscriminate assault on humanity, which when coupled with the 
limited understanding of the disease, provided for a significantly one-sided 
relationship of power: the disease held all the power. Cunha and Cunha highlight 
the disastrous effect of the Justinian plague on the Roman Empire contending that 
‗more than a third of the Roman Empire‘s population was eliminated by this 
plague‘.30 Such an impact ‗so weakened the Roman Empire that not long after the 
plague had passed, Roman borders were overrun by Huns, Goths, Moors and other 
―barbarians‖.‘31 The ability of the plague pandemic actor to overwhelm the Roman 
Empire illustrates the potential effect of the actor on the national power of the state. 
While the plague was not directly responsible for the fall of the Empire, the 
pandemic expedited the opportunity for the Empire‘s opponents. 
 
With plague having the upper hand in the power relationship, divisions among the 
infected and noninfected members of the population quickly come to light. 
Historian John Kelly illustrates such a happening during the Black Death within 
Messina, Italy: 
                                                 
28 Hirshleifer, J. (1966), op. cit. p.iii. 
29 Ibid.  
30 Cunha, C.B. and Cunha, B.A. (2006) ‗Impact of Plague on Human History‘, Infectious Disease 
Clinics of North America, 20, p.266. 
31 Ibid. p.267. 
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As the mortality deepened, churches and shops fell silent, beaches emptied, 
fishing boats lay idle, streets became deserted. Soon Messina, like 
Constantinople, became two cities, the city of the infected-a municipality of 
pain and despair-and the city of the uninfected, where fear and hate ruled.32 
The establishment of such a division highlights the psychosocial implications of the 
plague pandemic. The infected were abandoned and expected to look after 
themselves, while the uninfected sought to protect themselves.33 Such segregation 
magnifies the intensity of the fear of the contagion, further intensifying the power of 
the pandemic. 
 
The primary effect of the plague is similar to the effect of any event that results in 
the deaths of large proportions of the general population. The high mortality rate of 
plague during the first two pandemics bore a significant impact on both the 
population number and growth-rate for decades after the initial impact. In 
addressing the impact of the Black Death on the state‘s population, Hirshleifer 
contends that: 
The sudden population decline due to the arrival of the plague, with material 
property left essentially unaffected, raised overall per capita wealth in the 
short-term while drastically shifting relative returns and incomes in favor of 
the labouring and against the property owning classes.34 
This surprising outcome indicates the fundamental shift in the economic welfare of 
society as a result of a pandemic that is high in mortality and prevalence. However, 
the long-term sustainability of such economic benefits is questionable.35 
 
Secondary impacts relate to aspects of the pandemics scope, which inadvertently 
impede the ability of the state to recover from the initial impact of the pandemic. In 
the case of plague pandemics, the main secondary impact is the associated fear of 
the disease. The significant mortality rate of plague pandemics past seems to validate 
such fears, particularly when very little was known about the disease. The scope of 
                                                 
32 Kelly, J. (2005) The Great Mortality: An Intimate History of the Black Death, London: Harpers 
Collins, p.85. 
33 Kelly (2005) reinforces this notion with the words of Franciscan friar Michele da Pizza who 
contends ‗that if a son fell ill…his father flatly refused to stay with him‘. (p.85) 
34 Hirshleifer, J. (1966), op. cit. p.22. The effect of the Black Death on population demographics and 
trends is further analysis in Section 3.3.5 The Plague Pandemic: Population. 
35 See section 3.2.4 The Plague Pandemic: Cost 
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the domestic impact of plague has continued to be in line with Kelly‘s descriptions 
regarding Messina, being the adoption of quarantine measures to protect the 
population. The adoption of quarantine to indemnify the state from infection of 
plague is still utilised both in a domestic and international sense, despite the ability 
of modern medicine to treat plague victims via antibiotics.  
 
The psychological impact of plague has a significantly stronger, and potentially 
long-term, effect than the initial mortality on the state. This fear was still 
reproduced during a more recent outbreak of plague in Surat India in 1994, where, 
‗when word got out that an airborne disease was loose in the city, some 500,000 
residents of Surat boarded trains and within 48 hours dispersed to every corner of 
the subcontinent‘.36 The outcome for India‘s national power was damaging. During 
the 1994 outbreak many other states recognised the enhanced threat of the 
outbreak given the increase in and the ease of global travel. Clem and Galwankar 
contend that ‗in response to this threat, several countries closed their borders to 
travellers and cargo from India and stopped all air flights to and from India‘.37 Such 
a secondary effect widens the scope of the pandemic considerably, allowing its 
initial impact to fester and corrode power as the state attempts some modicum of 
recovery of society normalcy and state power. The scale of the behavioural change 
caused by plague pandemics is determined by the ability of the pandemic to 
establish its domain. 
 
                                                 
36 Garrett, L (1996) ‗The Return of Infectious Disease‘, Foreign Affairs, 75(1), p.73. In this instance 
the potential ramifications of the secondary impact were mitigated by the ‗bacterial strain that 
caused the outbreak [being] unusually weak‘, although the example does validate the significant 
amount of power that plague continues to wield over an uninfected population. (Garrett, 1996 p.73) 
[Bracket Added] 
37 Clem, A., and Galwankar, S. (2005) ‗Plague: A Decade Since the 1994 Outbreaks in India‘, Journal 
of the Association of Physicians of India, 53, p.458. 
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3.2.2 Domain 
Baldwin‘s dimension of domain seeks to establish the ‗number of other actors 
subject to‘ the influence of the pandemic.38 In analysing the domain of the various 
plague pandemics the microorganism‘s worldwide dissemination over the three 
pandemics is clearly illustrated. In order to provide such an illustration the use of 
WHO‘s regional approach to defining a pandemic is adopted, and can be seen in 
Table 3.1: Global Summary of Previous Plague Pandemics and Modern Domain, 
below. 
 
Table 3.1: Global Summary of Previous Plague Pandemics and Modern Domain39 
WHO 
Region 
Plague Presence 
Justinian 
The Black 
Death 
The Third 
Pandemic 
Modern 
Domain 
African 
  
 
 
European 
  
 
 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
  
 
 
The Americas 
  
 
 
South-East 
Asia 
  
 
 
Western 
Pacific 
  
 
 
 
The above table charts the progressive movement of the plague bacteria, from being 
endemic within two regions during the Justinian plague, to a truly global presence 
during the third.  To develop a greater understanding of the domain of each of the 
plague pandemics a brief overview of how the contagion spread during the three 
pandemic outbreaks is provided. 
 
                                                 
38 Baldwin, D.A. (2002), op. cit. p.178. 
39 Shaded area indicates a presence of the Plague pandemic within the region. 
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In accounting for the domain of the Justinian Plague, Lester K. Little illustrates the 
ease with which plague was able to move out from the Egyptian port city of 
Pelusium. 
It [plague] quickly spread eastward along to coast to Gaza and westward to 
Alexandria. By the following spring it had found its way to Constantinople, 
capital of the Roman Empire. Syria, Anatolia, Greece, Italy, Gaul, Iberia, and 
North Africa: none of the lands bordering the Mediterranean escaped it. Here 
and there, it followed river valleys or overland routes and thus penetrated far 
into the interior, reaching, for example, as far east as Persia or as far north, 
after another sea-crossing, as the British Isles.40 
Little establishes a fundamental attribute of the plague‘s pattern of dissemination, 
being the microorganism‘s tendency to follow the trade routes both by land and sea.  
The use of WHO‘s regional modelling establishes the domain, being the regions that 
endured the pandemic, and reveals a limited regional presence of the Justinian 
Plague to Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean regions. Such containment does 
not impinge on the Justinian Plague‘s status of a pandemic; although its domain is 
somewhat restricted in comparison to the two following plague pandemics. 
 
The second plague pandemic, the Black Death, is widely believed to have initially 
erupted in China in 1331, and then slowly moved westward.41 The genesis of the 
European phase of the pandemic commenced when the ‗disease broke out in 1346 
among the armies of the Mongol prince who laid siege to the trading city of Caffa in 
Crimea‘.42 The dissemination of plague from Caffa was assisted by ‗Caffa‘s large rat 
population…as they were carried on ships bound for major European ports such as 
Pera, a suburb of Constantinople, and Messina, in Sicily. By 1348 plague had 
entered Great Britain at Weymouth.‘43 Eventually the Black Death ‗spread more 
widely and moved further inland than it had eight hundred years before, for 
                                                 
40 Little, L.K. (2007), op. cit. p.3. [Brackets added] 
41 McNeill, W.H. (1998), op. cit. p.175; Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. p.35. 
42 McNeill, W.H. op. cit. p.177. Gottfried (1983) explains that while the Chinese records are vague, 
‗the first unimpeachable references appear in 1353, when chroniclers claim that two-thirds of 
China‘s population had died since 1331. Whatever the precise dates and circumstances, by the mid-
fourteenth century, the Black Death had struck China and, by 1393, after successive cycles of plague 
epidemics, the Chinese population had dropped to about 90 million from a thirteenth-century high 
of over 125 million‘. (p.35) 
43 Worsham, P.L., McGovern, T.W., Vietri, N.J. and Friedlander, A.M. (2007) ‗Plague‘, in Dembek, 
Z.F., ed., (2007) Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare, Washington D.C.: Office of the Surgeon 
General, p.93. 
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example, by reaching Scandinavia and also far into the Arabian peninsula for the 
first time.‘44 Taking into consideration the initial outbreak of plague within China, 
this particular episode of the plague pandemic expanded its regional domain to be 
more international and include not only the European and Eastern Mediterranean 
Region, but the Western-Pacific Region as well.45 
 
The third pandemic saw the plague actor utilise the transportation technology of the 
time to increase its domain significantly. The third pandemic originated in China 
‗beginning in the remote Chinese province of Yunnan‘.46 Whereas the previous 
pandemic has spread westward, this plague pandemic would take an easterly 
direction seemingly taking advantage of the ‗faster steamships‘ to ‗dramatically 
accelerate plague‘s spread‘.47 On arrival in Canton and Hong Kong in 1894, plague 
used these significant seaports to spread ‗to ports on every continent over the next 
seven years.‘48 In accordance with the WHO‘s pandemic definition, not only was the 
third episode of plague a pandemic, but the disease was one of a global scale.49 The 
third pandemic of plague exposed all WHO regions to the microorganism. While 
there has been some modicum of success in mitigating the health impact of plague, 
the disease still maintains a presence in almost all WHO regions.50 
 
Advances in the understanding of plague that transpired during the third pandemic 
enabled the medical establishment to treat the majority of plague cases, if symptoms 
                                                 
44 Little, L.K. (2007), op. cit. p.5. 
45 The inclusion of the Western-Pacific region into the domain of the Black Death serves to further 
illustrate the rashness of basing the definition of a pandemic purely on the geographical regions it 
infects. 
46 Echenberg, M. (2007), op. cit. p.16. 
47 Ibid. p.17. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Echenberg (2007) highlights the spread of the third pandemic: starting in Hong Kong (1894) 
plague spread to Bombay (1896), Taiwan (1896), Kobe, Japan (1898), Alexandria (1899), Porto 
(1899), Honolulu (1899/1900), Manilla (1900), Buenos Aires (1900), Rio de Janeiro (1900), 
Sydney (1900), San Francisco (1900/01), Glasgow (1900/01), Cape Town (1901), Mazatlán, 
Mexico (1902), Lima (1903), Accra, Ghana (1908), Shanghai (1908), Paris (1917), and Los Angeles 
(1924). (pp.xi-xii) 
50 The modern domain of plague sees two continents, Europe and Australia being the only continents 
known to be plague free.  
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are detected early enough and access to treatment is available. Modern outbreaks of 
plague have been somewhat limited, with the states affected being able to deploy 
control measure designed to mitigate the spread of plague.51  
 
The dimension of domain provides an appreciation of just how widespread the 
scope of the actor in question is, or can be. In relation to the plague actor the 
domain of the disease expanded over time by virtue the three main pandemics. 
While the international community has achieved some success in reducing the 
domain of this significant actor, plague still maintains a presence in five of the six 
WHO regions. The complete eradication of the actor is yet to occur. Having 
established both the scope of the plague actor, as well as the domain in which the 
scope transpires, confirmation that plague was the actor responsible for the scope of 
change experience is required. Baldwin‘s fourth dimension of weight provides such 
confirmation. 
3.2.3 Weight 
The dimension of weight seeks to verify the probability that the plague actor was 
responsible for the scope of change experienced by the state actor. In instances of 
pandemics the overwhelming driver of the scope of change within the state is the 
mortality associated with the infectious disease. Therefore, the determination of a 
pandemic‘s weight is derived from assessing the mortality of that pandemic actor. 
Indeed, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) in America, perceive the mortality 
rate, following infection with a microorganism, to be a central determinant of that 
pandemic‘s severity.52   While the exact figures of the severity of the plague actor 
                                                 
51 There are some concerns within the international scientific community as to the emergence of 
some strains of plague that appear to be antibiotic resistant. See Welch, T.J., Fricke, W.F., McDermott, 
P.F., White, D.G., Rosso, M.L., Rasko, D.A., Mammel, M.K., Eppinger, M., Rosovitz, M.J., Wagner, D., 
Rahalison, L., LeClerc, J.E., Hinshaw, J.M., Lindler, L.E., Cebula, T.A., Carniel, E., Ravel, J., (2007) 
‗Multiple Antimicrobial Resistance in Plague: An Emerging Public Health Risk‘, PloS One [online], 
2(3), e309, available:  
http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2fjournal.pone.0000309 [accessed 9 Feb 
2011] 
52 See Centers for Disease Control (2007), op. cit. 
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throughout the three main pandemics are not readily available, a consensus among 
researchers53 provides some indication as to the severity of the plague actor over the 
three instances. The consensus puts the mortality of plague very high, dependent on 
access to medication the mortality rate of plague can be anywhere between 25% and 
90%. 
 
Clem and Galwankar contend that ‗by the conclusion of the [Justinian] pandemic 50 
to 60% of the population‘ of affected areas had been decimated by the outbreak;54  
such figures provide an understanding regarding the psychosocial implications 
partnered with the plague‘s scope. In assessing the Black Death, Cunha and Cunha 
argue that the plague pandemic reduced the population of Europe by one third to 
one half, with the ‗mortality varied by location from 25-70%‘.55Overwhelmingly the 
high mortality associated with these earlier pandemics serves as the impetus for the 
fear that surrounds subsequent outbreaks of plague. The availability of data for the 
Third Pandemic of plague does allow for a stronger understanding of the severity 
and weight of the plague pandemic actor. 
 
The PSI for the Third Pandemic establishes the distortion between the pandemics 
prevalence among the population, and the severity of the pandemic; both these 
figures are provided in Table 3.2: Pandemic Severity Index for the Third Plague 
Pandemic.56 While the data presented within the table 3.2 (below) is limited to the 
urban impact of the Third Pandemic, these figures are widely representative of the 
                                                 
53 See Aberth, J. (2011), op cit. Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. World Health Organization (1999) 
Plague Manual: Epidemiology, Distribution, Surveillance and Control, Geneva: World Health 
Organization. Kelly, J. (2005), op. cit. Little, L.K. (2007), op. cit. Echenberg, M. (2007), op. cit. Clem, 
A., and Galwankar, S. (2005), op. cit. Echenberg, M. (2002), ‗Pestis Redux: The Initial Years of the 
Third Bubonic Plague Pandemic: 1894-1901‘, Journal of World History, 13(2), pp.429-449. 
54 Clem A., and Galwankar, S. (2005), op. cit. p.457. [Brackets Added] 
55 Cunha, C.B. and Cunha, B.A. (2006), op. cit. p.268. 
56 Echenberg (2007, p.314) provides a comparative table of the cities that were exposed to the third 
pandemic. In order to calculate the PSI the following cities were deemed to be representative of the 
various regions for this assessment: Cape Town (African); Porto (European); Alexandria (Eastern 
Mediterranean); San Francisco, Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires (The Americas); Bombay (South East 
Asia); Sydney, Honolulu, Hong Kong (Western Pacific). The PSI was calculated using the following 
formula: if n= people exposed to the plague and m=persons dying from plague; PSI=n/m x 100. 
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pandemic as a whole. For example, Clem and Galwankar estimate that the Third 
Pandemic ‗caused an estimated 26 million plagues cases worldwide and killed more 
than 12 million in China and India‘.57 Such numbers would suggest a wider 
mortality rate of approximately 46% based on the fatalities in China and India.  
 
Furthermore, the PSI for the Third Plague Pandemic (Table 2.3 below) indicates the 
high disparity between the prevalence of the third plague outbreak within specific 
regions, and the severity of that outbreak. Such an imbalance supports the assertion 
that the severity of the pandemic provides a clearer indication than the prevalence 
of the potential scope of the pandemic. The higher the severity of the pandemic 
actor the greater will be the psychosocial ramifications.  
Table 3.2: Pandemic Severity Index for the Third Plague Pandemic 
WHO Region 
Prevalence58 
(%) 
PSI 
(%) 
African 1.12 48.2 
European 0.05 35.7 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
0.28 47.9 
The Americas 0.04 53.5 
South East Asia 1.61 83.1 
Western 
Pacific 
0.58 88.9 
 
The figures used within the above table are somewhat restricted to ‗those persons 
treated in hospital or in their home by licensed physicians.‘59 Such a caveat alludes 
to the actual prevalence and PSI being higher than is represented in Table 3.2.  
 
                                                 
57 Clem, A., and Galwankar, S. (2005), op. cit. pp.457-458. 
58 The prevalence figure is restricted to the prevalence within those cities whose outbreaks where 
detailed by Echenberg (2007, p.314) and are listed above n.56.  
59 Echenberg, M. (2007), op. cit. p.313. 
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The fear associated with the plague contagion is a strong contributor towards the 
divergence associated with the cost of the plague pandemic. While the severity of 
the pandemic provides an indication of the probability that plague was responsible 
for the scope of the impact, it also allows for further discussion relating to the 
secondary impact of a pandemic actor. Secondary impacts of pandemics mainly 
refer to the (at least initially) non-lethal effect of the pandemic being the economic 
impact. Baldwin‘s fourth dimension of cost provides the foundation necessary to 
assess the cost of the pandemic to both the plague and the state actor. 
 
3.2.4 Cost 
Baldwin‘s dimension of cost requires an assessment of the cost of the pandemic to 
the actors involved, in the case of pandemic, an assessment of the cost of the 
pandemic to the state relative to the cost for the pandemic actor. In this assessment, 
the cost to the pandemic actor is rapidly understood. The cost extolled on the plague 
actor can be seen in the reduction of the plague‘s mortality rate. Such a reduction 
has taken place courtesy of the scientific advances that have led to greater 
knowledge of the plague actor and the development of treatment in the form of 
antibiotics.60 The assessment of the cost to the state actor from a plague pandemic is 
still far more complex. Two important factors need to be considered when looking 
at the cost of the plague pandemic to the state: first, the impact the plague has had 
on the facilitation of international trade for the duration of the pandemic; second, 
the post-pandemic cost to the state as it looks to make a strong recovery.  
 
A recent example of the cost of the plague pandemic is the outbreak of plague in 
1994 in India. As Laurie Garrett informs, ‗the epidemic sparked a global panic that 
cost the Indian economy a minimum of $2 billion in lost sales and losses on the 
Bombay stock market, predominantly the result of international boycotts of Indian 
                                                 
60 Aberth, J. (2011), op. cit. pp.21-22.  
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goods and travellers.‘61 The high financial cost of the Indian outbreak of plague 
transpired regardless of the efforts taken by Indian authorities to mitigate the 
pandemic. Echenberg contends that ‗locally based pharmaceutical labs produced 
over a million doses of the broadbased antibiotic tetracycline, and the drug was 
distributed free of charge as a preventive to all Surat residents who were potential 
incubators‘.62 While these measures are seen as a direct contributor to reducing the 
spread of the pandemic, they did little to assure either the domestic or international 
community of the potential threat, and cost, of a plague pandemic.  
 
The high cost to the Indian economy was the likely motivator for certain ‗cover-up‘ 
and political misdirection campaigns that transpired.  As Garret notes ‗as the 
number of countries banning trade with India mounted…the Hindi-language press 
insisted that there was no plague, accusing Pakistan of a smear campaign aimed at 
bringing India‘s economy to its knees‘.63 Such foreign policy directed accusations 
highlight the ability of the plague pandemic actor to become a political actor, with 
the ability to influence the relationship between two states.  More importantly, 
apportioning of blame to a rival state did little to reduce the economic burden of the 
outbreak on India.  However, had Pakistan taken serious affront at the comments, a 
further cost would have eventuated for India in either finding ways to placate 
Pakistan, or, in combating a new but more traditional security threat/incursion. 
 
Economic recovery from a plague outbreak further contributes to the cost 
apportioned to the state actor. The Black Death offers an insight into the recovery of 
the state from a high mortality pandemic. Hirshleifer contends that given the high 
mortality of the Black Death, its economic impact must be assessed in both the short 
and long term. In the short-term, economic recovery from the Black Death was 
                                                 
61 Garrett, L. (1996), op. cit. p.74. 
62 Echenberg, M. (2002), op. cit.  p.449. 
63 Garrett, L. (1996), op. cit. p.74. 
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‗rapid‘ with ‗a rapid rise in wages and per capita incomes of the laboring classes, 
and downward pressure on rents and the incomes of the propertied classes‘.64 Both 
outcomes were an immediate result of the high mortality rate; a shortage of workers 
in the workplace and in the home rental market.  
 
The long-term economic recovery was substantially different with ‗the century 
following the Black Death…usually considered…to be a period of depression‘.65 The 
link between the depression and the Black Death is somewhat tenuous, although 
Hirshleifer concludes that the ‗stagnation of this century appears to have been 
mainly due to the continuing recurrences of plague, secondarily to the effects of [the 
hundred years] war‘.66 The ability of the state‘s economy to recover is directly 
influenced by the actions taken by the governing authorities. 
 
The role of state authorities in enabling economic recovery from a plague outbreak 
is at the heart of both Baldwin and Morgenthau and should not be overlooked. 
Aberth offers a striking comparison between the abilities of England and Egypt to 
recover from the Black Death pandemic during the early sixteenth century:  
…In England, the long-term economic impact of the massive depopulation 
caused by successive waves of the plague led to growing prosperity in the 
population at large (with the significant exception of the landholding class), 
since, in general, wages of laborers rose, prices of agricultural necessities fell, 
and rents declined, all tending to raise peasant incomes and spelling the end of 
the oppressive manorial system; however, in Egypt, the reverse was true, with 
wages falling, grain prices rising, and rents increasing, all leading to the 
collapse of the economy based on fellahin labor. A simple comparison of the 
agrarian GDP (gross domestic product) in the two countries…dramatically 
illustrates the disparity: Egypt‘s fell by nearly 60 percent…while England‘s 
recovered and actually increased by 7 percent, so that England‘s GDP was by 
this time double that of Egypt‘s.67 
The ability of the government to respond to the depopulation of the state played a 
direct role in the economic recovery of the state. The role of the government in 
                                                 
64 Hirshleifer, J. (1966), op. cit. p.27. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. p.28. [Brackets Added] 
67 Aberth, J. (2011), op. cit. p.59. The role of the British and Egyptian authorities in facilitating the 
disparity in response is further explored in section 3.3.9 The Plague Pandemic: Quality of 
Government. 
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minimising the cost generated by the pandemic is vital to the preservation of that 
state‘s national power. However, even when the state addresses the outbreak, such 
as the case of India outlined above, the psychosocial ramifications of a plague 
outbreak may be too great to assuage the economic cost of the outbreak to the state.   
 
The dimension of cost reveals some important considerations in assessing the 
relationship between the plague pandemic actor and the state actor. The continued 
eruption of plague outbreaks has come at a physical cost for the pandemic actor. 
However, despite the ability of states to treat plague victims, and adopt preventative 
measures, an outbreak of plague still carries a considerable economic cost for the 
state actor.  
 
Baldwin‘s dimensions of power serve to illustrate the relationship of power between 
two actors. In assessing the relationship between the plague and the state, the 
dominance of the plague actor becomes obvious. The high rate of mortality 
associated with the plague provides the foundation for an assessment of the impact 
of a high mortality pandemic on the power of the state. While Baldwin‘s dimensions 
have proven that a relationship between the plague pandemic and the state exists, a 
broader assessment must be adopted in order to consider the national power 
implications of the plague pandemic actor. Morgenthau‘s elements of national 
power provide the framework for such an analysis to take place.  
 
3.3 Plague Pandemic Assessment 
The plague actor is positioned as a highly virulent contagion that places an 
extraordinary strain on the resources of any state tasked with confronting it. While 
the potency of plague pandemics has diminished over time, largely due to advances 
made in developed countries‘ health infrastructure, historical plague pandemics 
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provide the opportunity to gauge the impact of pandemics with a high virulence 
and high mortality on the national power of the state.  The central premise of 
Morgenthau‘s elements of national power is to illustrate the core attributes that a 
state must seek to maintain an ability to both preserve and protect its national 
power.  While the bulk of the following pandemic assessment concentrates on the 
Black Death, the occasional use of evidence from both the Justinian Plague, and the 
Third Pandemic, is included to insure clarity in regard to the effect of the plague 
pandemic actor on the state‘s national power. 
 
3.3.1 Geography 
Morgenthau contends that a state‘s geography is the ‗most stable factor upon which 
the power of a state depends‘.68 Such stability is derived from the permanency of the 
geographic features of the state, inclusive of its terrain and borders. While a state 
may be able to protect its borders from the visible threat, such as an advancing 
military, it is substantially more difficult to insulate the state from the invisible 
threat posed by microorganisms. Plague is one such microorganism. The chief 
vector of plague, the common flea, combined with its host of the black rat, made the 
dissemination of the disease across, and within, borders remarkably simple. Indeed 
the plague pandemic provides an ideal introduction to the ability of diseases to 
mitigate the geographic advantage so often touted by Morgenthau as vital to 
national power.  
 
When assessing the impact of plague on the element of geography the primary issue 
becomes the plague‘s ability to proliferate via its hosts, meaning, that the ability of 
plague to infect humans, rats and fleas, allowed for the infecting pathogen to be 
proliferated through multiple vectors ensuring the greatest scope of infection 
possible. Such an ability follows the ‗principle pattern of epidemic spread in the 
                                                 
68 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.122. 
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Middle Ages,‘69 which historian Ole Benedictow, surmised in describing the pattern 
of spread for the Black Death. 
…In medieval times, ship transport was by far the most efficient and rapid way 
of transporting goods and disseminating disease at a distance. Epidemic disease, 
consequently, first invaded seaports, cities and commercial hubs along the 
coasts of the Mediterranean and the western coasts of Europe or situated on 
large navigable rivers…Next, epidemics would radiate from them to local 
towns in the region, and from them further into the countryside by horse and 
carriage or by pack horses along secondary and tertiary lines of local 
communication. In this way a highly contagious disease would in the end tend 
to blanket entire areas and regions…Seaports would also serve as points of 
departure for other ships, which would take disease as well as cargo on board 
and carry it to other destinations and commercial centres that would serve as 
new epicentres for the spread of disease in their regions and so on…70 
The ability of plague to utilise human activity to aid its spread diminished the 
potential power of geographic location for the state. Seaports played an increasingly 
prominent role in the dissemination of plague in all three pandemics.71 Just as the 
use of ships had ‗greatly hastened the Black Death‘s conquest of Europe,‘72 the 
invention of the steamship served to further increase the pace with which plague 
was able to spread during the third pandemic. Once plague had entered the 
harbour it would spread by land ‗at a pace that was only a tiny fraction of the pace 
by ship‘.73   
 
The increased speed of dissemination via ship posed significant difficulties for 
authorities tasked with protecting the geographic border of the state. According to 
Benedictow, 
…The Black Death moved with such pace and in such an apparently fortuitous 
manner in the eyes of contemporaries that the weak and rudimentary medieval 
administrations of countries, city states or municipal authorities had no chance 
to organize effective countermeasures, such as blocking harbours to ships 
coming from abroad.74 
However, such countermeasures would only have been effective if the visible signs 
of plague were present among the crew of the ship. Even the quarantining of a crew 
                                                 
69 Benedictow, O.J. (2004) The Black Death 1346-1353: The Complete History, Woodbridge: The 
Boydell Press, p.227. 
70 Ibid. 
71 See Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. Little, L.K. (2007), op. cit. Echenberg, M. (2007), op. cit. 
Benedictow, O.J. (2004), op. cit. Aberth, J. (2005) The Black Death: The Great Mortality of 1348-
1350 A Brief History with Documents, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
72 Benedictow, O.J. (2004), op. cit. p.229. 
73 Ibid. p.231. 
74 Ibid. p.229. 
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showing signs of plague may not have prevented the introduction and spread of 
plague, given the vector of rats. 
 
However, some states were able to diminish the pace of the third pandemic‘s spread 
on its arrival on the mainland. Actions deployed by administrations during the third 
pandemic in large part built upon those established in the wake of the Black Death. 
The traditional notions of quarantine and cordoning of areas, contributed to the 
diminishing of the attrition rate throughout the third pandemic. However, 
Echenberg highlights the considerable role that the geographic attributes of specific 
areas played in decreasing the impact of the pandemic. For example, ‗Porto proved 
to be an unattractive beachhead for Y.pestis. The steep escarpments of the Douro 
River valley and its remoteness helped thwart the spread of bubonic plague to the 
interior, let alone cross the mountains into France or Spain.‘75 In short, 
unaccommodating terrain reduced the spread of disease, particularly when the state 
was able to prepare adequately for an oncoming pandemic, thereby holding as true 
Morgenthau‘s assertions in regard to geography. 
 
The ability to circumvent geographical terrain to ensure the safe and rapid trade of 
goods provides for a strong, if not interdependent, economic foundation. Historical 
examples give an understanding of the potential benefits geography brings to a state 
in the period of plague pandemics and the utilised trade routes (both sea and land). 
However, as Gottfried contends, the role of trade routes in the introduction of the 
contagion during the Black Death exposes a higher cost of maintaining an 
interdependent economy. While primary responsibility for infection can be assigned 
to rodents, the ‗work of man-the elaborate East-West trading system established in 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries‘ was just as responsible.76 Gottfried argues that 
                                                 
75 Echenberg, M. (2007), op. cit. p.127. Furthermore, the absence of ‗high-ways or easy rail linkages 
tie[ing] Porto to similarly crowded and unsanitary urban slums farther to the north and east,‘ 
contributed to mitigating the pandemic. (p.127) [Brackets Added] 
76 Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. p.35. 
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the westward movement of plague was mainly facilitated by the ‗overland trade 
route through central Asia‘ and assisted via the ‗sea-based routes‘.77 Ironically, the 
actions of humankind in establishing trade routes, arguably to ensure their 
prosperity, also facilitated a reduction in the potential benefits of the geographic 
element to the national power of the state. 
 
Echenberg contends that, ‗it had taken the return of an old pestilence to the very 
doors of Europe for governments to appreciate what infectious disease could now do 
so easily: cross boundaries of nations, states, and oceans.‘78 Humankind played a 
significant role in facilitating the ease with which plague was able to make such a 
crossing. Plague‘s persistent use of humanity‘s technological advancements to 
ensure its further spread highlights the tenacity of this pandemic actor. 
Morgenthau‘s element of geography underlines how susceptible to human and 
microbe development this ―most stable‖ element of national power is to the plague 
pandemic actor.  
 
3.3.2 Natural Resources 
The foundation of Morgenthau‘s element of natural resources is the ability of the 
state to provide for its constituents. An abundance of natural resources, namely food 
and raw material, reinforces the national power of the state by providing the base 
for other elements to fortify their strength.   
 
The Black Death struck Europe at a time when ‗the continent was caught in a 
Malthusian deadlock‘.79 John Kelly contends that ‗after two and a half centuries of 
rapid demographic growth, the balance between people and resources had become 
                                                 
77 Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. p.36. 
78 Echenberg, M. (2007), op. cit. p.307. 
79 Kelly, J. (2005), op. cit. p.293. 
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very tight.‘80 The Black Death facilitated a significant reduction of the European 
population, which allowed for a greater sharing of the resources for the survivors. 
The effect is almost paradoxical to the expected: the abrupt reduction in population, 
had a positive effect on strained natural resources. The deaths caused by the Black 
Death eased the burden on the state‘s natural resources, a burden derived from 
overpopulation of Europe. Kelly further contends that the ‗high mortalities of the 
Black Death…helped to end the paralysis and allow the continent to recapture the 
momentum‘ required to attain a balance between natural resources and the 
population.81  
 
Morgenthau‘s sub-elements of food and raw materials build on the preceding 
element of national power by allowing a realisation of the basis for society. While 
the geographic element offers some assurance of national power for the state, the 
possession of natural resources builds on that assurance, establishing the viability of 
a state‘s national power through its possession of food to support its population.  
3.3.2.1 Food 
The provision of food to a population is vital to the state‘s accumulation of national 
power. While the effect of the Black Death on this provision was to reduce the 
amount of suppliers, being the agricultural workers who succumbed to the 
outbreak, so high were the levels of mortality that an oversupply of food was 
created.  
 
The large population prior to the commencement of the Black Death was already 
placing a significant strain on food resources for a number of countries. The initial 
medieval population ‗boom‘ that transpired during the twelfth and thirteenth 
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centuries seemed to come to an abrupt end. As Kelly maintains, the strain the Black 
Death placed on the medieval economy bought the economy to ‗nearing collapse‘; 
In Europe, it was the implosion of the vastly larger domestic economy, 
particularly the agricultural economy, that people felt most keenly. The 
implosion was continent wide, but in England, a nation of meticulous record 
keepers, it was documented with great diligence. Around 1300 the acreage 
under plow decreased, while the land still in use either declined in productivity 
or stagnated. After centuries of heady advancement, the medieval peasant‘s 
mistakes had caught up with him. Some of the good land brought into service 
during the Great Clearances of the twelfth century had been over-farmed, and 
some of the more marginal land, which never should have been cleared in the 
first place, was giving out entirely.82 
The Black Death enabled the creation of agricultural techniques that would have a 
profound impact on future food supplies within the European region. As Kelly 
observes a ‗smaller population meant a larger share of resources for survivors-and, 
often as well, a wiser use of resources‘.83 In large part, this impact was derived not 
just from the severity of the pandemic and the extensive decimation of the 
population, but the fundamental restructuring of agricultural practice, which took 
place in the aftermath of the pandemic.   
 
The Black Death simultaneously decreased the demand for food, while increasing 
the supply of better quality product. Thompson provides an account of the sudden 
food oversupply and its effect on the medieval economy in that, 
The immediate effect of the Black Death was to lower prices and to glut the 
market with commodities…The mortality due to the Black Death was very 
high...The consequence was that when the plague had spent its force the 
surviving population found itself in possession of these accumulated stores, 
produce, goods, in addition to movable and real property which had once 
belonged to those now dead.84 
As Thompson alludes, too, the reduction in the population allowed survivors to take 
advantage of newly vacated allotments of land that could produce a greater yield.  
Yeloff and Van Geel‘s 2007 study contends, ‗the reduction of manpower available 
for farming meant that, in many cases, it would only have been feasible to farm the 
                                                 
82 Kelly, J. (2005), op. cit. p.56. 
83 Ibid. p.293. The adoption of sustainable agricultural techniques is further addressed in section 
3.3.3 The Plague Pandemic: Industrial Capacity 
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better quality soils‘.85 Such an assertion is supported by Kelly who maintains that ‗in 
the half century after the Black Death, crop yields rose, not because agriculture 
improved but because now only the best land was being farmed‘.86  In the case of 
the Black Death, the national power aspect of food supply was enhanced with an 
increase in the nutritional produce available to the population as a whole. 
Moreover, a stronger community, derived from the more nutritional produce, 
allows for greater positive contributions to national power. 
 
The increased surplus of specific types of food provided the opportunity for farmers 
with access to large parcels of land to focus less on the provision of grain and 
wheat, and more towards animal husbandry.87 This shift in agricultural focus, 
combined with the excess supply of the nutritional staples of wheat and grain, 
contributed toward a change in the diet of the general population.  Gottfried 
documents the nutrition transition that took place within the Middle East during the 
post-plague era: 
There is good evidence for this increased demand for mutton and other meats 
in the Middle East. In the early fourteenth century, before the Black Death, an 
average individual in Syria had consumed a daily diet of about 1154 calories, 
including 45.6 grams of protein, 196 grams of carbohydrates, and 20 grams of 
fat. By the mid-fifteenth century, this had risen to 1930 calories, including 82 
grams of protein, 294 grams of carbohydrates, and over 45 grams of fat. Before 
the Black Death, a monthly mutton ration for a family of four had been about 
12 kilograms; after the Black Death, it rose to 30 kg.88 
Such a transition in food supply enhances the health and well being of the 
population, allowing them to make a greater contribution to the national power of 
the state. The importance of maintaining a nutritional food supply for both military 
and domestic means cannot be overlooked in any calculation of national power. As 
Morgenthau contends, ‗self-sufficiency in food has always been a source of great 
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strength‘ and that a ‗permanent scarcity of food is a source of permanent weakness‘ 
reinforces this notion.89  
3.3.2.2 Raw Materials 
As much as the Black Death was able to replenish the food available to a nation, so 
too was the ability of the pandemic to restore a modicum of balance between the 
population‘s demand for raw materials and the availability of those materials. The 
high rates of mortality had a significant impact on the state‘s ability to utilise the 
population to extract existing raw materials. However, a number of studies90 
indicate that natural resources within the European continent were being over 
consumed to the point that the replenishment of renewable resources was 
increasingly strained. Indeed, David Herlihy contends that ‗nearly all available 
resources were committed to the effort of producing the food, clothing, and shelter 
needed to support the packed communities‘ prior to the outbreak of the Black 
Death.91  Herlihy lends support to the importance of the possession of raw materials 
to ensure not only just the security of the population, but also the national power of 
the state. 
 
The outbreak of the Black Death provided the depopulation required for a 
resurgence of raw materials. As Gottfried argues, the plague ensured a return to a 
productive balance between humankind and natural resources; 
By 1200, virtually all of the Mediterranean Basin and most of the north 
German plain had been deforested and cultivated. Indigenous flora and fauna 
were replaced by domestic grasses and animals, and invaluable woodlands 
were lost. With depopulation this process was reversed. Much of the primeval 
vegetation returned, and abandoned fields and pastures were reforested. Given 
the importance of wood as a building material and fuel, this alone guaranteed 
a rise in standard of living.92 
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The rejuvenation of these resources provided the foundation for a rise in the 
standard of living within states to enhance their national power as their population 
regained numbers and strength. The ability for a state to do so is dependent on its 
ability to enhance its industrial capacity to the point that the technique utilised by 
the state‘s industrial complex minimises the impact on the state‘s natural resources, 
thereby seeking to maintain a balance between the two. 
 
The mortality of the Black Death served to strengthen the potential national power 
garnered from the possession of natural resources. However, the recovery of natural 
resources following the Black Death is largely a long-term consequence. In the 
short-term the rapid depopulation afforded those tasked with capitalising on the 
state‘s natural resources the opportunity to adjust their technique to a more 
sustainable method. Sustainable methods are also inherent in Morgenthau‘s third 
element of national power, industrial capacity, which allows for an assessment of 
the impact of the plague pandemics on the industrial complex of the state.  
3.3.3 Industrial Capacity 
Morgenthau refers to a state‘s industrial capacity as the possession of the ‗industrial 
plants that can transform‘ the state‘s natural resources, ‗into industrial products‘.93 
The severity of the Black Death provided the impetus to adopt alternative methods 
within the medieval industrial complex. The initial impact of the pandemic, being a 
reduction in the institutional knowledge, was countered by a number of ―mini-
revolutions‖ within the industrial complex of the time. A staple of these ―mini-
revolutions‖ was the enhanced contribution they made to the national power of the 
state.     
 
The high mortality of the Black Death was responsible for generating a substantial 
shock to the European community. Historian David Herlihy maintains that this 
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shock ‗in turn broke the continuities of economic life and disrupted established 
routines of work and service…the high mortalities left numerous posts in society 
unfilled and services unperformed.‘94  The dearth of services posed significant 
problems to the industrial capacity of the region to overcome, as Thompson further 
explains, 
Those who survived found themselves personally richer than before; but 
Europe was immeasurably poorer, for production absolutely ceased for months, 
even a whole year, and when it was renewed the productive capacity of Europe 
was found to be much impaired, while the waste had been terrific. When all 
the accumulated surplus had been consumed or wasted, prices soared and the 
cost of living, both of commodities and of service, rose enormously. Farm 
laborers, guild workmen, domestic servants, clerks, even priests, struck for 
high wages.95 
The Black Death contributed to a shortage of specific service providers. This 
shortage was often filled by inexperienced or unqualified persons, as the population 
attempted to readjust.  One such example is the role of gravediggers. 
 
The Black Death provided a number of opportunities for those in need of gainful 
employment. In exploring the increased demand placed on gravediggers, Herlihy 
highlights how ‗Gravediggers gained a special prominence at a time when people 
died each day by the hundreds. The task of burying the dead apparently gave 
employment to marginal social groups, poor rustics, beggars, and the urban 
jobless.‘96 Indeed there appears to be some indication that ‗gravediggers who 
worked for pay were unknown…prior to the Black Death‘.97 The increase in 
demand for previously marginal services challenged prevailing professional 
frameworks to promote new areas of economic activity.   
 
As with all grand reactions to the economy, the dramatic change in population 
encouraged individuals to exploit the conditions to their advantage. The high 
demand for particular goods and services and the reduction in the supply of these 
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goods and services, allowed individuals to capitalise on the unique situation and 
demand whatever price or wage they deemed fit. The ramifications of the high wage 
demands significantly impeded the recovery of the state. In an effort to curb the 
high rates of profiteering in the wake of the Black Death, Thompson contends that 
‗governments had to resort to maximum laws both for commodities and wages‘.98 
The statute of labourers within England went so far as to imprison workers ‗who 
were idle and were not willing to take employment after the pestilence unless for 
outrageous wages.‘99 Furthermore, the statute determined that both ‗men and 
women, should be obliged to take employment for the salary and wages accustomed 
to be paid in the place where they were working in the 20th year of the king‘s reign 
[1346], or five to six years earlier‘.100 The intervention of the government tells us 
the relationship between the plague pandemics and governance and the importance 
placed on a viable industrial complex in order to maintain the state‘s national 
power. 
 
Interestingly, Kelly contributes to this idea contending that ‗depopulation…had an 
important effect on technological innovation‘, and that ‗the sharp decline in the 
workforce was an impetus for the development of labor-saving devices in many 
fields‘.101 Three fields where such advancements took place were fishing, book 
making, and mining. The ―mini-revolutions‖ that transpired within these fields 
provide an indication of the ingenuity experienced within the post-Black Death 
industrial complex, designed to counter the loss of the working population.   
 
Gottfried illustrates the innovative means introduced to the fishing industry: 
Fishing was big business in the Late Middle Ages, as fish was an important 
source of protein in most people‘s diets, especially during Lent. Before the Black 
                                                 
98 Thompson, J.W. (1921), op. cit. p. 568. France passed a statute of Laborers in 1350, England a 
similar law in 1351. 
99 Luders, A., Tomlins, T. E., France, J., Tauton, W.E., and Raithby J. (1810-28) ‗Statutes of the Realm 
1101-1713‘ in Horrox, R. (1994) The Black Death, Manchester: Manchester University Press, p.312. 
100 Ibid. [Brackets Added] 
101 Kelly, J. (2005), op. cit. p.288. 
The Plague Pandemic 
108 
Death, fisherman had to come ashore to salt (i.e., preserve) their catch. But 
around 1380, Dutch fishermen perfected a method of salting, drying, and 
storing their catch aboard ship. This allowed them to stay at sea longer, sail 
farther from shore, and bring home more fish.102 
Salting fish at sea expanded the function of the industry, expanded the domestic 
food supply, and strengthened the national industrial capacity. The advancements 
within the fishing industry translated to a ‗revolution in maritime transport,‘ with 
the production of ‗bigger ships with smaller crews‘.103 The benefit provided to the 
state by such advancements was the ability to project national power over greater 
distances and the waves. 
 
Of significant concern to the nascent book industry of the time was the rapid loss of 
labour and expertise. As Kelly explains, ‗during the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, the demand for books increased steadily, propelled by a growing class of 
merchants, university-trained professionals, and craftsmen‘.104 In the post-Black 
Death era, even though the demand for books had arguably decreased, the ‗labor-
intensive‘ process of book production became unaffordable in the ‗high-wage 
postplague era.‘105 In short, the Black Death resulted in a more expensive book 
industry. In order to counter this increased expense ‗Johann Gutenberg, an 
ambitious young engraver from Mainz, Germany... In 1453, and the near-centenary 
of the mortality…introduced his printing press to the world.‘106 While a 
considerable amount of time had passed since the Black Death and the creation of 
Gutenberg‘s printing press, such innovation is ‗a salient example of factor 
substitution which was transforming the late medieval economy‘.107 In this 
particular instance, the human factor in book production was being substituted 
with the printing press, similar outcomes also transpired within the mining 
industry. 
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After the Black Death, the development of society contributed towards a ‗general 
expansion in mining and metallurgy‘.108 This expansion was related to ‗an 
increasing demand for bullion and metals for guns,‘ and proved a substantial test 
for the burgeoning mining industry.109 As Gottfried explains,  
The number of miners, never large before the plague, suffered from the same 
extent of depletion as did the ranks of masons and carpenters. In essence, the 
mining industry faced disaster at a time of optimum demand. But, in the 
fifteenth century, there were new developments in water pumps, which 
allowed mines to be dug deeper, and new techniques in shaft shoring, which 
enabled miners to go into deeper holes and do so more safely than ever 
before.110 
Advances in technique that were adopted by the mining sector made a significant 
contribution to the industrial capacity of the state. Arguably, such advances may 
have transpired without the Black Death taking place. However the mass-reduction 
in personnel during the pandemic would have increased the demand and 
accelerated the need for these technical advances.    
 
The effect of the Black Death on the industrial capacity of the state has two phases. 
Phase one was the immediate impact of shock and devastation that comes with such 
large losses of human life. However, as opposed to crippling society to the point 
where it can no longer function, the Black Death served as a turning point for the 
industrial capacity of the region affected, as Herlihy infers, ‗after it recovered from 
the plague‘s initial shock and learned to cope with the problems raised by 
diminished numbers‘.111 Phase two was society‘s ability to recover and innovate to 
advance its interest. The transformative effects of the Black Death on the medieval 
industrial complex translated to a similar transformation in the military forces of 
the time.    
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3.3.4 Military Preparedness 
The military during the Black Death was profoundly different to the military to 
which Morgenthau referred, given that throughout the Middle Ages ‗medieval wars 
had been fought not by ―armies‖ in any recognizable, modern sense but by loose 
collections of men, often under little or no central command‘.112 Military personnel 
were drawn from the healthier members of the population in times of war. While 
specific data detailing the impact of the Black Death on military forces is lacking, 
the data available from all three pandemics of plague does provide a synthesised 
indication as to the threat generated by a pandemic to a state‘s military 
preparedness. 
 
The Black Death provided an impetus for change within the military establishment, 
in particular it was the ‗nature of warfare‘ which needed change spurred on, in 
part, by ‗labor shortages and high wages‘.113 The military leadership were expected 
to maintain the effectiveness of the military force with a significantly diminished 
population from which to draw.  As with industrial capacity the use of technology 
was pivotal in the state‘s ability to maintain or promote its national power. 
3.3.4.1 Technology 
Technical innovation plays an important part in the maintenance of a state‘s 
national power. In the medieval era, innovation in military technique enhanced the 
ability of a state‘s military to protect its national power. One such early medieval 
innovation was the creation of the infantry. Morgenthau contends that the creation 
of the infantry, ‗spelled a momentous shift in the distribution of power in favor of 
those who used those weapons before their enemies did‘.114 In order to reinforce his 
argument Morgenthau cites the battles of Morgarten (1315) and Laupen (1339), in 
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which, ‗armies composed of Swiss infantry inflicted disastrous defeats on feudal 
cavalry, demonstrating the food [sic] soldiers recruited from the common people 
were superior to an aristocratic and expensive army of equestrians‘.115 While the 
use of foot soldiers or ‗peasant infantry‘116 provided some advantage in the 
technique of war, the need for a large number of armed forces to sustain such an 
advantage posed further difficulties for the state, particularly during the Black 
Death. Faced with a decrease in potential recruits, commanders were forced to 
adopt more experimental techniques in warfare. 
 
One such technique was the use of the pathogen itself as a way to defeat the enemy. 
Indeed, the first recorded incident of biological warfare took place just prior to the 
commencement of the Black Death and was a likely contributor to the plague‘s 
dissemination. The trading centre of Kaffa on the Crimean coast came under siege 
by the Tartars in 1346, ‗after a three year siege, plague broke out in the Tartar 
camp…Kaffa fell after the Tartars catapulted their plagued dead over the city 
walls‘.117 Whether the use of the corpses led to the infection of those within the 
centre‘s walls is a point of contention.118 However, the tactic did lead to success for 
the Tartars, with refugees fleeing Kaffa by ship.119 The technique of using plague as 
a biological weapon established at Kaffa was ‗continued in innumerable siege 
situations well after the Black Death‘.120 The Tartars used biological agents with 
crudity – however, later armies have used military technology effectively to 
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disseminate biological agents. One such recent example includes the use of plague 
by the Japanese during World War II. Cunha and Cunha contend that the Japanese, 
‗used aircraft to drop rice contaminated with infected fleas on several Chinese cities‘ 
infecting thousands and causing ‗approximately 700 plague-related deaths‘.121 
 
While not considered a direct result of the Black Death, the standardisation of 
firearms as a staple of military weaponry seems to have derived from the reduction 
in manpower, as a result of the Black Death. The reduction of the population meant 
an increase in demand for capable soldiers. Consequently, soldiers were able to 
demand higher pay, and ‗as the salaries of soldiers increased, war became more 
expensive‘.122 Higher expenses contributed towards higher expectations and 
arguably, ‗soldiers with firearms could fight more effectively than those without‘.123 
In short, ‗the development of guns…was accelerated by the postplague lack of 
manpower‘.124  
3.3.4.2 Leadership 
Military leaders were not immune from the plague. Cunha and Cunha refer to the 
effect of plague on the outcome of the Peloponnesian war, arguing that ‗the plague 
killed Pericles, leaving Athens without one of its greatest statesmen‘.125 The loss of 
military leadership, combined with Athens‘ adversaries, the Spartans, being 
‗comparably untouched by the disease‘ contributed towards Athens‘ ultimate 
defeat.126 There are some indications as to the lack of leadership displayed during 
the Black Death and the need to improve on this vital component of military 
preparedness. While the leadership within the military was just as susceptible as the 
common soldier or citizen to plague, the actions of the leadership, particularly 
during the Black Death, highlight the rather large disconnect between the two.  
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The actions taken by the Royal government of England during the Black Death show 
the stark disconnect. Horrox contends that ‗the royal government expected business 
as usual during the plague, and accordingly fined Aymer fitz Waryn, the Sheriff of 
Devon, £20 for failing to come to Westminster to render his account in summer 
1349‘.127  The sheriff justified his absence by maintaining that, 
Richard de Greencome, who was his under-sheriff and sub-escheator and 
responsible for receiving the issues of the county, along with his other 
ministers and officials…who had the keeping of the writs, rolls and 
memoranda which he needed to make up his account, had died suddenly…of 
the pestilence then raging in the country.128 
Record keeping of such a seemingly minor transgression and debilitation make it 
logical to assume that similar instances transpired within military forces. All 
instances accumulate to threaten the national power of Britain. The assault of the 
Black Death on the military preparedness of Britain can also be witnessed in the 
actions taken by military leaders during the post-Black Death era. 
 
Fifteenth century changes to the British military complex, under the leadership of 
King Henry V, indicate an awareness of the need to strengthen the defence of the 
state‘s national power in the wake of the Black Death. According to Bradbury, ‗the 
royal fleet had virtually disappeared in the fourteenth century, and at Henry‘s 
accession consisted still of a mere handful of ships. Within a few years Henry built a 
fleet of some strength.‘129 In realising the need to project the national power 
through a naval capacity, King Henry commenced a programme aimed at restoring 
the national power of the state. Similar actions carried out by Henry such as the 
mass production and banning of the exportation of bows and arrows130 facilitated 
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an enhancement of the state‘s military preparedness. The production of bows and 
arrows, as well as a reconstitution of naval force, should be construed as a desire to 
project power, without committing the manpower to more traditional infantry 
battalions. Whether or not the Black Death played a part in the decisions of King 
Henry remains unknown, however the loss of manpower from the Black Death 
would have demanded a re-evaluation of military practices.  
 
For Morgenthau, military leadership ‗has always exerted a decisive influence upon 
national power‘.131 The plague pandemics have had a significant impact on this 
important sub-element. The domestic situation largely determines the ability of the 
military leader to effectively carry out his duty of preserving the national power of 
the state. Furthermore, as can be seen in the aftermath of the Black Death, military 
leadership must be willing to adapt to the new environment with which they have 
been presented.  Such adaptation incorporates an appreciation of the impact of the 
pandemic on both the quality and the quantity of their armed forces.   
3.3.4.3 Quality and Quantity of Armed Forces 
Assessing the quality and quantity of armed forces is fitting when describing the 
impact of plague on the state‘s military preparedness. Prior to the Black Death, the 
Justinian Plague illustrated the potential effect a pandemic could have on a state‘s 
military. Simply put, a loss of life within the general population forced the military 
leadership to look to other means to fill the vacancies. Little contends that a heavy 
reliance on peasants to fill the Byzantine army contributed to severe manpower 
shortages during the Justinian plague.132 The impact of the plague on the general 
population required ‗searches beyond the usual sources for fresh recruits,‘ which 
led to ‗the ever-greater induction of barbarians‘ into the armed forces.133 
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The use of mercenaries to fill the role of a professional military was a common, yet 
expensive, way to ensure the quantity of forces. Furthermore, the extra support 
required for medieval warfare required large numbers of individuals. Ehrenreich 
contends that ‗long campaigns required retinues of craftsmen and laborers-
blacksmiths, for example, and miners to dig under the walls of besieged cities. In 
addition, there were large numbers of peasant foot soldiers: archers, pikemen, and 
lightly armed men.‘134 While the ability to draw such a large and diverse quantity of 
forces during and after the Black Death would have been difficult, the ability to 
ensure the quality of health for recruits and forces alike was just as complicated. 
 
The maintenance of a large military during the medieval era was complicated by the 
nature of the job. The violence of medieval warfare likely played a role in the 
susceptibility of armed forces to infection of plague. Kelly illustrates such a point in 
arguing that, 
Since stress, including combat stress, weakens immune system function, 
arguably one consequence of bigger more violent wars was a larger pool of 
disease-vulnerable people. Less arguably, larger armies produced larger 
contributions of dirty men and debris, which attracted larger concentrations of 
rats and fleas.135  
The creation of conditions conducive to the spread of plague served to empower the 
pandemic further in its attack on the national power of the state. The responsibility 
for ensuring the quantity and the appropriate quality to ensure such an undertaking 
fell to the leadership and served as the impetus for changing the nature of the 
medieval military establishment.  
 
When assessing the national power of the state, the preparedness of the military to 
protect and recover power is the key desired attribute. Throughout history, the 
plague pandemic actor has maintained a decisive influence on a state‘s military 
preparedness, be it the death of a leader, or the microorganism‘s use as a weapon. 
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The Black Death required an innovative approach to technique in order for the state 
to recover. However, the success of adopting innovative approaches to military 
preparedness can only be viable if the state is able to recruit from a healthy 
population.  
3.3.5 Population 
The element of population serves as Morgenthau‘s first ‗purely human‘ factor that 
‗determines the power of a nation‘.136 Within the element of population, this 
assessment turns to a purely quantitative agenda. The primary effect of a pandemic 
on a population is the reduction in size through death. However, the plague‘s high 
mortality rate, and the ease with which it conquered the European continent, 
allowed the pandemic to cause significant upheaval within the demography of 
Europe. Indeed, William McNeill contends that ‗overall, the best estimate of plague-
provoked mortality, 1346-50, in Europe as a whole is that about one third of the 
total population died‘.137 Such a high rate of mortality has significant consequences 
for both the distribution of the population, as well as the trends of the population.  
3.3.5.1 Distribution 
The distribution of a state‘s population dictates the ability of the population to 
contribute towards the national power of the state. Ideally, the size of a state‘s 
population is maintained at a level that sustains the other elements of national 
power such as industrial capacity and military preparedness. The Black Death, 
combined with successive outbreaks of plague, imposed a significant burden on the 
distribution of the medieval population.  
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Size 
Prior to the Black Death, the European continent had been experiencing high levels 
of population growth. Gottfried contends this was a result of Europe‘s disease pool 
reaching ‗an equilibrium of sorts,‘ 
The High Middle Ages was remarkably disease-free. The result was an increase 
in population from about 25 million in 950 to about 75 million in 1250. In 
some regions, the rate of increase was even greater.138  
This population boom contributed towards what Herlihy has described as a 
‗Malthusian deadlock,‘ meaning that ‗the community was maintaining at stable 
levels very large numbers over a lengthy period‘.139 The outbreak of the Black Death 
in 1348 halted the nature of this growth.  
 
Over the three years of the Black Death, the population size decreased considerably 
with regional and seasonal variations.140 In 1351, at the end of the Black Death‘s 
three year run, ‗agents for Pope Clement VI calculated the number of dead in 
Christian Europe at 23,840,000. With a pre-plague population of about 75 million, 
Clement‘s figure accounts for a mortality of 31%.‘141 Such a mortality rate is widely 
considered to be the midpoint of probable rates of mortality, with some areas, such 
as Normandy, experiencing plague mortality ‗between 40% and 50%‘.142  Based on 
these figures, it is possible to presume that in the three years of the Black Death 
more than 23,000 persons per day died across Europe.   
Age 
For Morgenthau, the age of a population relates to the productive young and their 
inputs to the development of the state‘s national power. With the Black Death, age 
relates to the groups that died and the withdrawal of their labour capacity. Despite 
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the difficulty in ascertaining age specifics during the Black Death, Herlihy contends 
that historic records indicate that, ‗the plague preyed on the young rather than the 
mature…If a person survived one major epidemic, the chances improved that he or 
she would survive the next‘.143 Herlihy bases his assumption on the Castato, being a 
survey of the Florentine population from 1427 to 1430, which revealed that ‗old 
persons age 60 or above…constitute[d] nearly 15 percent of the community‘.144 
Hirshleifer supports Herlihy‘s findings, insinuating that the recurrent exposure to 
plague pandemics, ‗reduced the incentives to bear children and raise families‘.145 
 
Herlihy offers further assistance in establishing the size of the population segment of 
―maximum potential usefulness,‖ which enhances the national power of the state. 
Herlihy contends that within, the Castato, ‗the adult and productive members of 
society, those between 20 and 59, were…a minority of about 41 percent‘.146 While 
this figure represents the age distribution after the Black Death, it is logical to 
assume that, given the significant shortages evident within the industrial capacity 
and the military preparedness elements, the Black Death had a catastrophic effect 
on the productive population demographic.  The Black Death pandemic was the 
start of a cycle of pandemics, which saw the Plague return to the European 
continent a number of times to varying degrees. According to Gottfried Pestis 
Secunda commenced in the spring of 1361 and lasted for approximately one full 
year, with an average mortality rate of 20%, ‗many observers…believed it was 
especially deadly for select groups, including the young-those born after the Black 
Death-and the landed upper class‘ further diminishing the power potential of the 
population element.147  
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Geographic Distribution 
The Black Death fundamentally altered the geographic distribution of the European 
population in two distinct ways: first, the migration of populations to areas that 
were seemingly not at threat from the plague and second, the migration of rural 
populations to recently depopulated urban centres.  Thompson contends that the 
popular response to the plague was similar to an invasion in that ‗it either killed or 
drove out the population‘.148 The movement of the population is best evidenced, 
according to Thompson as ‗new place-names, new faces, even unfamiliar speech in 
various regions, attest it…One finds evidence of Italian colonies in south German 
and south French cities; French and Germans in north Italy; Flemings in Normandy; 
Normans in Picardy, etc.‘.149 Similar patterns of redistribution occurred 
domestically as well. Gottfried documents the migration of peasants from the 
countryside to more urban areas: 
Peasants fled from the countryside to, which was beset by a drop in food prices, 
a temporary breakdown of local authority, and omnipresent criminal bands 
and mercenaries, for the economic opportunity and comparative stability of 
large urban centers such as Florence and Siena.150 
This redistribution, in part, assisted in the regeneration of the natural resources that 
were being heavily harvested prior to the Black Death.151 Furthermore, the effect of 
the Black Death on geographic distribution reinforces the psychosocial aspects 
related to the disease. Thus, while the fear of contagion prompted the desertion of 
specific locales, the need for survival allowed certain populations to overcome that 
fear. 
Level and Distribution of Human Capital 
The impact of the Black Death drastically affected the human capital of a population 
despite attempts ‗to keep its occupational cadres constant in size, even though the 
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total community and the pool of possible members was shrinking‘.152 Evidence that 
guilds sought to establish an equilibrium of sorts between membership losses and 
new enrolments seem to suggest a recognition of the potential impact on member 
numbers resulting from the Black Death. Herlihy provides evidence of the 
matriculation lists of the guild of Por Santa Maria in Florence, which illustrate that, 
In the 20 years immediately preceding the Black Death, from 1328 to 1347, 
the guild matriculated 730 new members. In the 20 following years, from 
1348 to 1367, it brought in almost as many, 672, although the population was 
down by about one-third. In the early fifteenth century, from 1408 to 1427, it 
admitted 784, more than in the pre-plague period, although the city‘s 
population had fallen by two-thirds.153 
In order to maintain a steady rate of enrolment ‗the guild had to spread its net 
broadly and bring in new apprentices with no previous family connection with the 
trade‘.154 The efforts of the guild to counter a decrease in memberships indicate not 
only a loss in human capital, but also the willingness for the guild to enrol less 
qualified individuals, to indemnify the guild from a loss of members. Herlihy 
maintains that a similar experience was likely to have transpired across all 
professions, which would have contributed to some loss of institutional memory.155  
 
Evidence of the impact of the Black Death on the population distribution is 
somewhat sparse. However, available data do provide an appreciation of the 
potential effects of the pandemic on the medieval population. The distribution of the 
population establishes the immediate implications for that population of a 
pandemic. In order to comprehend fully the impact of the Black Death on the 
Morgenthau‘s element of population, an appreciation of the effect of the pandemic 
on the trend of the population is required. 
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3.3.5.2 Trends 
The trend of a population ‗plays an important role‘ in assessing the ‗future 
distribution of power‘ for a state.156 Gottfried illustrates the weighty effect that 
‗several attacks of plague in a single generation‘ had on the demographic growth 
within Europe:157  
Europe‘s population in 1430 was 50% to 75% lower than it had been in 1290. 
In some places it began to rise in the 1450s, in others in the 1480s, and in 
others still not until early in the sixteenth century. Most observers agree that it 
was not until the mid-sixteenth century that Europe regained its thirteenth-
century population levels.158 
Importantly, a reduction in the population trend served to benefit the European 
continent, preventing it from experiencing the effects of the over-populated pre-
Black Death times. While it is possible to presume that a slow population recovery 
would usually be to the detriment of the state‘s national power, the reduced 
population‘s quality of life was significantly enhanced. A greater quality of life 
arguably provides a greater  contribution to national power than less. The element 
of national character does provide some indication as to whether the population‘s 
experience both during and after the Black Death was capable of making any 
contribution to the national power of the state. 
 
3.3.6 National Character 
The element of national character plays a distinct role in the state‘s ability to recover 
from the impact of a pandemic. A stronger national character‘s contribution to 
recovery, while difficult to gauge effectively, cannot be ignored when assessing the 
impact of a pandemic on national power. The Black Death‘s assault on the national 
character of the state was coupled with a lack of knowledge about the contagion, 
the influence of religious authorities and a disconnect between the political 
leadership and its constituency. The severity of the Black Death contributed towards 
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a ‗tremendous…manifestation of mob psychology,‘ which Europe had not witnessed 
since the Crusades.159 Thompson contends that this manifestation was a result of the 
‗lapse of all the accustomed inhibitions of church, of state, of society,‘ which led to 
‗the thought and conduct of men on eccentric tangents‘.160 The Black Death 
effectively removed any pre-existing national character within the European 
continent, to replace it with a national character of chaos; one where the ability of 
the individual to survive was considerably diminished and threatened. The scar that 
the Black Death would leave on the national character of the European region 
would last for centuries. 
 
In assessing the changes in attitude experienced within the general population 
following the Black Death, Gottfried contends that ‗life took on more violent and 
emotional overtones‘.161 Gottfried explains that ‗much of the cruelty and violence, 
as well as the piety and joy, of the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries can be 
understood only by keeping in mind the new omnipresence of plague the possibility 
of sudden, painful death.‘162 McNeill lends support to this point saying that ‗when 
an outbreak of plague implanted fear of imminent death in an entire community, 
ordinary routines and customary restraints regularly broke down‘.163 The changes 
effected by the Black Death on the national character can be illustrated through the 
political and religious characteristics of the population. 
 
The Black Death had significant ramifications for the political authorities‘ ability to 
exert influence over the population‘s character. The feudal system, where ‗both the 
court and police systems in most of fourteenth century Europe were operated by 
local landholders,‘ contributed to the chaotic nature of the national character.164  
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Gottfried contends that in stark contrast to the feudal system, ‗plague did not honor 
social class, and mortality among the nobility approximated that of the general 
population‘.165 The loss of the ―noble class‖ as well as ‗the economic and military 
power and social prestige of the landholders declined, their ability to uphold the law 
also diminished‘.166 The inability to maintain law and order contributed to the 
deterioration of the fabric and structure of society as ‗people resorted increasingly to 
violence to settle their differences.167 
 
The decline of political authority was not replicated everywhere. In exploring 
aspects of human behaviour within medieval England, John Kelly contends that the 
broken window theory168 of human behaviour ‗may speak to the relatively low-level 
of upheaval in Black Death England‘.169 Specifically, Kelly singles out those who, 
Stepped forward-to harvest the crops, maintain the land and buildings, keep 
the records, man the courts-to convey that the country was not slipping into 
anarchy, that authority was being maintained. Their steady leadership may 
have helped sustain order, self-discipline, and lawfulness at a very difficult 
moment.170 
The Black Death provided a significant test for the ability of individuals to adapt and 
cultivate the national character. While some within the aristocracy were unable to 
provide the inspiration required to foster growth of the national character, or at 
least the defence of it, there is evidence that others could do so.171  
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Religious authority suffered greatly from the Black Death while ‗many priests had 
died…many fled the contagion,‘172 abandoning their congregation to ensure their 
own health and wellbeing. These actions led ‗many people‘ to believe, ‗often 
unjustly, that the clergy were greedy, self-centered, and filled with a sense of their 
own importance‘.173 However, with a population forced to confront its own 
mortality, religious conviction surged, even as criticism of the Church peaked. 
Perhaps the most scathing critique of the church came from the pen of Pope 
Clement VI who in 1351 ‗as the first wave of plague was lifting‘ was unrelenting in 
his indictment of the clergy, questioning:174   
―About what can you preach to the people?‖ he asked. ―If on humility, you 
yourselves are the proudest of the world, arrogant and given to pomp. If on 
poverty, you are the most grasping and covetous,… if on chastity-but we will 
be silent on that.‖ 175 
While the church‘s ability to influence the national character of the population 
waned after the Black Death, God was still considered to play a fundamental role in 
the daily lives of man. Benedictow contends that ‗in the intense religious mind of 
medieval man, it was generally thought that epidemic disease was God‘s way of 
punishing people for their moral depravity and grave sins‘.176  
 
The loss of faith in the organisation was so great that ‗several new heretical 
movements became active in the post-Black Death era‘, further diminishing the 
contribution of the Church to the national character of the state.177  One form of 
religious fanaticism could be seen in the flagellant movement. Flagellants, believing 
that the Black Death was God‘s punishment, consisted of ‗large 
groups…wander[ing] from town to town scourging themselves in order to save 
their souls and alleviate the Lord‘s wrath, believing in the mortification of the flesh 
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as suitable penance for man‘s sins.‘178 The ability for the Flagellant movement to 
gain popularity179 is a likely indication as to the vulnerability of the post-Black 
Death national character. However, the popularity of violent movements can also be 
seen with the accusations of Jewish involvement in the dissemination of the plague. 
 
The labelling of the Jews as being responsible for the Black Death had colossal 
ramifications for the Jewish population of Europe. Central to the accusations against 
the Jews was the notion that ‗the great mortality was caused by Jews and other 
―enemies of Christendom‖ that poisoned their wells and other sources of drinking 
water‘.180 The argument gained traction, according to Benedictow, ‗because the Jews 
in many places functioned as pawnbrokers and moneylenders, activities that were 
prohibited for Christians by the Catholic Church, persecution, exiling and 
murdering Jews could also serve personal economic motives‘.181 Efforts of religious 
authorities to prevent the murder of Jews had little effect on the situation, in large 
part because of the loss of faith in the authority of the Church.182 The loss of faith 
combined with the exposure to high rates of mortality contributed towards a 
cultural obsession with death, fundamentally altering the national character of the 
population.183 
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3.3.7 National Morale 
The national morale of a population is vital to the stability of a state‘s national 
power. Morgenthau contends that central to the notion of national morale is the 
‗degree of determination with which a nation supports the foreign policies of its 
government in times of peace or war‘.184 In order to gauge the impact of the Black 
Death on national morale, there is a need to take into consideration the quality of 
the society and government which are the decisive factors in the accumulation of 
national morale. Indeed, while the Black Death took place at a time when the style 
of government was remarkably different from that used by Morgenthau to illustrate 
the importance of national morale, the relevance of this component of national 
power is no less significant in analysing the impact of the Black Death on medieval 
society.  
 
Morgenthau‘s assessment of national morale pays particular attention to segmented 
society‘s role in cultivating this important element of national power. Specifically, 
he argues that ‗any country with deep and unbridgeable class division will find its 
national morale in a precarious state.‘185 Morgenthau alludes to the importance of 
participation for all segments of society as being vital to the maintenance of national 
morale. This importance is derived from the notion that; 
Whenever deep dissensions tear a people apart, the popular support that can 
be mustered for a foreign policy will always be precarious and will be actually 
small if the success or failure of the foreign policy has a direct bearing on the 
issue of the domestic struggle.186 
This assessment highlights the morale of the English, French and Florentine 
populations, allowing for an indication of the national morale created by the 
policies enacted by the authorities within these states. There is no stronger example 
of a state‘s inability to foster the national morale within the post-Black Death era 
than that offered by the reaction of the population to the various statutes of 
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labourers that were introduced by England and France as well as the economic 
regulation employed by various guilds in Florence. Specifically, the revolts that 
transpired against this legislation illustrate the potential ramifications for a state 
that fails to take this vital element of national power into account, when enacting 
policy designed to recover the state‘s national power. 
 
Recovery of national power from the Black Death required the support of the 
population in order to be successful. Pre-Black Death support for political authority 
existed with ‗comparatively few‘ revolts that were ‗generally of religious 
inspiration.‘187 In the wake of the depopulation of Europe after the Black Death 
revolts took on ‗political overtones‘ and became ‗increasingly socioeconomic in 
nature‘.188 In short, the post-Black Death society offered the perfect opportunity for 
survivors to pursue aggressively objectives designed to improve their quality of 
life.189  
 
While the dramatic depopulation of Europe ushered in an era of prosperity for the 
survivors, the aristocracy of the time perceived this prosperity as a threat to their 
own status. The consequence of this was to pressure authorities into taking action to 
ensure that the working class would not be able to prosper financially in the post-
plague world. For example, Edward III ‗in 1349 and again in 1351, froze wages at 
preplague levels‘.190 When combined with ‗new laws [that] made it illegal to refuse 
employment or to break a labor contract‘ the banning of luxury goods such as silk 
and fur-lined cots for peasants‘ the morale of the English population sank to a 
considerable low.191 The low national morale reached its nadir when ‗in the late 
1370s the poll tax was extended to previously exempt groups like unskilled laborers 
                                                 
187 Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. p.97. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Gottfried (1983) contends that the revolts after the Black Death ‗had several characteristics. First, 
they took place during a general breakdown in law and order…a heightened sense of class identity… 
[and a] new relationship between wages and prices‘. (pp. 97-98) [Brackets Added] 
190 Kelly, J. (2005), op. cit. p.287. 
191 Ibid. [Brackets Added] 
The Plague Pandemic 
128 
and servants‘.192 The result of Edward‘s tax was the Peasant‘s Revolt of 1381. While 
the English Peasants‘ Revolt may be the best-known post-plague revolution, the 
revolt was replicating two other revolts that had transpired on the European 
continent, the Jacquerie (1358) in France, and the Ciompi (1378) in Florence. 
 
In 1358 the Jacquerie revolt was to last only a few weeks yet ‗it was one of the 
bitterest and bloodiest in French history‘.193 Central to the cause of the revolt was 
the lack of political determination felt by the peasants and bourgeoisie. Gottfried 
contends that ‗the soldiers of the uprising were mainly peasants, but many of the 
leaders including the spokesman…were bourgeois. The bourgeoisie wanted political 
power commensurate with their economic gains‘.194 The Jacquerie was centred on 
the population revolting against government policy. 
 
The Ciompi (1378) emerged when ‗workers saw their standards of living 
crumble‘.195 The policies enacted by the various guilds within Florence, especially 
pertaining to valuation of currency, bought about mass violence and urban 
disorder.196 Gottfried contends that ‗during the most violent spell, in late July, the 
palaces and townhouses of the rich were looted, gutted, and burned‘.197 The 
outcome of the Ciompi was only moderately beneficial, ‗for almost five years, the 
workers were able to share in the government of the city. They demanded the right 
to form guilds of their own, tax reform, the abolition of financial privileges, and a 
moratorium on debts‘.198 The success for the Ciompi revolt was, in the end, purely 
economic. By 1383 the ‗merchant elite managed to regain power, and the Ciompi 
were disenfranchised yet again…their wages would remain relatively stable into the 
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fifteenth century‘.199 While the conditions all three revolts sought to address existed 
prior to the Black Death, the ‗plague accelerated the changes and general social 
tensions‘, further exacerbating the disparity between the workers and their 
superiors.200 The Black Death served to intensify strong division within a segmented 
society, which negatively impacted the national morale of a population. 
 
The importance of fostering national morale by the state cannot be overlooked when 
developing plans that affect the whole of society. Not only is the cooperation of the 
population central to any containment plan, it is vital for governing authorities to 
look towards the recovery of its national power. Indeed, the notion of cooperation is 
central to the following element of national power, the quality of diplomacy. 
 
3.3.8 Quality of Diplomacy 
The element of diplomacy is reliant on the government‘s ability to harness its 
national power, in a way to provide the maximum leverage possible to achieve its 
national interest and foreign policy. Morgenthau assesses the quality of a nation‘s 
diplomacy on the ability to combine ‗those different factors into an integrated 
whole, gives them direction and weight, and awakens their slumbering potentialities 
by giving them the breath of actual power‘.201 Given the backdrop of the Hundred 
Years War between England and France, the Black Death demanded an astute 
realisation of the impact of the pandemic on the state‘s national power in order for 
either state to sustain the battle. 
 
Such a realisation is apparent following England‘s defeat of France at the Battle of 
Crecy (1346), merely two years prior to the outbreak of the Black Death. The defeat 
would eventually give way to a truce, which would last until 1354, four years after 
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the initial wave of the plague pandemic.202 Cutino contends that the Black Death 
served to exacerbate an already difficult time as ‗neither England nor France-nor 
any other medieval state…could sustain a large army in the field for an extended 
period…large enough credit facilities simply did not exist, and there had already 
been a series of financial crises in England‘.203 While the Black Death did not force 
the authorities of France and England to engage in diplomatic activities, the 
increased strain placed on already depleted resources demanded such engagement. 
 
When assessing the impact of the Black Death on the level of diplomatic interaction 
at the time, there is some indication that the reprieve in war did enhance diplomatic 
activity. For example, during the ‗ten years following Crecy…there are records of 
fifty-nine English embassies that went abroad,‘204 so the Black Death did provide a 
small window of opportunity to exercise some international diplomacy. However, 
the dearth of diplomatic activity by states during the Black Death, aiming to mitigate 
the pandemic‘s assault on the population, likely played a role in magnifying the 
power of the plague witnessed during the Black Death.  
 
Centuries after the Black Death, as the world was on the cusp of experiencing the 
Third Pandemic, an increase in diplomatic activity between affected states sought to 
ensure the reduction in the power of plague. The International Sanitary Conference 
of Venice (1897) was called to deal solely with the question of plague and its 
resurgence in Hong Kong and India.205 Twenty sovereign states attended the 
conference where ‗all participating countries except Denmark, Sweden/Norway, 
and the United States signed a convention on bubonic plague, making it an 
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internationally notifiable disease.‘206 The conference also provided the opportunity 
for the sharing of scientific information, albeit somewhat misguided, regarding the 
spread of plague. 
 
Central to the Venice conference‘s understanding of plague‘s aetiology was the role 
of the victim in the dissemination of the bacteria.207 The findings of the conference 
provided the impetus for the instigation of international quarantine measures to be 
applied. Echenberg contends the conference, ‗erected quarantine and inspection 
barriers on the Suez Canal…to guard Europe against plague, and they also agreed to 
establish specific quarantine measures applicable to passengers and the crews of 
ships sailing from infected ports‘.208 The international efforts deployed to mitigate 
the spread of plague struggled in taking hold, as ‗political authorities‘ reluctance to 
declare a port infected until the last moment rendered moot any maritime control of 
vessels‘.209 Echenberg argues that central to the failure of these measures was that, 
‗national governments, whether powerful or modest, [were not] prepared to 
surrender to any international body even one iota of their sovereign control over 
health policies in the territories under their jurisdictions.‘ 210 Regardless of the 
success of the measures, the actions adopted through the consensus of the Venice 
conference provide a clear indication as to the willingness of states to engage in 
diplomatic efforts in order to mitigate a potential threat to their national power. 
 
The impact of plague in improving the quality of international health diplomacy 
continued to grow after the Venice conference. Echenberg argues that: 
Bubonic plague led to a watershed at Paris in 1903, the agreement to create a 
permanent body, the International Office of Public Hygiene, a forerunner of 
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the World Health Organization, to promote effective international cooperation 
in infectious disease control.211 
As was addressed in Chapter One, WHO has been at the forefront in combating the 
pandemic actor. The prominence of the plague pandemic actor was evident during 
the formation of the World Health Regulations (1969). Indeed plague is one of only 
three diseases subject to regulation and notification of WHO within twenty-four 
hours.212  
 
Central to Morgenthau‘s concept of a state‘s quality of diplomacy is the ability of the 
state to appreciate the attributes of its national power in order to maximise their 
utility. Such an ability is further required when dealing with a pandemic that is 
assailing those very attributes. The Black Death‘s assault on the population of 
England and France arguably forced the two states to a truce, as they sought to 
realign their foreign policy with their respective national power. Similarly, the 
ferocity of the Black Death has been central to the increased international health 
diplomacy that is still ongoing.  Indeed, the international response to counter plague 
provides even more evidence as to the weight of this significant international actor. 
 
3.3.9 Quality of Government 
Morgenthau‘s final element of quality of government provides the framework to 
analyse the effectiveness of the governments that confronted the Black Death. The 
element looks towards the maintenance of balance between the resources that are 
available to the state and the foreign policy being pursued, and perhaps most 
tellingly, the popularity of that policy. In order to assess the effect of a pandemic as 
severe as the Black Death on the quality of government, priority must be placed on 
                                                 
211 Echenberg, M. (2007), op. cit. p.307. 
212 World Health Organization (1983), op. cit. p.10. The two other diseases subject to regulations are 
cholera and yellow fever. The 2005 Revision of the International Health Regulations (2005) replace 
the requirement of notification of these diseases to WHO, mandating that member states inform 
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international health concern within its territory‘. (p.11) 
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how the disease impeded the ability of the government to maintain those vital 
components outlined by Morgenthau.  
 
At face value the efforts taken by governments immediately after the Black Death 
seemed to have been designed to repair the damage caused by the pandemic to 
national power. Herlihy illustrates that 
Governments tried to cap the swell in wages and to shore up shrinking rents. 
They sought to hold prices and wages to previous levels and insisted that 
workers accept the employment offered them. But they succeeded only in 
sowing discontent and in provoking social uprisings in city and countryside.213 
While such an arrangement may have been designed to rebalance the equation 
between resources and policy, the discontent and social uprisings were largely 
results of the governing authorities failing to maintain the popular support of the 
general population, all of which, according to Morgenthau, are the vital 
components of a state‘s quality of government. 
Balance Between Resources and Policy 
Prior to the Black Death, the governments were highly ineffective at managing the 
balance between the natural resources they possessed and the human resources the 
material provided for. Arguably the lack of a policy pertaining to this balance was a 
significant contributor to the latter‘s mismanagement. The immediate impact of the 
Black Death was to substantially reduce the level of human resources. This dramatic 
reduction would usually pose a significant challenge for any government to 
effectively establish a balance between resources and policy. However, the strain on 
resources, established by the pre-plague population, diminished any potential 
imbalance during the post-plague period.  Inadvertently, the Black Death provided 
the opportunity for governments to improve their governance by reducing the strain 
on resources. 
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The reality of the Black Death‘s impact on the state was sparsely understood. 
Throughout the European continent there was no ‗real or rational understanding of 
the effects on the economic system of a huge diminution of the population‘.214 
Indeed, Benedictow contends that the population related to the aftermath of the 
Black Death in a traditionalistic manner with,  
Everybody expecting that everything would shortly revert to its pre-plague 
status, and life would soon be what it was assumed always to have been. At 
first, new tenants and labourers alike accepted customary contracts or wages 
according to pre-plague standard. Only slowly did it dawn on them that the 
economic and social scene had changed profoundly.215 
The lack of government leadership in the post-Black Death period contributed 
towards a confused population.216 The lack of policy designed to rebalance the 
economic system of the time, and ensure the quality of life of the populace, 
contributed towards the growing unrest within the peasantry.217  
 
Some city-states were able to enact policy that served to protect the population from 
the Black Death. Specifically, ‗one early innovation in the field was the municipal 
health board, such as those of Florence and Venice established in 1348 to oversee 
sanitation and the burial of the dead‘.218 In this instance the creation of the health 
boards should be seen as a policy designed to prevent the further loss of human 
resources to the pandemic, and a way to provide a modicum of balance between the 
resources of the state and the policy being pursued.  
 
While attempts were made by governments to counter the effects of the Black 
Death, their success was varied. This variance is derived from the structure of 
society at the time and the lack of understanding regarding the behaviour of the 
pandemic. While some governments concentrated on maintaining the economic 
resources of the state, others sought to stymie the impact of the plague on the 
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216 As illustrated in section 3.3.7 The Plague Pandemic: National Morale. 
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population.219 The more successful approach was reliant on the successful balance 
among resources.  
Balance Among Resources 
Morgenthau contends that on establishing a balance between the policy being 
pursued and the resources possessed by the state, the ability for the government to 
manage its resources in a way that provides a balance among one another is vital 
for good government. The balance among resources pertains to the mobilisation of 
the full resources of the state in order to counter the threat posed by the opposing 
actor. Initially, the ability of a government to maintain a balance among its 
resources was tested during the Black Death, as members of a government were not 
immune to the pandemic. Gottfried succinctly illustrates that ‗the Black Death killed 
indiscriminately, and probably afflicted as many lay as ecclesiastical bureaucrats. It 
took a long time to train new officials, and growth at all levels of government was 
slowed for at least a generation‘.220  The successful management of state resources 
throughout the Black Death, and for a significant time afterwards, would have been 
severely impaired by the loss of knowledge regarding the possession of resources.  
 
However, Hirshliefer indicates that despite some instances of ‗organisational 
breakdowns in cities‘ during the height of the Black Death, ‗the mechanisms of 
government did not collapse‘.221 Furthermore, any Government that was able to 
prevail and was ‗quick to recover had the opportunity to extend its power into new 
areas...quick recovery, in turn, was predicated on the resources a government had 
                                                 
219 In contrast to the actions of the city states of Florence and Venice, according to Gottfried (1983), 
France in 1348 ‗assessed one of the highest, most comprehensive [tax] rates in French history‘ 
(p.149) the assessment was to no avail though as the tax base diminished during the Black Death, a 
result of both the population and those in charge of collecting the taxes succumbing to plague. The 
reduction in tax income would eventually led to a spate of revolutions as the townspeople utilised 
their newfound wealth, derived from no longer paying taxes, to overthrow those that ‗had controlled 
just about every aspect of [their] political and economic life.‘ (p.151) [Brackets Added] 
220 Gottfried, R.S. (1983), op. cit. p.145. 
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and could mobilize, particularly its tax base and means of collection‘.222 The ability 
for a state to successfully ‗extend its power‘ was heavily reliant on its ability to 
maintain the balance among its resources. 
 
Within the post-plague period there was an ability for states to seek to establish a 
balance among the resources they possessed. The capacity was, in part, created by 
the economic and social consequence of the Black Death. Benedictow contends that 
the Black Death‘s depopulation contributed to ‗the pace and dynamics of societal 
change and transformation‘ increasing.223 In a similar fashion, and ‗for the same 
basic reasons, the kings, princes, city states and urban governments improved and 
professionalized their administrations, seeking to cut costs, increase the efficiency of 
taxation and improve the provision of public services‘.224 The ability for 
governments to recognise the need to provide a balance among resources provided 
the foundation for the enhancement of the state‘s national power. When coupled 
with the final component of the quality of government, popular support, the ability 
for the government to foster a national power that furthers the interest of the state 
becomes significantly less complicated.  
  
Popular Support 
Morgenthau contends that the component of popular support is especially 
important for ‗a contemporary government, especially one of democratic control.‘225 
However, the notion of popular support was just as important during the Middle 
Ages, for without it the aristocracy might have been subject to revolt. By accounting 
for popular support within the policies issued by a government, the ability to 
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develop a policy of recovery that capitalises on this support, as opposed to ignoring 
or diminishing it, becomes more achievable and has a greater likelihood of success. 
 
John Aberth illustrates the possible advantages of maintaining the popular support 
by assessing the recovery of the Egyptian economy. Within Egypt, ‗the Mamluk 
military elite that ruled the country from Cairo owned the…landholdings in the 
countryside…on a nonhereditary, unstable basis and administered them through an 
elaborate bureaucracy that discouraged personal supervision and control.‘226 The 
actions taken on by the Mamluk elite not only failed to account for any need for a 
balance among resources, but also did not seek to foster the popular support 
required for a rapid recovery.  
 
Conversely, the approach adopted by governments in England and Europe differed 
greatly to the policies that unfolded in Egypt. The feudal system, which ‗ensured a 
decentralized, local control over landholdings‘, empowered the peasant 
communities who were the ‗ones who were able to bargain more effectively as a 
collective unit by taking advantage of landholders‘ rivalry and economic 
competition with each other‘.227 The empowered peasantry were then able to make 
a stronger contribution to establishing the balance among the state‘s resources, 
thereby reinforcing the quality of the government. In this way popular support 
increases the effectiveness of government policy. England‘s ability to foster the 
popular support for its policies, despite the occasional diversion, allowed the state to 
recover at a much greater pace than that of militaristic Egypt. 
 
The Black Death provides an understanding of the importance of the quality of a 
government during and following a large-scale pandemic. The importance of 
                                                 
226 Aberth, J. (2011), op. cit. p.60. Furthermore, ‗the Mamluk caste of soldiery was able to respond to 
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maintaining a balance among policy and resources highlights the connection 
between the government and its responsibility to its constituency. In order to protect 
its constituency, the maintenance of a balance among the resources possessed by the 
nation is paramount to maintaining, if not increasing the power of the nation.  
Finally, the quality of a government is overwhelmingly determined by the support 
that government receives from the population. Above all Morgenthau‘s element of 
the quality of government looks to the ability of a government to protect all the 
elements of a state‘s national power.   
3.4 Conclusion 
The plague as an actor is unique in that its continued exposure to the human 
population has exacted a toll on its own strength. While initially plague was able to 
claim large numbers of victims, and avoid mitigation attempts to increase its 
domain, innovations, such as quarantine measures and antibiotics, have achieved 
some success in reducing the power of this actor.  While the morbidity of plague 
may have diminished over the years, the ability of the disease to inflict change on 
the society it infects has not. In the modern era, the scope of behavioural change in 
response to a pandemic is more prominent than it was in the past. The ramifications 
of a recent outbreak of plague in India serve as a validation of plague‘s reputation, 
in that even a small outbreak has detrimental effects on the state‘s power.  
 
The ease with which plague is spread is another point of concern for authorities. 
The domain that plague has developed over time has expanded along with the 
expansion of civilisation and the increased levels of trade between different 
cultures. Furthermore, given that the vector of the disease can be as miniscule as a 
flea the ability to stop the disease at the border requires a significant mobilisation of 
resources. This has become easier for states over time with the Third Plague 
pandemic being somewhat limited in its spread once the pandemic had entered a 
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territory. When combining the ease of spread with the high rate of mortality, 
perhaps the strongest validation of plague‘s reputation is the ease with which it kills 
its victims. Without aggressive intervention of health authorities, the varying forms 
of plague can claim victims anywhere between twenty-four hours and a week. Such 
a high rate of attrition poses a significant challenge for health authorities if a large-
scale outbreak was to occur. 
 
When assessing the impact of the plague, particularly the Black Death pandemic, on 
the national power of the state, an indication of the threats posed by a large scale, 
high mortality pandemic is created. The Black Death appeared at a time when the 
European population was placing an enormous strain on its resources. The 
overpopulation of the continent prevented effective utilisation of natural resources 
leading to a Malthusian stalemate. The Black Death had the effect of reversing this 
trend where it ultimately and surprisingly benefitted the strength of the state‘s 
national power. Such a reversal enabled governing authorities to respond by 
pursuing policy that was designed to protect and promote the national power of the 
state. These actions serve to reinforce the central argument of this thesis: that when 
confronting the pandemic threat states will place a priority on the protection of 
their national power. 
 
The utilisation of Morgenthau‘s elements of national power provide the theoretical 
framework necessary to assess comprehensively the effect of a large scale pandemic 
on the national power of the state. The Black Death has served as an example of 
such a pandemic. Given the Black Death is commonly utilised to serve as the model 
for the impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the thesis now turns to assess the utility 
of Morgenthau‘s framework to assess the various political implications of the AIDS 
pandemic as provided in the following chapter. 
The AIDS Pandemic 
 
Chapter Four: The AIDS Pandemic 
4.0 Introduction 
Since its discovery in 1981 the HIV/AIDS pandemic has evolved to test two pivotal 
aspects of modern society. First, the longevity of the pandemic has seen HIV/AIDS 
transform into an atypical pandemic where international security is threatened, as 
Dupont asserts: 
AIDS epitomises the transnational challenge to international security. It is a 
global non-military phenomenon that strikes indiscriminately at its human 
victims, weakening the socio-economic foundations of states and corroding 
government institutions.1  
Second, disease reveals the ability of society to deal with a pandemic whose nature 
of transmission has historically been considered somewhat unsavoury by certain 
elements of society. International relations theory is illuminating in regard to 
political responses to a global and deadly pandemic, such as HIV/AIDS, in the 
modern era. An assessment of the political implications of the HIV/AIDS pandemic 
reveals the ramifications for a state‘s national power when the state authorities fail 
to address a burgeoning pandemic threat. 
 
This chapter provides a comprehensive account of the power and impact of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic on modern government systems.  For the majority of times 
covered in the previous chapter with the account of the Black Death, the state 
system was largely embryonic.  The HIV/AIDS pandemic offers an opportunity to 
assess the experience of a pandemic in the modern era where the state system is 
firmly established.  By using Baldwin‘s dimensions of power, the chapter provides 
an understanding of the power of this pandemic actor, as well as the relationship of 
power between the state and the AIDS pandemic. The chapter will then utilise 
Morgenthau‘s elements of national power approach to analyse the threat posed by 
                                                 
1 Dupont, A. (2001) East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security, Cambridge: 
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the AIDS pandemic towards a state‘s national power. By applying both Baldwin‘s 
and Morgenthau‘s frameworks to assess the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the chapter 
amalgamates the diverse assumptions relating to the HIV/AIDS pandemic to provide 
an emphatic understanding of the HIV/AIDS political actor.  Prior to such an 
assessment taking place it is important to address the (social) history of the disease, 
which has both tainted the response of states to this pandemic, while at the same 
time magnifying the pandemic impact, since the discovery of the virus. 
 
4.1 Background 
The scale of the HIV/AIDS pandemic‘s impact on the state derives, in part, from the 
reluctant acknowledgement by the international community of the contagion at the 
time of the disease‘s discovery. Laurie Garrett of the Council on Foreign Relations 
speculates that the slow recognition of the threat posed by the HIV pandemic may be 
a result of a somewhat distracted international community.  
HIV has emerged in a historic period that is marked by the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the end of the Cold War; widening gaps in wealth distribution, both 
globally and within states; a decline in traditional or conventional warfare; and 
a rise in threats to states posed by asymmetric, terrorist, and ethnically or 
religiously rationalized violence. In other words, the globalization of HIV has 
come against a backdrop of radically shifting transnational threats to states, 
rich and poor alike.2 
These initial distractions, combined with the perception that those susceptible to 
HIV infection were restricted towards a high-risk segment of society, contributed to 
a lack-lustre response to the pandemic from the domestic and international 
community.3  Sherman maintains that within the USA those associated with 
HIV/AIDS were ‗typically those held in low esteem and discriminated against in 
housing, jobs, and everyday social contacts; i.e., those of different sexual persuasion, 
promiscuous individuals, drug addicts, and prostitutes‘.4  Durack, in his 1981 New 
England Journal of Medicine article assessing the outbreak of what was to become 
                                                 
2 Garrett, L. (2005a) HIV and National Security: Where are the Links?, New York: Council on Foreign 
Relations, p.14. 
3 Lee, K. and Zwi, A. (2003), op. cit. p.23. 
4 Sherman, I. W. (2006), op. cit. p.113. 
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HIV, goes as far as to warn the international community that  ‗Students of public-
health issues will want to put this outbreak into a social perspective,‘ in contrast to a 
public health concern.5 Durack‘s perception has proven accurate with the 
stigmatisation of the disease, which is still prevalent throughout the world. 
 
HIV first captured the attention of the scientific community in 1981 after a number 
of young homosexual men in New York City, San Francisco, and Los Angeles were 
diagnosed with ‗a rare cancer of the skin, called Kaposi‘s Sarcoma‘.6 Writing in the 
New England Journal of Medicine, David T. Durack argued that ‗three salient 
features‘ had emerged:  
The patients are typically homosexual men, most of whom live in large cities 
and many of whom use drugs; the infectious agents are low-grade pathogens 
that often cause opportunistic infections in compromised hosts; and the death 
rate is fearfully high.7  
The perception of the disease as predominantly affecting homosexual men (and the 
underclass) led to the disease ‗originally been designated in both health and media 
circles as Gay-Related Immunodeficiency Disease, or GRID.‘8 Such a perception 
would continue to taint the identity of the disease, even after confirmation that the 
disease was not indigenous to homosexuals.  
 
The assumption that the virus was limited to homosexuals would lead to a 
stigmatisation of the disease that would last for decades. This stigmatisation was not 
helped by health officials at the time, who continually made unfounded assumptions 
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such as there being ‗no apparent danger to non homosexuals of contagion‘.9 
Rosenberg illustrates the socially constructed response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic:  
If diseases can be seen as occupying points along a spectrum, ranging from 
those most firmly based in a verifiably pathological mechanism to those, like 
hysteria or alcoholism, with no well-understood mechanism, but with a highly 
charged social profile-then AIDS occupies a place at both ends of that 
spectrum.10 
The social tainting of AIDS deterred the political response to the nascent pandemic. 
However, over the first two years of the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the social construction 
of the virus would change as women and children started falling prey to the disease. 
With increasing recognition that the virus was not necessarily transmitted sexually, 
the stigmatisation progressed from one of a strictly communal disease towards 
HIV/AIDS being equal to death.  
 
The implications of the diseases identity led to a prolonged debate as to the 
international implications of the pandemic, with very few researchers looking 
towards the ramifications of the disease on international security. This, however, 
has changed significantly in the 21st century.11 Almost two decades after the 
discovery of the virus, in July of 2000, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
affirmed the threat to international peace and security posed by the pandemic. 
Specifically, the Security Council recognised that ‗the spread of HIV/AIDS can have 
a uniquely devastating impact on all sectors and levels of society,‘ and that the 
pandemic ‗if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security‘.12 Yet, even with 
UNSC intervention, the pandemic continues to proliferate throughout the world and 
contributes to a growing internal instability for a number of countries. The 
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intervention of the UNSC served to move the political debate on the pandemic from 
one of mere health concerns, towards one focused on the security implications of 
the disease. The primary concern of the UNSC related to the ‗possible growing 
impact on social instability and emergency situations‘ of the AIDS pandemic.13 Colin 
McInnes, the founder and Director of the Centre for Health and International 
Relations at Aberystwyth University, contends that the ‗intervention of the Security 
Council in 2000 was a critical move not simply in raising AIDS awareness but in 
constructing HIV/AIDS as a national security problem which demanded 
international attention and action.‘14 McInnes argues that the ‗claims made by the 
Security Council in 2000 have set the agenda for the subsequent debate on 
HIV/AIDS as a national security issue‘.15 The elevation of the AIDS pandemic to a 
security threat affirms the central theme of this thesis, being that a pandemic 
constitutes an actor in a relationship of power with the state. Treating the AIDS 
pandemic as a security threat demands a structured assessment in order to avoid 
falling into the same initial traps of diagnosis and social blame. Establishing the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic actor provides the basis for such an assessment. 
 
4.2 HIV/AIDS: The Pandemic Actor 
Baldwin‘s dimensions of power provide the framework to assessing the relationship 
of power between the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and the state. The four dimensions of 
scope, domain, weight and cost, illustrate the power the pandemic actor has over a 
state. The scale of the HIV/AIDS pandemic has strengthened the power wielded by 
this particular actor. The inability, or unwillingness, of states to adequately confront 
the pandemic in its nascent years has allowed the pandemic to firmly embed itself in 
the international arena. While the scope of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is no longer 
universally experienced, with most developed states being able to minimise the 
                                                 
13 United Nations Security Council (2000), op. cit. 
14 McInnes, C. (2007), op. cit. pp. 93 – 94.  
15 Ibid. p.94. 
The AIDS Pandemic 
145 
effect of the pandemic within their own borders, the ramifications for the national 
power of less-developed states still exists.  
4.2.1 Scope 
When investigating the scope of the HIV/AIDS pandemic the first consideration 
must go towards the pandemic being considered by researchers16 to be a ―long-
wave event‖. Essentially, a long-wave event is one ‗where troubling and large-scale 
effects emerge gradually over decades,‘17 as opposed to short-term pandemics that 
may flare and expire within a much shorter amount of time. The distinction of 
HIV/AIDS being a long-wave event is also a by-product of the virus‘s incubation 
period and rate of mortality.18 Tony Barnett and Gwyn Prins, of the Mackinder 
Centre for the Study of Long Wave Events, note the various features that distinguish 
a long-wave event, such as the HIV/AIDS pandemic: 
 Observers are usually aware of their [the pandemics] starting point; 
 By the time observers become aware of its [the pandemics] presence 
and effects it takes a long time to slow down the process or to stop it; 
 It [the pandemic] demands visionary thinking to engage with its 
implications and long term ramifications; 
 A central reason these events are difficult to halt is that it is enormously 
hard to get people to recognise them for what they are and to take 
appropriate action; 
 Managing the consequences of long wave events makes novel demands 
and our existing experience is not necessarily a good guide to how we 
should respond; 
 Most political and administrative capacities are not established to deal 
with such events – that is why they confront us with particularly 
testing challenges; 
 When ‗discovered‘, they [long wave events] are thought of and reacted 
to as ‗emergencies‘, creating a high chance that actions taken for good 
in the short term will make a situation worse in the long term.19 
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As this chapter will show, the AIDS pandemic fulfils each of these long-wave event 
criteria.  Moreover, the long-term scope of AIDS has significant ramifications for 
the national power of the state due to the pandemic‘s ability to affect generations of 
victims for years to come.  
 
McInnes further confirms that the scope of the instability caused by the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic covers two areas: ‗the potential economic impact of the disease; and its 
social and political effects‘.20 In regard to the potential economic impact of the 
disease, McInnes highlights the broad range of issues that can erupt as a by-product 
of the pandemic which include: 
Lost productivity due to worker illness, absenteeism and low morale; the loss of 
skilled labour, with their replacements perhaps less well educated and poorly 
trained and motivated; reduced business investment as revenues shrink or are 
diverted into AIDS-related healthcare schemes; reduced external investment as 
health costs increase and productivity falls; the flight of capital outside AIDS-
afflicted countries into more productive regions; and reduced savings as money 
is spent on healthcare.21 
McInnes means for us to grasp the broad scope of the disease here, and to consider 
the everyday, economic impact. In addition, the socio-political impact of the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic widens the scope of the pandemic‘s power as its impact moves 
beyond its initial assault on the human population, to firmly implant the pandemic 
in conflict with the state‘s national power.   
 
The socio-political ramifications of the pandemic pertain to issues that are the ‗very 
fibre of what constitutes a nation‘.22 The impact of the virus on the skilled 
professional demographic is particularly troublesome. Specifically, ‗concerns are 
growing about the long-term effects on the continuity and quality of public services 
and governance‘,23 the variety of ways by which ‗the epidemic is undermining 
                                                 
20 McInnes, C. (2007), op. cit. p.94. 
21 Ibid. pp.94-95. 
22 International Crisis Group (2001) HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue, International Crisis Group: 
Brussels, p.1. 
23 UNAIDS (2006a), op. cit. pp.93-94.  
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health services‘,24 and the impact of the pandemic on ‗the quality of education 
offered to children‘.25 Piot, Bartos, Ghys, Walker and Schwartländer contend that 
the future impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic will test ‗the capacity of societies to 
sustain the dignity and security of human life‘.26 Such a test will take place because 
‗AIDS magnifies its impact into the future because it erodes social capital‘.27 As 
McInnes has pointed out, ‗the full social and economic impact of the disease may be 
seen in decades, not months or years.‘28 The nature of the pandemic, in its long-
wave form, makes it ‗extremely difficult to comprehend how HIV is affecting 
societies, economies, cultures and political realities‘.29 The HIV/AIDS pandemic has 
a pervasive scope and poses greater challenges to governments than purely public 
health, on both the domestic and international front. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is not 
contained merely to domestic health concerns; it is an ongoing concern, with the 
full scope of the pandemic yet to be realised.  
4.2.2 Domain 
The domain of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is global. The pandemic is well established 
in each of the WHO regions, albeit to a varying degree of prevalence. The 
prominence of its domain is detailed courtesy of the Joint United Nations 
Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), who have subdivided WHO regions into 
smaller regional groupings.30 Variation in prevalence does exist throughout 
different regions of the world – this is shown in the following table (4.1), where the 
diversity in the total persons infected is related to the various stage of economic 
development within those specific regions. For example, the less economically 
                                                 
24 Ibid. P.95-96. 
25 Ibid. p.97. 
26 Piot, P., Bartos, M., Ghys, P.D., Walker, N. and Schwartländer, B. (2001) ‗The Global Impact of 
HIV/AIDS‘, Nature, 410, p.970. 
27 Ibid. 
28 McInnes, C. (2007), op. cit. p.96. 
29 Garrett, L. (2005a), op. cit. p.21. 
30 Table 4.1 contains both the UNAIDS regions as well as WHO regions to provide evidence in line 
with WHO‘s definition of a pandemic outlined in Section1.3.2 Power and Pandemics: Domain. 
Differences between the WHO regions and UNAIDS regions in membership is outlined in footnotes 
32, 33 and 34. 
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developed African region accounts for approximately 67% of global infection of 
HIV. The UNAIDS regional breakdown provides a more refined assessment of the 
pandemic spread within WHO regions, allowing for a stronger infection of the 
disparity of infection within WHO region. 
Table 4.1 Global Summary of HIV/AIDS Epidemic, 2009 
WHO Region 
UNAIDS 
Region 
Adults and 
Children 
Living with 
HIV 
Adults and 
Children 
Newly31 Infected 
with HIV 
% Adult 
Prevalence  
(15-49 
years) 
AIDS-related 
Deaths among 
Adults and 
Children 
African 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
22.5 million 
[20.9- 
24.2 million] 
1.8 million 
[1.6-2.8 million] 
5.0 
[4.7-5.2] 
1.3 million 
[1.1-1.5 million] 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa32 
460 000 
[400 000- 
530 000] 
75 000 
[61 000-92 000] 
0.2 
[0.2-0.3] 
24 000 
[20 000-27 000] 
South East Asia 
South and 
South-East 
Asia33 
4.1 million 
[3.7-4.7 million] 
270 000 
[240 000- 
320 000] 
0.3 
[0.3-0.3] 
260 000 
[230 000- 
300 000] 
Western Pacific 
East Asia34 
770 000 
[560 000- 
1.0 million] 
82 000 
[48 000-140 000] 
0.1 
[0.1-0.1] 
36 000 
[25 000-50 000] 
Oceania 
57 000 
[50 000-64 
000] 
4500 
[3400-6000] 
0.3 
[0.2-0.3] 
1400 
[<1000-2400] 
Americas 
Central and 
South America 
1.4 million 
[1.2-1.6 million] 
92 000 
[70 000-120 000] 
0.5 
[0.4-0.6] 
58 000 
[43 000-70 000] 
Caribbean 
240 000 
[220 000- 
270 000 
17 000 
[13 000-21 000] 
1.0 
[0.9-1.1] 
12 000 
[8500-15 000] 
North America 1.5 million 
[1.2-2.0 million] 
70 000 
[44 000-130 000] 
0.5 
[0.4-0.7] 
26 000 
[22 000-44 000] 
European 
Eastern Europe 
and Central 
Asia 
1.4 million 
[1.3-1.6 million] 
130 000 
[110 000- 
160 000] 
0.8 
[0.7-0.9] 
76 000 
[60 000-95 000] 
Western and 
Central Europe 
820 000 
[720 000- 
910 000] 
31 000 
[23 000-40 000] 
0.2 
[0.2-0.2] 
8500 
[6800-19 000] 
 
Global Total 33.3 million 2.6 million 0.8 1.8 million 
Source: UNAIDS (2010a) Global Report: UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2010, Geneva: 
UNAIDS, pp.20-21. 
 
Arguably, the prevalence of the pandemic, estimated on the percentage of the 
population aged 15-49 years old who are HIV positive, offers the most accurate 
reflection of the diversity between the regions. Within WHO‘s European region, 
there is a significant difference in all four measures (see table 4.1), between the 
                                                 
31 Newly infected refers to those adults and children who contracted HIV during 2009. 
32 Includes Algeria, which is considered by WHO to be within the African region. 
33 Includes Cambodia, Lao People‘s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Viet 
Nam, which is considered by WHO to be within the Western Pacific region. Also includes Pakistan, 
which is considered by WHO to be within the Eastern Mediterranean region. 
34 Includes the Democratic People‘s Republic of Korea, which is considered by WHO to be within the 
South-East Asia region. 
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Eastern Europe and Central Asia UNAIDS region, and the Western and Central 
Europe UNAIDS region. Such a difference illustrates the link between economic 
development and the prevalence of HIV, with Western and Central Europe being 
better developed than Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and arguably better-
equipped to mitigate the proliferation of the virus. However, the differences 
between East Asia and Oceania, the sub-regions of WHO‘s Western Pacific Region, 
are worthy of closer attention given the disparity in the population of the regions. 
Specifically, the larger figures for the East Asia region, while a concern within that 
region, are not reflected in the prevalence of the virus among the population. 
However, within Oceania, the higher prevalence of 0.3%, commensurate with the 
prevalence throughout South and South East Asia, would indicate a regional 
population with an increased likelihood of exposure to the HIV. Indeed, within 
Oceania the ‗number of people living with HIV in the region has nearly doubled 
between 2001 and 2009‘.35  Furthermore, the ‗largest and the only generalized 
epidemic‘ in the region is in Papua New Guinea.36 While the HIV/AIDS pandemic is 
truly global in domain, the varied prevalence between and within regions provides 
evidence as to the difficulties states have had in mitigating the spread of the virus. 
 
While taking the prevalence rate into consideration, there is a need to further 
consider the effect that treatment has had on the mortality rate of the disease. 
Essentially, by gaining access to treatment, higher numbers of persons are able to 
live reasonably normal lives, while being HIV positive, in all regions.  According to 
UNAIDS, ‗the annual number of new HIV infections has been steadily declining 
since the late 1990s, this decrease is offset by the reduction in AIDS-related deaths 
due to the significant scale up of antiretroviral therapy over the past few years.‘37 
Arguably, the scope of the AIDS pandemic‘s impact could be mitigated with greater 
                                                 
35 UNAIDS (2010a) Global Report: UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2010, Geneva: 
UNAIDS, p.60 
36 Ibid. 
37 UNAIDS (2010a), op. cit. p.23. 
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access to treatment. However, even with the scale up of treatment, diversity in the 
severity, or weight, of the pandemic, indicates the likelihood that the scope of the 
pandemic is just as varied throughout WHO regions. 
 
4.2.3 Weight 
Applying the CDC‘s PSI modelling to the AIDS pandemic established the weight of 
the pandemic. The PSI establishes the likelihood of a HIV positive person‘s death 
being caused from an AIDS related illness in 2009. The PSI provides and indication 
of the region‘s experiencing difficulty in providing treatment for HIV, as they are 
unable to reduce their respective AIDS related mortality rate. In the following table 
(4.2) both the prevalence of HIV in adults aged 15-49, as well as the PSI are 
provided as confirmation of the scope of the AIDS pandemic‘s impact. 
 Table 4.2 Prevalence and Pandemic Severity Index for the HIV/AIDS Pandemic, 2009 
 
Region 
Prevalence38 
(%) 
PSI39 
(%) 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5.0 5.7 
Middle East and North Africa 0.2 5.2 
South and South-East Asia 0.3 6.3 
East Asia 0.1 4.6 
Oceania 0.3 2.4 
Central and South America 0.5 4.1 
Caribbean 1.0 5 
Eastern Europe and Central Asia 0.8 5.4 
Western and Central Europe 0.2 1.0 
North America 0.5 1.7 
Total 0.8 5.4 
Source: Global Report: UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic 2010, 
Geneva: UNAIDS, pp.20-21 
 
The PSI presented above provides a valuable insight into the weight of the 
pandemic. The high PSI within the South and South-East Asia region suggests a lack 
of success by governments, as well as international organisations, to reduce the 
                                                 
38 UNAIDS (2010a), op. cit. p.20-21. 
39 The PSI is based upon the figures provided by the 2010 UNAIDS Report (UNAIDS (2010a), op. cit). 
The PSI is calculated as the mortality rate of the AIDS pandemic through the following formula: If n= 
People living with HIV and m= death from AIDS related illness; PSI = n/m x 100. 
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severity of the AIDS pandemic within that region. Such a reduction can only 
transpire by increasing the access to HIV medication within the regions where the 
severity is high. While looking at the prevalence rate clearly illustrates the spread of 
a pandemic, by using the PSI, and redirecting the focus towards severity, the 
disparity in access to treatment is clear. The disparity in global access to treatment 
may impede a proper assessment of the severity of the HIV pandemic. Yet at the 
same time, it provides an avenue of assessment for the weight of the AIDS pandemic.  
 
While the PSI is an accurate depiction relating to the severity of the AIDS pandemic, 
it must be noted that the accuracy of the severity index is reliant on the source of 
those figures utilised within its calculation. While UNAIDS ultimately correlates the 
statistics, the organisation‘s 2010 Global Report was based on information from 
only 182 states. Furthermore, the accuracy of the figures in question is reliant on 
the reports forwarded to UNAIDS by state governments, which may have a vested 
interest in withholding the genuine statistics. The HIV/AIDS pandemic is also a 
difficult disease to which to apply other epidemiological factors to, largely because 
the disease varies significantly between regions. Tony Barnett articulates another 
important inhibitor to accuracy when he notes that in regard to seroprevalence and 
prevalence, 
Reference is most frequently made to the former measure, while information 
about the latter is hard to obtain and is fraught with difficulties of 
interpretation given the problems of obtaining clinical diagnosis of illness and 
cause of death in circumstances where clinicians may be in short supply and 
where an AIDS diagnosis is stigmatizing.40 
Indeed WHO guidelines41 in determining the AIDS status of an HIV patient within 
developing countries, seek to establish a method to ascertain a patient‘s status 
                                                 
40 Barnett, T. (2008) ‗The Long Wave of HIV/AIDS: A Special Case of Pathogen-Host-Environment 
Interactions‘, in Volberding, P.A., Sande, M.A., Lange, J., and Greene, W.C., eds., (2008) Global 
HIV/AIDS Medicine, Philadelphia: Saunders Elsevier, p.779. 
41 See World Health Organization (1994) ‗WHO Case Definitions for AIDS Surveillance in Adults 
and Adolescents‘, Weekly Epidemiological Record [online], 69(37), p.274, available:  
http://www.who.int/hiv/strategic/en/wer_94_69_273.pdf [accessed 24 July 2011]. 
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without the use of ‗sophisticated laboratory support‘.42 Such a system may lead to 
misrepresentation within the figures provided by WHO and UNAIDS.43 Resulting 
figures are likely to be representative of ‗what is likely to happen to a population in 
the near future given the likely absence of effective anti-retroviral treatments in 
most poor countries‘.44 The ability for states to mitigate the weight of the pandemic 
reduces the scope of the pandemic impact; however, such ability can only be 
ascertained at substantial expense. The cost of providing this treatment, particularly 
for the nation state, constitutes a considerable component of the pandemics power. 
 
4.2.4 Cost 
The cost of the HIV/AIDS pandemic has been substantial. Financial estimates are 
based on a three-pronged approach to the disease covering prevention, treatment, 
care and support.45 In 2009, the provision by ‗international donors and 
governments together provided US$15.9 billion for the global AIDS response‘,46 and 
represented a substantial increase of the US$300 million available for AIDS funding 
in 1996.47 UNAIDS contends that the elevated investment pays ‗clear dividends-it 
saves lives now, improves the quality of life of people living with HIV, and will 
lessen future burdens of cost and disease.‘48 However, when assessing the impact of 
the cost to the state‘s power, it is important to consider associated costs related to 
combating the pandemic, such as the opportunity cost of the long-wave event. The 
long-wave financial impact of the AIDS pandemic results in greater expense to the 
state as it tends to the health needs of its population. 
                                                 
42 DeCock, K.M. (2008) ‗The Global Epidemiology of HIV/AIDS‘, in Volberding, P.A., Sande, M.A., 
Lange, J., and Greene, W.C., eds., (2008) Global HIV/AIDS Medicine, Philadelphia: Saunders 
Elsevier, p.3. 
43 DeCock (2008) contends that ‗the weakness of vital registration systems in developing countries 
has limited the use of AIDS mortality…In general, international estimates of AIDS incidence and 
mortality have been made through modelling from HIV prevalence data.‘ (p.4) 
44 Barnett, T. (2008), op. cit. p.779. 
45 UNAIDS (2006a), op. cit. p.224. 
46 UNAIDS (2010a), op. cit. p. 146. 
47 UNAIDS (2004), 2004 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, Geneva: UNAIDS, p.131. 
48 Ibid. 
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The high medical expenses related confronting the AIDS pandemic is preventing 
nations from investing in other areas of development. The UNAIDS 2010 report 
contends that ‗in many low- and middle-income countries, the largest source of HIV 
funding- 52% -is domestic expenditure‘.49 The diversion of funds on such a long-
term basis is unparalleled, in comparison to short-wave disease pandemics. The 
increased burden placed on these countries prevents a diversification of funds 
toward other social development initiatives.  Such a scenario is why the mitigation 
of the HIV/AIDS pandemic is fundamental to efforts to improve levels of human 
development globally.  
 
Even by only contemplating the dimensions of domain and scope, two important 
arguments are cultivated in respect to the relational power of the HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. First, the scope of the pandemic indicates significant behavioural impact, 
asserting its power over both the economic and socio-political elements of a nation‘s 
power. Second, while there is a global presence of the pandemic, the severity of the 
pandemic is varies from region to region. This poses a significant difficulty for those 
tasked with defeating the pandemic actor. Conquering the AIDS pandemic requires 
a more regionally, if not locally, focused approach, as opposed to a ‗one size fits all‘ 
global effort.  
 
Baldwin‘s dimensions of power provide the foundation for a greater assessment of 
the impact of the AIDS pandemic actor on the national power of the state. The 
relationship between the state and the pandemic has revealed the pandemic to have 
a distinctly long-range effect on the state, thereby increasing the scope of the 
pandemic‘s impact. In order to facilitate a greater understanding of the impact of 
the pandemic on the state, there is a need to break down the pandemic‘s assault on 
                                                 
49 UNAIDS (2010a), op. cit. p.146. According to UNAIDS (2010a), ‗government donors provide an 
additional 42% and the international philanthropic sector 5%‘. (p,146) 
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the elements that constitutes the state‘s national power. Morgenthau‘s elements of 
national power framework provide the criteria necessary to ascertain such an 
understanding.  
 
4.3 The HIV/AIDS Pandemic Assessment 
The utilisation of Morgenthau‘s elements of national power to diagnose the impact 
of the AIDS pandemic on a state‘s power reveals the multifaceted threat generated 
by this pandemic. While not all elements of national power were assaulted at the 
outset, the longevity of the pandemic has enabled this actor to erode the various 
elements that constitute a state‘s power base. In doing so, the AIDS pandemic has 
established itself as a notable non-state actor of considerable strength, and one that 
poses a threat to both the stability and security of a nation state. Morgenthau 
reminds us that for a state to be a strong international actor, it must best utilise its 
wealth in the following elements50. Pandemics undermine that strength. 
4.3.1 Geography 
The UNAIDS information presented in Table 4.1: Global Summary of HIV/AIDS 
Epidemic, 2009 confirms that there is not a region of the world untouched by the 
AIDS pandemic. Indeed, Morgenthau‘s assertion regarding the benefits of a state‘s 
geographic locale providing some isolation for aggressors, not surprisingly, did not 
anticipate the path of this pandemic. In the initial stages of the pandemic, advances 
in transportation technology played a vital role in eroding any advantage given to 
nations by their geographic location. John Aberth informs of the first known cases 
of HIV and the role that advances in transportation technology played in 
overcoming any geographic barrier: 
The oldest HIV-positive blood result has been obtained from a native of 
Kinshasa on the eastern border of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Genetic 
mapping of progressive changes in the HIV genome indicates that the first 
infection of humans from chimpanzees probably took place during the 1930s, 
                                                 
50 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.122. 
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which coincided with massive conscription of natives for railroad construction 
in the French colonies of west-central Africa, where famine forced workers to 
consume wild animals, including monkeys. From its ―ground zero‖ point of 
contact, HIV then spread rapidly in human populations throughout Africa and 
around the world through the new, interconnected global networks of the 
second half of the twentieth century.51 
Research suggests that the interconnected global transportation networks played a 
significant role in the proliferation of the virus, particularly from Africa to the USA 
albeit at a sedentary pace.52 Such a pace is derived from the period of time for HIV 
positive persons to become symptomatic, which allows an infected person to travel 
symptom free. This latency period was a contributing factor to preventing states 
from utilising their geographic location to their advantage with enforced isolation 
and local quarantine when confronting this pandemic actor. 
 
The latency period of HIV, being the amount of time it can take for a patient to show 
symptoms of the disease, is relatively long.53 This poses significant difficulties for 
authorities to detect infection of persons without conducting stigmatising tests, 
preventing them from taking aggressive measures to prevent the entry of HIV 
persons into the country.54 There were, however, some exceptions, with some 
countries opting to treat HIV aggressively in the same fashion as previous outbreaks 
of infectious disease that had threatened the integrity of the nation‘s power. Here, 
there was the introduction of mandatory testing and quarantine measures against 
those crossing its borders.55 The predominant example is Cuba who, ‗imposed 
screening on broadly defined groups (travellers abroad, hospital and STD patients, 
                                                 
51 Aberth, J. (2011), op. cit. p.142. 
52 Investigative journalist Randy Shilts‘ book And the Band Played On (1987) provides an account of 
flight attendant Gaetan Dugas. Dugas was perceived to be the patient zero of the AIDS pandemic 
within the United States. Dugas appears to have facilitated the transferral of the virus through the 
litany of homosexual partners he maintained around the world, in large part established via his 
employment. (Garrett, 1994, pp.306-307) 
53 Garrett (1994) contends that ‗the disease‘s latency period for gay men averaged over ten years‘. 
(p.307) This is supported by Aberth (2011) who maintains that without access to treatment, and 
dependent on contributing lifestyle factors (such as drug use), this period can be reduced to six 
months to two years. (p.137) By way of comparison the latency period for influenza is about two 
days. 
54 See  section 4.3.7 The AIDS Pandemic: National Morale.  
55 Baldwin (2006) provides a summary of the efforts made by some countries to counter the 
pandemic, ‗China, Iraq and Syria demanded testing of aliens entering for long stays and nationals 
returning from abroad. In China anyone with reason to believe that another citizen suffered from 
AIDS was required to report that person for isolation and treatment…In the Indian state of Goa, no 
one could refuse HIV testing if disease was suspected and seropositives were isolated.‘ (p.35) 
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pregnant women, and the sexual contacts of seropositives) and, ultimately, on the 
entire population through its inevitable contacts with the national health system.‘56 
 
The second aspect of geographic location relates to the varied prevalence and 
severity of the pandemic across different regions. John Aberth contends that the 
pandemic exists in three different ‗patterns‘.57 The first such pattern relates to 
‗primarily the United States and Western Europe…while the other is set mainly in 
sub-Saharan Africa and the Caribbean‘, and ‗what will happen in those countries 
where AIDS is still emerging, such as Eastern Europe, Asia and the Middle East‘ 
being the third pattern‘.58 Aberth infers that the varied levels of human 
development within regions determine the pattern, or severity, of the AIDS 
pandemic within that region. The International Labour Organization (ILO) agrees: 
The pandemic has taken on different forms in the various parts of the world. In 
some areas, HIV has spread rapidly to the general population, while in others 
certain sub-populations have been particularly affected, including sex workers 
and their customers, men who have sex with men, and injecting drug users.59 
The disparity among these regions is a replication on the macro scale of what has 
been taking place on a micro level, or domestically, in developed states.60  
 
The micro impact of the pandemic centres on Morgenthau‘s second prominent 
measure for the geographical element, being the size of the territory, and highlights 
the particularly insidious behaviour of the virus. The greatest proliferation of the 
pandemic occurs where it can operate most opportunistically: at a distance from 
medical intervention. Consequently, occurrence erupts in developing countries as 
well as regions, rural towns and villages. The tyranny of distance ensures that the 
pandemic is at its strongest in rural environments, that are likely to be a significant 
                                                 
56 Baldwin, P. (2006), op. cit. p.35. 
57 Aberth, J. (2011), op. cit. p.135. 
58 Ibid. 
59 International Labour Organization (2000) HIV/AIDS: A Threat to Decent Work, Productivity and 
Development, Geneva: International Labour Organization, p.5. 
60 Amie L. Meditz, of the University of Colorado-Denver contends that ‗Women, nonwhites, and 
people in the southern United States who were newly infected with HIV and followed for an average 
of four years experienced greater HIV/AIDS related morbidity compared to men and people of other 
races living in other regions of the country‘. (e!Science News, 2011) 
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distance away from urban medical assistance, and poses a particular challenge to 
centralised state authorities tasked with combating the AIDS pandemic.  
 
One particular example offered by Anne-Christine D‘Adesky in her work Moving 
Mountains: The Race to Treat Global AIDS, is offered through an interview with a 
local Doctor from Oaxaca, Mexico, 
There are two worlds, two completely different realities when it comes to AIDS 
in Mexico…You cannot compare what you find in Oaxaca to Mexico City. 
Unfortunately, what exists up in the mountains is the truer picture. There you 
find a lack of infrastructure and medical attention, lack of training of doctors, 
and totally inadequate combinations of drugs prescribed for HIV. This is what 
we see in a huge percentage of cases. Patients are not only dying of AIDS, but 
are dying without any medical attention at all.61 
D‘Adesky‘s findings are repeated around the world for similar reasons; for example: 
Papua New Guinea, where a crippled health infrastructure has seen a drastic 
reduction in the number of trained medical personnel, and reduced access to health 
resources.62 Morgenthau thought geography to be an important element in self-
defence, and that large expanses of terrain would be difficult to control. The AIDS 
pandemic, as an actor, has agreed and used geography to maximise its lethal 
potential. 
 
The threat posed to the geographic element by the AIDS pandemic is not as blatant 
as the threat it poses to other elements of national power. There is, however, a 
certain avenue of assessment that geography provides for greater insight into the 
impact of AIDS. The disparity between the various WHO and UNAIDS regions 
illustrates a connection between the state‘s geographic location and the prevalence 
of the AIDS pandemic. Furthermore, the geographic makeup of the state, meaning 
the geography within the state‘s borders, may offer states great difficulty in treating, 
as well as mitigating the impacts of, the pandemic. By appreciating the geographical 
barriers that prevent a state from aggressively defending itself from the AIDS 
                                                 
61 D‘Adesky, A.C. (2004) Moving Mountains: The Race to Treat Global AIDS, London: Verso, p.124. 
62 Tobias, M.D. (2007) ‗The HIV/AIDS Crisis in Papua New Guinea‘, Issue Analysis, 81, Sydney: 
Centre for Independent Studies. 
The AIDS Pandemic 
158 
pandemic, there can be no guarantee, or contribution to, the defeat of this pandemic 
actor. 
 
4.3.2 Natural Resources 
The AIDS pandemic poses a unique threat to the natural resource power of the state. 
Unlike an invading army, which may be seeking to abscond with the resources for 
its own state‘s power, the pandemic impedes the state from capitalising on the 
resources it already possesses. Essentially, the pandemic places an increased strain 
on the self-sufficiency of the state by impacting on such essentials as food security of 
the state. The effect of the pandemic on food security is manifold, from the negative 
impact on agricultural production from loss of labour, to the perceived increased 
demand caused by food insecurity in urban areas. Both contribute to increased 
levels of high-risk behaviour by the state and the citizenry, further increasing the 
‗power‘ of the pandemic. Such high-risk behaviour would include women who are 
forced into sex work for food security. Furthermore, the economic ramifications of a 
pandemic assault on natural resources elevate the impact of the pandemic on 
national power. In addition, the high cost for resource-oriented corporations of 
maintaining a viable, healthy workforce, free from the burden of HIV has had 
significant implications for the economies of a number of developing countries.  
 
In summary, while impeding the exploitation of natural resources does not threaten 
the existence of a state‘s raw materials, it does prevent the state from being able to 
maximise their worth. Over the two sub-elements of food and raw materials, the 
threat to the industrial sector of a nation‘s power, posed by the AIDS pandemic, 
becomes more acute.  
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4.3.2.1 Food 
The AIDS pandemic impacts on a nation‘s food supply in three ways. First, death 
and infection from the pandemic impact on the agricultural sector by impeding 
both the cultivation of food products, and the economic benefit of excess 
production. Second, the inability to produce food contributes to food insecurity 
within a state. This phenomenon is amplified if a state already suffers from food 
shortages. Finally, as mentioned in relation to natural resources, food insecurity 
leads to an increase in levels of high-risk behaviour, which further accelerates the 
spread of the pandemic. 
 
Agriculture plays an integral role in the establishment of a nation‘s power, 
particularly for developing countries. As Barnett and Whiteside contend,  
Without this sector [agriculture] there would be no industry, no services and 
no urban areas. We all have to eat. Seed production, plant breeding, food 
production, processing and marketing have been interlinked worldwide 
activities for thousands of years.63  
The agricultural sector has the ability to affect ‗food security, the fate of national 
economies and the sustainability of environmental assets‘.64 The threat the AIDS 
pandemic poses for agricultural sectors stems from the disease‘s impact on rural 
populations, which are the essential worker component of the state‘s agricultural 
sector. 
 
UNAIDS maintains that ‗the epidemic attacks the agricultural base - it infects and 
then kills many agricultural workers prematurely‘.65 These premature deaths 
contribute to an erosion of knowledge regarding crop production and food stock 
preservation techniques.66  Furthermore, The United Nations Department of 
                                                 
63 Barnett and Whiteside (2002), op. cit. p.222. [Brackets Added] 
64 UNAIDS (2006a), op. cit. pp.100-101. UNAIDS (2004), op. cit. p.50. 
65 UNAIDS (2004), op. cit. p.50. 
66 Hlanza, Gama, and Mondlane (2005) contend that ‗because HIV/AIDS kills certain members of 
the family who have certain types of knowledge, those who are left behind will not have the 
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Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division contends that the erosion of 
knowledge has also contributed to a change in the intent for the crops,  
HIV/AIDS has caused shifts of production from cash crops to food crops in 
AIDS-affected households. The change has resulted in lower household 
incomes and a lack of funds to buy non-food essentials or non-labour inputs 
necessary to maintain agricultural yields.67 
As agricultural production regresses towards self-subsistence, placing the interest of 
the household first, the levels of food security attainable by the nation further 
diminishes.  
 
The impact on a state‘s national power from agricultural change is summarised by 
the ILO in their 2000 report: 
Agriculture is the largest sector in most African economies, accounting for a 
large proportion of production and a majority of employment. Studies carried 
out in Tanzania and other countries have shown that AIDS will have adverse 
effects on agriculture, including loss of labour supply and remittance income. 
The loss of a few workers at crucial periods of planting and harvesting can 
significantly reduce the size of the harvest. In countries where food security is 
an important issue because of drought, the decline in household production 
can have serious consequences. A loss of agricultural labour also causes 
farmers to switch to less labour-intensive crops. In many cases, this means 
switching from export crops to food crops, thereby affecting rural economies.68 
The movement away from export crops directly impinges on the state‘s national 
economy and limits stronger profits for rural economies. These inhibitors force the 
state to seek external resources to fill the void created by the pandemic‘s impact on 
food supply. The inability for the state to guarantee access to food supply provides 
the second insight into the pandemics impact on the state, being the increase in food 
insecurity. 
 
Food insecurity, as defined by Miller et. al. as ‗having uncertain or limited 
availability to nutritionally adequate or safe food or the inability to produce food in 
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socially acceptable ways,‘69 poses a significant challenge to the state. Within a 
developed state the ability to adequately prepare for an impending food shortage is 
possible as long as there is ‗ample forewarning before‘.70 However, as UNAIDS 
illustrates, ‗AIDS-affected households have reduced coping capacity‘ in relation to 
food security, increasing the strain on the state.71 Medically, food security is of 
particular importance to those susceptible to HIV infection as ‗food insecurity and 
malnutrition can increase the risk of HIV infection following exposure, and 
accelerate progression to AIDS and death among those infected‘.72 Indeed UNAIDS 
has expressed concern as the role that food insecurity has taken on in the 
proliferation of the pandemic. 
Food insecurity is widespread globally and forces people to use various types of 
coping behaviour, some of which increase the likelihood of engaging in 
unprotected sex, particularly sexual risk-taking among women, as they may 
engage in transactional sex to procure food for themselves and their children.73 
Such acts increase the likelihood of exposure to, and transmission of, the pandemic. 
By compelling individuals to take high-risk behaviour the power of the pandemic 
actor is further increased. 
 
Central to the power potential of food is the notion of self-sufficiency. In short, the 
AIDS pandemic impedes a nation from developing and maintaining levels of self-
sufficiency in relation to the natural resource of food. By reducing the state‘s 
agricultural capacity, the pandemic reduces the power that the state is able to 
garner from this particular element. Medically, the inability for a state to provide 
food security for its population has an almost cyclical effect in the proliferation of 
the disease. Whenever a state lacks the ability to capitalise on their raw materials, 
there is further diminution to the power of the state. 
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4.3.2.2 Raw Materials 
The state‘s ability to capitalise on raw materials rests with its ability to extract and 
capitalise on those materials. As Anna Stablum succinctly wrote, AIDS often 
precludes such capitalisation: ‗from Africa to Russia, from Peru to China, mining 
companies face a problem: the workers who haul up the earth‘s riches are coming 
down with AIDS, and it is hampering operations at a time of booming demand for 
minerals‘.74 Similar to the impact of the pandemic on a state‘s food supply, the AIDS 
pandemic prevents a state from utilising its raw materials by attacking the human 
element. 
 
The ‗assault on human capital‘75 has a considerable impact on companies. 
According to Reuters, a sick employee may cost a mining company ‗over three times 
as much as his annual salary.‘76 The increase in cost is derived from a variety of 
aspects: 
With more employees falling sick due to HIV/AIDS, companies face increased 
costs for health insurance, sick leave and funeral benefits. Companies also bear 
the costs of recruiting and training new staff. Lower morale due to illness and 
loss of co-workers threatens the stable environment needed to sustain 
operations.77 
Importantly, the shortage of skilled workers leads ‗to higher production costs and a 
loss of international competitiveness‘.78 Such a distinct effect has seen a number of 
governments, and international organisations, look to ways of mitigating the impact 
of the AIDS pandemic on this specific demographic. For example; in 2003, spurred 
on by the ‗urgency of the AIDS crisis, global unions agreed to join forces so that the 
combined strength of mass organizations could be the basis for an unprecedented 
worldwide response towards the disease‘.79 The global union was able to facilitate 
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greater collaboration with both the ILO and the WHO in order to assist its 
membership in confronting the pandemic.80 The formation of the union signifies the 
global understanding of the multifaceted response required to combat the 
pandemic. However, the aim of the union was to mitigate the effects of the 
pandemic on elements such as, but not restricted to, the capitalisation of raw 
materials, as identified by Morgenthau.  The impact on a state‘s raw materials by the 
pandemic is strongly related to the impact upon the state‘s industrial capacity.  
 
4.3.3 Industrial Capacity 
As with the previous element, the primary impact on a state‘s industrial capacity is 
derived from the demise of its human resources. Within a state‘s industrial complex 
there are three distinctive areas where the AIDS pandemic has a detrimental 
influence. First, the threat to humanity generated from the demise of the domestic 
working sector; second, the impact on migrant workers, often utilised to replace the 
gap caused by AIDS within the indigenous workforce; and third, the increased 
threat posed towards transport workers who have an instrumental role in 
maintaining the industrial capacity of the state.  
 
This assessment not only looks towards the impact on the traditional industrial 
areas, but also widens the scope of assessment to investigate the impact of the 
pandemic on the education sector; as education makes a key contribution to the 
industrial capacity of the state. As Morgenthau contended the ‗industrial capacity of 
a nation, and hence its power,‘ depends upon not just ‗the quality and capacity of 
the industrial plant‘ but  ‗the know-how of the working man, the skill of the 
engineer, the inventive genius of the scientist, [and] the managerial organization‘.81 
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Simply put, the industrial capacity of the state is largely derived from both the 
working population, and the education of the population. 
 
Considerable attention82 has been made to the impact of the AIDS pandemic on a 
state‘s workforce. This attention is derived from the disease ‗primarily strik[ing] the 
working age population‘.83 At no time should the loss in revenue as a result of a loss 
of the size of the workforce be ignored. Such loss provides a number of difficulties 
for governments. The most prevalent being the increase in expenditure required to 
provide health infrastructure.84 The implications of the pandemic are summarised 
by UNAIDS, in their 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, where they argue 
that, ‗the impact [of the AIDS pandemic] is widespread and complex: consumption is 
reduced, profits are foregone, tax revenue and investments are lost and essential 
services are not delivered‘.85 One such essential service that has been significantly 
impeded by the AIDS pandemic is education delivery. 
 
The ILO contends that the AIDS pandemic impacts the education sector in three 
distinct ways. First, the pandemic reduces the supply of teachers; second, it increases 
school absences as a result of children being required to stay at home to care for a 
sick family member or to work; and third, children are being forced to drop out of 
school, due to the inability of sick parents to pay school fees.86 Such repercussions 
ensure the cyclical, dangerous behaviour of the pandemics initial impact and 
further extend the longevity of the contagion. Even when children are able to attend 
school, the pandemic‘s impact on educators has reduced the level of education 
available to them. 
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Globally the ‗prevalence and death rates vary greatly,‘ among teachers.87 For 
example, UNAIDS maintains that ‗The United Republic of Tanzania needs around 
45,000 additional teachers to make up for those who have died or left the system 
because of AIDS.‘88 Similar problems confront the Zambian school system where 
‗illness of teachers or their responsibilities of caring for family members (including 
attending family funerals) accounts for over 60% of teacher absences.‘89 Replacing 
teachers is also problematic. According to Coombe, teacher production through 
existing educational resources is also failing to cope with the demand for new 
teachers, ‗ The Zambian Ministry of Education reported that 2.2% of all teachers 
died in 1996. This was already more than the number of teachers produced by 
colleges that year.‘90 Any withdrawal of teacher services impacts on the quality of 
the teaching available to the next generation as ‗more inexperienced and under-
qualified teachers and increased class sizes reduce quality student-teacher 
contact‘.91 The pandemic has ensured a loss of potential power of the state by 
guaranteeing the under-education of the vulnerable youth.  
 
The effect of the pandemic on the education sector extends the pandemic‘s impact 
on the state‘s national power. The domestic situation of students must also be 
considered here. UNAIDS contend that ‗many AIDS-affected families may withdraw 
children from school to compensate for labour losses, increased care activities and 
competing expenses‘.92 In preventing access to the education that children require 
to maintain a competitive edge in the marketplace the pandemic practically ensures 
a negative longevity of its impact. 
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The working class of a state is no less affected. The ILO, in their 2000 report 
HIV/AIDS: A Threat to Decent Work, Productivity and Development, contend that 
the impact of the pandemic on the working force within developing countries is 
two-fold. First, the pandemic‘s impact on the life expectancy of the population will 
account for ‗changes in the age and sex distribution of the labour force.‘93 Second, 
the labour force will be significantly smaller.94 The ILO maintains that while there is 
a dearth in the data available to make such assertions due to a lack of ‗relevant and 
available studies,‘  
It would…be expected that the age and sex distribution of the labour force will 
change, due to the rising number of widows and orphans seeking a livelihood 
and the large proportion of people with AIDS in the age group 20-49 years, 
resulting in early entry of children into the active labour force, the early 
withdrawal of people with AIDS and the retention of older persons in the 
labour force due to economic need.95 
The ILO further contends that within high prevalence countries96 ‗there will be 
about 11.5 million few persons in the labour force, without even considering the 
impact on economic growth of absenteeism, productivity decline and morbidity.‘97 
The impact of the pandemic is not restricted to a numbers game; the potential 
secondary, or indirect, effects of the AIDS pandemic must be taken into 
consideration. 
Firms confronted with a high level of adult HIV prevalence may be faced with 
other, less quantifiable effects. For example, HIV/AIDS can result in a 
substantial decline in morale among workers. As employees witness the deaths 
of their co-workers, they may adopt a fatalistic attitude towards work and life 
in general, which may have a detrimental impact on the production of firms.98 
Furthermore, an increase in worker absenteeism is likely to escalate the amount of 
work required by healthy workers in order to compensate for the decrease in 
productivity. These measures come at an extra cost to the company, and increase the 
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‗stress among employees, which may result in a decline in both the quantity and 
quality of the final product‘.99 Alternatively, some companies, particularly within 
the industrial complex, will seek to replenish the depletion in their workforce by 
looking towards migrant workers to fill the void. In doing so, the companies further 
risk a greater impact on the industrial capacity of the state by exposing it to 
potentially unknown domestic variants of the AIDS pandemic, as well as other 
infectious diseases. 
 
Within certain regions migrants and human traffickers take advantage of unsecured 
borders to move and replenish workers. According to UNAIDS, this ‗growing 
phenomenon‘ plays ‗an increasingly important aspect of global, regional and 
national economies‘, and ‗HIV has become a key issue of concern with cross border 
and overseas migration‘.100 However, the porous nature of the borders of a number 
of countries around the world, ―the soft geography element‖, impedes the ability of 
governments to track this significant issue. Such actions take place particularly 
within sub-Saharan Africa, as well as within Asia, which makes a significant 
contribution to the increased rate of infection within the regions.  
 
For example, a 2004 study by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
on Thailand‘s response to HIV/AIDS, contends that while ‗studies of HIV prevalence 
among foreign migrants have been sporadic…the actual magnitude of HIV 
infections among them is unknown. Nevertheless, available information indicates a 
troubling glimpse of the virus‘s presence among these mobile populations.‘101 While 
the primary focus of the UNDP‘s investigation centred on the sex worker industry, 
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other recent studies have resulted in similar results for other industries.102 Such 
problems are not solely isolated to the developing regions of the world; the USA 
faces a similar issue, with Mexican migrant workers who had a prevalence of HIV 
three times as high as both the general American and Mexican population.103 The 
inability for a state to maintain vigilance on the health of migrant worker 
populations poses significant and specific problems for securing the industrial 
capacity of the state.  
 
The third aspect of a state‘s industrial capacity to take into consideration is its 
transportation sector. The very nature of a transport worker‘s lifestyle has the ability 
to expose the drivers to HIV infection. As the International Crisis Group contend,  
Like miners, their work often takes them far from home for extended periods, 
and they receive a steady salary. Both of these characteristics make them 
attractive to the commercial sex trade…In an example, 90 per cent of sex 
workers targeting truckers at one Botswana-South Africa border crossing were 
found to be HIV-infected. It is often through the mixing of transient truckers 
with populations of sex workers with high prevalence of HIV that the disease 
diffuses back into the countryside and into new populations of women and 
children.104  
Similar scenarios are transpiring in other regions of the world as well. In India a 
survey conducted by the Centre for Media Studies indicate that ‗almost 40 percent 
of India‘s truck drivers and their helpers are infected with AIDS‘.105 The 
implications of the AIDS pandemic for the transportation worker mimic any other 
sector: the individual, family and employers all pay a cost for the spread of the 
disease and the industrial base of the economy. 
 
The impact of the AIDS pandemic on the state‘s industrial capacity remains 
detrimental to a state‘s ability to promote and preserve its national power. In 
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particular the impact on the human resource sector, which prevents the state from 
capitalising on its natural resources, has the potential to erode an economy, making 
the prospect of any post-pandemic recovery more difficult.  
 
4.3.4 Military Preparedness 
Morgenthau contends that the three sub-elements of a state‘s military preparedness; 
technology, leadership, and the quantity and quality of armed forces, are the ‗most 
significant factors‘ that establish a military‘s capabilities.106 The AIDS pandemic has 
negatively affected all three sub-elements that Morgenthau asserts to be most vital 
to a state‘s national power. Researchers agree that prevalence rates for AIDS within 
the military are higher than within the civilian population, being as high as ‗two to 
three times, or two to five times that of the general population‘.107 Yet confirmation 
of such assertions from national defence forces is relatively uncommon.108 The 
release of such data is likely to indicate potential weaknesses within a state‘s 
national defence apparatus, thereby increasing the national security implications of 
the disease. The rates are derived from the perception of the high-risk environment 
within which a state‘s military operates.109 In outlining the threat posed towards the 
military by the AIDS pandemic, the US National Intelligence Council maintain that 
while 
It is difficult to make a direct connection between high HIV/AIDS and other 
infectious disease prevalence in military forces and performance in 
battle…given that a large number of officers and other key personnel are dying 
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or becoming disabled, combat readiness and capability of such military forces 
is bound to deteriorate.110 
The implications of such deterioration ‗are clear: a military force that is sick and 
dying will not be as effective - or as disciplined-as one that is healthy‘.111 Such an 
impact escalates the AIDS pandemic threat considerably, from one of domestic 
concern to one with international ramifications. Morgenthau‘s three traditional 
sub-elements of military preparedness still allow an investigation into the impact of 
AIDS. By doing so, the threat to the traditional first line of a state‘s defence is 
developed and, with it, a stronger understanding of the political implications of the 
AIDS pandemic to the national power of a state. 
4.3.4.1 Technology 
Morgenthau contends that the ‗fate of nations and of civilizations has often been 
determined by a differential in the technology of warfare for which the inferior side 
was unable to compensate in other ways‘.112 In regard to countering the AIDS 
pandemic, the technological advantage rests in the hands of the state, given the ease 
with which transmission of HIV can be prevented.113 However, the promiscuous 
nature of military personnel114 places them at a similar, if not greater risk, than 
those employed within the industrial sector analysed above.115 The main difficulty 
for the military within this element is twofold: first, the inability to prevent, or at 
least reduce the incidence of, transmission; second, the inability to provide adequate 
treatment for infected personnel. Both these difficulties are indicative of an initially 
flawed technological capacity of the military. 
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The United Nations General Assembly was only able to launch ‗a global initiative to 
improve AIDS awareness in militaries‘ in 2003,116 some twenty years after the 
recognition of the pandemic. Yet, because of military structures they have had a 
moderate amount of success in executing the program, as McInnes summarises, 
In Thailand, not only was an awareness and prevention programme extremely 
successful in reducing HIV prevalence, but the structured, disciplined nature of 
the military was seen as useful in raising awareness and ensuring that 
preventative measures were taken. In Eritrea, UNAIDS commented that the 
military were a captive audience and an ‗ideal medium‘ for AIDS awareness 
campaigns, contributing to near universal knowledge of HIV. Nevertheless, 62 
per cent of the Eritrean military saw themselves as not being at risk from AIDS. 
Similarly, surveys of Nigerian, Cameroonian and Cambodian armies all 
revealed both a high level understanding of how HIV was transmitted and how 
it could be avoided, but that a significant percentage still engaged in 
unprotected sex with non-regular partners.117 
 
The reluctance to utilise a condom is not restricted to developing countries. The USA 
Navy‘s HIV infection rate doubled between 1999 and 2009, in large part due to a 
growing unwillingness to use condoms.118 Naturally, unwillingness increases the 
likelihood of exposure to HIV and personnel becoming infected. 
 
With adequate treatment, the ramifications of HIV infection can be significantly 
minimised. For this reason ‗around the world many militaries are quietly putting 
their infected commanders on antiretroviral medicines‘ and encouraging their 
troops to put condoms to use.119 There are some dangers within this practice 
however, as Garrett illustrates, 
Brazil, like the United States, has also used antiretroviral drugs to treat the 
estimated 1 percent of its uniformed personnel who are HIV positive. But the 
Brazilian officers and enlisted men treated have grown steadily more resistant 
to the drugs, with some 86 percent of affected personnel now reporting 
resistance to at least one of the powerful protease-inhibitor drugs used to hold 
the virus at bay.120 
While the element of military technology is usually reduced to assessing the 
weaponry of a state, the inability for a military to utilise technological advances to 
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provide the resources necessary to assist HIV positive personnel is problematic.121 As 
the International Crisis Group reported in 2002,  within African countries, ‗with 
expensive AIDS therapies exceeding the average soldier‘s income of US$50 per 
month, there is no perceived benefit in knowing one‘s HIV serostatus.‘122 Until a 
military is able to utilise technological advancements to benefit its own members, 
there is little assistance that this sub-element is able to offer the state in maintaining 
its national power when faced with the AIDS pandemic. 
4.3.4.2 Leadership 
The first implication of the AIDS pandemic on military leadership is the loss of 
military officers of experience and particular expertise. The loss of leadership poses 
some difficulty for states as while ‗dead recruits and infantry troops tend to be easy 
to replace…a general or top technical officer…often represents decades of training 
and acquired experience.‘123 McInnes expands on this issue contending that the 
threat is significantly broader than merely the loss of experience:  
The high rate of infection among officer corps and NCOs will not only affect 
leadership and experience, but may mean the loss of informal networks crucial 
to the efficient operation of complex institutions such as military. Of particular 
concern appears to be the potential loss of experienced military and technical 
specialists with 8-15 years service, the ‗middle management‘ and technical 
glue which holds an organisation together.124 
 
Military leadership plays an important role in marshalling support among the 
members of the armed services for prevention techniques to take effect. McInnes 
goes as far as to incorporate the ‗willingness of military leaders to acknowledge the 
problem‘ of the AIDS pandemic, to be a decisive variable in the success of awareness 
training.125 The level of leadership within the military, and the role they play in 
combating the AIDS pandemic, directly correlates to the final component of military 
preparedness - being the quality and quantity of the armed forces. 
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4.3.4.3 Quality and Quantity of Armed Forces 
The advantage of technology and leadership is minimalised if the state does not 
possess the quality and quantity of armed forces required to ensure its military 
preparedness.126 The AIDS pandemic has assaulted the preparedness of the state‘s 
military in three important areas: first, the impact of the pandemic on the 
population has reduced the quality of the population from which the military can 
draw.  Second, the pandemic has affected the health and well being of the armed 
forces, translating to a heavy toll on the quality of the armed forces; third, the 
pandemic‘s attrition rate for military personnel is reducing the ability of the military 
to protect the state‘s national power.  
 
Russia is one particular country where the AIDS pandemic, along with other 
significant health concerns, is having a detrimental effect on the military‘s 
recruitment base. According to Garrett, ‗in both 2002 and 2003, about 5,000 
conscripts - or about a third of all young men drafted - were rejected for military 
service for health reasons, that included chiefly HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, drug 
addiction and ―psychological problems‖.‘127 The diminution of the recruitment base 
for the Russian military is further exacerbated by the declining number of births 
within Russia,128 a situation that is representative of ‗similar trends in the armed 
forces of Ukraine, the Baltic states, and possibly Belarus and Moldova as well‘.129 A 
reduction in the recruitment pool for the military directly translates to a reduction 
in the future quantity and quality of armed forces personnel. The lack of quality 
recruits is also being replicated within the ranks of armed forces. 
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The quality of the troops the state already possesses is even more important to the 
state of military preparedness. The ill health of military personnel has affected the 
quality of their work. According to McInnes, evidence exists that: 
Flight times in African militaries have been significantly affected because crew 
have been too ill to fly; there is concern that soldiers may be wary of helping 
comrades with blood injuries in combat due to fear of infection; and unit 
cohesion may suffer if some are HIV-positive and others are not.130 
 
The overall effect of the HIV/AIDS pandemic on the quality of armed forces is a 
reduction of cohesiveness, capabilities, and readiness,131 when this is combined with 
the impact of the pandemic on the quantity of the armed forces, the state‘s national 
power is significantly impaired.132 
 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is decimating the quantity of a number of armed forces 
throughout the world. The figures are a growing concern for those tasked with 
maintaining national security, ‗troop strength in Malawi, for example, has already 
reportedly fallen to 50 percent of the minimum capacity needed to guarantee 
safety…In Mozambique, police recruits cannot be trained fast enough to replace 
those dying of AIDS.‘133 Of significant concern is the secondary impact a decline in 
troop numbers presents to the international community. International peacekeeping 
missions, in large part are, supported by developing countries with high infection 
rates; these missions may well suffer as a result of the impact of AIDS pandemic on 
the quantity of the troops.134 As a result, the international community may be 
hindered in adequately responding to outbreaks of violence.  
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The AIDS pandemic tests the strength of a state‘s military preparedness across all 
three sub-elements. By doing so the pandemic exposes a number of concerns that 
need to be addressed in order to allow the military to carry out its task in preserving 
a state‘s national power. The assault on all levels of military personnel, coupled with 
the impact of the pandemic on the general population, facilitates a significant 
reduction in the state‘s ability to maintain a comprehensive and robust military able 
to counter any threat towards the nation state. 
4.3.5 Population 
As outlined above the impact of the AIDS pandemic varies across regions. According 
to WHO, in 2004 HIV/AIDS was the sixth largest cause of death worldwide, 
accounting for 3.5% of all deaths.135 The majority of deaths related to the pandemic 
are in low-income countries,136 indicating that middle and high-income countries 
have had some success in reducing the burden of the AIDS pandemic on their 
population. The assessment of the AIDS pandemic‘s impact on a state‘s population 
distribution and trends, provides a quantitative understanding of the pandemic. 
4.2.5.1 Distribution 
The variance in the regional mortality rate of the AIDS pandemic poses some 
difficulties in establishing a global assessment of the impact of the AIDS pandemic 
on global population distribution. Morgenthau contends that ‗a nation cannot be in 
the first rank without a population sufficiently large to create and apply the 
material implements of national power.‘137 The AIDS pandemic prevents a state 
from meeting such a rank through its assault on the population of the state. By 
assessing the impact of the pandemic on the demographics that make up a state‘s 
population; namely size, age, geographic distribution, and level and distribution of 
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human capital, the impact of the AIDS pandemic on the state‘s population 
distribution becomes evident. 
Size 
While a precise figure is difficult to come by, there appears to be a general 
consensus among scholars138 that the AIDS pandemic has been responsible for the 
deaths of between 20 and 22 million persons globally. One study maintains that 
between the period 1995-2025, AIDS will be responsible for over 64 million 
deaths.139 
  
The 2006 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population 
Division report on The Impact of AIDS assesses the burden of the AIDS pandemic on 
the population of fifty-three states with varied prevalence.140 The study offers a 
more detailed examination of impact of AIDS on the size of the population, paying 
close attention to gender disparity. While the study concluded that globally AIDS 
would be responsible for 38 million excess deaths in the period 2020-2025, it was 
also suggested that the pandemic would reduce life expectancy at birth by 4.9 
years.141 While these figures are gender-neutral, evidence indicates that more 
females are likely to die from the AIDS pandemic than males.  
 
The gender disparity of the AIDS pandemic has resulted in ‗more than half of all 
people living with HIV [being] women and girls‘.142 This is a particular problem in 
sub-Saharan Africa where, according to the 2010 UNAIDS Report on the Global 
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AIDS Epidemic, ‗more women than men are living with HIV, and young women 
aged 15-24 years are as much as eight times more likely than men to be HIV 
positive‘.143 The 2006 study indicated that ‗the impact of AIDS on life expectancy is 
projected to be higher for women than men‘ with countries within the 20 percent 
or more prevalence range seeing a loss of ‗at least 6 years of life expectancy more 
than their male counterparts‘.144 Such a disparity alters the gender makeup of the 
population and is likely to have ramifications for the future trends of the 
population.145 These ramifications are largely derived from the age of the persons 
being infected with the disease, which in most instances ‗are the years when people 
are most likely to start becoming parents‘.146 
 
Age 
The AIDS pandemic most frequently attacks those considered to be within the most 
industrially productive age demographic of 15-59 years. The ‗young adult years,‘ as 
the United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs/Population division 
refers to them, ‗are the most productive for income generation and family care 
giving, so the loss of people in this group to AIDS has far-reaching implications for 
households, the labour force, food production and the well-being of society‘.147 The 
most recent 2010 Global report for UNAIDS indicates that both HIV prevalence and 
AIDS related deaths are declining amongst children.148 Whilst this decrease is a 
positive sign, there is an increasing gap within the population age distribution given 
the high rates of AIDS-related deaths in older generations. The increased death rate 
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in the young adult generation leads to an increase in the older demographic,149 and 
an increase in the number of resulting child orphans.  
 
Indeed, the increase in the number of orphans is ‗one of the worst consequences of 
the AIDS epidemic‘.150 The ‗total number of children aged 0-17 years who have lost 
their parents due to HIV has not yet declined‘.151 In 2009 UNAIDS estimated that 
there were close to 16.6 million orphans with ‗almost 90%‘ living in sub-Saharan 
Africa.152 An increase in the amount of orphans in turn increases the number of 
children vulnerable to recruitment as child soldiers, as Barnett and Whiteside 
illustrate, 
In a society which is already stressed and where government offers very little, 
large numbers of ‗youth‘ who have been orphaned from an early age can easily 
become armed youths, easy recruits for millenarian cults or prey to 
unscrupulous politicians.153 
The use of child soldiers also places further strain on the military preparedness of 
the state, specifically; whether or not the military is capable of engaging child 
soldiers. The implications of the AIDS pandemic on the age demographic are 
perhaps one of the more insidious aspects of the disease. By sapping a population of 
its most productive segment, the pandemic significantly increases the burden of the 
disease on the state. 
Geographic Distribution 
Anecdotally, geographic distribution plays a crucial role in assessing the impact of 
the AIDS pandemic because it establishes the disparity between rural and urban 
areas in both prevalence, and access to treatment. There is very little data available 
to compare the rate of HIV prevalence in rural and urban areas within a state. 
However, there is some evidence that while there has been some success in urban 
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areas at promoting prevention methods, and supplying treatment to those that 
require it, this is not replicated at the rural level. A 2001 study, Real and Perceived 
HIV Risk by Population Density: An Exploratory Examination, indicates that,  
Although the prevalence of HIV/AIDS is substantially lower among less 
populated areas, including smaller metropolitan and rural areas, the stability of 
these rates suggests that those living in these areas have been less likely than 
those in larger cities to adopt effective risk-reduction practices.154 
The study primarily focuses on the United States where infection rates are 
considerably lower compared to other countries. However, the results are likely to 
be replicated elsewhere in the world where efforts of awareness are concentrated 
within urban areas. Such a situation is exacerbated by the inability to deliver 
treatment to sustain life to a number of rural areas in high-prevalence countries. 
 
Over the last ten years significant resources, spearheaded by UNAIDS and WHO, 
have gone into scaling up access to treatment for HIV, aimed at lowering the 
mortality of the AIDS virus. However, as WHO maintains, ‗the geographical location 
of treatment sites can also increase barriers to treatment - both directly, such as 
through increased costs associated with transport and food, and indirectly, in terms 
of time spent on travel and waiting in queues.‘155 All such treatments are dominated 
by the level and distribution of human capital.  
Level and Distribution of Human Capital 
In regard to combating the AIDS pandemic, the level and distribution of human 
capital directly relates to the availability of health care facilities designed to mitigate 
the impact of the pandemic. The AIDS pandemic has come at a tremendous cost to 
the health care systems of low- and middle-income nations. As Ashford maintains, 
‗the epidemic has already crippled health systems in Africa, where systems were 
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weak before the epidemic struck‘.156 The concentration of healthcare within urban 
centres has contributed to the overwhelming of these systems with HIV/AIDS 
patients, at the cost of other health concerns. Furthermore, the concentration of 
healthcare facilities in urban, as opposed to rural, areas has further impeded the 
access to healthcare for large proportions of the population. 
 
Even when members of the population are able to access health facilities, the access 
to treatment may not be forthcoming. The increased burden of the AIDS pandemic 
has placed a strain on the health infrastructure with AIDS patients frequently 
occupying more than half of hospital beds in some sub-Saharan Africa countries.157 
Increased access to antiretroviral therapy continues to ease this burden. However, 
the insidious nature of the pandemic means a cost is further incurred as healthcare 
workers also fall ill, 
The loss of healthcare staff to AIDS is another blow to the health care sector in 
heavily affected countries. Their loss is particularly painful given the escalating 
need for their professional skills as more people fall ill with AIDS. According to 
the health service in South Africa, 14 percent of staff (mostly nurses) died from 
AIDS between 1997 and 2001.158 
Similar instances have been cited by UNAIDS in their 2006 Report on the Global 
AIDS Epidemic for other countries.159 While the impact of the AIDS pandemic on 
the level of human capital, through its assault on health care workers, is a 
significant impediment to defeating the pandemic, this issue is compounded by the 
inability of states to adequately distribute their health infrastructure throughout 
their population.  
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4.3.5.2 Trends 
The trend of a state‘s population growth is an important facet in gauging the impact 
of the pandemic as it provides an indication of the potential recovery rate of the 
power, which the state derives from its population. The AIDS pandemic poses a 
multi-faceted problem for a state seeking to protect the power derived from this 
particular sub-element. The impact of AIDS on the birth-rate can deny the state the 
potential benefits from a positive population trend; such as, a population base to 
support the military preparedness, and the industrial capacity of the state. Lamptey, 
Johnson and Khan utilise South Africa as an example of the complexities derived 
from the pandemic. 
South Africa embodies many of the challenges projected for populations 
severely affected by AIDS. By 2020, fewer children will be born because of 
deaths and lower fertility among HIV-positive women. Many children will die 
of AIDS-related causes during childhood. The adult population will shrink, 
with especially high losses among women in their 30s and 40s, and men over 
40, which will be evident in the country‘s age and sex structure in 2020.160 
The summary of trends in South Africa is likely to be replicated throughout high-
prevalence countries. A long wave event interpretation further emphasises that such 
devastation is unlikely to be fully realised until at least ten years after HIV 
prevalence has peaked.161 Such an outcome highlights the importance of 
Morgenthau‘s sub-element of trends when taking into account the impact of a 
pandemic on the national power of the state. 
 
The element of population provides a quantitative exploration of the AIDS 
pandemic. The spread of the HIV/AIDS pandemic appears to be reducing in size. 
According to UNAIDS, 2009 saw a notable reduction in the incidence of HIV 
infection globally, by 19% from 1999.162 This reduction has been replicated by a 
decrease in the amount of AIDS-related deaths in 2009 when compared to 2004, a 
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result in the increased access to medication.163 While such figures seem to indicate a 
level of success in reducing the population‘s susceptibility to the AIDS pandemic, the 
population‘s support for the policies enacted can only be assessed through the 
element of national character. 
 
4.3.6 National Character 
Specifically, the national character is determined by the ‗intellectual and moral 
qualities‘ of a population.164 In essence, the element of national character seeks to 
establish a more qualitative aspect of the population‘s contribution to national 
power. While Morgenthau contends that both national character and national 
morale ‗stand out…for their elusiveness from the point of view of rational 
prognosis‘ an understanding of the importance of the national character can be 
developed by looking toward the response to the population to the AIDS 
pandemic.165  
 
The social construction of AIDS from the nascent days of the pandemic established 
the foundation of its assault on national character. As John Aberth maintains ‗AIDS 
is perhaps the most culturally constructed [infectious disease], whose ever-shifting 
metaphors relative to each society‘s attitudes and behaviours are intimately 
connected with the clinical and biological manifestations of the disease.‘166 The 
ability to respond adequately to the growing threat of the AIDS pandemic was held 
up by the nature of the social construction of the disease. That is, the ‗emerging 
politics‘ relating to the pandemic resulted in two sides of the argument becoming 
ingrained within the population. One side consisted of a ‗highly organized radical 
and vocal disease constituency,‘ while the other side was an ‗organized opposition 
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by a radical and organized religious right‘.  Both sides made a concerted effort to 
frame the national character of the state.167 Levin and Sanger contend that such a 
discourse between the disease constituency and their opposition offered, 
A lethal combination capable of paralysing and reinforcing the timidity of 
legitimate public actors, from elected officials to appointed agency heads. 
Further, the legitimate scientific complexity and uncertainty of developing safe 
and effective treatments and preventative agents exacerbated the impediments 
to purposeful action.168 
The stereotypes attached to the HIV/AIDS pandemic saw a varied interpretation of 
the causes of the virus. As Dennis Altman succinctly implies, ‗the taboos around 
dealing with HIV stem from the history of the epidemic, the means of its spread and 
the fear of recognising its potential consequences‘.169 In essence the battle to 
confront the pandemic became more of an ideological battle, than one of man 
versus microbe. Without exception, national character has played an important role 
in both the proliferation of, and response to, the AIDS pandemic. This assessment 
looks towards the role of four predominate elements of authority, which play a role 
in the framing of the national character of the state:  the political, religious, 
intellectual, and professional, authority.  
 
The lack of strong political authority at the beginning of the epidemic provided for a 
foundation of inaction. According to the World Bank,  
The denial of the problem throughout the early years of the epidemic, 
including at national political levels, and the lack of political commitment, 
national prevention strategies, and coordinated response, all result[ed] in 
inaction and entrenchment of the disease.170  
The relegation of HIV/AIDS to be solely a problem for homosexuals,171 made 
addressing the disease at its outset an unpopular advocacy among politicians. 
Altman contends that, ‗the behaviours associated with the spread of the disease 
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embarrass many authorities, who would rather deny the existence of HIV than 
admit that stigmatised and unpopular behaviours exist within their countries.‘172 
This form of denialism reflected the social construction of the means of 
transmission. However, the sexual mode of HIV transmission is not the only form of 
―denialism‖ that political authorities have had relating to the AIDS pandemic. 
 
The propagation of medical ‗AIDS denialism‘, a disproven contention that HIV does 
not cause AIDS, has permeated political efforts at dealing with the pandemic.173 The 
denialist approach to HIV adopted by South African President, Thabo Mbeki, is 
estimated to have cost the lives of 330,000 souls, ‗because a feasible ARV 
[Antiretroviral] treatment program was not implemented in South Africa‘.174 In 
summarising the case, Chigwedere et. al. contend that 
In 1999, President Thabo Mbeki, under pressure to provide zidovudine (ZDV 
or AZT) for prevention of mother-to-child HIV transmission (PMTCT) and 
AIDS treatment announced that the government was not going to provide it. He 
then questioned whether HIV was the cause of AIDS, and this broadened the 
debate from the usefulness of ZDV to the usefulness of antiretroviral (ARV) 
drugs in fighting the AIDS epidemic because they all target HIV. President 
Mbeki‘s government restricted the use of freely donated nevirapine and 
obstructed the acquisition of Global Fund grants.175 
At this point the medical argument saw the cross over from medical denialism to 
social consequence, and contributed to the proliferation of the pandemic. 
Furthermore, the questionable tactics of the Mbeki government contributed to the 
further proliferation of the pandemic at a time when the preponderance of scientific 
evidence has clearly established the causes of the AIDS pandemic.176  
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Political authority in relation to the AIDS pandemic has impacted on the national 
character by promoting a number of falsehoods about the pandemic, the legacy of 
which still exist today.  Indeed, ‗the hypocrisies of official discourse means that 
messages about HIV are often confusing and misleading…in countries as different 
as Singapore, Chile and Kenya governments have limited prevention campaigns in 
the name of ―tradition‖, ―morality‖ and ―religion‖‘.177 This trilogy of national 
character is used in many domestic political discussions where there are perceived 
threats from external sources and globalisation.   
 
The World Bank explicitly addresses this notion that ‗the cultural and religious 
conservatism that constrains open discussion and information provisions about 
sexual matters in general, and about AIDS in particular‘178 is a key determining 
factor in the misunderstanding of the AIDS pandemic. These misunderstandings 
permeate the national character of many states. In the earlier years of the pandemic 
within Africa, a ‗belief that the act of marriage itself makes partners immune to 
infection‘ appears to have come about ‗because both the Catholic and Anglican 
churches, as well as Muslim leaders have urged marriage‘ and fidelity or ‗zero 
grazing‘, or monogamy.179 As a result, the influence of religious authority on the 
policies of governments in combating the AIDS pandemic has served to undermine 
mitigation. The ideological persuasion of governing authorities has seen decisions 
being based on belief, as opposed to science. One such example is the US foreign aid 
initiative to address the AIDS pandemic. 
 
The President‘s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) was first announced by 
USA President, George W. Bush, during his 2002 State of the Union Address.180 The 
program was designed to combat the effects of the pandemic with the delivery of 
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HIV treatment to 15 countries at an estimated cost of US$18 billion. As Garrett 
contends ‗no other nation has mounted an HIV/AIDS campaign of this scale‘.181 
However, the influence of ideology tainted the potential success of the campaign. 
In 2004, the appropriations bill allocating money for PEPFAR stipulated that a 
third of the prevention and education funds had to be spent on abstinence-
promoting programs, that none of the money could be spent buying sterile 
syringes or needles for intravenous drug users, and that faith-based 
organizations should receive special priority in the receipt of care and 
treatment funds.182 
The inclusion of faith-based organisations as a channel for HIV mitigation funding, 
as well as the apparent move away from harm minimisation programs, was 
controversial. Simply put, the program moved away from science based solutions 
toward more ideological assumptions regarding the pandemic‘s spread and 
mitigation. Indeed Garrett and Rosenstein contend that PEPFAR became ‗so highly 
politicized that its achievements are obscured by controversy‘.183 Faith-based 
initiatives and religious leaders continue to play an important role in influencing 
the national character, and the ability of that character to overcome the impact of 
the AIDS pandemic.184 In some respects, religious authority also acts as intellectual 
authority, further confusing the element of national character. 
 
In order to strengthen the national character of a population facing the AIDS 
pandemic, the deferral to an intellectual authority is preferred. However, what 
defines ‗intellectual authority‘ is blurred. Essentially, persuasive members of the 
public assert an intellectual authority on the matter, regardless of their knowledge 
gap. The World Bank illustrates how proliferation of the pandemic continues 
because of the ―knowledge gap‖; 
Such gaps can be dangerous, for example, where infected men seek out 
uninitiated girls with the aim of curing themselves. In South Africa, a third of 
survey respondents believed that HIV-positive people would always show 
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183 Garrett, L. and Rosenstein, S. (2005) ‗Missed Opportunities: Governance of Global Infectious 
Diseases‘, Harvard International Review, Spring, p.64. 
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symptoms. In Kenya, AIDS orphans-often in denial-believed that their parents 
had died from witchcraft or a curse.185 
Burnett and Blaikie, highlight another knowledge gap danger found in Buganda 
where ‗the idea that female beauty is a protection against AIDS infection is prevalent 
among men‘, and that ‗this is mentioned by adolescent school children in their 
essays.‘186 Here the groundwork for proliferation rather than mitigation or 
containment is established. A sound national character is required, and intellectual 
authorities that are competent and well informed. Where the AIDS pandemic is 
involved, there is a clear undermining of the element at the cost of national power. 
 
Finally, the ability for multinational corporations to have usurped all professional 
authority to contribute to enhancing the national character of the population in the 
face of the pandemic has been well established, and practiced, for at least the last 
decade. Essentially, corporations have been challenging the traditional role of 
government, being the provision of health care, by providing access to AIDS 
medications for their employees.187 Arguably, the actions taken by corporations are 
entirely self-serving.188 However, by doing so companies are placed in a unique 
position to be able to cultivate, or at least influence, the character of the population 
they employ.  
 
Assessing the impact of the pandemic on a state‘s national character should be 
considered in isolation. The ability of authorities to frame the national character of 
its population is vital to an effective response to the AIDS pandemic. Such ability 
must draw on the influence of all forms of authority; including political, religious, 
intellectual, and professional if the approach is to be successful. As Morgenthau 
                                                 
185 World Bank Staff (2002), op. cit. pp.5-6. 
186 Barnett, T. and Blaikie, P. (2002), op. cit. p.45. 
187 For a detailed discussion on the advantages of such a program see Van der Borght, S.V. et al. 
(2006), op. cit. 
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warned from the outset, the failure to account for the national character of the 
population is detrimental to establishing the national power of the state.  
 
4.3.7 National Morale 
Simply put, the national morale of a population goes to the ‗degree of determination 
with which a nation supports‘ the policies being enacted by governments.189 In 
regard to mitigating the AIDS pandemic, a number of governments have sought the 
assistance of the wider international community to combat their localised 
epidemics. This assistance offers the ability to assess two areas of national morale: 
the degree of determination with which the nation supports its domestic policies 
regarding AIDS, as well as the support for the international community‘s efforts. 
The ability for both governments and international organisations to sustain the 
national morale of the population has been significantly tested by AIDS being a 
long-wave pandemic. The longevity of the AIDS pandemic has provided a rare 
insight and assessment of constantly varying government policies to control the 
pandemic as well as the public‘s response.  
 
The initial public policy response to the AIDS pandemic really fell across two 
choices; 
The first involved traditional transmissible-disease control: identifying and 
reporting the infected and tracing their contacts, isolating and quarantining 
them, treating potentially dangerous carriers, and taking steps to destroy the 
contagion through disinfection, cleansing, or other antimicrobial means. 
Proponents of the second approach claimed that such techniques were 
antiquated, ineffective and counterproductive. Instead of seeking to control the 
infected, health officials should encourage voluntary compliance with 
procedures of identification, testing, and treatment and regard behavioural 
changes that lessened transmission.190 
 
Determining the approach embraced by the state was significantly aligned with the 
national character of the population. The traditional ―quarantinist‖ approach to 
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infectious disease outbreaks had served a number of states well during previous 
pandemics, and for most states this approach had become ingrained within their 
domestic legislature.191 Cuba seems to have adopted the quarantinist approach to 
the AIDS pandemic. However, the AIDS virus posed a different challenge for some 
states as they needed to contemplate as to whether to place the rights of the 
individual above the rights of the state. This topic would become the centrepiece of 
the debate surrounding public policy and AIDS.192  
 
In responding to the AIDS pandemic, Cuba instigated a series of policies designed to 
mitigate the spread of the virus throughout the country, and impede any impact of 
the virus on its national power. According to Garrett, 
No nation on earth had ordered as broad a sweep of AIDS regulations as had 
Cuba. Between March 1986 and January 1988 the government conducted 
1,534,993 HIV tests…and the intention was to test every citizen and nontourist 
visitor to the country, or 10.4 million people.193  
The Cuban government commenced their testing regimen with the military, 
particularly the ‗hundreds of thousands who served as soldiers on military duty in 
Africa,‘194 before expanding it to include the general population. Those found to be 
HIV positive were then isolated in ‗sanatoriums where, though they were 
quarantined, their salaries were paid…they were allowed to pursue education, 
permitted home visits, and otherwise treated (by most accounts) in a humane 
fashion‘.195 The program, despite being seen as ‗impracticable, oppressive and 
                                                 
191 Baldwin (2006) maintains that ‗because of existing contagious-disease legislation, those who 
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discriminatory,‘196 has been remarkably successful in decreasing the rate of 
prevalence within Cuba.197 Furthermore, the sanatorium system has evolved 
considerably over time, and the draconian regulations governing their patients have 
been somewhat reduced. As a wider understanding and awareness of the pandemic 
has come to fruition, the Cuban government adjusted their program accordingly.198 
Debate surrounding the Cuban program mainly refers to the lack of ‗privacy or 
consent for Cubans living with HIV,‘ particularly in regard to mandatory testing.199   
 
Other members of the international community largely adopted a voluntary 
approach to HIV testing for civilian populations. Such an approach was indicative of 
a movement away from recognising the collective interests of society, towards 
acknowledging that individual rights now took precedence.200 The framing of the 
AIDS pandemic to be a personal matter, as opposed to one that is detrimental to 
national power, has played a part in the increased spread of the pandemic. The 
response of governments that adopted the ―individual‘s responsibility‖ approach 
further framed the national character through the cultivation of immense fear 
campaigns that contributed significantly to the stigmatisation of the disease. 
 
The response of governments concentrated on divulging information regarding the 
spread of HIV. Arguably, these awareness campaigns did benefit society in 
increasing awareness, yet at the same time the campaigns instigated the 
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development of a national morale that, in some instances, is perceived to be worse 
than the virus itself. 
For many, HIV is linked with issues of immoral behaviour such as sex work or 
drug use. The stigma related to HIV is therefore reinforced and exacerbated by 
the stigma which already exists for groups such as gay men, drug users, prison 
workers or sex workers…Because of the stigma and fear associated with HIV, 
people are reluctant to get tests. Indeed, it is estimated that more than 80 per 
cent of people with HIV do not know they have the virus. Stigma also blocks 
people from accessing services, including counselling and treatment. Most of 
all, stigma means people who do test positive often keep their status a secret.201 
Such stigma is still ingrained within the national character of many states. This 
attribute of national character has allowed some governments to ignore the growing 
pandemic, with the public providing tacit approval for government policy based on 
the stigma attached to the disease. Responsibility for effective AIDS programs has 
now largely fallen within the purview of the international community, which 
provides a further avenue of the assessment of national morale, being the level of 
support for the international community‘s actions to mitigate the pandemic. 
 
In order to assess the impression of its efforts, in 2010 UNAIDS commissioned 
Zogby International to ‗survey the world on what people think about the AIDS 
epidemic and response,‘ which is provided in Table 4.3 Is the World Effectively 
Dealing with AIDS, below.202 When asked specifically about their support for the 
global response to AIDS, 43.6% of respondents indicated some element of 
dissatisfaction, with 22.8% unsure.203 Such a response is a likely outcome given the 
amount of time taken by the international community to respond to the pandemic, 
as well as the lack of clarity regarding just what the global response to the pandemic 
has been. 
 
 
                                                 
201 Boler, T., and Archer, D. (2008) The Politics of Prevention: A Global Crisis in AIDS and Education, 
London: Pluto Press, p.13. 
202 UNAIDS (2010b) Outlook Report 2010, Geneva: UNAIDS, p.34. Zogby International conducted 
an online survey of adults with Internet access in 25 countries. A total of 11,820 respondents 
participated in the study. (UNAIDS, 2010b, op. cit. p.38.) 
203 Ibid. p.35. 33.6% of respondents indicated yes. 
The AIDS Pandemic 
192 
Table 4.3: Is the World Effectively Dealing with AIDS 
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Yes 21 32 26 18 45 53 32 30 22 75 
No 54 58 42 61 23 28 39 56 42 25 
Not Sure 25 10 32 22 32 19 30 14 36 - 
Source: UNAIDS (2010c) The Benchmark: What the World Thinks about the AIDS 
Response, Geneva: UNAIDS, p.19.  
 
 
The geographic breakdown, outlined in the able above (Table 4.3), indicates the 
variance in support for the global response, and provides significant insight into 
regional perceptions. Overwhelming support for the global effort is limited to the 
Caribbean and South and South-East Asia regions, with 75% and 53% respectively 
answering in the affirmative. Those regions most underwhelmed with the global 
effort were ‗Eastern Europe (61%), the USA (54%), and sub-Saharan Africa 
(50%).‘204 The poll reveals that over one-fifth of participants were unable to 
determine the success, or failure, of global efforts to deal with the AIDS pandemic. 
Such a large response rate may be indicative of a lack of knowledge regarding 
international leadership within the AIDS response, or the remnants of the initial and 
human responses to AIDS being considered a ‗dirty disease‘, both of which bear an 
impression of the international character of the global constituency.  
 
Contrastingly, when asked whether or not their country was responding effectively 
to AIDS, as seen in Table 4.4: Is your Country Effectively Dealing with AIDS?; 41.9% 
indicated ―no‖, 41.2% indicated ―yes‖, and 16.9% were unsure, such a result 
ensures a divide in national responses to any policy to stop the contagion enacted 
thus far by government.205 Moreover, the close-to-even split relating to a country‘s 
AIDS response program would indicate a less than enthusiastic level of support for 
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any future development policies the government embraces in order to mitigate both 
the pandemic its the impact.  
 
Table 4.4: Is your Country Effectively Dealing with AIDS? 
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Yes 55 39 47 11 44 39 28 26 51 63 
No 29 54 26 78 30 40 46 69 20 37 
Not Sure 16 7 26 12 26 21 26 5 29 <1 
Source: UNAIDS (2010c) The Benchmark: What the World Thinks about the AIDS 
Response, Geneva: UNAIDS, p.21.  
 
However, the regional analysis, offered in Table 4.4, provides a different image. The 
only regions where the response indicated ―overwhelming satisfaction‖ 206 with 
their country‘s response were:  the Caribbean (63%); North America (55%); and 
Oceania (51%).  Those least satisfied with their country‘s response were:  Eastern 
Europe/Central Asia (78%); sub-Saharan Africa (69%); and Latin America (54%).207 
Such a split largely coincides with low and high infection rates of the regions, with 
low prevalence countries exhibiting greater satisfaction in their country‘s response. 
On a regional basis, the national morale relating to AIDS pandemic policies 
indicates significant room for improvement. Such improvement can be acquired 
through stronger engagement between states and international health organisations. 
The level of engagement that has transpired between governments through 
diplomatic means provides an indication of the level of seriousness with which the 
pandemic is being considered by the political constituency.  
 
4.3.8 Quality of Diplomacy 
The element of diplomacy covers a wide gamut of actions; from the ability of the 
state to gain access to the various treatments required, to utilising diplomatic 
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contacts to assure funding for various HIV programs. Central to the element of 
diplomacy is the ability of the government to maximise their elements of power in a 
way that decreases the impact of the pandemic. While previous pandemics have, to 
a degree, disrupted diplomatic communications, the AIDS pandemic has seemingly 
done the opposite. The diplomatic effort to combat AIDS on a global basis extends 
far beyond the traditional method of bilateral diplomacy. Indeed, the increased 
attention given to the AIDS pandemic during the first decade of the 21st century has 
placed AIDS firmly within the framework of Global Health Diplomacy.  
 
The need for high-level diplomacy to deal with the AIDS pandemic was recognised 
by the international community as early as 1987, when WHO established a Special 
Programme on AIDS.  The programme was primarily designed to ‗dispel the many 
myths that existed about HIV/AIDS and to promote a human rights approach to the 
pandemic‘.208 Diplomatic activity regarding the pandemic would increase in 1994, 
when the United Nations‘ Economic and Social Council established UNAIDS,209 in 
order to deliver a coordinated effort to deal with the broader pandemic effects. 
According to Das and Samaraskera, the UNAIDS programme would address several 
key objectives namely, 
To provide global leadership in response to HIV/AIDS; promote global 
consensus on policies; monitor trends; strengthen the capacity of national 
governments to develop comprehensive national strategies; promote broad-
based political and social mobilisation to prevent and respond to HIV/AIDS 
within countries, involving a wide range of sectors and institutions; and 
advocate for greater political commitment to, and adequate resources for, 
tackling the disease.210 
In the realm of international diplomacy, UNAIDS has played a vital role in ensuring 
that HIV/AIDS became a more prominent issue. The ability for UNAIDS to lobby the 
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major organs of the United Nations, namely the Security Council and the General 
Assembly, to place the AIDS pandemic within their domain should not be 
overlooked.211 Neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly had ever 
contemplated the impact of pandemics on international security prior to the year 
2000. 
 
The United Nations Security Council convened on the 10 January 2000 to address 
‗the impact of AIDS on peace and security in Africa.‘212 The Council meeting was 
chaired by United States Vice-President, Al Gore213; and ‗marked the first time that 
the Council had addressed a health issue as a threat to international peace and 
security‘.214 In justifying the utilisation of the Security Council as the forum to deal 
with the AIDS pandemic, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations 
Richard Holbrooke explained that 
If we [got] AIDS in the Security Council, that will begin to break down the 
stigma; that will begin to get more money to the issue; that will bring more 
leadership to the issues, and that will lead to a solution.215 
While the special session was largely focused on the continent of Africa, it still 
‗injected the issue into the international political discourse at the highest level‘ and 
eradicates any conjecture on the political actor status of the pandemic.216 The 
passing of Resolution 1308 signalled a turning point for international health 
diplomacy. The Resolution expressly recognised that the HIV/AIDS pandemic ‗can 
have a uniquely-devastating impact on all sectors and levels of society‘, and that ‗the 
HIV/AIDS pandemic, if unchecked, may pose a risk to stability and security‘.217  
Furthermore, the resolution expressly mandated that there should be ‗additional 
discussion among relevant United Nations bodies, Member States, industry, and 
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other relevant organizations to make progress, inter alia, on the question of access 
to treatment and care, and on prevention.‘218 In doing so, the Security Council 
increased the level of diplomatic attention that was given to the disease. 
 
The next major diplomatic effort to confront the AIDS pandemic came in the form 
of the United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS. The Special 
Session, which was convened in June of 2001, was the first Special Session to be 
called based on a health issue. The final resolution of the Session became known as 
the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, and outlined the role that the 
international community would play in defeating the pandemic.219 The 
Commitment resolved to provide for at least one full day of every future General 
Assembly Session to review and debate the report from the Secretary General on the 
AIDS pandemic.220 Furthermore, in adopting the Declaration of Commitment, 
Member States obliged themselves to report on their countries progress to the 
General Assembly.221 Such a commitment ensures continued and substantial 
diplomatic efforts would transpire to ensure the defeat of the pandemic.  
 
Five years after the Declaration of Commitment was signed, a ―follow-up‖ session of 
the General Assembly, based on the implementation of the Declaration, was 
convened. The Secretary-General‘s report to the Session argued that, 
The available evidence underscores the great diversity among countries and 
regions in implementing the response envisioned in the Declaration of 
Commitment on HIV/AIDS. While certain countries have reached key targets 
and milestones for 2005, as set out in the Declaration, many countries have 
failed to fulfil the pledges.222 
The notion of goal setting as a measure to hold Member States to account of their 
commitment has become a stalwart of UN efforts against the AIDS pandemic.  
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One further commitment can be seen with the prominent placement of combating 
the AIDS pandemic within the Millennium Development Goals.223 In order to 
achieve these goals, Member States have been forced to enter into a diplomatic 
relationship with non-state actors; such as non-governmental organisations 
(NGO‘s) and pharmaceutical companies, to seek assistance in mitigating the effects 
of the pandemic on their national power.224 
 
Successful mitigation of the pandemic also requires non-traditional diplomatic 
efforts where the state will need to engage with other actors within the international 
community to ensure its national power. Barnett and Whiteside maintain that those 
countries that have shown some success in containing the AIDS pandemic have 
‗adopted a multi-sectoral response‘.225 On the domestic front, such a response has 
seen ‗a commitment across a society, from political leaders at all levels through to 
religious leaders, NGOs, the private sector and, where appropriate, traditional 
leaders‘ to confront the pandemic.226 The multi-sectoral response has seen states 
become more reliant on non-government organisations to enter into negotiations, 
arguably a stalwart of diplomacy, in order to protect their national power. A strong 
reliance of organisations; such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation for 
finances, and the negotiating strength of the Clinton Global Initiative, has seen the 
significant increase in diplomatic engagement from nation state in order to decrease 
the impact of the pandemic.227   
 
                                                 
223 United Nations (2010) The Millennium Development Goals: Report 2010, New York: United 
Nations, p.40. 
224 Ibid. pp.40-51. 
225 Barnett, T. and Whiteside, A. (2002), op. cit. p.336. 
226 Ibid. p.337. 
227 Seoane-Vazquez and Rodriguez-Monguio (2007) contend that ‗several national and 
multinational efforts have been organized with the aim of reducing ARV prices. The Accelerated 
Access Initiative (AAI), created in May 2000 with the participation of international organizations 
and several originator pharmaceutical companies, achieved price reductions of original ARVs. The 
Clinton Foundation HIV/AIDS initiative, established in 2002, has also negotiated price ceilings for 
ARVs with generic suppliers.‘ (p.64.) 
The AIDS Pandemic 
198 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic has provided the impetus for increased cooperation 
between international actors in matters of global health. Taking into account the 
broader impact of the AIDS pandemic validates justification for such a diversified 
diplomatic approach. Short wave outbreaks of pandemics past had multilateral 
coordination and cooperation designed to impede the progress of the pandemic. 
Such diplomatic efforts were minute in comparison to the diplomacy required to 
combat the AIDS pandemic. While the diversified diplomatic approach to combating 
the AIDS pandemic has had some success in preserving state‘s national power, the 
responsibility for maintaining a balance between the elements of national power 
falls to the government of the state. Morgenthau‘s final element of the quality of 
government seeks to assess the overarching ability of a government to maintain 
such a balance. 
 
4.3.9 Quality of Government 
The quality of a state‘s government is vital in preserving the state‘s national power 
during a pandemic. The AIDS pandemic poses a unique challenge to governments, 
given the multifaceted impact of the virus. Indeed, governments must not only seek 
to reduce the impact of the AIDS pandemic on society as a whole, but look to 
protecting the institutions that they have created to facilitate that reduction.  
 
Overwhelmingly, governments of low and middle-income countries have 
experienced significant difficulties in dealing with the AIDS pandemic due to a ‗lack 
of resources, low salaries, and sometimes downright corruption‘.228 Barnett and 
Whiteside contend that these issues make the state ‗inefficient or incapable of 
governing‘ with the illness and death related to AIDS adding ‗to an apparently 
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endless downward spiral‘.229 All of which contributes towards the magnification of 
the scope of the pandemic.  
 
The importance of a robust quality of government to combat the AIDS pandemic 
cannot be underestimated, as UNAIDS illustrates, 
An effective and functioning public sector is vital for delivering essential goods 
and services, and developing successful national AIDS responses. Before the 
epidemic, several worst affected countries were already struggling with 
daunting development challenges, excessive debt burdens, and declining trade. 
In many low-and middle-income countries, adjustment programmes involved 
deep public-spending cuts, and governments currently struggle to provide 
basic social services, support and infrastructure. In the worst affected 
countries, AIDS has additionally undermined the public sector‘s functional 
effectiveness.230 
Assessing the impact of the AIDS pandemic on the quality of a state‘s government 
indicates the difficulties authorities have had in confronting the magnitude of 
threats posed by this pandemic actor is established.  
 
Balance between Resources and Policy 
In order to facilitate an adequate response to the AIDS pandemic, a government 
must facilitate the protection of all of the elements of its national power. In order to 
do this, the government needs to maintain a balance between the materials that it 
possesses, and the policy that it has developed. The longevity of the AIDS pandemic 
has made the likelihood of a perfect balance somewhat difficult to achieve. As the 
2006 UNAIDS Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic asserts, 
In countries with high levels of HIV prevalence, the epidemic is having a 
serious impact on public-service sectors. At the same time as productivity and 
tax bases are being constrained by the deaths of adults in their productive 
prime, AIDS is placing increasing demands on public-sector services, such as 
health and education, and on public administration.231 
Such a conflagration of issues provides the ―perfect storm‖ for a government being 
unable to maintain the balance which is required. This is where the uniqueness of 
the AIDS pandemic becomes somewhat pronounced. 
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Most pandemics would justify emergency measures being implemented by a 
government, such as quarantine and treatment. Such measures are incredibly 
effective during short-wave events. Given the longevity of the AIDS pandemic, and 
the reluctance for governments to react in a timely fashion, governments have 
struggled to insulate themselves from the pandemic. UNAIDS has expressed 
growing concerns ‗about the long-term effects on the continuity and quality of 
public services and governance, with the significant disruption of institutional 
memory‘ resulting from the impact of the AIDS pandemic.232 The impact of the 
pandemic on the human resources of the government impedes the quality of the 
government‘s ability to respond effectively by ensuring a balance among the 
resources that it possesses. 
Balance among Resources 
A successful effort in combating the AIDS pandemic comes with the realisation that 
‗AIDS control is part of government‘s activities, [and] where there is a large 
epidemic each ministry or department should look at their activities and consider 
what they may do differently.‘233 A whole-of-government approach has the ability 
to address areas on which the pandemic has impacted that do not fall within the 
gamut of the ministry of health. For example, Barnett and Whiteside illustrate the 
importance of various aspects of a government being able to minimise the burden of 
the AIDS pandemic upon the state in arguing that, 
Delays at borders due to slow customs and immigration procedures result in 
truck drivers spending days at border posts. Villages spring up to house, feed 
and entertain them. Prevention activities might include education and condoms 
for both truckers and local women. Alternatively, government departments in 
charge of immigration and customs could work together to speed border 
crossings.234 
                                                 
232 UNAIDS (2006a), op. cit. p.94. 
233 Barnett, T. and Whiteside, A. (2002), op. cit. p.299. [Brackets Added] 
234 Ibid. p.299. 
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By incorporating a whole-of-government approach to fighting the AIDS pandemic, 
the burden placed on the health services sector of the state could be considerably 
reduced. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter Two, the ability of the government to maintain the level of 
governance, which its citizenry has come to expect, is vital when confronted with a 
pandemic. The AIDS pandemic has placed a tremendous strain on health care 
systems, particularly within sub-Saharan Africa, where the system was already 
fragile. UNAIDS contends that ‗people with HIV-related disease occupy more than 
half of all hospital beds.‘235 The primary concern, according to Barnett and 
Whiteside, is that this ‗increased demand is from people who are not normally users 
of health care: young adults‘.236 As mentioned above, with young adults, or those of 
‗maximum potential usefulness‘ (as Morgenthau would refer to them), unable to 
contribute to the national power of the state, the ability of a government to maintain 
the delicate balance among resources may be further impeded through a loss in tax 
revenue. 
 
The increased burden placed on government budgets through the strain on health 
resources is part of an almost cyclical impact of the AIDS pandemic. Barnett and 
Whiteside contend that a reduction in tax revenue transpires because, 
 GDP is lower. This has knock-on effects: companies making 
lower profits pay less company tax; fewer employed people 
means less personal tax; less economic activity reduces value 
added tax and customs revenues; reduced savings means less 
tax and stamp payments from financial institutions. 
 Where companies are not bound by minerals, other natural 
resources or markets, they may, if the epidemic and its impact 
are serious enough, move to other less affected locations; new 
investments and businesses avoid affected areas. 
 The revenue collection process itself may be affected. 
Morbidity and mortality hampers government operations and 
                                                 
235 UNAIDS (2006a), op. cit. p.95. 
236 Barnett, T. and Whiteside, A. (2002), op. cit. p.308. 
The AIDS Pandemic 
202 
efficiency. For example, if border customs officials are absent 
or have died then revenue collection becomes less efficient.237 
If a government is unable to maintain consistent revenue in order to provide the 
resources to its constituency, the burden of the AIDS pandemic continues to be 
magnified. Through this inability, the government‘s capacity to foster the final 
measurement of quality, popular support, is significantly challenged.  
 
Popular Support 
The maintenance of popular support for any government is vitally important to 
establishing its credibility and, arguably, its quality. Importantly, the notion of 
maintaining popular support is not entirely universal, particularly in regard to 
matters of public health. Communist countries, such as Cuba, have enacted policy 
regarding the AIDS pandemic, regardless of the level of popular support for the 
policy. Within democratic countries though, the ability to gauge the level of popular 
support through elections is a staple of the quality of government. The impact of 
AIDS on a democracy is an area that is highly under-researched.238 Yet the logical 
presumption, as illustrated by UNAIDS, is that the pandemic carries with it a 
significant burden for democratic governance. 
AIDS can have a negative effect on political participation and other aspects of 
democratic government…possible effects include declining involvement in 
voluntary organizations and local politics (due to death, illness or 
demoralization), absenteeism and death of elected representatives, and a shift 
from debating long-term issues of democracy and human rights to focusing on 
more narrow and immediate issues of service provision.239 
The ability for a constituency to be able to express its support for particular policies 
relating to AIDS is understandably impeded by the pandemic. Illustrating yet once 
again the ability of the AIDS pandemic to erode elements of a state‘s national power.  
 
When assessing the impact of the AIDS pandemic on the quality of a government 
the result is relatively straightforward: ‗AIDS will erode the capacity of governments 
                                                 
237 Barnett, T. and Whiteside, A. (2002), op. cit. p.303. 
238 See Barnett, T. and Whiteside, A. (2002), op. cit. 
239 UNAIDS (2006a), op. cit. p.94. 
The AIDS Pandemic 
203 
to govern.‘240 The pandemic does this by inadvertently manipulating the 
government‘s ability to maintain logical balances between resources, both human 
and otherwise, and policy. At the same time the pandemic impedes the ability of a 
government‘s constituency to express their support, or lack thereof, towards 
particular policies embraced by the government. In doing so, the pandemic further 
undermines not only the established power of a nation, but the ability of that nation 
to pursue further power.  
 
4.4 Conclusion 
The AIDS pandemic provides the opportunity to assess a long-wave pandemic that is 
still ongoing in the 21st century. The assessment reveals the AIDS pandemic actor to 
be able to exploit the lack of development within specific regions to its advantage. 
While developed regions have managed to reduce the impact of this pandemic, the 
high level of prevalence and mortality within economically developing regions 
reveals the likely social standing of this pandemic‘s victims.  
 
The AIDS pandemic brings a significant scope of impact on both the economic and 
socio-political aspects of national power. The proliferation of the pandemic was 
assisted through its ability to mask its symptoms for a period of time preventing 
early detection without intrusive testing taking place. This latent period provided 
the avenue the pandemic required to spread globally. The growth of the pandemic 
within low-and middle-income countries has outpaced that in more developed 
countries, with those least-developed nations suffering from a significantly higher 
prevalence rate. Congruently, this economic correlation has been replicated on the 
domestic front within developed countries where the disease is more prevalent in 
lower segments of society than it is in higher. 
 
                                                 
240 Barnett, T. and Whiteside, A. (2002), op. cit. p.315. 
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The AIDS pandemic has also provided a significant test for the gauging of the 
severity of pandemics. The use of mortality over prevalence offers a more accurate 
picture of the severity of the AIDS pandemic. While a high prevalence of HIV is 
indicative of a state‘s inability to protect its population from exposure to the disease, 
the mortality rate provides an indication of the state‘s inability to keep its population 
alive. 
 
This chapter has sought to ascertain the impact of the pandemic on the various 
elements of national power, and demonstrate the veracity of considering AIDS as a 
pandemic actor when it assaults national power. This assault is further magnified 
because of the stigma attached to the HIV/AIDS virus. In essence, the chapter has 
detailed the likely behaviour of a state that is facing a long-wave pandemic that 
erupts among the socially segregated members of society. The findings suggest that 
to mitigate potential long-wave pandemics in the future, there is an inherent need 
to treat all pandemics, regardless of victims, as a threat to the national power of the 
state.   
 
The AIDS pandemic has further verified the viability of using Morgenthau‘s element 
of national power as a tool of pandemic assessment. While the severity of the impact 
of AIDS has grown considerably over time, the need to test Morgenthau‘s elements 
on a short-term localised and recent pandemic now presents itself. In order to do 
this, the following chapter provides an overview of the SARS pandemic of 2003, 
paying particular attention to the realist response of the actors involved as they 
sought to protect their respective powers.  
 
  
Chapter Five: The SARS Pandemic 
5.0 Introduction 
The SARS pandemic of 2002/03 offers a contemporary case that reaffirms the 
centrality of Morgenthau‘s realism in 21st century international relations, and 
assures that the responses by government to the non-state actor threat have not 
altogether changed over time. This case study adopts a more narrative approach 
than previous chapters, by contextualising the responses and measures that a 
number of actors, both state and non-state, deployed in order to mitigate the 
pandemic. 
 
SARS erupted on the medical and political scene a mere two years after the UN 
Security Council had designated the AIDS pandemic a threat to international 
security. The rapid succession from AIDS to SARS would test the resolve of the 
international community in regard to confronting this newly designated form of 
non-traditional security threat. The outbreak of SARS ‗was an attack by an unseen 
invader to which nations had to respond as they would to any other attack – by 
mobilizing their resources to repel the invader.‘1 Indeed, the way in which states 
responded to SARS mimicked the way in which states have responded to traditional 
threats, and threatening actors - with a form of warfare. Abraham reinforces this 
comparison to traditional warfare, contending that ‗SARS hammered home the 
message that an infectious disease…could be as disruptive and costly as a 
conventional war‘.2 Abraham has, albeit unintentionally, alluded to the realist 
nature of states. His suggestion becomes explicit with his contention that the SARS 
                                                 
1 Abraham, T. (2007), op. cit. p.2. 
2 Ibid. 
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pandemic ‗awakened governments to the fact that microbial disease is as great a 
threat to national security as an invasion by a foreign army‘.3  
 
States have an ability to prepare for conventional warfare by ensuring their 
elements of national power are strengthened in order to deal with external, or 
internal, aggressions. If the aggressor happens to be an unknown, and an essentially 
invisible entity, such as SARS, the necessity for the state to secure its various 
elements is doubly tested. The action taken by states to secure their interests in 
response to SARS confirms the realist mentality embedded within modern 
international politics.  Likewise, and given the nature of the political environment in 
which this contemporary pandemic existed, international organisations acting 
politically also adopt a realist posture. 
 
The SARS case illustrates the behaviour of actors when they are forced to respond to 
the sudden appearance and dominance of another actor. While states had the 
opportunity to seek assistance through the interdependent international community, 
the realist attribute of self-interest saw some of them, particularly China, adopt a 
more self-centred approach - considering the initial epidemic to be a purely 
domestic affair. This chapter will illustrate the centrality of the realist response, 
being the reinforcement and protection of national power, to emergency situations 
such as pandemics.   
 
The SARS outbreak has been a strategic choice for this thesis due to its infection in 
multiple political and governmental systems during its short life span. The chapter 
will begin by first addressing the core attributes, which are the medical and socio-
political effects of the SARS pandemic. Second, the chapter will present the response 
of China to the domestic epidemic in the earliest days of the outbreak to highlight 
                                                 
3 Abraham, T. (2007), op. cit. p.2. 
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how Morgenthau‘s realism explains the response to the non-state threat of 
pandemic. The assessment of the communist state‘s response to the pandemic, once 
the virus had breached its mainland border, has been useful. The examination of the 
Chinese experience with SARS aims to establish the case of how, regardless of the 
state system, all states responded in a realist form.  In order to show how the realist 
response is multinational, the chapter will then turn to the Canadian SARS outbreak. 
Given the contemporary nature of this pandemic, the chapter will then turn its 
attention to the international links that were forged in the global response to the 
SARS pandemic. Specifically, the response of the WHO, whose unprecedented 
actions throughout the pandemic, promulgated the need for the organisation to 
possess far more realist tendencies than previously assumed, or required, by its 
member states.   
5.1 The SARS Aggressor 
The evolution of the SARS virus from its emergence as a zoonosis to pandemic took 
place over a four-month period.4 The rapid dissemination of the virus was, in part, 
enabled by modern technology. Whilst advances in transportation technology 
played a role in the preceding cases, the speed and increased frequency of modern 
travel enabled the proliferation of the SARS virus to take place in a shorter period of 
time. Therefore, the SARS pandemic provides an example of the potential impact 
that an unknown pathogen can have on modern international relations. For a 
greater understanding of the SARS virus, the medical taxonomy of the virus is 
presented to establish SARS as the causative agent for the wider societal implications 
of the pandemic.  
                                                 
4 Patient zero for the SARS pandemic was retrospectively determined to be a resident of Guangdong 
province, China on the 16th November 2002. In line with WHO guidelines on defining a pandemic, 
the death of a 78-year-old woman in Toronto, who eventually became the index case for the SARS 
pandemic, on 5th March 2003, also provided the evidence necessary to classify the SARS outbreak as 
a Pandemic. See Whaley, F., and Mansoor, O.S. (2006) ‗SARS Chronology‘, WHO Regional Office for 
the Western Pacific, SARS: How a Global Epidemic Was Stopped, Geneva: World Health 
Organization, pp.3-10.  
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The ability of SARS to threaten the national power of states was largely derived from 
the symptoms of its victims being similar to seasonal influenza.  The epidemiological 
characteristics of SARS are such that the virus has a short incubation period5 with 
the symptoms (of SARS infection) generically described as ‗flu-like‘.6  The similarity 
increases the likelihood of exposure for state health care providers and individual 
carers, who initially neglected the adoption of extraordinary precautions in treating 
the victims.  The symptoms would eventually escalate to incorporate ‗lower 
respiratory tract infection and gastrointestinal complications‘, which would lead to 
about 25% of patients developing respiratory failure, to which 10% would succumb, 
‗despite intensive therapy‘.7 The period of communicability, while not well defined, 
seems to be that ‗transmission only occurs when cases are symptomatic.‘8 Given that 
infected persons are likely to seek medical assistance only once they are 
symptomatic, the exposure of a high proportion of health care workers to the 
pandemic, and hospitals becoming ‗sites of transmission amplification‘, creates a 
viral hothouse.9 Although the epidemiological footprint for SARS is now well 
established, at the time of the initial outbreak very little, if anything, was known 
about the pathogen. The dearth of information and a lack of international 
cooperation played a direct role in the global spread of the disease. A global 
summary of the SARS pandemic is provided below in Table 5.1: Global Summary 
and PSI of the SARS Pandemic, 2003. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 According to Merianos and Plant (2006) the ‗incubation period is generally reported as two to 10 
days‘. (p.188) 
6 Sung, J.J-Y. (2006) ‗Clinical Features‘, WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific, SARS: How a 
Global Epidemic Was Stopped, Geneva: World Health Organization, p.182.  
7 Sung, J.J-Y (2006), op. cit. p.182. 
8 Merianos, A., and Plant, A. (2006) ‗Epidemiology‘, in WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific, 
SARS: How a Global Epidemic Was Stopped, Geneva: World Health Organization, p.188. 
9 Ibid. p.188. 
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Table 5.1 Global Summary and PSI of the SARS Pandemic, 2003 
 
Source: Table adapted from Global Alert and Response, World Health Organization (2003), Summary 
of Probably SARS Cases with Onset of Illness from 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003, [online], 
available: http://www.who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/en/index.html[accessed 22 
March 2011]. 
 
As Table 5.1 indicates above, the SARS pandemic managed to infect persons within 
each WHO region. However, the prevalence of the pandemic, as well as its 
                                                 
10 The PSI is calculated as the mortality rate of the SARS pandemic thought the following formula: If 
n= number of SARS cases and m= number of deaths; PSI=m/n*100. 
WHO Region Country Cases Deaths 
PSI10 
(%) 
No. of Infected 
Health Care 
Workers (%) 
African South Africa 1 1 14 0 (0) 
European 
France 7 1 14 2 (29) 
Germany 9 0 0 1 (11) 
Italy 4 0 0 0 (1) 
Republic of Ireland 1 0 14 0 (0) 
Romania 1 0 0 0 (0) 
Russian Federation 1 0 0 0 (0) 
Spain 1 0 100 0 (0) 
Sweden 5 0 0 0 (0) 
Switzerland 1 0 0 0 (0) 
United Kingdom 4 0 22 0 (0) 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
Kuwait 1 0 0 0 (0) 
The Americas 
Canada 251 43 17 109 (43) 
United States 27 0 0 0 (0) 
South East Asia 
India 3 0 0 0 (0) 
Indonesia 2 0 0 0 (0) 
Thailand 9 2 0 1 (11) 
Western Pacific 
Australia 6 0 0 0 (0) 
China 5327 349 7 1002 (19) 
China, Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region  
1755 299 17 386 (22) 
China, Macao  
Special Administrative 
Region 
1 0 0 0 (0) 
China, Taiwan 346 37 11 68 (20) 
Malaysia 5 2 0 0 (0) 
Mongolia 9 0 40 0 (0) 
New Zealand 1 0 0 0 (0) 
Philippines 14 2 0 7 (50) 
Republic of Korea 3 0 0 0 (0) 
Singapore 238 33 0 97 (41) 
Viet Nam 63 5 8 36 (57) 
Total 8096 774 9.6 1706 (21) 
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mortality, represented by the PSI, was substantially varied from 100% in the African 
region, to 0% in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The regional assessment of the 
SARS pandemic reveals a greater concentration of infection within the Western 
Pacific region.11 
 
Outside of the Western Pacific region, where Chinese cases constituted over 95% of 
the regions total, the number of cases within the Americas was mainly restricted to a 
single state: Canada, which accounted for 90% of the total. Furthermore, all deaths 
within the Americas occurred within Canada.12 The higher figures within Canada, 
and China, were the result of a pandemic related ‗super-spreader event‘ as 
described by WHO. 
 
A super-spreader event is, as the term suggests, one person being responsible for 
multiple transmissions. The term super-spreader ‗emphasizes the role of the host 
(person infected) above that of the agent (nature of the virus) and the environment 
in accounting for the phenomenon‘.13 Balasegaram contends that ‗most of the 
super-spreading can probably be traced to a chain of transmission that starts with 
first the super-spreading event in Guangzhou‘.14 Figure one provides an overview of 
the super-spreading events during the SARS pandemic. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 See Global Alert and Response, World Health Organization (2003) Summary of Probable SARS 
Cases With Onset of Illness From 1 November 2002 to 31 July 2003 [online], available: 
http://who.int/csr/sars/country/table2004_04_21/wn/index.html [accessed 22 March 2011]. 
12 Exposure to the virus in the African and Eastern Mediterranean regions were restricted to one case 
each in South Africa and Kuwait respectively. 
13 Balasegaram, M. (2006) ‗The First Super-Spreading Event‘, WHO Regional Office for the Western 
Pacific, SARS: How a Global Epidemic Was Stopped, Geneva: World Health Organization, p.136. 
14 Ibid. p.138. 
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Figure 2: SARS Super-spreading Events15 
 
With the benefit of historical analysis, Fidler contests the ‗super-spreader event‘ as 
the only causative agent in the spread of the pandemic pathogen:   
The main reasons for scepticism involved the lack of scientific evidence for the 
phenomenon and the existence of alternative, more plausible explanations for 
high infection rates being associated with individual cases. The most plausible 
alternative was that the ‗super-spreader‘ phenomenon had less to do with a 
particular individual shedding virus at especially high rates and more to do 
with the non-application or misapplication of infection control techniques at 
critical times.16 
Traditionally, the application of infection control techniques provides states with the 
ability to disrupt the spread of an infection, and protect the power of the state. 
However, the lack of knowledge in regard to the epidemiological nature of SARS led 
to state authorities failing to execute programs designed to mitigate the spread of the 
contagion.  What is sure in the case of SARS is that the super-spreader event, and 
                                                 
15 Adapted from Balasegaram, M. (2006), op. cit. p.139. Solid lines indicate direct transmission; 
broken line indicates assumed direct transmission. Whaley (2006) confirms the Metropole Hotel 
outbreak being directly linked to the Toronto outbreak of SARS. (p.146) 
16 Fidler, D.P. (2004b) SARS, Governance and the Globalization of Disease, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, p.89. 
No. 2 Hospital 
Guangdong, China 
>69 infected
Metropole Hotel 
Hong Kong, China 
21 infected
Hanoi-French 
Hostpial 
Hanoi, Vietnam 
>20 infected
Prince of Wales 
Hospital 
Hong Kong, China
143 infected
Flight CA112 
Beijing China
83 Infected
Amoy Gardens 
Hong Kong , China 
74 infected
Tan Tock Seng 
Hospital 
Singapore
22 Infected
Toronto
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the misapplication of controls, both contributed to the cross-regional proliferation 
of SARS due to the availability of air travel in the 21st century.17 In this occurrence, 
the SARS pandemic is fundamentally different to the preceding cases of the Plague 
and HIV/AIDS pandemics. While the plague and HIV/AIDS utilised their human 
hosts and the technology of their era to assure spread, the evolution of technology, 
including ease of access to air travel, has diminished pathogen transportation times 
across borders to more rapidly threaten additional states. Essentially, the SARS 
pathogen was able to spread further and faster than any previous pathogen. 
Furthermore, airplanes have the ability to act as incubators of a virus. The high 
density of the on-board population presents the perfect opportunity for infectious 
particle dissemination resulting in multiple cross infections. The behaviour of the 
virus in the air provides a microcosm for the behaviour of the pandemic on the 
ground, and serves as an avenue of explanation as to the regional variation of 
infection for the SARS pandemic.  The role of international air travel as a vector for 
the SARS pandemic was clear – the rapid transport of people also meant the rapid 
transport of the pandemic.  
 
Table 5.1 (above) also provides the case fatality ratio as an indicator of the severity 
(PSI), or weight of the pandemic within each WHO region. The PSI illustrates the 
severity of the pandemic within each WHO region and provides some initial insight 
into the weight of the SARS pandemic. Globally, the PSI for SARS is significantly 
higher than the PSI for the AIDS pandemic.18 The global PSI for AIDS was 5.4%, 
whereas the SARS PSI was 9.5%. The difference in severity provides greater weight 
to the probability that SARS was responsible for the change in state behaviour, as 
states took more aggressive action designed to mitigate the immediate impact of 
                                                 
17 One example of in-flight transmission took place on China Airlines Flight 112 (CA112), according 
to Whaley (2006b): ‗Flight CA112 on 15 March was a Boeing 737-300 aircraft, which can typically 
carry up to 126 passengers. On this flight there were 112 passengers and eight crew members. At 
least 22 passengers and two crew members developed SARS raising the spectre of international 
spread through air travel‘. (p.149-150)  
18 See section 4.2.3 The AIDS Pandemic: Weight.  
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SARS. The scope of behavioural change of states during the pandemic, when 
assessed with regard to the epidemiological characteristics of the SARS pathogen - 
particularly its communicability - becomes understandable. Furthermore, the 
regional PSI‘s for SARS contain some statistical anomalies that deserve exploration.  
 
The anomalies result from the WHO practice of publishing data by region.  By 
definition, a region is made up of multiple states - yet not all states will always be 
affected by the same pandemic.19  The experience of an outbreak in one state within 
a region can determine the PSI for that entire region. For example, the PSI for the 
African region is a result of one fatal case of SARS within South Africa. In a similar 
vein, the Western Pacific region accounted for eight of the twenty-five states 
affected by SARS with the PSI varying between zero,20 meaning no fatalities, and 
40%, meaning those diagnosed with SARS has a 60% likelihood of survival.21 
Similarly, within the region of the Americas only two, Canada and the United States, 
of the thirty-five states that constitute the region, experienced the SARS pandemic.  
No deaths were recorded within the United States for the SARS pandemic, making 
the PSI for the Americas purely representative of deaths occurring within Canada. 
Such a varied prevalence and mortality highlight the issues with WHO‘s adopted 
methodology of defining a pandemic on a regional basis and not isolating the high 
prevalence among health care workers. 
 
The high number of cases among health care workers is worthy of inclusion in 
assessing the weight of the SARS pandemic given the integral nature of their work. 
Health care workers serve two functions – they are the first line of response in 
matters of pandemic emergency, and they also must maintain the level of general 
health care demanded by the general population on a daily basis. The SARS assault 
                                                 
19 See Appendix One: WHO Member States by Region. 
20 Including Australia, Mongolia, New Zealand, and Republic of Korea. 
21 Malaysia registered five cases of which two died. 
The SARS Pandemic 
214 
on health care workers illustrated the susceptibility of a state‘s health infrastructure 
to a pandemic. The total number of health care workers affected by the SARS 
pandemic was 1,706 individuals, or roughly 21% of all those infected.22 When 
assessing the impact on a country level, Vietnam ranked the highest with 57% of 
those infected by SARS being health care workers, followed by Canada (43%), and 
Singapore (41%).23 The inability of the state to protect its front-line assets from a 
pandemic assault exposes a fundamental risk to power and response of affected 
states.  
 
The scale of the economic impact was heightened due to the perceived threat of the 
pandemic. In no small part the economic impact exceeded expectations. Analysts, 
such as Fidler, note that the element of fear weighed heavily in economic responses 
to the short-lived pandemic.24 In essence, the cost of the SARS pandemic was 
compounded by a psychologically fearful perception of the pandemic‘s threat. 
 
Considering the short timeframe from eruption to mitigation, the intensity of the 
SARS pandemic‘s effect on the international community is surprising. Abraham 
illustrates how the element of fear was integral, along with the major ramifications 
of the SARS pandemic, and exceeded the domestic impact of the virus:  
In a little over three months, SARS touched every continent, and paralysed 
some of the world‘s most dynamic cities and regions. The global economy lost 
about US$30 billion in production, most of it in Asia. Governments clamped 
quarantines and other restrictions on travellers, reversing a decades-long 
global trend of loosening travel restrictions. Airports emptied, airlines 
cancelled flights and it appeared as if the virus had blocked the arteries of a 
networked, interconnected, globalized twenty-first century world.25 
The scope of the SARS pandemic was out of proportion to the number of people 
infected by the disease. As such, the pandemic‘s impact in the modern era is being 
                                                 
22 Global Alert and Response, World Health Organization (2003), op. cit. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Fidler, D.P. (2004b), op. cit. p.6. 
25 Abraham, T. (2007), op. cit. p.3.  
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amplified through globalisation and highlights the additional burden placed on the 
economies of afflicted in any attempt to recover from the pandemic. 
 
The SARS aggressor challenges the state, as the fiscal costs associated with a 
pandemic accumulate rapidly with little reassurance as to when the financial 
burden will lessen. There were two main cost areas associated with SARS, initially, 
the health-related costs to the state for treating those infected by the pandemic and 
subsequently the post pandemic economic recovery costs. While treatment costs are 
difficult to determine, Saywell, Fowler, Crispin, Bosurk and Cohen, contend that the 
sudden and additional cost of treating SARS patients would essentially double the 
amount already spent on treating patients for seasonal flu. For example, ‗the annual 
cost of flu to the Thai economy…is about $450 million in direct medical costs and 
an additional $1.6 billion in lost productivity due to time off from work‘.26  When 
combined with the additional burden of SARS, the Thai Ministry of Finance was 
forced to trim its GDP forecast a full percentage point, an additional loss of as much 
as $1.3 billion.27 This immediate financial burden is just the beginning.  Flowing on 
is the post-pandemic recovery phase, including a responsibility of the state to ensure 
its economic recovery.  
 
As will be shown, overall the SARS aggressor was extremely effective at exacting a 
substantial toll on the stability of the globalised international system. The dominance 
of the SARS aggressor was significantly assisted by the unknown nature of the 
pathogen. However, the role of the modern state in the proliferation of the virus 
should not be underestimated. The most disruption, however, was in the domestic 
environs of specific states. This thesis now turns to assess the impact of SARS on 
                                                 
26 Saywell, T., Fowler, G.A., Crispin, S.W., Borsuk, R., Cohen, M. (2003) ‗The Cost of SARS: $11 
Billion and Rising‘, Far Eastern Economic Review, 166(16), p.13. 
27 Ibid. 
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China‘s national power, and how the Chinese state responded to this impact and 
sought strategies to mitigate the pandemic threat.  
5.2 The Chinese Front28 
The People‘s Republic of China constituted the epicentre of the outbreak of the SARS 
pandemic, with Guangdong province as ground zero for the contagion. The initial 
responses of the Chinese government were fundamental in the elevation of what 
was a localised epidemic to a global pandemic. By retelling the SARS outbreak, with 
an emphasis on realist nature of both the SARS pandemic actor and the response of 
the Chinese state, the section reaffirms the prominence of Morgenthau‘s works on 
modern international relations, and moves beyond the scope of previous 
investigations.29   
5.2.1 The Epidemic 
The People‘s Republic of China was the epicentre for the SARS pandemic with the 
first retrospectively recorded case of SARS taking place in a ‗45-year-old man in 
Foshan City, Guangdong‘ in November of 2002.30 The origin of the SARS pathogen 
remains debatable. Originally the virus‘s introduction was thought to have stemmed 
from the consumption of palm civet cats, considered a delicacy in Southern China.31 
However, Ohio State University contends that ‗Bats harbor a strain of SARS that is 
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Epidemic, New York: Harper Perennial. Duffin, J. and Sweetman, A., eds. (2006) SARS in Context: 
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31 Recent research contends that the civet cats contracted SARS from humans. Ohio State University 
(2008) ‗Evolutionary History of SARS Supports BATS as Virus Source‘, ScienceDaily [online], 20 
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our best example of the virus before it infected humans – but we still see missing 
links in the history of the transfers of SARS from animals to humans‘.32 For SARS to 
take hold of the population the virus first needed to move from its animal host to a 
human host. The susceptibility of Guangdong as the point of cross-infection was 
based on the urban environmental and trading aspects of the province, as Breiman 
et al explain:  
The province is famous for its ―wet markets,‖ where a bewildering variety of 
live fauna are offered for sale (sometimes illegally) for the medicinal properties 
or culinary potential. The opportunity for contact, not only with farmed 
animals but also with a variety of otherwise rare or uncommon wild animals is 
enormous.33 
While the presence of the SARS virus within these animals is difficult to confirm, it 
should be noted that more than one third of early cases, prior to 1 February, 2003, 
were in local food handlers (people who handle, kill, and sell food animals; or those 
who prepare and serve food).34 This high figure illustrates the likely transition from 
zoonosis to the pandemic being via the wet markets of Guangdong, and a lack of 
adherence to state regulations regarding food supplies.  
 
The introduction of the disease via the food supply acted as the vanguard for SARS 
to assault other elements of the state‘s national power. As increasing numbers of 
workers contracted the disease, and became increasingly sicker, the inability of the 
health infrastructure of Guangdong to adequately address an outbreak of an 
unknown infectious organism became apparent.  
 
Initially, as more persons became infected local health professionals managed the 
response to the outbreak. As the seriousness of the outbreak was realised, doctors 
                                                 
32 Ohio State University (2008), op. cit. 
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sought guidance from higher authorities. Christopher McNally contends that as the 
disease spread within Guangdong province,  
Many local doctors became alarmed and reported in early January 2003 
strange clusters of pneumonia to Guangdong provincial authorities. Experts 
sent out concluded that they faced a type of pneumonia of previously unknown 
cause. Although some effective health measures were taken at the local level 
the virus spread more and moved on to the provincial capital of Guangzhou.35 
McNally further contends that while ‗provincial officials notified central disease 
control and health authorities…the content of this information and how central 
officials reacted is…unknown‘.36 What is known is the inability of the provincial 
authorities to prevent the transmission of the virus throughout the region.  As the 
virus spread to other areas in China, the response of both provincial and central 
officials was lacklustre at best. Compounding the Chinese authorities‘ hesitancy in 
their response was a misdiagnosis of the initial outbreak. 
 
The diagnosis of SARS victims as having atypical pneumonia caused by Chlamydia,37 
as opposed to an unknown pathogen, prevented any aggressive measures taking 
place to quarantine the initial patients. The lack of quarantine allowed those 
exposed to the contagion to move freely throughout China, unwittingly spreading 
the virus to others.  
 
The Guangdong officials justified their reluctance to share information by 
contending that central to the Guangdong government was the protection of its 
economic functions.  Abraham contends that, Guangdong officials admitted after 
the outbreak ‗…that ―they were afraid of the impact of the illness on tourism and 
investment, because they did not know how to treat the illness‖‘.38 Regardless, by 
seeking to contain the information regarding the outbreak, Chinese authorities 
                                                 
35 McNally, C. A. (2003) ‗Baptism by Storm: The SARS Crisis‘ Imprint on China‘s New Leadership‘ in 
Koh, T., Plant, A., and Lee, E.H., eds., (2003) The New Global Threat: Severe Acute Respiratory 
Syndrome and Its Impacts, World Scientific Publishing: Singapore, p.71.  
36 Ibid. 
37 Whaley, F., and Mansoor, O.S. (2006), op. cit. pp.5-7.  
38 Abraham, T. (2007), op. cit. p.24. 
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contributed towards the amplification of the pandemic threat as it permeated the 
state‘s geographic border to infect other states.  
 
As Abraham notes in regard to China‘s response to the outbreak: 
Secrecy…allowed the disease to spread internationally. The health authorities 
in neighbouring Hong Kong had been alarmed by reports of the new disease 
and the panic it was causing. But efforts by the Hong Kong Department of 
Health to find out what was going on from their Guangdong counterparts was 
met with silence. Later, Hong Kong authorities were told that this was because 
infectious diseases were a state secret and could not be disclosed to outsiders.39 
The determination of infectious diseases to be a ‗state secret‘ that cannot be disclosed 
to international neighbours, highlights China‘s perception of the pandemic threat. 
Indeed, China‘s unwillingness to divulge information to its own Special Autonomous 
Region (SAR) of Hong Kong reveals the extent to which the threat was perceived by 
local officials and the state.  The government stance of one message for the public, 
and another message for international responses exemplifies a realist response that 
places the national interest of the nation at the forefront of all considerations. 
However, the inability for China to exert authority over its geographic domain 
contributed to the further dissemination of the virus. 
 
Geographic borders play a vital role in strengthening the power of the state. The 
ability for the state to control access across its borders is an undeniable asset to 
national security. As was seen in the instances of the bubonic and AIDS pandemics, 
securing of physical borders can interrupt the transmission of the pandemic. With 
SARS we can witness an evolution in the notion of border security to incorporate 
recent advances in technology; the evolution of the Internet and 
telecommunications, have contributed toward redefining the traditional notion of 
access to incorporate what can best be described as a virtual access. This virtual 
access to a state‘s geographic territory has allowed the strength of its physical 
borders to be tested in a way that resulted in a weakening of the power of the state 
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over its national borders.  In the nascent months of the pandemic, China adopted a 
realist position aimed at the preservation of the state‘s power by exerting a strong 
amount of control over the dissemination of information.40 
 
The international community commonly expresses the notion of pathogens not 
needing passports. The 21st century, via a combination of advances in technology 
and the advent of social networking, is increasingly seeing the development of 
information similarly spreading without passports. The state is finding it more and 
more difficult to control the flow of information, at all levels of communication. The 
strength of the state is of paramount importance within realism; therefore, any act 
or actor that lessens the strength of the state poses a direct threat to the national 
security of the state. 
 
In China, the citizens felt the government had adopted an ostrich approach to 
information dissemination, and took matters into their own technological-savvy 
hands. Frustrated by the lack of official media releases, ‗the citizens of Guangzhou 
began sending each other SMS messages sharing whatever information they had.‘41 
The communication between citizens was suddenly internationalised when WHO 
was made aware of the SMS arrangement via their global influenza surveillance 
network. One pertinent message, sent on 10 February 2003, ‗said that the disease 
was caused by a mutant influenza virus and that the anti-influenza drug Tamiflu 
was the best cure‘.42 This message was received with such seriousness that it marks 
the first time the WHO has taken action based on information not provided by a 
state authority. Once alerted, the international community made many attempts to 
gather relevant information about the disease from Chinese authorities.43 Such 
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efforts are important as they establish the foundation of the international response 
where the seriousness of a pandemic as an international actor is viewed as 
overriding the traditional authority of a state to control information flow. In the case 
of SARS, the WHO, for the first time, requested information from a member state 
with the only evidence being anonymous information provided electronically to the 
organisation. 
 
The inability of the Chinese state to utilise its natural geographic borders and thus 
the physical transmission of the pandemic, together with the use of communication 
technology which ignores geographic borders, resulted in a severe testing of 
Chinese power. Porous border control experienced within Guangdong exemplifies 
the relevance of Morgenthau‘s element. Geography has traditionally been ‗the most 
stable factor on which the power of a nation depends‘.44 But as the Guangdong and 
China example shows, the advent of the digital age makes the protection of the state 
significantly more difficult.  
 
5.2.2 The Pandemic 
As the SARS virus continued its spread outward from Guangdong province, the 
effect of the pandemic on the national power of the state became more pronounced. 
The inability of Chinese authorities not only to control the spread but also the 
information on the virus compounded the affect of the virus on the daily existence 
of the population. For example, during the SARS pandemic, text messages 
throughout Guangzhou urged the use of a medicinal quality of vinegar that should 
be boiled for disinfecting and to ‗stock up on banlangen, a Chinese herbal medicine 
used to treat colds and fevers‘.45 As the advice filtered throughout the community 
                                                 
44 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p.122. 
45 Abraham, T. (2007), op. cit. p.20. 
The SARS Pandemic 
222 
the panic buying of products spread to incorporate the ‗basic food items like rice, 
salt and oil‘.46  
 
Such actions reinforce the prominence of self-survival within human nature, with 
the natural human response to mere rumours of a strain on food supplies being to 
hoard food.47 Hoarding behaviour further threatens the ability of the state to ensure 
its ability to equitably distribute food to their population. Potentially, the hoarding 
behaviour exhibited within Guangzhou could have been controlled had the 
information regarding the outbreak been shared with the population. The lack of 
action taken by Chinese authorities to prevent an increase in demand for food 
supplies in Guangzhou at the time of the initial outbreak was replicated in other 
aspects of the Chinese economy, such as the industrial complex. 
 
The need to protect the industrial complex from outside influence appears to have 
been one of the motivations for Chinese authorities to maintain the silence in regard 
to the growing epidemic. McNally contends that ‗local and provincial officials in 
China are evaluated on a variety of standards pertaining to the conditions in their 
localities, most of which emphasize economic development and social stability‘.48 
Such an evaluation provides the motivation for officials to ensure, at the very least, 
the stability of their region‘s economy: pandemics pose a threat to this stability. For 
example, the Guangdong province maintains a status of being China‘s export 
powerhouse, and provincial leaders withheld information pertaining to SARS as 
‗reporting openly on the outbreak of SARS…would have affected foreign investment 
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and international economic transactions‘.49 The desire to maintain foreign 
confidence in the region‘s industrial capacity led to the provincial authorities 
actively covering up the outbreak to avoid the negative impact on the industrial 
capacity of both the province and the state. 
 
Furthermore, the government‘s decision to keep factories and businesses open, as 
well as schools and universities, was a choice that likely led to the further 
proliferation of this as then unknown virus. The significant risk of disease-spread 
directly relates to the nature of the local workforce with the factories and 
workshops of Guangdong being ‗manned largely by 10 million migrant workers 
from poorer provinces‘.50 Abraham notes, ‗there was a real danger that the poorly-
ventilated worker dormitories would provide an ideal environment for the explosive 
spread of the virus, leading to thousands of new cases.‘51 While such an occurrence 
failed to eventuate, the assessment highlights how modern industrial practices can 
exacerbate an outbreak. In addition the use of migrant workers increases the 
probability of further spread of the virus as these workers return to their villages 
and countries of origin. The potential consequences may have been catastrophic to 
the industrial capacity of the region. The decision of the Chinese Government to 
limit information dissemination exemplifies the state working in its own best 
interest and preservation mode where it prioritises the industrial capacity over the 
health of the citizens in the name of state security and power. 
 
The SARS outbreak in Guangdong also allows us to witness how other industrial 
sectors immediately responded to protect their own interest. In short they moved the 
production of essential products offshore. The USA-based National Intelligence 
Council contends that, 
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Anecdotal evidence suggests that some export-oriented industries, particularly 
clothing manufacturers, temporarily shifted some orders to Bangladesh, 
Turkey, India and Pakistan. Foreign electronics manufacturers, including a 
large Japanese electronics firm, shifted some production to plants in the 
Philippines and Malaysia with highly specialized sectors and relatively low 
costs.52 
Such moves reveal an additional level of risk involved in combating pandemics for 
investors in a localised industrial complex. This risk prompted some multinational 
organisations to ‗rethink the costs and benefits of concentrating investment in one 
country or region‘, namely China and Guangdong.53 The ramifications of SARS for 
the industrial complex were minimal, although Abraham contends that ‗luck‘ more 
so than the virus‘s inability to take hold, ‗appears to have played a part in this‘.54 
While SARS failed to embed itself within the industrial complex of Guangdong, the 
virus continued to spread among the population of China. 
 
Of the WHO regions, the Western Pacific stands out as the most heavily burdened 
by the SARS pandemic. The geographic density, meaning the closeness of established 
communities within the region, combined with the level of secrecy accorded to the 
virus by Chinese health authorities, made a significant contribution to the spread of 
the pandemic. 
 
Within China the majority of infections occurred within major cities. A 2009 study 
by Fang et al., traced the diffusion of the SARS virus among various outbreak centres 
in mainland China. The study revealed a relationship between the presence of SARS 
in 345 counties of three provinces near Beijing, and the population density within 
those counties.55 Essentially, the higher the rate of persons per kilometre squared in 
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each county, the higher the likelihood of SARS cases.56 The high-density population 
of China simplified the path of infection for the virus. Also, the Chinese authorities 
initially did not embrace policies such as quarantine, so as to ensure the safety of 
their population. The lack of mitigation policies ensured an attack on the state‘s 
population, thereby undermining the central component to Morgenthau‘s elements 
of national power framework.  
 
China‘s governmental responses during the SARS pandemic also provide an insight 
into the potential role of the military during a pandemic. In Beijing the provision of 
health care by the military serves to reinforce the role of city authorities on a 
regular basis. As the Economist noted at the time, 
Of Beijing‘s 175 hospitals, 16 are under the control of the armed forces 
and…are under no obligation to report SARS cases to the city authorities (even 
though, with their often superior facilities, they are a magnet for military and 
civilian patients alike).57 
The secrecy surrounding the number of SARS patients within military facilities was 
significantly detrimental to the mitigation of the pandemic, and further contributed 
towards the empowerment of the pandemic. However, it should be noted that it was 
a prominent surgeon and former director of a military hospital, Dr Jiang Yanyong, 
who broke this silence to inform international authorities of the prevalence of the 
virus within military hospitals.58 Yangyong disputed the official count of nineteen 
SARS patients citing at least sixty ‗undisclosed cases in military hospitals‘.59 
Yanyong‘s leak to the international media was fundamental in exposing the rise of 
the pandemic across China, and prompted a significant change in the Chinese 
government‘s stance on the pandemic. 
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Recognition of the full extent of the SARS pandemic by the Chinese government 
provided the impetus for action. The immediate mobilisation of the military in order 
to confront the SARS pandemic saw the approval by the chairman of the Central 
Military Commission, Jiang Zemin, for 1,200 military doctors and nurses to be 
‗transferred from all major units to Beijing‘s designated SARS hospitals‘.60 Holding 
true with Morgenthau‘s element of military participation when a state confronts a 
threatening actor, the Chinese military were now leading the national defence 
against the pandemic protagonist. The promotion of the pandemic to a national 
threat and the associated increased role of the military were outlined in one report 
from the PLA Daily as SARS being: 
…a top priority for the Communist Party of China and the whole country to 
fight SARS and that it is an unshirkable duty of the army to provide medical aid 
to local hospitals. The whole army is required to select capable medical staff to 
provide sufficient guarantees and complete successfully the task of fighting 
SARS.61 
The role of the military in confronting the SARS pandemic would not have been 
possible without the quantity, as well as the quality, of armed forces being prepared 
and equipped to do so. China‘s ability to deploy armed forces made a positive 
contribution in the battle against SARS. Military personnel were deployed to areas 
susceptible to infection. For example, McNally contends that in China ‗the 
government deployed 5 million reservists and militia to 50,000 villages in Hebei to 
educate rural Chinese on SARS‘.62 The mobilisation of the People‘s Liberation Army 
(PLA) by the Chinese authorities reinforces Morgenthau‘s element on the 
importance of a prepared military. The ability for China‘s diversified military to 
both treat patients, and serve as a transmitter of information to inform potential 
victims of the disease, recognises the role of the modern military in protecting the 
national power of the state. 
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Initially, as the Chinese government censored media outlets, the spread of SARS 
continued unabated. The population of Guangzhou became reliant on ‗SMS 
messages sharing whatever information they had‘.63 Abraham contends that ‗had 
there been greater openness about the disease, those who were at risk might have 
taken precautions to avoid infection‘.64 Instead, the national character of the 
Chinese population embraced a notion of self-survival where the individual was 
responsible for taking action against the unknown pathogen. Even though 
Morgenthau‘s element of national morale had taken a psychological beating in the 
battle against the pandemic, the element of national character rose to ensure the 
longevity of the general masses. The China Daily News, in a rare rebuke to the 
government authorities, surmised the role of the Chinese government in 
constructing an aura of chaos: 
The Chinese Government has not, in the past, been accustomed to public 
disclosures of its activities. Unfortunately a long-held but outdated conviction 
among many top public servants dictated that information could also cause 
possible social panic and disorder. Hence, information was controlled, which 
was just what happened at the onset of the SARS outbreak.65 
The initial secrecy with which SARS was treated was an unfortunate consequence of 
the Chinese party system.66 However, once the Chinese government chose to 
acknowledge the SARS pandemic, the mobilisation of the state served to re-energise 
both the morale and the national character of the population.  In short, the 
recognition of the extent of SARS in China by the government provides evidence of 
the existence of Morgenthau‘s elements of national morale and character as 
qualitative elements of national power. 
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The authority of the Chinese government was on full display in its attempt to take 
control of the SARS pandemic. As McNally argues ‗as soon as the government 
decided to come clean, the nation‘s propaganda apparatus and media organizations 
sprung into full action.‘67 The use of the media by Chinese authorities saw the 
comprehensive issuing of medical advice relating to SARS, it ‗exhorted the Chinese 
to rally around the leadership and overcome the national hardship‘.68 Abraham 
illustrates the abilities of the newly united China in mitigating and treating the SARS 
pandemic aggressor: 
The speed and scale on which China can operate once mobilized was 
illustrated by its amazing feat in constructing a fully operational 1000-bed 
SARS hospital at a cost of US$170 million within a week on the outskirts of 
Beijing. Construction of the hospital began on April 26, near the site of a 
former sanatorium, and it was opened to the first patients on May 2. Seven 
thousand workers completed the buildings in six days and seven nights using 
prefabricated materials.69 
 
Central to China‘s newfound approach to dealing with the SARS outbreak was the 
need to look towards greater transparency in the provision of information. 
However, as is the nature of the pandemic pathogen, the aggressor needed to keep 
on the move to find new hosts for establishment of colonies of infection.  In this 
way, Hong Kong and Taiwan found themselves in the direct path of the invading 
protagonist, and from where the virus would continue to proliferate around the 
world. 
 
The onset of SARS in Hong Kong did not come as a surprise to local health 
authorities. Abraham highlights that once the disease was present on the mainland 
‗it was only a matter of time before it reached Hong Kong…over 250,000 people 
cross the border between Hong Kong and the mainland every day, making it one of 
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the busiest land crossings in the world‘.70 Political arrangements since the return of 
Hong Kong to Chinese sovereignty precluded cooperation between Hong Kong 
provincial authorities with their neighbouring provinces. Simply Hong Kong 
authorities must deal directly with Beijing, not their provincial counterparts. 
Abraham contends that at the time the governmental arrangement was thought to 
offer Hong Kong some autonomy, but ‗as SARS demonstrated, this lack of 
communication and coordination between adjoining regions is dysfunctional‘ and 
costly at a time of threat.71 Beyond the dysfunction, the lack of cooperation from 
Beijing would have repercussions in both Hong Kong and the rest of the world. As 
the pandemic crossed into Hong Kong, confirmation of the suspicions held by Hong 
Kong health authorities would come from a victim, Professor Liu Jianlun, who, 
having contracted the virus himself, confirmed the presence of SARS in Guangdong.  
 
Professor Liu ‗triggered the epidemic in Hong Kong and globally… All of Vietnam‘s 
63 SARS cases, as well as 238 cases in Singapore and 136 cases in Canada flowed 
directly or indirectly from this one person.‘72 The Professor has been responsible for 
treating patients of the initial outbreak within Guangzhou City, and while staying at 
the Metropole Hotel (refer Figure 1: SARS Super-Spreading Events above) the doctor 
unknowingly exposed the other residents of the ninth floor to the SARS virus.73 The 
Metropole hotel outbreak has been well-documented and thoroughly investigated.74 
Overwhelmingly, the consensus regarding responsibility for the outbreak rests in 
the lack of communication and refusal of Hong Kong authorities to ‗examine 
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anecdotal evidence coming from Southern China‘ regarding the epidemiology of the 
disease‘.75  
 
Once SARS had been introduced into Hong Kong the ramifications for the island‘s 
economy, particularly tourism, were significant. The impact of the SARS pandemic 
on Hong Kong‘s economy illustrates the susceptible nature of industries, such as 
tourism, to attack by such non-state actors. In 2002 the Hong Kong SAR ‗reaped 
$8.2 billion from tourism alone…about 5% of its GDP‘.  Any impact on such a 
contribution poses a threat to the economic capacity of the state, which contributes 
to the national power of that state.76 The WHO first issued a travel advisory 
regarding atypical pneumonia in Hong Kong on 12 March, 2003.77 The advisory 
did not recommend the restriction of travel, although it did offer guidance and 
provided the first indication of the pending outbreak.78 The advisory initially had 
little impact on the tourism sector; however, the same cannot be said for the revised 
advice on 2 April 2003.  
 
The second advisory called for persons to reconsider all but essential travel to Hong 
Kong and Guangdong province due to the spread of SARS over such a short period 
of time.79 The effect of the new advisory was immediately detrimental to the Hong 
Kong tourism sector. As Pine and McKercher‘s 2004 study reveals: 
Passenger traffic at Hong Kong international airport saw a year-on-year 
decline of nearly 80 per cent - passenger numbers were just 565,000 
compared with more than 2.8 million in May 2002…[a] 59 per cent decline in 
the number of movement of passenger aircraft was recorded in June.80 
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Other aspects of the Hong Kong tourism sector that were affected include hotels81 
and retail.82 Overall, the impact of the SARS pandemic on the tourism sector was 
significant. The dramatic toll of the pandemic on the economic coffers of Hong 
Kong, as well as other affected areas, highlights the short-term ramifications of a 
pandemic. The outbreak in Hong Kong also revealed the pandemic‘s penchant for 
infecting health care workers, and exemplifies how a state is impacted by the non-
state actor threat. 
 
The nature of the SARS virus demanded medical assistance with 20%-25% of  
patients requiring intensive care treatment.83 The implications for health care 
workers and other patients were severe. The high rate of infection amongst health 
care workers in all geographic areas of the pandemic would eventually lead to an 
increase in the negative impact of the pandemic on the national power of the state.  
 
Within Hong Kong, the SARS pandemic carried two specific threats towards health 
care workers. The first and immediate effect was to physically impair the health 
care workers through infection. The second was surprising and speaks to the 
national character of the citizen of Hong Kong. There was a psychological toll 
exacted by the pandemic on the health workers. Carmichael notes in relation to 
conditions at the Prince of Wales Hospital in Hong Kong: 
When the illness of nurses and physicians, and support staff reached a critical 
mass, compromising the care of patients, senior physicians and administrators 
became alarmed, imposing aggressive infection-control measures within the 
hospital. Members of the senior medical staff, however, refused hospital 
admission and insisted on remaining at home with their families, meanwhile 
helping themselves to hospital medical supplies.84 
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The loss of human capital through fear of infection is a significant impediment 
towards the mitigation of any pandemic.85 Indeed, when seeking to establish the 
impact of the pandemic on the industrial capacity of the state, the ability of the state 
to provide healthcare for its population to ensure the strength of its capacity comes 
to the fore. 
 
As mentioned above, the infection rate among health care workers during the SARS 
pandemic was abnormally high. This anomaly poses distinct difficulties for the 
normal operations of a state, as those whose role it is to treat casualties of the 
pandemic became victims and agents of the virus. The clusters of SARS that 
transpired around hospitals in Taiwan reinforce the assertion that health care 
workers played a role in the spread of the virus. 
 
The outbreaks in Taiwanese hospitals generated two of the more significant clusters 
in northern and southern Taiwan.86 Chen, Chien and Yang contend that ‗the 
proportion of hospital-acquired infection among SARS cases was around 10% prior 
to April 22, and 90% afterward.‘87 This high rate of infection challenges the 
established norm of hospitals being ‗perceived as safe havens, and as places that 
combat and contain disease‘.88 The pandemic places an extraordinary strain on 
health care systems. In response to an outbreak in the Taipei Municipal Hopin 
Hospital, in which a ‗number of health care workers, hospitalized patients and their 
relatives and visitors were infected‘ authorities opted to close the hospital and 
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transfer the patients.89  The outcome of the sudden closure of the hospital and 
relocation of patients resulted in the transmission of the pathogen throughout the 
region.90 Thereby further straining existing health care systems that are the 
responsibility of the state.  
 
The advantage of 21st century communications allowed authorities to actively 
discourage groups of people gathering during the outbreaks, thereby decreasing the 
likelihood of exposure. Here is where Taiwan utilised communication technologies 
to mitigate the spread of the disease, in direct contrast to the experience in China. 
Taiwan, with the benefit of lessons learned in China, had a positive approach to the 
mitigation of the virus and, as a result, strengthened state power in the face of the 
pandemic adversary. 
 
The propensity for SARS to infect large numbers of people contributed towards the 
coining of the term ―super-spreader events‖.  The efforts by Taiwan to mitigate 
super-spreader events incorporated isolation and quarantine measures. Maloney, 
Olowokure and Roth found that individuals who violated quarantine could be fined 
up to US$1,800 overall 131,132 persons were quarantined.91  While quarantine 
measures are difficult to enforce, particularly on such a large scale, the move by 
Taiwanese authorities illustrates concerns relating to mass exposure, which is 
highly likely in high-density populations. Such strategies also speak to the 
government understanding of the national morale and character.  There was an 
understanding that citizens would, at least initially, accept such draconian 
initiatives in the name of national defence.  Unfortunately, the success of the 
measures was short-lived. Eventually Taiwan would experience the third largest 
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outbreak of SARS, at an economic cost ‗estimated at US$820 million to US$1,300 
million‘.92  
 
The WHO contends that the SARS pandemic ‗revealed weaknesses in hospital 
infection control, disease surveillance, and public health infrastructure in 
Taiwan‘.93 The Taiwan experience with SARS highlights the susceptibility of state 
infrastructure to a pandemic threat. Simply put, without the installation of infection 
control mechanisms within hospitals, the potential for health infrastructure to 
become a conduit for the further spread of the pandemic actor is high. A weakness 
in the hospital system also further weakens the control and power of the state, as the 
government combats the non-traditional invading force; one that cannot be seen 
nor engaged by traditional military responses. The impact on state power occurs in 
a different pattern than imagined by Morgenthau, with a realignment of the 
elements of power to focus on the integrity of the state‘s health infrastructure, and 
the provision of health security to ensure the national power of the state is 
indemnified from non-traditional security threats.  
 
China‘s response to the SARS pandemic varied from province to province. However, 
as has been illustrated above, the response was consistent with the state 
responsibility of protecting the national interest. From the initial cover-up to the 
deployment of the People‘s Liberation Army (PLA), the response sought to mitigate 
the impact of the pandemic on the national power of the state, specifically the state‘s 
economic power, which arguably came at the expense of the population. Despite the 
non-traditional nature of the attacker, evidence of Morgenthau‘s elements remains 
constant. This means that Morgenthau‘s framework remains valid. In addition, the 
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utility of Morgenthau‘s elements of national power can also be applied when 
assessing the actions taken by authorities in the wake of the SARS pandemic. 
 
5.2.3 The Aftermath 
As China began to comprehend the need for greater international transparency, its 
foreign policies relating to SARS fundamentally shifted. The quality of diplomacy 
conveys the progression of diplomatic activity throughout the SARS pandemic, and 
provides a clear understanding of the power of this pandemic actor. The 
relationship between China and WHO, one largely fostered by the latter, offers the 
first indication of the importance of diplomacy in combating the impact of 
pandemics.  
 
The Chinese response to the SARS pandemic was initially to cover it up from the 
international community. Initially, Chinese authorities withheld information ‗for 
fear of causing social instability‘.94 Yet the cover-up was instrumental in the 
construction of fear pertaining to the risk of SARS, thereby challenging the morale 
of the citizens. Shen contends that the ‗closed-door SARS policy was at once 
implemented when Zhang Wenkang, the Minister of Health, guaranteed the WHO 
in March 2003 that SARS was ―well under control‖ and the number of infections 
was declining‘ when in reality SARS continued to spread, largely unabated by 
Chinese efforts.95  
 
Regardless of Chinese promises to increase transparency, the provision of 
information by the Ministry of Health to the organisation was not forthcoming. 
Expressing their displeasure with the situation, the WHO ‗in a highly unusual move 
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for the Organization…publically accused the Chinese government of 
underreporting SARS cases, and misleading the public‘ about the spread of SARS.96  
WHO‘s actions towards China were unprecedented on behalf of the international 
organisation.  While WHO had been able to facilitate cooperation from other states 
affected by SARS, China‘s unwillingness to cooperate threatened the ability of the 
organisation to maintain surveillance of the spread of the pandemic.97 China‘s 
stance would change on the removal of Zhang and Beijing Mayor, Meng 
Xuenong,for the implementation of the policy of non-cooperation.98  
 
Shen contends that the adjustment of China‘s policy should be seen as a message to 
the international community that, 
Beijing would no longer protest against its label as the origin of SARS. Instead 
China would try demonstrating to the world its responsibility in containing 
―its‖ epidemic, in the hope of strengthening the inevitability of Greater China‘s 
integration.99  
China‘s first acts to establish its credentials as a responsible partner in the war 
against SARS was to ‗increase the information it provided, improve its cooperation 
with the WHO and other countries, and heighten the seriousness of its SARS-control 
efforts‘.100 China‘s realisation of the need for a higher quality of diplomacy in order 
to successfully address the SARS pandemic reinforces the importance of this 
particular element of power.101 The interrelated nature of modern globalisation 
prevents a state, particularly one as economically significant as China, from 
operating in isolation. The ability to protect other elements of national power, 
through the effective use of diplomacy, provides states with the ability to maintain 
their respective national power.  
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The post-SARS assessment of Hong Kong also has much to offer here in 
understanding the fine balance authorities sought to maintain between resources 
and policy during the SARS outbreak, which also inflicted significant economic 
losses on Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government‘s response to the SARS pandemic 
failed to consider the national morale of the population. An April 2003 survey 
‗showed that 58 percent of the respondents were dissatisfied with the performance 
of Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa in handling SARS, while only 8.7 percent were 
satisfied‘.102 The government‘s response to the SARS pandemic was characterised as 
‗sluggish‘, with the government failing ‗to take drastic measures at the beginning to 
contain the virus, partly because it did not want to alarm the public‘.103 In essence, 
and as the hindsight surveys reveal, the response from the Hong Kong authorities 
did not incorporate the morale of the population into its actions. For example, the 
government ‗agreed to suspend schools only when many classrooms were half 
empty because parents had refused to let their children go to school‘.104 
 
The effect of SARS on health care workers provides reinforcement of Morgenthau‘s 
contention that ‗the national morale of any people will…break at a certain point‘.105 
As has been mentioned above, the response of senior medical officers in Hong Kong 
provided very little assurance to subordinates as to the ability of the state to confront 
the pandemic. The refusal of senior medical staff to attend to their duties at the 
hospital constituted a strong example of the morale reaching breaking point. 
 
Furthermore, central to Morgenthau‘s element of the quality of government is the 
ability to maintain a balance between the resources possessed and the policy 
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enacted.  The actions of the Hong Kong SAR during the pandemic clearly illustrate a 
governing authority that was unable to maintain this vital balance. Ma notes: 
The perceived slow response of the SAR government was largely due to the lack 
of a crisis mentality in preparing for SARS-like epidemics or similar territory-
wide crises. The reluctance to acknowledge the SARS crisis has to do with the 
basic bureaucratic ethos and technocratic rationality of SAR decision makers 
and political constraints on the SAR state. The lack of crisis mentality also led to 
institutional unpreparedness, and a perceived slow response to the crisis.106 
By failing to perceive the risk associated with the SARS pandemic, the Hong Kong 
SAR were unable to manage the balance between its resources and policy in order to 
mitigate the pandemic. Assessing the ability of a government to apply its resources 
during times of a pandemic exposes the susceptibility of the state to the wider effects 
of the pandemic, that is the effects beyond the human toll. 
 
The ability to utilise Morgenthau‘s elements not only to assess the impact of the 
pandemic, but to analyse the response of the provincial authorities, reinforces the 
centrality of Morgenthau‘s realism in state behaviour. However, the strength of 
Morgenthau‘s theory can only be gauged by assessing the impact and response of 
other states under the same threat. The SARS outbreak in Toronto, Canada, provides 
a parallel pandemic-threat experience, and one that reinforces the prominence of 
Morgenthau‘s assertions in respect to states and their national power. 
5.3 The Canadian Front 
The outbreak of the SARS pandemic within Canada was directly linked to the 
Metropole hotel outbreak in Hong Kong (see Figure 1 above).107 Before the 
pathogen burned itself out, the pandemic would infect 251 persons and cause the 
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death of 43 people, mostly in Toronto, Ontario.108 While the Canadian pandemic 
did not impact every element of Morgenthau‘s framework during the outbreak, the 
effect of the pandemic on the province, and the response of provincial authorities, 
supports the prominence of Morgenthau‘s realism in exploring the behaviour of the 
state.     
 
The foundation of industrial capacity is aimed at obtaining, or preserving, the 
maximum amount of power from the state‘s natural resources. The modern state 
has developed an ability to exploit its natural resources in divergent ways. The 
experience in Ontario during the SARS pandemic provides the impetus for the 
inclusion of two other facets of industrial capacity beyond the possession of an 
industrial complex designed to cultivate the natural resources of the state namely: 
tourism and health infrastructure. 
 
First, the tourism industry allows states to exploit their natural resources in a way 
that benefits the state‘s economy on an ongoing basis. Tourism has taken on an 
increasingly vital role in reinforcing the traditional cornerstone of a state‘s economy 
- its ability to exploit its resources. The impact of the pandemic on Toronto‘s tourism 
was closely in line with the impact witnessed in Hong Kong. During the SARS 
pandemic in Toronto, the pandemic bore a surprising impact on the tourism sector.  
 
Within Toronto this impact was considerable; the Canadian Broadcasting 
Commissions contend that some of the more significant impacts of the pandemic on 
the Toronto tourism economy included: 
 Cancellations at Greater Toronto Area hotels led to an estimated $39 million 
in lost revenues during the month of April 2003 alone; 
 Audiences at theatres dwindled; 
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 More than 800 bus tours were cancelled…with an estimated economic loss 
of $5 million to $6 million; 
 Fewer people were dining at restaurants; 
 Conventions were cancelled – the cancellation of one health-care convention 
probably cost the region about $6 million.109 
The most affected industries of the SARS outbreak were tourism, transportation and 
retail trade, which prompted The Conference Board of Canada to contend that the 
outbreak would ‗shave nearly $1 billion off…Toronto‘s real gross domestic 
product‘.110 The disproportionate impact on tourism encourages a new 
consideration of the industrial complex to incorporate the impact on the collective 
psyche of (non-traditional) threats.  What the SARS case shows is that the industrial 
complex is now comprised of different sectors of productivity than when it was 
conceptualised initially by Morgenthau.  Tourism, in modern economies, can be 
more influential on the strength of the state than was manufacturing at the time of 
the development of the realist state power framework. Such a finding does not 
diminish the importance of the Morgenthau framework; rather it encourages the 
elements to be re-framed into a modern context.  As the case studies have shown, 
where a state garners its strengths and power have shifted over the extended period 
of time covered from pre-Westphalian to contemporary and 21st century state 
constructs.  A further modern aspect of state power should also be examined in 
terms of the SARS outbreak: the rise of inter-governmental international 
organisations and their ability to amplify the impact of the pandemic actor on the 
tourism sector. 
 
In the process of monitoring the spread of the SARS pandemic, the WHO ‗without 
any express permission or authority to do so under international law or pursuant to 
policy action by the World Health Assembly‘ issued travel advisories informing 
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persons of the risks evident in travelling to infected countries.111 On 23rd April, 
2003, five weeks after the first reported case, WHO expanded its previous travel 
advisories pertaining to Hong Kong and Guangdong, to incorporate the city of 
Toronto.112  Canada‘s inclusion in the advisory prompted an immediate and furious 
response from all levels of Canadian officials.113 The officials demanded that the 
WHO immediately re-evaluate the SARS situation within Toronto, as opposed to the 
three-week period required for a re-examination to take place.114 In response to the 
pressure asserted by its member state, WHO lifted the travel advisory for Toronto 
merely one-week after issuing it.115 The organisation justified their lifting of the 
travel advisory on the grounds that ‗in Toronto, the magnitude of probable SARS 
cases has decreased‘ it had been twenty days ‗since the last cases of community 
transmission‘, and that ‗no new confirmed exportation of cases has occurred‘.116 
 
The reversal, however, was too late to save Toronto from the economic impact of the 
pandemic. Leo Paquin notes, ‗the known burden of the WHO travel advisory was a 
severe economic shortage for Toronto‘s tourist industry. Toronto lost an estimated 
CAD$1.13 billion due to the advisory‘.117 The protest of government officials to 
WHO, and the reversal of the advisory, embeds the consideration of the tourism 
sector within the national power framework. This sequence of events further 
substantiates the fundamental relevance of Morgenthau‘s element of industrial 
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capacity in the modern realist state where all actions must be designed to ensure a 
state‘s economic prosperity.  
 
The SARS pandemic also emphasises a shift in the state‘s industrial capacity to 
consider health infrastructure, given the whole-of-state responsibility for healthcare 
in the modern state. Morgenthau‘s promotion of the contribution and ‗know-how of 
the working man,‘ in ensuring the ‗industrial capacity of a nation,‘118 and the need 
to protect the ability of the ‗working man‘ makes the provision of health services a 
priority. Nearly half of the 251 infected with SARS in Toronto were health care 
workers. The impact on the health infrastructure within the city was substantial, 
considering the size of the outbreak in Toronto, with the financial impact on the 
health care system alone being $945 million.119  
 
Aside from the financial cost, the health infrastructure of Toronto, along with its 
ability to provide health care service to Torontonians, also suffered. For example, 
when the Ontario provincial health officials ordered the closure of the Scarborough 
Hospital‘s Grace Division, whose emergency department would typically treat 
40,000 people per annum, creating a gap in an already overburdened health care 
infrastructure. Carolyn Abraham contends that during the closure,  
Ambulances were diverted. Pregnant women were directed elsewhere. All 
appointments and procedures, including all cancer-related surgeries were 
cancelled-a catastrophic setback for a public health system already notorious 
for its dangerous delays and waiting lists.120 
 
Decisions made to mitigate the impact of the pandemic can, and in an integrated 
healthcare system, do have secondary and sometimes unintended consequences for 
the ability to protect the working population with the industrial capacity of the 
state. Furthermore, the impact on the Toronto health system brought with it 
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significant mental health issues for the health care workers, which, in turn, 
impeded the recovery of the state.121 The reluctance of staff to return to work where 
they had either become infected, or had seen colleagues become infected and in 
some instances die, led the SARS Commission to conclude that the pandemic ‗had 
Ontario‘s health system on the edge of a complete breakdown‘.122 The response of 
staff, particular senior medical staff at Scarborough Hospital, highlights the integral, 
and sometimes not so subtle, links between Morgenthau‘s elements and provides an 
indication to the relationship with the national morale of the Canadian population. 
 
In stark contrast to the response of senior medical staff in Hong Kong, senior 
medical staff in Canada adopted an aggressive and pro-active approach to 
combating the medical, industrial complex and morale issues. Carolyn Abraham 
tells of the lengths Dr Paul Caulford, Scarborough Hospital‘s chief of family 
medicine and community services, undertook to ensure adequate staffing of SARS 
assessment centres: 
In 48 hours Dr Caulford managed to recruit enough staff members to run a 
provincially ordered SARS assessment clinic that was hastily built in the 
General‘s parking lot on 2 June. The tented structure, outfitted with $500,000 
in medical equipment, popped up overnight. The wind blew through it, there 
was no running water, but nurses and doctors stood guard inside until 31 July 
2003, when, at long last, there were no more SARS cases to catch.123  
Morgenthau‘s element of national morale seeks to assess a population heading 
towards its breaking point. The action of Dr Caulford, particularly his ability to 
recruit fellow health care workers, confirms a resiliency within the segment of the 
population tasked with confronting the pandemic. The active role of health care 
workers within Toronto is commensurate with the actions embraced by Chinese 
authorities - once Chinese officials had come to terms with the state of the outbreak 
and the need to mitigate the spread of the disease.  
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The resiliency of such morale was further evident in efforts embraced by Canadian 
authorities to restart the Toronto economy. Here is a strong example of a 
government seeking to ensure a balance among its resources in order to protect its 
national power.  The Ontario and Toronto governments provided reinforcement of 
one of the central contentions of Morgenthau‘s element: the quality of government. 
Pauline Chan illustrates the extent to which the government was involved in the 
recovery of Toronto: 
Air travellers were greeted with small gift packages containing free items and 
coupons, some even being handed out by the Mayor himself…Video campaigns 
were beamed via satellite to the international community. The federal 
government promised 100 million dollars for the city‘s SARS recovery efforts, 
along with 118 million dollars pledged by the provincial government. 
Politicians including Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, made a point of dining at 
Chinese restaurants while posing for news cameras…124 
All of these actions tell of an appreciation by the Canadian government of the 
importance of rebalancing the elements of its national power and how vital such 
public relations and morale building activities were to the recovery of the Toronto 
economy. Indeed, the actions taken by Canadian officials, both provincial and 
federal, were clearly in line with the realist notion of protecting the national interest 
and mitigating threats towards national power. 
 
The Canadian front highlights the centrality of Morgenthau‘s classical realism to a 
modern democratic state in responding to threats to the national power. The 
response of various Canadian authorities at all levels of government establishes the 
notion of national power being defined by Morgenthau‘s elements, not only at the 
state level, but also the provincial (regional) and local (city) level as well.  While 
Canada, along with China, constituted the primary fronts for the SARS pandemic, 
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the response of other actors to the pandemic further reinforces the multi-faceted 
applicability of Morgenthau‘s classical framework.  
5.4 The Global Response 
Any assessment of the SARS pandemic would not be complete without a brief 
account of the effect of the SARS pandemic on actors outside of China and Canada. 
The purpose behind such a diverse assessment is to provide an indication of the 
versatility of Morgenthau‘s realism when dealing with a non-state actor.    
Vietnam 
While Vietnam‘s SARS experience was limited to 63 cases, its aggressive actions 
during the pandemic led to the state being the first country to interrupt the 
transmission cycle of the virus.125 Vietnam‘s success was largely derived from the 
government making difficult decisions in a timely manner, as opposed to adopting a 
wait and see approach, which characterised the Chinese response. In essence, the 
Vietnamese authorities recognised the potential ramifications of the SARS pandemic 
and enacted policy designed to mitigate the impact. The decisions included:  
 The establishment of a SARS Task Force within the Ministry of Health;  
 A national intersectoral steering committee for SARS Control;  
 The allocation of a special budget to the Ministry of Health;  
 The designation of hospitals for suspected SARS cases; 
 Establishing quarantine areas and isolation rooms at border crossings, 
airports and seaports; 
 Notification of provincial governments and the creation of provincial 
steering committees; and 
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 Public information campaigns to help prevent panic in the population.126 
WHO representative in Vietnam, Mr. Pascale Brudon, argued that in order for 
Vietnam to successfully confront the SARS pandemic, ‗immediate political 
commitment and leadership at the highest level were vital‘.127 The provision of this 
commitment and leadership by the Vietnamese government, combined with 
assistance by WHO, allowed the government to successfully maintain a balance 
between the resources it possessed and the policy the state was pursuing. Such 
action is in line with Morgenthau‘s element of the quality of government, and 
illustrates a realist government counterbalancing to an external threat in a way that 
seeks to maintain the national power of the state.  
Singapore 
The Singaporean government adopted a multi-faceted approach to mitigating the 
effect of SARS. According to Stella R. Quah, the ‗main features of the state‘s crisis 
management approach…were: (a) transparency; (b) public education; (c) multi-
pronged approach; (d) legislation.‘128  In Singapore, the SARS pandemic highlighted 
the ability of the government to foster the national morale of the population as an 
effective, combative weapon. Indeed, the success of Singapore‘s actions resulted in 
an April, 2003 poll showing that ‗three out of four Singaporeans were confident the 
government could stop SARS.‘129 This support was in stark contrast to public 
support offered to leaders in China, Canada, Hong Kong and Taiwan, where 
governments were criticised ‗for failing to grasp the seriousness of the situation, to 
act quickly to contain the spread, and to accept responsibility for missteps‘.130 
 
                                                 
126 Brudon, P. and Cheng, M. (2004), op. cit. p.99.  
127 Ibid. 
128 Quah, S.R. (2007) ‗Public Image and Governance of Epidemics: Comparing HIV/AIDS and SARS‘, 
Health Policy, 80, p.264. 
129 National Intelligence Council (2003), op. cit. p.15. 
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The central motivation behind Singapore‘s policy was to harness the national morale 
of Singaporeans in order to counter the pandemic. Quah notes: 
The SARS situation in Singapore was characterized throughout by transparency 
on the part of the health authorities in their reporting and distribution of a 
continuous flow of information to the public on new infections and deaths, 
locations, and contact-tracing efforts and approaches. It was believed that an 
informed public can collaborate better and participate more effectively in 
containing the spread of the disease than a public kept ignorant of the 
seriousness of the situation.131 
The openness of the Singaporean government contributed towards the fostering a 
national morale conducive to appropriately dealing with the SARS pandemic. This 
method of open transparency was also extended to the international domain, 
‗Singapore‘s success in controlling the outbreak during May was evident when 
WHO removed Singapore, on 31st May, from the list of areas with recent local 
transmission of SARS. Singapore was initially scheduled to be removed from the list 
of SARS-affected areas on 11th May but, on that date, Singapore reported a new case 
of SARS to WHO, an indication of Singapore‘s commitment to open reporting and 
cooperation with WHO.132 The ability of the Singaporean government to adopt a 
more transparent and cooperative approach to the SARS pandemic mitigated the 
overall impact of the pandemic.133 
 
The United States of America 
Morgenthau notes that the military and their preparedness is an important element 
of securing state power. This includes cooperation with non-military institutions as 
required.  The most striking example of a state‘s military being capable of 
cooperating with civilian institutions on technical issues with the SARS pandemic 
was the role of the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious 
                                                 
131 Quah (2007), op. cit. p.264.  
132 Ibid. 
133 The pandemic in Singapore did infect 161 individuals, taking the lives of thirty-three of them. 
Such figures may indicate a failure in Singaporean authorities to protect their population from the 
pandemic. However, the response by Singaporean authorities once the pandemic was established 
highlights the potential success a state can have when it seeks to maintain a balance among its 
resources, specifically the maintenance of the national morale of the population. 
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Disease (USAMRIID). While USAMRIID‘s mission specifies its role in protecting the 
war fighter,134 their inclusion into the fight against the SARS pandemic was 
validated on the grounds that US personnel may operate ‗in an area where the SARS 
virus was in fact transmitting‘, which might ultimately result in ‗a significant 
military problem‘ for America.135 USAMRIID‘s efforts were vigorous, even though 
no US military personnel had been infected with the virus. These efforts were aimed 
at testing possible treatment(s) for SARS.136 In essence, the mere potential infection 
of US military personnel demanded USAMRIID take pre-emptive action in order to 
preserve the state‘s power derived from the military.  The involvement of USAMRIID 
serves to indicate the perceived seriousness that the threat of the SARS pandemic 
posed to the USA government. USAMRIID sought to protect the state of the USA 
against the threat of the SARS pandemic, as a traditional military would against a 
traditional enemy. USAMRIID thereby becomes a clear example of a military 
undertaking action against a threat to the power of the state. By the time of the 
pandemics end, the USA remained hopeful that a cure could be found.137 
 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
The impact of SARS transcends the borders of the countries actually infected to have 
a global impact regarding the access to natural resources, which as Morgenthau 
points out, effects state power accumulation.  Here, access to natural resources 
throws up an interesting example. In short, the effect of SARS on the tourism 
industry resulted in a downturn in the global demand for oil.138 The reduction in 
                                                 
134 USAMRIID (2010) About USAMRIID [online], available: 
http://www.usamriid.army.mil/aboutpage.cfm [accessed 28 March 2011]. 
135 Sample, D. (2003) ‗Top Military Research Lab Part of Worldwide Search for SARS Cure‘, 
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flights, and other tourist related activities, throughout Asia prompted OPEC to hold 
an emergency meeting where leaders concluded that ‗SARS had worsened a global 
economic slowdown‘, and prompted member states to then decrease oil output.139 
The national interest of the OPEC states was thereby threatened, and the states acted 
in the realist fashion to secure their wealth generation and power. The move by the 
OPEC organisation serves to highlight the realist consequences of pandemics in the 
21st century beyond the borders of the countries experiencing the pandemic.  
The World Health Organization 
The emergence of the SARS virus tested the diplomatic environment of the 21st 
century. With the increased presence of international organisations, particularly 
those with a mandate in the field of global health, the SARS pandemic would serve 
to assess the ability of states to preserve their national power while negotiating a 
significantly different political landscape. The increased attention paid to the actions 
of governments has made it difficult for governments to circumvent their 
responsibilities on matters of public health. The example set by China clearly 
indicates the advantages of utilising international health diplomacy to enhance the 
national power of the state. Furthermore, the SARS pandemic provided WHO with 
an opportunity to display its potential as an international actor. The ability of WHO 
to influence the actions of states provides the strongest indication of the progression 
of the international system towards what Fidler refers to as the ‗Post-Westphalian 
system‘.140 
 
The role of WHO during the SARS pandemic expanded from one of a coordinator 
for member states, to a significant actor in the international community. WHO‘s 
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[accessed 27 March 2011]. 
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strength as an actor was best exemplified through its issuing of travel warnings. As 
David P. Fidler notes,  
In issuing alerts and advisories, WHO exercised significant power in the 
absence of any agreed policy or legal framework and without deference to the 
sovereignty of affected states. These actions revealed WHO as an autonomous 
actor influencing events directly rather than just acting as a convenient device 
for coordinating the sovereign behaviour of its member states. Without any 
express policy or legal basis for its actions, WHO took steps with serious 
political and economic consequences for states affected by SARS…WHO 
actions signal the emergence of a radically transformed governance context for 
infectious disease control.141 
The elevation of WHO‘s role during the SARS pandemic forced those states effected 
by its actions to take diplomatic action in order to mitigate the impact of the newly 
powerful organisation. The issuing of a travel advisory against Toronto is a powerful 
example of WHO‘s newfound place in the international community. The advisory 
was issued ‗without consulting the Canadian government‘ provoking a stern 
diplomatic objection from Canadian authorities.142 WHO‘s actions were, according 
to Fidler, a display of real power ‗as a general matter, international organizations do 
not exercise independent power because their member states tightly constrain what 
the organization can and cannot do.‘143 The success of WHO‘s role in the SARS 
pandemic is reinforced by the World Health Assembly‘s formal approval of WHO 
issuing advisories for future pandemics.144 
 
The Global Media 
The global media has the ability to frame the perception of the risk associated with a 
pandemic, and manages to do so over two phases. Smith contends that the media‘s 
reporting of SARS mimicked that of other infectious disease outbreaks in that it first 
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characterised ‗the outbreak as a frightening threat,‘145 and would then eventually 
contend that the threat ‗is happening in a geographically and/or culturally distant 
population‘.146 Such reporting makes a negative contribution to the national 
character of a population as it seeks to apportion blame for the outbreak taking 
place. 
 
The effect of the SARS pandemic on the national character of effected populations 
was surprising ‗while SARS posed some medical risk, it exerted a disproportionately 
large psychological impact on people in relation to its relatively low morbidity and 
mortality.‘147 As the first pandemic of the 21st century, the SARS virus clarified the 
hazards involved with the abundance of mass media. Smith contends the 
psychological impact on the population is derived from two factors regarding the 
information about SARS: 
First, the almost costless and rapid transmission of information through 
modern media and communication technologies, not only maintained attention 
on the development and spread of disease but also meant that conflicting and 
confusing information was disseminated in ‗real time‘. Second, the lack of 
sufficient medical information on SARS meant that, although there was a rapid 
flow of information often this was not robust scientific information. Rather, 
much of the information presented during the outbreak was based on opinion, 
guesswork and preliminary results.148 
The role of the media in framing the national character of a population has become 
increasingly important in the modern world.  
 
The isolation of the disease to a specific culture, or demographic of society can have 
serious consequences for the longevity of the pandemic. For example, the longevity 
of the AIDS pandemic is a result from the misinformation relating to the genesis and 
behaviour of HIV. This was replicated, to a somewhat lesser extent, during the SARS 
pandemic, for example attitudes displayed to the Scarborough Grace Hospital in 
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Toronto, which was erroneously viewed ‗with suspicion, and outright accusation‘ of 
complacency in the spread of the virus.149 Similarly, in other areas of Toronto ‗on 
hearing in the media of a putative relationship between the infection and the 
Chinese community, many stopped going to Chinese restaurants‘.150 Fortunately, the 
misinformation campaign surrounding the cultural aspects of the SARS pandemic 
had minimal effect. This is more likely a result of the length of the pandemic, as 
opposed to the weakening of the media‘s influence over the national character. 
 
In providing an account of the global response to the SARS pandemic, Morgenthau‘s 
framework provides an insight into the complexities of contemporary society. The 
former case studies were historical, and government responses were a reflection of 
the state system of the time, and the lack of a robust IGO sector. The timing of SARS 
brought with it a more complex inter-relationship of Morgenthau‘s elements of 
national power. The ability to utilise the framework to investigate the influencing 
factors of national character, for example, constitutes a strong example of the 
versatility of Morgenthau‘s classical realism.  
5.5 Conclusion 
By using Morgenthau‘s elements of national power to assess the effect of the SARS 
pandemic on various states, the intricacies of the 21st century international system 
are revealed. The evolution of technology has seen the element of geography take on 
two new and diverse interpretations. The notion of hard geography, incorporating 
the physical aspects of the geographic element, remains as important as it was in 
Morgenthau‘s original assessment. However, the introduction of soft geography has 
exposed the vulnerability of this fundamental element and made it difficult for states 
to protect their sovereign territory. The proliferation of communication technology 
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has made the ability for states to exert authority over information more difficult. 
The ease with which modern technology is capable of disseminating information 
has complicated the state‘s ability to control the flow of information. In essence, the 
state‘s duty to secure its hard borders has expanded to incorporate the securing of 
its digital, or soft borders, in order to prevent assaults on its national power. 
 
Morgenthau‘s element of industrial capacity provides the foundation for moving the 
assessment of national power towards the maintenance of a vibrant and diversified 
economy. The inclusion of the travel and tourism industry into the element of 
industrial capacity serves to highlight the increased interdependence on the 
population of other states for national power. The contribution made by the travel 
and tourism industry is both direct and indirect. Directly, the travel and tourism 
industry makes a significant contribution towards the state economy strengthening 
the national power of the state. Indirectly, the industry serves to enhance the image 
of the state thus adding to the diplomatic capacity of the state.  
 
Morgenthau‘s elements also revealed the increased prominence of other actors 
within the international system. The role of WHO during the SARS pandemic saw 
the organisation‘s evolution from a simple international organisation seeking to 
assist member states on matters of public health, to an international actor that 
wielded considerable power throughout the crisis, and enshrined its political 
weight. Remarkably, the evolution of WHO went seemingly unchallenged, even 
though the ramifications of WHO actions were at a considerable cost to some state‘s 
economies. Morgenthau‘s framework proved its relevance in the 21st century here, 
by highlighting that the realist response of states to non-traditional security threats 
echoes the states‘ response to traditional threats. That is, states will seek to maintain 
their national power. Furthermore, the framework reveals that when states fail to 
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protect their elements of national power from the impact of a pandemic, the effect 
of the pandemic is magnified to be far greater than it otherwise would be. 
 
Overall, the SARS pandemic revealed that Morgenthau‘s elements of national power 
make a valuable contribution towards the assessment of both power and national 
interest. While the elements have evolved since their first incarnation, the 
framework of assessment, which Morgenthau had hoped would ‗impose intellectual 
discipline on the observer‘ and ‗make a theoretical understanding of politics 
possible‘, still remains.151 Furthermore, the diversity of Morgenthau‘s framework 
allows for the observer to comprehend the implications for both state and non-state 
actors involved in conflict. 
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Chapter Six: The Pandemic Threat 
6.0 Introduction 
Morgenthau‘s classical realism provides the scaffold for the assessment of a diversity 
of traditional threats toward any state‘s national power.  Orthodox assessments of 
state behaviour have confirmed the insight Morgenthau provided in the theory of 
realism, and the ability of the theory to adequately understand the complex 
interplay of state attributes1 and power in response to a threat. In most cases the 
assessment was reserved to assess the behaviour of one state toward the other. This 
thesis has used the realist framework provided by Morgenthau, to assess a non-
traditional state threat. Pandemics are a non-traditional state threat to the very 
power of any state when these epidemiological events occur.  This being the case, 
this thesis has accepted the responsibility to evaluate the strength of Morgenthau‘s 
work in regard to pandemics as an actor and threat to the state. 
 
The thesis asserts that pandemics constitute a realist actor. The pandemic‘s sole 
interest is survival and domination, and it does so unencumbered by the typical 
constraints applied to states through the foundation of global norms. While 
established norms deter states from attacking other state‘s borders, pandemics do 
not attack borders in any traditional sense. Rather a pandemic will utilise its medical 
victims to facilitate its challenge to the state‘s power; the same state power that seeks 
to protect its citizens against the invading threat.  Should a state fail in its strength 
against the pandemic actor, the ultimate outcome would remain the dominance of 
society by the confronting actor, and the collapse of the existing state. The role of 
                                                 
1 The attributes of the state are the elements of national power that the state possesses. While states 
would usually seek to maximise their national power, under threat, the state‘s priority must be the 
preservation of national power. By understanding how one element is able to compensate for a 
decline in another element, the state is better positioned to protect its national power. For example, 
the possession of a military that is prepared to supplant the domestic infrastructure of the state, be it 
industrial or even medical, is able to compensate the state‘s national power if there is an assault on 
the state‘s industrial capacity. 
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the realist state is to either preserve or enhance the power it possesses in order to 
guarantee the survival of the state. Any actor that prevents the state from achieving 
that role is a threat to the national power of the state. In other words, Realism‘s 
theoretical grounding exists within the notion of power and the prominence of the 
state in international relations. 
 
When tasked with countering a threat to the state, the governing authorities tend to 
respond in one of two ways. First, they may seek to deter, or prevent, a threat by 
acting unaided. The state that does so assesses its own power as being sufficient to 
counter the prevailing attack. Therefore, the state takes action in line with 
traditional realism; that is, action designed to reinforce the integrity of the state‘s 
national security. Alternatively, the state may marshal cross-border resources. The 
nature of pandemics, more often than not, requires increased collaboration among 
states in order to ensure a reduction in the spread of the contagion. Such 
collaborations have increased in popularity during the 20th and early 21st centuries, 
with the establishment of international health organisations such as the WHO.  
Indeed, modern pandemic events witnessed intergovernmental organisations, such 
as WHO, explicitly and somewhat forcefully, encouraging cooperation and 
collaboration in order to counter pandemics. However, state compliance with 
externally enforced policies to counter pandemic outbreaks has been low, as this 
thesis has shown. The likelihood of states adhering to externally enforced policy is 
also low; especially wherever compliance will result in additional and enhanced 
threats to national power and security. Realist responses to pandemics are centred 
on the preservation of national power. However, in order to preserve the national 
power from the effects of a pandemic, a stronger understanding of the pandemic 
actor is required. 
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Pandemics are a unique actor given their inability to discriminate. This unique 
aspect of the pandemic actor provides the foundation of a formidable opponent for 
the state. Overwhelmingly, a pandemic is more likely to erupt when individuals 
become exposed to an unknown pathogen. Despite the actions of modern scientists, 
a number of known microbes and pathogens still pose a significant threat to the 
human population. 
 
The threat of a pandemic event, therefore, is an attack equal in threat value as any 
traditional form of assault. Only the method of assault varies. While a state may 
prepare itself to counter an attack by fellow states, preparations to counter 
infectious disease pose difficulties rarely encountered previously. For instance, the 
diversity of infectious diseases that evolve into pandemics prevents states from 
adopting a pre-determined medical response to the new pathogen. In the early 
stages of a pandemic, the state‘s role is typically reduced to the adoption of 
unambiguous protocols designed to reduce the spread of the disease.  The primary 
role of the state is to protect its national power from the effects of the pandemic, 
which constitutes far more than merely placating a susceptible population. 
Meanwhile, the science and medical world pursue ways to restore the health and 
well-being of the population in support of the continuance of the state; much akin 
to the traditional role of the military in times of national threat. 
 
The multifaceted effect of a pandemic on a state‘s national power transcends the 
quantitative toll a pandemic takes from the state‘s population. The focus by states on 
the preservation of the human population can impede the traditional role of the 
state, that is, protecting its national power. In preparing to counter a pandemic, the 
state must look to preserving the national power of the state in a fashion that 
reduces the impact of the pandemic on the various elements of national power, that 
has been described by Morgenthau. This preservation establishes a dilemma for state 
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authorities as they determine the actions required to counter the pandemic threat. 
Finally, all actions by the state are typically determined so as to strengthen its 
infrastructure to counter the recurring nature of the pandemic threat. 
 
This thesis serves to validate the assertion that Morgenthau‘s classical realism is a 
relevant theory in the 21st century.  The thesis has proposed that the utility of this 
theory has been overlooked in the modern era by restricting its application to state 
actors.  
6.1 Actors in the Modern Era 
Central to the theory of realism is the prominence of the state as the central actor in 
the international system. The basis of this centrality stems from the pre-eminent role 
the state plays in protecting its national power from other states, and asserting its 
own power in the international system. However, the modern era has seen a 
proliferation of non-state actors that impede the ability of the state to protect its 
national power. Essentially, the state is no longer solely threatened by other states as 
political actors. The evolution of non-state actors has led to an international society 
where an actor; such as, a multi-national corporation, a terrorist organisation, and, 
as this thesis has established, a pandemic, can increasingly threaten the national 
power of the state. Assessing the relationship between the two actors, being the 
traditional state actor, and the non-traditional pandemic actor, illuminates the scale 
of this threat. 
 
Gauging the power of one state actor over another is relatively straightforward. 
Baldwin‘s dimensions of power being scope, domain, weight and cost, possess a 
flexibility that allow for the analysis of the relationship between the non-state actor, 
and the state. The flexibility of Baldwin‘s dimensions establishes the power of the 
non-state actor over the state in a way that clearly indicates not just the effect of the 
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non-state actor but also the cost of the non-state actor. In essence, the broadness of 
Baldwin‘s dimensions allow some liberty in analysing international actors, moving 
beyond a focus on the state actor, to incorporate non-state actors as well.  
 
An investigation into the threat posed by various non-state actors on national power 
can only be justified if there is a high level of certainty regarding the non-state actor 
to be the causative agent. Such certainty is possible through the use of the 
framework of relational power created by Baldwin. Within this thesis, Baldwin‘s 
dimensions of relational power have provided the avenue to establish the specific 
pandemics of plague, AIDS and SARS, as actors in the international arena, a 
summary of which is provided in Table 6.1: Pandemic Actor Summary, below. The 
dimensions clearly establish the attributes inherent in an actor, demanding a level of 
analysis that not only charts the scope or effect of the actor but the domain, weight, 
and cost of the actor as well. 
 
Baldwin‘s four dimensions provide a clear indication of the power of the pandemic 
actor. The value of the case studies in this thesis has been their three distinct periods 
of time, assessing three different pathogens, thereby reinforcing the applicability of 
the dimensions. 
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Table 6.1: Pandemic Actor Summary 
 Pandemic 
Dimension Plague AIDS SARS 
Scope 
 
Establishes how the pandemic affected the 
state i.e. the power the pandemic had over 
the state. 
An indiscriminate assault on humanity; 
Segregation of infected and uninfected; 
psychological impact of plague still 
exists in the modern era. 
Lost productivity; loss of skilled labour; 
reduced business investment; extra 
strain on over burdened health care 
infrastructure; loss of professional, 
political, and military institutional 
knowledge; impacts into the future of 
heavily affected states through social 
erosion. 
Significant impact on the global 
economy. Institution of strict quarantine 
measures, in some regions. Decrease in 
travel and tourism. 
Domain 
 
Indicates the spread of the pandemic, in 
large part based on WHO regions. 
Over the three pandemics: Justinian, 
The Black Death, and the Third 
Pandemic, plague has established a truly 
global domain. Currently, plague is only 
absent from the European (WHO) 
region, as well as Australia. 
The HIV/AIDS pandemic is global with 
not one region of the WHO, or 
(UNAIDS), remaining unaffected. The 
prevalence rate of HIV varies from as 
low as 0.1% in the Western Pacific (East 
Asia), to as high as 5.0% in the African 
Region (Sub-Saharan Africa). The global 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS pandemic is 
o.8%. 
SARS touched every region of the world. 
However, only 28 countries are 
indicated to have experienced SARS 
infections. 
Weight 
 
Indicated by Mortality or Pandemic Severity 
(PSI) 
Based on estimated mortality rates: 
 Justinian Plague - 50-60% of 
the population 
 The Black Death - 25-70% 
mortality in various areas 
 The Third Pandemic – PSI 
between 48.2% (African 
Region) and 88.9% (Western 
Pacific) 
The PSI of the AIDS pandemic varies, 
and provides a strong indication of the 
access HIV positive individuals have to 
treatment. The lowest PSI exists in 
Western and Central Europe (1%) and 
the highest in South and South-East Asia 
(6.3%). The severity of the AIDS 
pandemic is in contrast to its prevalence 
where Sub-Saharan Africa is the highest 
(5%) and the lowest, is East Asia (0.1%). 
The global PSI was 9.5%, with a range 
as high as 100% in the African region 
(based on the one infection and death in 
South Africa) to 0% in the Eastern 
Mediterranean (Based on the one 
infection in Kuwait. 
Cost 
 
Financial cost to the state actor. 
Latest outbreak in India (1994) 
estimated to have cost $2 billion in sales 
and losses on the Bombay stock market. 
 
The international community 
contributed US$15.9 billion towards the 
global response in 2009. The cost to 
individual states with high prevalence is 
estimated to be 52% of domestic 
expenditure. 
Estimated to have cost the global 
economy about $30 billion in 
production alone. Individual states were 
affected as well, particularly Toronto 
(Canada) and Hong Kong (China) as 
tourism took a dramatic downturn. 
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6.1.1 Scope 
The initial impact of a pandemic is the ability of a pathogen to rapidly escalate the 
population of sick and dying in a state. When seeking to assess the level of behavioural 
change affected by the pandemic actor, a large proportion of the change is a result of 
the psychological aspects. All the case studies presented showed the changes at the 
domestic, state, and international level. Considered altogether, the scope highlighted the 
comprehensive volatility of any pandemic, especially given its ability to transcend 
traditional borders. With the three cases examined, the dimension of scope is 
remarkably similar. 
 
At the domestic level, regardless of the period being examined, the fear of contagion 
immediately created overt discrimination directed towards those thought responsible for 
the pandemic. The discrimination was mostly fuelled by a fear of the unknown 
pathogen, and was unfounded. During the Black Death, the discrimination was directed 
towards the Jews; in the AIDS pandemic homosexuals were targeted, and the Chinese 
population was cast as the protagonist in the SARS pandemic. Misdirected 
discrimination perpetuates a cycle that serves to intensify the scope of the threat - 
meaning, individuals are likely to withhold medical information if they consider the 
personal cost of divulging that information as detrimental. Similar actions are replicated 
at the state level, where the state withholds information from other members of the 
international community in order to assure its national interest. 
 
Scope also considers the pandemic‘s impact on the state infrastructure. While such an 
issue was minimal during the pre-Westphalian Black Death, the strain is apparent in 
any assessment of the AIDS and SARS pandemics. Pandemics force states to take action 
designed at mitigating the pandemic threat. For example; such can be the impost on 
states that they are forced to seek assistance from the international community. This in 
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itself indicates a significant behavioural shift caused by pandemics as state‘s sacrifice 
their sovereignty in order to protect their national interest. 
 
The maturity of the international community is apparent within the SARS case study.1  
Without the banding together of the international community during these outbreaks, 
the AIDS and SARS pathogens would have elicited far more fatalities. To be effective, 
however, the work of the international community could prevail in an unfocussed 
fashion. Organisational behaviour needed to change. The increased role of WHO during 
the SARS pandemic is a strong indicator of changes in the traditional state-centric realm 
of international politics. Moreover, the sovereignty of the state needed to take a back 
seat to the health and well being of the domestic and wider international community. 
The insistent action by WHO in issuing travel advisories, which at that time the 
organisation had no authority to do, validates the changing role of the organisation in 
the face of the pandemic threat.  
 
In sum, the dimension of scope facilitates an initial exploration of the effect of the actor. 
In the case of pandemics the change brought about by the pandemic actor is seen at 
three levels:  the domestic, the state, and the international level.  A response by the state 
at each level validates the notion of pandemics as a political actor.  As significant as the 
scope of the pandemic threat is in informing us about the changing profile of political 
actors and political threats, it is Baldwin‘s dimension of domain that indicates the scale 
of political behavioural changes wrought by the actor.  
6.1.2 Domain 
The dimension of domain provides the avenue for comprehending the size and 
implications of the now-established political actor. By design, this thesis has embraced a 
regional approach of analysis to establish the domain, thereby confirming the global 
                                                 
1 Arguably, efforts to combat the AIDS pandemic in the 21st century provide a further indication as to the 
maturity of the international community. 
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phenomenon of pandemics. In relation to domain, the disparity for WHO regions 
between developed and developing countries indicated the ability of the state, if not the 
region, to respond to the threat posed by pandemics. For example, the difference in 
prevalence of HIV/AIDS between Western Europe and Eastern Europe, as outlined in 
Chapter Four, clearly indicates the ability for Western Europe to mitigate the pandemic, 
as opposed to Eastern Europe. The dimension of domain substantiates the actor as being 
responsible for the scope of (inter- and intra-state) behaviour change. 
 
The WHO definition of a pandemic is designed to explore the spread of the infectious 
agent, as opposed to its lethality, and is utilised to assist the regionalised approach of 
this thesis in reviewing each pandemic. In essence, WHO has adopted a definition for 
pandemics that solely evaluates the domain of the infectious disease outbreak. The WHO 
domain approach coincides with the necessary geographic political assessment. The 
alignment facilitates a compartmentalised medical and political evaluation of the effect 
of the actor, potentially narrowing the scope of the threat. A regional level of focus also 
provides the ability for other regions to compare and enhance their political and 
medical responses to mitigate the effect of the actor within their respective region. 
However, the increasingly globalised nature of modern society has made mitigation 
efforts substantially more difficult, and broadened the scope of the pandemic impact. 
 
The dissemination of information within modern society has effectively reduced the 
traditional interpretation of global domain. This means that if an epidemic erupts within 
one region of the world, the impact of that epidemic can transcend regional boundaries 
to affect other regions, relatively simply becoming a pandemic. For example; as outlined 
in Chapter Three, the response of the international community to the outbreak of plague 
in Surat, India in 1994 in suspending trade with India, even though only one region in 
the country was afflicted by plague. Such an impact is derived from a lack of general 
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knowledge regarding the uncertainty of the pandemic threat, as well as how a disease 
outbreak becomes classified, by the international community, as a pandemic.  
 
The one short coming to WHO‘s adoption of the region-based definition for pandemics 
is that it can result in unfair discrimination against states within the region that remain 
infection-free. For example, during the SARS pandemic within the Americas region, 
only two of the thirty-five countries within the region were exposed to the virus. The 
whole of the Americas, however, were swept into the regional assessment. The problem 
with a regionally-based definition was further reinforced during the low-mortality 
Swine Flu pandemic of 2009.2 Confusion surrounds the general population‘s 
understanding of a pandemic. While WHO has adopted a definition based solely on the 
spread of contagion, the global population still associated pandemic with the high 
mortality associated with past pandemics. 
 
The dimension of domain, then, facilitates an appreciation of the field of influence the 
actor has embraced. Domain also provides a quantitative opportunity to comprehend 
how widespread the scope of the actor is. In order to remove any doubt of the role the 
actor has played in generating the behavioural change of another actor, Baldwin‘s third 
dimension of weight explores the probability of responsibility.   
 
6.1.3 Weight 
This thesis utilised the PSI developed by the CDC as a way of determining the weight of 
the pandemic actor. The primary indicator of the PSI was mortality, as opposed to 
infection. Weight seeks to provide an assurance of the probability that the actor is 
responsible for the scope of behavioural change. In doing so the dimension reinforces 
the strength of the actor‘s relational power and builds on the preceding dimension of 
                                                 
2 See Section 1.3.2 Power and Pandemic: Domain 
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domain. In short, the dimension seeks to validate the actor‘s role as the cause of the 
behavioural change.  
 
The use of a mortality ratio really only provides an initial indication of the possible 
weight of the pandemic actor. A stronger indication of the weight of the pandemic actor 
combines both the prevalence, and the PSI of the pandemic. Weight can be supported by 
both an indication of the prevalence of infection, as well as the mortality of the disease.  
 
The PSI for the AIDS pandemic adopted in this thesis illustrated the advantages of not 
just looking towards the prevalence of HIV infection, but the mortality rate of those who 
die from AIDS related illness. Based on prevalence alone, the Sub-Saharan Africa region 
bears the greatest burden of HIV infection; yet, when looking to mortality alone, a 
regional shift of burden takes place to the South and South East Asia region. Moreover, 
those within regions with greater access to medication saw a lower severity index than 
those without access. The PSI contained within the AIDS case study illustrates a 
pandemic where the disparity in access to treatment is increasing mortality, confirming 
the utility of the PSI, in combination with prevalence, as opposed to only prevalence. 
Given the long-term nature of the AIDS pandemic, the utilisation of constant PS‘s 
provides the ability to monitor the change in the weight of the pandemic across various 
regions. Evolutionary information provided by a series of PSI reports focuses the 
political and medical attention on the scope of required changes in state behaviour. 
 
The dimension of weight seeks to confirm the role of the actor in generating the scope of 
behavioural change. The importance of such confirmation is vital in qualifying the 
power of the actor being analysed, prior to assessing the threat the actor poses. The use 
of the PSI in this thesis establishes the close connection between the power of 
pandemics, and the mortality rate of the contagion. Furthermore, the use of the PSI in 
this thesis was validated through the case-studies of contemporary pandemics; in 
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particular, where the connection between the power of the pandemic and the mortality 
of the contagion contributed to the weight of the pandemic actor. 
6.1.4 Cost 
The dimension of cost seeks to assess the financial ramifications of the confrontation 
between the actors. In the case of pandemics, the outcome is unique in that the financial 
cost to the pandemic actor is zero in comparison to the financial costs incurred by its 
human opponent. That is not to say that the pandemic suffers no cost at all, increased 
exposure to pathogens does allow the human body to build up its own immune defences 
to decrease the effect of the virus. Additionally, technology is likely to evolve in the form 
of vaccines and medication designed to further reduce the pandemic‘s impact. However, 
such efforts to combat pandemics come at considerable cost to the responding actor. 
When looking to assess the cost of the pandemic actor to the state, three main 
components of assessment should be considered: the cost of treatment during the 
pandemic, the cost of pandemic recovery, and the opportunity cost resulting from the 
pandemic. 
 
The initial costs of a pandemic are unpredictable and substantial. As the pandemic 
expands and more people become victims, the increased strain on state infrastructure, 
particularly existing health infrastructure, exacts a toll on the treasuries of the state. The 
increase in expense is twofold - the cost to treat patients, and the forfeited state income 
via income taxes and other human contributions to the wealth of the state.  
 
Increasingly, the interconnected nature of globalisation has increased the financial 
burden of pandemics. This was clearly seen in the cost analysis of the SARS pandemic in 
Chapter Five. In order to recover the initial cost of the pandemic, states were, post-
pandemic, forced to purposely stimulate their economies to restart national growth. 
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Unlike any traditional threat actor in a conflict between states, in a pandemic, there is 
no financial cost to the protagonist – in this case, the SARS pandemic actor.  
 
As the state is forced to confront the pandemic actor, the state is forced to divert its 
resources away from strengthening its national power. For example, if the industrial 
capacity of the state is diminished as a result of illness and fatalities in the workforce, 
the state‘s economy suffers. Additionally, if the state is forced to utilise its military to fill 
the void left within the ranks of police or medical personnel, the military preparedness 
of the state may become vulnerable to other threats. The opportunity cost derived from a 
state‘s conflict with the non-traditional state actor is unique in comparison to the 
mutual opportunity cost, when the conflict is between two state actors.  In short, 
Baldwin‘s dimension of cost seeks to reveal the fiscal nature of the relationship between 
two actors. For this thesis, the dimension clearly illustrates the dominant advantage of 
the pandemic actor. 
 
Considered together, Baldwin‘s four dimensions facilitate an examination of pandemics 
to establish their legitimacy as actors in international relations, and their ability to wield 
considerable influence over the state‘s ability to maintain its national power. However, 
in isolation, Baldwin‘s dimensions are insufficient to authoritatively establish the impact 
of pandemics on a state‘s national power.  
6.2 The Utility of Morgenthau‘s Classical Realism 
Morgenthau‘s classical realism utilises an elements of national power framework to 
allow the analyst to evaluate the existing and potential national power of the state. 
Likewise the framework can be simultaneously applied to any actor that poses a threat 
to, or detracts from, the state. This thesis has proposed that by adopting Morgenthau‘s 
realism, it becomes possible to explore the power relationship between non-state actors 
and the state. The thesis then assumes the responsibility to show how the traditional 
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elements, as proposed by Morgenthau, remain valid in a confrontation between state 
and non-state actors i.e. between states and pandemic. Ultimately, this thesis has 
provided an adaptation, or update, devised to assess the relationship between the non-
state pandemic actor and the state, and which allows for modern advancements that 
affect both the state and power relationships.  
6.2.1 Geography 
Morgenthau‘s element of geography, and its pre-eminent stability, reinforces the 
validity of geography as the first element of national power. Yet, as the pandemic case 
studies within this thesis have illustrated, modernity has served to reduce the stability 
and expose vulnerabilities within the contemporary interpretation of the geographic 
element. As the cases have shown, the innovations of humankind to facilitate trade have, 
at the same time, facilitated the ease with which infectious disease can proliferate. Such 
an outcome highlights the susceptibility of modern trading systems to non-state actors, 
and the potential diminishing of national power. Advances in technology have further 
contributed to an understanding of soft geography.  Soft geography has elevated the 
importance of considering this element when seeking to protect or promote the national 
power of the state. The element of geography has expanded beyond the location and 
terrain of the state.  Specifically, the element of geography incorporates the ability of the 
state to protect the integrity of its geographic borders, and maintain control of the 
territory within those borders. 
 
Geographic landscape has the ability to help or hinder the state‘s ability to counter a 
non-state actor. Geographic isolation from disease epicentres may provide some short-
term benefits; however, once the disease becomes endemic within the geography of the 
state any benefits are quickly eroded. This was clearly illustrated within the AIDS 
pandemic case, where isolation from city-centres complicates access to medical 
infrastructure, preventing the state from protecting its national power.   Modern 
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application of the geography element remains as relevant as its application was for 
Morgenthau: a state is still required to combat the threat with a constant physical 
geography however, the state must take into account the internal geography of the state 
as well as its territorial integrity. 
 
The notion of soft geography assists an understanding of specific outcomes observed; for 
example, during the SARS pandemic. The use of technology to rapidly access 
information from across borders encourages a rethinking of the geographic element of 
national power in light of technological advancements. The control of information has 
become a vital component of national power:  if a state is unable to execute the control 
of information both within its borders, and across its borders, the stability of this 
element is exposed to outside influence.  
 
Morgenthau‘s first element establishes the foundation for a broader assessment of 
threats to national security by incorporating elements beyond the territorial integrity of 
the state. Whilst the strength of Morgenthau‘s element of geography remains consistent, 
an understanding of its functionality in light of technology and soft-geography notions 
has become one of the findings of this thesis. Through all three case studies, 
technological advances continually eroded the power derived from the geographic 
element. Indeed, the role of mobile telecommunications in transmitting information 
across borders during the SARS pandemic substantiates the need for states to consider 
soft geography as a dimension of this specific element of national power. A state‘s 
responsibility to preserve its national power not only includes the reinforcing of its 
geographical borders, but also the utilisation of its natural resources to further enhance 
its national power as well.  
The Pandemic Threat 
270 
6.2.2 Natural Resources 
The possession of natural resources ensures the building blocks for a state‘s economy. 
The primary implication of the pandemics assessed within this thesis indicates that 
while the possession of natural resources benefit the state, the inability of  the state to 
capitalise on those resources takes away from the element‘s contribution to national 
power. Morgenthau‘s sub-elements of food and raw materials reinforce this finding. 
6.2.2.1 Food 
Access to adequate food can provide a basic contribution health and well-being for a 
population. A well-fed and healthy population makes a positive contribution to the 
national power of the state. Conversely, food insecurity creates a burden for the state 
and risks national stability. The impact of pandemics on agricultural production serves 
as a good example of the fragility of food insecurity on national power.  Certainly with 
the ongoing AIDS pandemic, the inability to maintain healthy food supplies contributes 
to the inability of the state to ensure security for its citizens against the medical 
implications of the disease. During the time of SARS, the Chinese experienced a high 
demand for specific food products rumoured to protect the individual from the disease. 
Simply put, the need for food security during any pandemic (or even an epidemic), 
places an even greater importance on the element of natural resources, and the 
contribution this element makes toward national power. 
 
The effect of pandemics on crop cultivation was clearly illustrated within the AIDS 
pandemic. The notion of cash crops ceased to exist, as some individuals afflicted by the 
pandemic were only able to cultivate crops at a subsistence level. As Chapter Four 
showed, in Africa the GDP decreased by 15% in 2000 resulting from the morbidity and 
mortality as a consequence of the AIDS pandemic. Indeed, the economic consequences 
of a downturn in production illustrate a ―trickle-up‖ effect, where the individual‘s 
inability to provide the most basic of resources begins to erode the net national power of 
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the state to provide for its citizens. Similar outcomes are accorded to the second sub-
element of raw materials. 
6.2.2.2 Raw Materials 
Raw materials contribute to a state‘s self-sufficiency, and its ability to participate in the 
global economy. However, possessing raw materials can only serve to benefit the state if 
it is capable of exploiting them. Wherever a state utilises raw materials for economic 
gain, as opposed to domestic use, a drop in supply will have further negative 
consequences for the state‘s accumulation of national power.  Indeed, as the SARS 
pandemic reinforced, the interconnected nature of the modern world ensures that even 
a pandemic that is relatively minor in mortality can affect the supply of raw materials, 
such as oil. 
 
In sum, Morgenthau‘s element of natural resources allows an appreciation of the impact 
on the economic potential of the state when threats occur. Pandemics, as a non-state 
actor, elicited impacts commensurate with impacts expected with traditional security 
threats. Natural resources, particularly food and raw materials, remain vital to the 
survival of the modern state, and its economy. However, these elements alone do not 
convey the full impact of a threat to state power. Industrial capacity seeks to build on a 
state‘s possession of natural resources and their potential contribution to the national 
power of the state. 
6.2.3 Industrial Capacity 
The element of industrial capacity seeks to assess the ability of the state to capitalise on 
its natural resources, and utilise them in a way that provides the maximum benefit for 
the national power of the state. The industrial capacity of a state is determined by 
human capacity and industrial infrastructure. For a state to maximise the potential 
power of industrial capacity it must protect this element from protagonists, such as 
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hostile non-state actors. Within this thesis, the evidence available regarding the impact 
of both the AIDS and SARS pandemics on the industrial capacity provided exceptional 
examples of how the state‘s fortunes were reversed. The impact on human resources 
during a pandemic reduces the labour force available to the state, which provides the 
state with vital revenue. Simply put, in order for an industrial capacity to thrive, the 
state must have a viable workforce. 
 
The pandemic actor threatens the industrial infrastructure by assaulting one of its most 
precious commodities, the human worker. Typically national workers man the 
industrial capacity of a state. However, whenever there is a shortfall of domestic 
employees, states look toward the populations of other states to fill the void, as Chapter 
Four has shown, occurred with the AIDS pandemic. Such actions increase the 
probability of further exposing individuals to the pandemic. One solution has been 
multinational corporations providing health care to their employees to ensure optimum 
productive capacity of their infrastructure investment. In this way, the corporations are 
supplanting the traditional role of the state. This too is a modern evolution that now has 
currency within Morgenthau‘s element of industrial capacity. Industrial infrastructure 
is largely the domain of private industrialists, and they too will act in a realist manner to 
protect and maximise the return on their investment in the face of a threat. 
 
As a general rule, states seek to assure their population remains productive with the 
provision of health care. However, the risk of exposing health care workers to infection 
has, in modern times, become a primary concern for the state. Both the AIDS and SARS 
pandemics took a notable, and immediate, toll on health care workers. The medical 
fraternity was not well established during the plague. The AIDS pandemic has witnessed 
a protracted and constant loss of health care workers to the disease, which has lead to a 
significant decrease in institutional knowledge. But the medical sector is not unique.  
Importantly, knowledge loss was also experienced in other sectors, such as education 
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and government - all of which make a significant contribution to the state‘s industrial 
capacity. The combined impact is an inability of a state to sustain development.  SARS in 
Toronto also witnessed echoes of the loss-of-knowledge phenomenon, but the impact 
was mitigated as a result of Canada‘s developed state status. The case studies in this 
thesis have investigated the impact of pandemics on both developing and developed 
states.  Each case has reinforced a finding that developing states are far more vulnerable 
when confronted with the pandemic threat. Developing states have fragile industrial 
capacities and are often supplanted by international multinationals. As Chapter Four 
(The AIDS Pandemic) showed, in these instances, even the multinational response to the 
pandemic threat is an identical method as originally outlined by Morgenthau about the 
behaviour of the realist state. 
 
Morgenthau‘s element of industrial capacity has always incorporated the ability of the 
state to facilitate an industrial infrastructure that will capitalise on existing natural 
resources, thereby ensuring the population may utilise that infrastructure. 
Morgenthau‘s essence has remained constant throughout this assessment.  The ability of 
a state‘s industrial capacity to impact on state power remains constant. Modernity has 
facilitated, however, an adaptation within the element and allowed a significantly 
broader interpretation of the state‘s industrial capacity, and its contribution to national 
power. If the industrial capacity of the state is derived from both its natural resources, 
and its workers, then the protection of both during pandemics is vital. The modern 
industrial capacity has, therefore, expanded to incorporate the health infrastructure of 
the state, which is designed to protect the industrial worker; and the tourism sector, 
which arguably is aimed at the exploitation of the natural resources of the state. By 
adopting this broader interpretation, the analyst is capable of not only assessing the 
national power of the state, but also the state‘s ability to protect its industrial capacity 
from non-state actors. Traditionally, this role has been relegated towards the military of 
the state. 
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6.2.4 Military Preparedness 
The contribution of a state‘s military to its national power is straightforward: the 
military serves to protect. Therefore, its preparedness to protect the state‘s national 
power against hostile actors becomes an area of valid enquiry in the face of a pandemic 
protagonist. Morgenthau has traditionally delved into this investigation with the sub-
elements of technology, leadership, and the quality and quantity of armed forces.  This 
thesis has again returned to these elements to test their applicability in the modern state, 
with the non-traditional threat of the pandemic to test the impact. 
6.2.4.1 Technology 
In order to successfully counter the abilities of other actors, a state‘s military must 
possess technical capabilities superior to that of its opponents. In regard to the 
pandemic actor, the cases examined within this thesis illustrate the ability of state 
military units to investigate the actor - as was the case with the SARS pandemic - as well 
as treat the victims of the pandemic. The ability of military technology to complement 
that of civilian technology offers the state the opportunity to utilise the military to 
support, if not replace, the domestic elements of the state that have been affected by the 
non-state actor. The belated Chinese response to the SARS pandemic, as outlined in 
Chapter Five, provides a strong example of the benefits a military can have on the 
domestic front during a pandemic. However, in order for such an act to be successful 
the military, as well as the state, requires tenacious leadership to provide for such a 
need. 
6.2.4.2 Leadership 
Leadership is vital to the successful use of the military in times of a pandemic. However, 
as the case study on the AIDS pandemic in Chapter Four has illustrated, the institutional 
knowledge of the military is just as susceptible to a pandemic as are the domestic 
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elements of the state. The loss of military leadership to the AIDS pandemic poses 
significant national security issues. As the case studies have highlighted, this was 
certainly the case for a number of states in the hardest-hit regions. The loss of military 
leadership due to the AIDS pandemic has seen an erosion of knowledge within African 
military institutions, as generals and technical officers were also afflicted by the 
pandemic. Without a strong leadership base, the quality of the armed forces is likely to 
suffer. Once again, the AIDS pandemic validates the need for strong leadership, 
specifically in the recognition of the pandemic. The failure for military leadership to 
acknowledge the ramifications of pandemics for their forces exposes troops to the 
impact of the pandemic, further burdening the national power of the state. 
6.2.4.3 Quality and Quantity of Armed Forces 
Intertwined with leadership is the importance of maintaining a troop contingent of high 
quality and quantity. To do so makes a significant contribution to the national power of 
the state. It is here where the impact of the pandemic actor is most severe regarding the 
state‘s military preparedness. The pandemic actor affects troop quality in a number of 
ways. First, the armed forces are equally, if not more, susceptible to infection as 
civilians; this directly affects the quality and quantity of troops. Second, the morale of 
the troops is diminished through the loss of their comrades to the disease, along with the 
loss of loved ones outside of the military. In the long term, the infection and subsequent 
erosion of the recruitment base for military personnel poses significant quality problems 
for the state and military leadership as they attempt to maintain an effective military. 
 
Morgenthau‘s element of military preparedness has always been considered relatively 
straightforward. The ability of the analyst to conceptualise the power of the nation in 
terms of quantity of military, and quality of its leadership and technology, provides an 
insight into the state‘s ability to counter threats to its national power. Any threat that 
diminishes the quantity and quality of the military directly impact state defences. 
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Pandemics affect both, and thereby impact the ability of the state to maintain power 
during periods of crisis.  Extending Morgenthau‘s element to incorporate the impact on 
the recruitment base for the military, reveals that at the heart of this element is the 
notion of an ongoing and viable population. It is here where the interaction between 
Morgenthau‘s elements becomes evident, and remains pertinent in the modern threat 
scenario. Pandemics attack the human population in the first instance. 
6.2.5 Population 
The element of population presents the opportunity to assess the quantitative human 
element and its contribution toward the national power of the state. In order to make 
such an assessment, the element encompasses population distribution and trends. Both 
sub-elements provide the analyst with the ability to quantify the impact of the non-state 
actor on the population of the state. Throughout the case studies of this thesis, the 
element of population has provided the ultimate framework for gauging the 
quantitative impact of the pandemic actor; that is, the mortality of the pandemic on a 
state‘s population, in both the short- and long-term. All the cases support a conclusion 
that the impact of a pandemic on a state‘s population transcends the total amount of 
persons killed, to incorporate other demographic factors that contribute to the national 
power of the state. 
6.2.5.1 Distribution 
A population‘s distribution provides the state with the capacity required to guarantee its 
national power. In order to present a strong appreciation for the importance of 
population distribution, the cases within this thesis expanded on the sub-element to 
incorporate the more specific demographic notions of population size, age, geographical 
distribution; as well as the level and distribution of human capital. By incorporating 
these attributes into the assessment of the population‘s distribution, the impact of the 
pandemic on the population‘s distribution thereby enhances the utility of this sub-
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element. Such an assessment provides an indication of the potential contribution of 
population in the wake of a pandemic, or other non-traditional threats. Without a 
population of maximum potential usefulness, the national power of the state begins to 
wane. 
6.2.5.2 Trends 
Trends assess the long-term capabilities of the state‘s population. Therefore, the impact 
of a non-state actor on the trends of the population provides a useful tool of assessment 
to understand the threat posed to not just the population of the state, but the threat to 
the national power of the state. As evidenced within the three cases, the impact of 
pandemics on population trends is significant in that they decrease the population 
growth rate. A strong growth rate is vital to the state in order to fulfil the human 
component of the other elements of national power; such as industrial capacity, and 
military preparedness. 
 
In order for a state to overcome the effect of the pandemic on its population it must look 
towards its more qualitative aspects of national power; such as national morale, and 
national character. As Morgenthau‘s framework moves towards the more qualitative 
elements of national power, the scope of assessment moves beyond statistics to offer a 
larger picture of the impact of the pandemic.  
6.2.6 National Character  
A population‘s national character is formulated by the population‘s intellect and 
character. While such notions are difficult to measure, they make a valuable 
contribution to the national power of the state. This thesis contends that those 
individuals who possess a higher level of authority within the community largely 
influence a population‘s intellect and character. There are four main types of authority 
that influence a state‘s national character: political, religious, intellectual, and 
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professional. The cases presented within this thesis seek to illustrate the influence of all 
four levels of authority in framing the national character during the period of 
confrontation, and which determines the ability of the state to effectively counter the 
pandemic actor.  
 
The political authority of the state provides the population with a reassurance as to the 
stability of the state. If the political authority is perceived as weak or unable to provide 
such assurances, the population is likely to be disrespectful to its directives. 
Disrespecting directives can result in significant medical and political difficulties for the 
state countering a pandemic.  Both the AIDS and SARS case studies provide examples of 
the power of political authority.  The role of President Mbeki of South Africa in leading 
the HIV/AIDS denialist movement prevented the treatment of thousands of South 
Africans. More broadly, the international political community at the commencement of 
the AIDS pandemic contributed towards the considerable length of the disease, by 
focusing on the social factors of transmission, as opposed to the science. But perhaps it 
is the response of Chinese authorities during the SARS pandemic that best highlights the 
pivotal role of political authority. The reluctance of the Chinese government to come to 
terms with the outbreak of SARS directly contributed towards the spread of the 
contagion, and forced the population to rely on other avenues of authority for 
information regarding the medical risk to themselves, and the counter-measures being 
sought by government.  As the case study showed, Chinese citizens bypassed 
government information in preference for rumours conveyed to them electronically. 
 
The influence of religion in framing the national character of society became a clear 
element for consideration in this thesis, in regard to the impact of pandemics in political 
authority. Religious leaders have the ability to exert considerable influence over their 
congregations. As Chapter Three presented, religious movements during the Black 
Death saw a concerted effort to eradicate any Jewish population, based on the belief that 
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they alone were responsible for the spread of plague. Again in the AIDS pandemic, the 
actions of religious leaders in the proliferation of myths; such as gaining immunity to 
AIDS through marriage, and that female beauty is protection against AIDS, significantly 
impaired efforts by other authorities to combat the pandemic. Such human endeavours 
highlight the importance of intellectual and professional authority during threats to the 
state 
 
In general terms, intellectual and professional authority have an ability to frame the 
national character; most often with the support of either political or religious 
authorities. In the contemporary state, a new actor has emerged: the multinational 
corporation.  As the case-studies have shown, multinational corporations have 
established such depth and breadth in communities that they also see the need for 
measures to ensure the health and well-being of their employees. In doing, so the 
corporations, seeking to protect their workers, have developed an unexpected level of 
authority. For example; mining companies within Africa provide health care to workers 
and their families, to ensure the ongoing contribution of that worker to the profit of the 
company. Such actions make a contribution to the formulation of the national 
character, and further reinforce the state‘s national power.  
 
Morgenthau argued that the national character of a state was difficult to measure.3 This 
thesis agrees with that general statement.  However, as a result of the case studies 
presented, the thesis would also now assert that it is possible to divine the origins of 
national character. The thesis suggests that the utility of the national character is being 
able to assess those who are influencing the behaviour of the population. The influence 
and impact of authority has become multifaceted in contemporary society, especially in 
response to the non-state actor.  As Morgenthau suggested, national character does not 
                                                 
3 Morgenthau, H.J. (2006), op. cit. p. 140. 
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operate alone. The level of support offered by the population, particularly towards the 
political authority of the state, also relies on the national morale of the state. 
6.2.7 National Morale 
National morale seeks to understand the level of support the population maintains for 
the policies enacted by the state, and the likelihood of the states‘ response being 
effective. In a similar fashion to national character, the element of national morale is 
difficult to predict. When faced with countering the pandemic threat, the state has two 
options readily available to it: the traditional quarantinist approach, or the wait-and-see 
approach. These opposing approaches to countering pandemics have similarly opposing 
effects on the national morale of the population. In the short-term, quarantine policies 
are usually condemned and considered a violation of human rights. Over the long term, 
these policies have incidentally proven to be the most effective when combating 
infectious disease outbreaks. Cuba‘s response to the AIDS pandemic, outlined in Chapter 
Four, reinforces this notion. 
 
The wait-and-see approach, adopted by a number of states in response to the AIDS 
pandemic, enshrines the human rights of the infected minority, while exposing the 
majority to potential infection. As the AIDS pandemic case study has illustrated, this 
approach also made a significant contribution to the longevity of the pandemic. A 
revisionist history of the case may also offer some answers as to why the pandemic is 
still ongoing. More recently, the ability to foster the support of the population for the 
policies enacted has come down to one simple element: transparency. 
 
The more transparent the governments have been in response to public health concerns, 
the more effective has been the response by the population. The SARS pandemic 
provides the clearest example of the impact of transparency. Prior to public 
acknowledgement of the SARS outbreak, the Chinese government lacked authority on 
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the pandemic.  However, once the Chinese authorities admitted the seriousness of the 
epidemic, the national morale of the Chinese population increased, and the country was 
able to effectively combat the outbreak. Transparency brought legitimacy and power to 
the Chinese state. Similarly, within Singapore, the initial and primary key to success in 
combating the SARS outbreak was transparency. By conveying to the population the 
risks to themselves, and justifying the need for specific measures, the Singaporean 
government was able to heighten the national morale, and mitigate the impact of the 
pandemic. In essence, through transparency, particularly in matters of public health, 
the support of the population can be maintained, thereby strengthening mitigation 
efforts. 
 
The utility of this element of national power is derived from the need to comprehend the 
response of the population. In essence, if a state is going to enforce quarantine 
measures, the effectiveness of these measures is reliant on the population‘s willingness 
to comply. If a state is able to execute policy with the support of the population, the 
likelihood of success for the state is substantially stronger. Indeed, harnessing the 
national morale of the population is also replicated on a larger scale through the 
diplomatic efforts of the government. 
6.2.8 Quality of Diplomacy 
The quality of state diplomacy raises the discussion of power, and the impact of 
Morgenthau‘s elements from the domestic location to the international arena. Quality of 
diplomacy assesses the ability of the state to leverage its national power for potential 
gain in the international arena. If a state maintains a high quality of diplomacy, its 
ability to mitigate the effects of a non-state actor is much higher; as opposed to that of 
the state that opts to not engage with other actors. Essentially, the multifaceted threats of 
the modern era demand a multifaceted approach to diplomacy. When confronting a 
threat, such as pandemics, the state is now required to engage with a number of other 
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non-state actors diplomatically in an effort to assure its national power; for example, 
IGO‘s, NGO‘s and MNC‘s. Threats to the state posed by non-state actors, such as 
pandemics, demand a collaborative response in order to diminish the impact of the 
actor.  
 
The reliance of states on IGO‘s as one means of diplomatic activity has seen the elevation 
of these organisations in the modern era. As the case of the SARS pandemic has 
illustrated, the increased prominence of WHO during the outbreak of SARS, which has 
been consolidated in the aftermath, is testament to the power position attained by WHO 
specifically, and indicative of the general rise in power potential of all IGOs. The WHO, 
during the SARS pandemic, was a significant actor with considerable power. For 
example, the issuance of WHO travel advisories correlated to a significant (negative) 
impact on the economies of their recipients; for example, Hong Kong and Toronto, 
which is outlined in Chapter Five. These recipients were forced to go on a diplomatic 
offensive in order to have the advisories rescinded. The impact on a state‘s national 
power, should it not maintain a high quality of diplomacy, may be mitigated by the 
increased presence of IGO‘s and NGO‘s. However, diplomatic engagement with these 
organisations requires just as much tact as traditional diplomatic engagement. 
Therefore, the ability to execute a high quality of diplomacy constitutes one small 
responsibility for the government of the state. 
 
Especially during the period of a pandemic, a number of states become reliant on the 
assistance of NGO‘s in matters of health diplomacy. The strongest example of this relates 
to the AIDS pandemic and the role of the Clinton Global Initiative (CGI) in negotiating 
medication pricing with pharmaceutical companies. However, it should be noted that 
this particular diplomatic cooperation eventuated in 2005, twenty years after the onset 
of the pandemic. The traditional role of the state, ensuring the health, or potential 
usefulness, of its population, has been adopted by the CGI as it undertakes negotiations, 
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which can ultimately maximise the national power of the state. In essence, the role of 
the CGI reduces a burden on the state which is heavily weighed down with responding 
to other aspects of a pandemic.  The IGO, therefore, holds the potential to elevate the 
power of the state by adopting a diplomatic role that the state may not be in a position to 
fulfil.  In terms of impact, the IGO assists the state to maximise their impact on the 
threat at hand, and bolster national power simultaneously. Morgenthau‘s final element 
of national power is as fitting as it is summative, as it is seeks to assess the quality of the 
government in managing the precarious balance between all elements of their national 
power. 
 
6.2.9 Quality of Government 
Morgenthau‘s final element, the quality of government, seeks to assess the state‘s ability 
to manage all the resources in its possession in order to protect and/or promote the 
state‘s national power. In other words, the ability of government to balance all the 
quantitative and qualitative elements in regard to the resources it possesses, and the 
policy it is attempting to pursue. Whenever there is a challenge to a state, be it from a 
fellow state or non-state actor, the role adopted by government becomes vital in 
ensuring the national power of the state. The adoption of passive and/or assertive 
policies during a pandemic outbreak has tested the ability of a government to balance 
resources with policy, and its ability to maintain support. 
 
Balance between Resources and Policy 
A state with a high quality of government will seek to enact policies that are in line with 
the resources in its possession. While such a statement seems generic and simplistic for 
a state of stable power relations, this is not always sustainable at times of confrontation.  
When confronting a national crisis, the temptation to adopt policies that the state is 
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unable to enforce is high. Indeed, if the government refuses to accept the nature of the 
threat and fails to execute any policy to mitigate the pandemic, such as the Hong Kong 
SAR during the SARS pandemic, the ability to manage the balance disappears 
completely. Understanding and balancing national resources is the role of the state, and 
the ultimate outcome will arise from the government‘s ability to do so.  Resources are 
more than the natural resources found within the borders of state. Indeed, the ability of 
the government to comprehend a deficiency within the resources of the state, and seek 
international assistance to overcome those deficiencies is vital for a state to effectively 
combat a pandemic.  However, international assistance may not be required if the 
government is able to rebalance its own resources, for example, reassigning its military 
assets to supplement civilian resources. 
Balance among Resources 
The maintenance of a balance among resources by a government allows the state to 
respond more effectively to any threat towards the national power of the state. In order 
to adequately respond though, the government must comprehend the nature of the 
threat. Such comprehension poses difficulties for governments, particularly when 
confronting a pandemic, as each pandemic possesses unique attributes. An effective 
government must seek to maintain a balance among its resources of national power, as 
the threat to national power continues to unfold. For example, if a pandemic reduces 
the capacity of a state‘s industrial complex, a government of high quality will maintain 
a balance by utilising other resources to fill the void (for example, the military). The 
maintaining of a balance among resources demands a government that is capable of 
perceiving threats to the national power, and executing policy specifically designed to 
counter and repair any damage from that threat. A strong example of the importance of 
maintaining this balance can be seen in the role of health care workers within the AIDS 
and SARS pandemics. The ability of some governments to reinforce and complement 
civilian workers with military ones was an action designed to balance the resources. 
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Even when a government possesses the resources to enact policies, and the ability to 
maintain a balance among those resources, its capability may be reduced if it fails to 
accommodate the popular support of the population. 
Popular Support 
A government that is able to mobilise a population by appealing to that national 
character, and the national morale of the state, maintains significant popular support. 
While the maintenance of popular support bears significant importance within 
democratic countries, even authoritarian states require some level of popular support in 
order to mitigate threats to the state.  The notion of popular support builds on the 
element of national morale; however, it also plays an important role in ensuring the 
survival of some governments; particularly democratic ones. A government that 
maintains the support of its constituency is able to foster this support in order to 
enhance the national power of the state as a whole. As the SARS pandemic clearly 
illustrated, the popular support garnered by the Canadian and Singaporean 
governments, and eventually the Chinese government, was instrumental in overcoming 
the effects of the pandemic. Such an outcome serves to reinforce the quality of a 
government. That ultimately all the major infected states called on the quality of 
government element to quell the impact of the infection shows the importance of this 
Morgenthau element. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
By reframing the realist framework in order to provide an assessment of pandemics, this 
thesis has established not just the pandemic threat, but reaffirmed the centrality of 
realism as being at the heart of international relations theory. While other theoretical 
perspectives may provide an avenue of understanding of how relationships between 
states evolve, or even an explanation of global events, the focus of realism on self-
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interest provides the foundation to study threats to that interest. Specifically, Hans 
Morgenthau‘s conception of the power of the state being defined by the elements that 
make up that power, has proven its utility to assess the implications of non-state actors 
on the power of the state. Furthermore, by using Morgenthau‘s concept to assess 
pandemics, which continue to be a significant threat to the states, the thesis has 
reinforced the relevance of Morgenthau‘s work in the 21st century. 
 
Morgenthau‘s nine elements of national power were originally conceived to provide a 
framework in order to assess the power of nations relative to one another. This thesis 
has shown the relevance of Morgenthau‘s elements when assessing the threat posed by 
any actor towards the state‘s national power. Furthermore, the thesis has expanded on 
Morgenthau‘s original elements to allow for a modern interpretation of the elements 
that constitute the power of the modern state. In doing so, the thesis has confirmed the 
longevity of Morgenthau‘s classical realism as a pertinent theory of 21st century 
international relations. 
 
By assessing the pandemic actor, this thesis has found that, in the modern context, there 
are further implications from ancillary, non-traditional, non-state actors for a state‘s 
national power. Non-state actors, such as IGO‘s, NGO‘s and MNC‘s, are embracing a far 
more influential role in the 21st century than ever before. The ability for this role to 
erode or enhance the traditional aspects of national power was a surprising finding in 
this thesis. The emergence and incorporation of their importance in the case studies, 
however, verifies the adaptability of Morgenthau‘s original framework. 
 
Hans Morgenthau‘s framework not only makes it possible to assess the national power 
possessed by states, but it also provides an indicator of various elements of national 
power that a state must protect from threats. Traditionally, such an assessment would be 
limited to states, and the ramifications of state versus state conflict.  However, the 
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adaptability of Morgenthau‘s framework has also allowed the evaluation of the threat 
posed to the nation state by non-state entities, such as pandemics. The use of 
Morgenthau‘s framework in assessing the pandemic threat has advanced the 
implications of a pandemic for the state beyond a mere public health concern to reveal 
the multitude of implications for a state‘s national power. Such an outcome confirms the 
usefulness of Morgenthau‘s classical realism in 21st century international relations. 
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Appendix One: WHO Member States by Region 
African European 
Eastern 
Mediterranean 
The Americas South-East Asia Western Pacific 
Algeria 
Angola 
Benin 
Botswana 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Comoros 
Congo 
Côte d‘Ivoire 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
Gabon 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Kenya 
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Mali 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Rwanda 
Sao Tome and Principe 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
Swaziland 
Togo 
Uganda 
United Republic of Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
Albania 
Andorra 
Armenia 
Austria 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Georgia 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Monaco 
Montenegro 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Republic of Moldova 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
San Marino 
Serbia 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Tajikistan 
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
Uzbekistan 
Afghanistan 
Bahrain 
Djibouti 
Egypt 
Iran 
Iraq 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Morocco 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Somalia 
Sudan 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tunisia 
United Arab Emirates 
Yemen 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Cuba 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Jamaica 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and 
Grenadines 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United States of America 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Democratic People‘s Republic of 
Korea 
India 
Indonesia 
Maldives 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Australia 
Brunei Darussalam 
Cambodia 
China 
Cook Islands 
Fiji 
Japan 
Kiribati 
Lao People‘s Democratic 
Republic 
Malaysia 
Micronesia 
Mongolia 
Nauru 
New Zealand 
Niue 
Palau 
Papua New Guinea 
Philippines 
Republic of Korea 
Samoa 
Singapore 
Solomon Islands 
Tonga 
Tuvalu 
Vanuatu 
Viet Nam 
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African 
Eastern 
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Asia 
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Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
South and 
South-East Asia 
East Asia Oceania 
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South America 
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America 
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and Central Asia 
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Congo 
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Congo 
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Lesotho 
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Malawi 
Mali 
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Mozambique 
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Nigeria 
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Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
South Africa 
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Togo 
Uganda 
United Republic of 
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Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
Algeria 
Bahrain 
Cyprus 
Egypt 
Iraq 
Israel 
Jordan 
Kuwait 
Lebanon 
Libyan Arab 
Jamahiriya 
Morocco 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
Sudan 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
United Arab Emirates 
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Afghanistan 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
Cambodia 
India 
Indonesia 
Iran 
Lao People‘s 
Democratic 
Republic 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Myanmar 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Philippines 
Singapore 
Sri Lanka 
Thailand 
Timor-Leste 
Viet Nam 
 
China 
Democratic 
People‘s Republic 
of Korea 
Japan 
Mongolia 
Republic of Korea 
 
Australia 
Fiji 
New 
Zealand 
Papua New 
Guinea 
 
Argentina 
Belize 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Guyana 
Honduras 
Mexico 
Nicaragua 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Suriname 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
 
 
Bahamas 
Barbados 
Cuba 
Dominican 
Republic 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
 
Canada 
United States 
of America 
 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Estonia 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyzstan 
Latvia Lithuania 
Republic of 
Moldova 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
Ukraine 
Uzbekistan 
 
Albania 
Austria 
Belgium 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Serbia and Montenegro 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
The former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia 
United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern 
Ireland 
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